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India will go to polls this month to elect a government for the next five-years. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is seeking a third consecutive victory under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a bigger and broader mandate this time. In a politically charged atmosphere, blame games among and between political parties are common. 

In a surprise entry, Prime Minister Modi raised the issue of Katchatheevu island, a past territorial dispute between India and Sri Lanka resolved in 1974 by the two governments through an understanding. For an Indian electorate, the border dispute with Pakistan and China has made more sense in raising a nationalistic mood in the past. Still, Katchatheevu is a political masterstroke by the BJP targeting the electorate in the state of Tamil Nadu who continue to feel the ire of the 1974 agreement. 

In a recent tweet, Prime Minister Modi took a dig at the opposition party, Indian National Congress (INC), accusing it of weakening India’s unity and interests by giving away Katchatheevu island to Sri Lanka in 1974. Whether ceding Katchatheevu was a shortsighted move by the then firebrand Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, under whose leadership India had defeated Pakistan in 1971, the BJP leaves no stone unturned in framing it as one aimed at political gains. 

The fishermen from both sides used to access an island called Katchatheevu in the narrow Palk Strait between Sri Lanka’s northern district of Jaffna and India’s southern state, Tamil Nadu, to dry their nets and replenishment activities. Historically, Katchatheevu fell under British rule in India and became a contested territory post-Indian independence. 

Following long-held negotiations and existing goodwill, the then Indian PM Gandhi and her Sri Lankan counterpart Sirimavo Bandaranaike signed an agreement in 1974 to demarcate the maritime boundary where Katchatheevu ceded to Sri Lanka. 

Considering the resource richness of the waters, Sri Lanka soon asserted its sovereign rights over the island and prevented Indian fishermen from accessing it. It was against India’s expectations that Sri Lanka would consider cultural and historical aspects and allow Indian fishermen to access the territory. 

Katchatheevu has raised regional sentiments in Tamil Nadu following the detention of 6,184 Indian fishermen and seizing of 1,175 fishing vessels in the last 20 years—as reported by Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. He added that while previous governments ignored and used the issue for political purposes, BJP takes the fishermen’s issue seriously. 

By selecting BJP headquarters to hold a press conference on a foreign policy matter, Foreign Minister S Jaishankar kept the matter under political ambit. He avoided making it the position of the government of India. The Sri Lankan foreign minister has responded, saying Sri Lanka does not intend to entertain further discussions on the matter. 

With BJP expecting to sprout its political clout in Tamil Nadu in the forthcoming elections against powerful regional parties, including ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)—an ally of the Congress India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance—it finds Katchatheevu as a solid point to start its campaign. 

Away from the politics of Katchatheevu, small island and island countries are finding prominence in India’s geostrategic thinking today, especially after China’s expansionist entry into the Indo-Pacific. China’s presence in the regional waters became more prominent after Sri Lanka leased its Hambantota Port to China for 99 years. Also, with a China-friendly government in the Maldives, India needs allies to address the China challenge.   

Strategic consideration to find like-minded allies to counter China resulted in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or QUAD—a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, committing to supporting an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. While China makes little in QUAD’s black and white, the unsaid understanding among the QUAD members is attempting to resolve the China challenge. 

In developing its capabilities, India’s ambitions as a naval power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond are visible from its assertion as a ‘responsible naval power’. Recent rescue missions by the Indian Navy concentrating on combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea have involved deploying guided missile cruisers, marine patrol aircraft and drones to monitor commercial shipping activity in the region.

In conclusion, by raising the Katchatheevu issue, the BJP may have increased the political temperature in Tamil Nadu, but it has not affected India’s relations with Sri Lanka. If something comes up from Sri Lanka, India knows it’s manageable, especially after Delhi rescues it from the economic crisis. However, India’s signaling of its rising naval aspirations, including maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, must be seen from a broader lens of Delhi’s changing strategic geography.

Coleman Nee is senior economist at the Economic Research and Statistics Division of the World Trade Organization (WTO), where he has worked since 2004. Kamal Dev Bhattarai of ApEx spoke with him about global trade, problems faced by LDCs, and how geopolitics is affecting global trade.

How do you see the prospects of global trade in 2024?

We expect a gradual rebound in global trade volume for goods throughout 2024 and 2025, following a decline in 2023 primarily due to the persistent impact of elevated energy costs and inflation in developed economies, notably in Europe. Specifically, we project a 2.6 percent increase in merchandise trade for 2024 and a further 3.3 percent growth in 2025, following a 1.2 percent dip in 2023. Nevertheless, the presence of various downside risks has contributed to the uncertainty inherent in all economic predictions, particularly those concerning trade. These risks encompass regional conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and uncertainty in economic policies.

It seems we are making progress towards global trade recovery, what are the reasons behind it?

Inflation diminished real household earnings and reduced net earnings of businesses in 2023, leading to a decline in the demand for manufactured goods, which play a significant role in global trade. Conversely, as inflationary pressures diminish and policy interest rates eventually decrease, this should have a contrasting effect this year and the following, progressively boosting consumption and increasing the demand for imports.

What are the downside risks?

Geopolitical tensions and policy uncertainty could limit the scope of any trade rebound. While export growth should improve in many economies as external demand for goods picks up, food and energy prices could again be subject to price spikes linked to geopolitical events. Choosing an appropriate pace of interest rate cuts will also be challenging for central banks in advanced economies, and any miscalculation could lead to financial volatility later in 2024. The resilience of global trade is also being tested by disruptions on two of the world’s main shipping routes: the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal. 

The Panama Canal handles six percent of global trade, with over 70 percent of traffic destined for or originating from the United States. It is currently operating at partial capacity due to freshwater shortages, with restrictions likely to remain in place for some time. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal handles about 12 percent of global trade, and roughly one-third of container shipping between Asia and Europe. The diversion of traffic away from the Red Sea and around the Cape of Good Hope has added around 10 days to Asia-Europe journeys while boosting fuel costs.

Overall, risks are tilted to the downside, although there is some upside potential if trade in the European Union recovers faster than expected.

How does geopolitics affect global trade?

The global economy has been hit by several economic shocks in recent years while geopolitical tensions have been rising. In response to these and other concerns, some governments have become more skeptical about the benefits of trade and have taken steps aimed at re-shoring production and shifting trade towards friendly nations. These actions have had some impact on trade patterns, but evidence of a sustained trend toward deglobalization remains scant. One early sign of changing trade patterns is bilateral trade between the United States and China. Despite a record high in 2022, total bilateral trade between the world’s two largest economies grew 30 percent more slowly since 2018 than their trade with the rest of the world. 

In services, there are early indications also as data from the United States appear for example to show evidence of recent ‘friendshoring’ in information and communication technology (ICT) services. US imports of ICT services by region from 2018 to 2023. During this period, US imports from North American trading partners (mostly Canada) increased from 15.7 percent of total ICT imports to 23 percent. At the same time, US imports from Asian trading partners (mostly India) fell from 45.1 percent to 32.6 percent. 

Regarding the regional aspects, what are the prospects of growth in Asia?

In 2023, weak demand reduced export volumes in Europe and prevented a stronger recovery in Asia, while the picture in other regions was mixed. If the WTO’s trade forecast for 2024 is realized, Asia will contribute more to merchandise trade growth than it did over the last two years. The region is expected to add around 1.3 percent points to the projected 2.9 percent growth in world exports this year, or around 45. On the imports side it should add 1.9 percentage points to the anticipated 2.3 percent growth in world imports, or around 81 percent. Asia’s exports will grow 3.4 percent in 2024 and 3.4 percent in 2025. Asia’s imports meanwhile will grow 5.6 percent in 2024 and 4.7 percent in 2025. 

What are the key problems faced by LDCs countries in the global trade?

The impact of the 2023 trade slump on least developed countries (LDCs) is a matter of concern since these countries have limited resources to deal with global economic shocks. The drop in merchandise exports of LDCs last year was in line with the decline at the world level, but the contraction on the import side was larger, limiting consumption possibilities for LDCs. Merchandise exports of LDCs fell from $269bn in 2022 to $256bn in 2023, corresponding to an annual percentage change of -4.6 percent. This was roughly equal to the decline at the world level, leaving the share of LDCs in world exports stable at 1.1 percent. Meanwhile, merchandise imports of LDCs fell from $355bn in 2022 to $316bn in 2023. The -11 percent decline was roughly twice as large as the decline in world imports. As a result, the share of LDCs in world imports fell from 1.4 percent in 2022 to 1.3 percent in 2023.

LDC oil exporters recorded large merchandise trade surpluses in both 2022 ($24bn) and 2023 ($14bn). Other groups of LDCs experienced trade deficits last year, ranging from $36bn for countries that mostly export agricultural products to $4bn for ones that primarily export non-fuel minerals. According to preliminary WTO estimates for 2023, the US dollar value of LDC exports of fuels and mining products fell 16.5 percent in 2023. Their exports of agricultural products were also down 8.7 percent while shipments of manufactured goods dropped 12.6 percent. Exports of other products (including non-monetary gold) increased by four percent. These developments in value were influenced by corresponding price changes (for example, an eight percent rise in gold prices) as well as trade volume developments.

Nepali Congress has objected to the government’s decision to prorogue the winter session of the Federal Parliament.

A meeting of the Parliamentary Party held on Sunday morning concluded that the government has been ignoring the demand of the main opposition to form a parliamentary probe committee to investigate the alleged involvement of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Rabi Lamichhane in the cooperative fraud.

Congress Chief Whip Ramesh Lekhak mentioned that the government has been turning a blind to the demand of the party.

“There should be a serious and meaningful dialogue on the demand of the Nepali Congress to form a parliamentary probe committee to investigate charges against Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Ravi Lamichhane. But the government has been moving ahead against the parliamentary norms and values,” he said, adding, “The government should be serious on the people’s demand. The parliamentary practice cannot be undermined.”

He said that the Congress has not obstructed the Parliament, instead the House is being obstructed due to the irresponsibility of the government.

Congress has strongly condemned the government's decision to end the winter session.

Leader Lekhak said that the government has unexpectedly prorogued the winter session of the federal Parliament.

Let me start with a short disclaimer. I love short stories. I’m a sucker for stories that are a few pages long, especially when there’s a lot of work and I can’t seem to concentrate on longer works of fiction. Short stories also help me get out of the inevitable reading slump. Here, I must admit that I’m not very happy with how much I’ve read this year. Apart from a few rereads and some odd slim novels here and there, I haven’t enjoyed many of the books I’ve picked up.

A short story collection is always a safe bet. I don’t have to invest much time and mental energy into getting to know a character. And since a story takes an hour or two at the most to finish, I feel like I’ve at least accomplished my reading goal for the day. I’ve mostly gravitated toward horror stories like Bora Chung’s ‘Cursed Bunny’ and Carmen Marie Machado’s ‘Her Body and Other Parties’ which is why Cho Nam Joo’s ‘Miss Kim Knows and Other Stories’ was such a refreshing read.

Cho is the author of the best-selling novel ‘Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982’ which sparked a debate on feminism in South Korea while catapulting the writer to global fame when the book was longlisted for the United States National Book Award. Cho is known for highlighting gender inequality and misogyny in South Korea. Miss Kim Knows and Other Stories is a collection of eight stories about women from all walks of life. They are stories of life in South Korea from a female perspective. But the themes—loneliness, domestic violence, dysfunctional families, aging etc.—are universal.

What I liked about the book is that the stories aren’t dramatic but they leave you with some important messages—they might be things you already know and experience but you might have seldom paid attention to them. Women often make room for misogyny by not speaking up and letting things slide, and Cho draws our attention to that. She writes about the invisible labor women put in at home, work, and society at large, celebrating all the ‘little things’ they do to keep the ball rolling. In one of the stories, a neglected worker quits and the entire office starts to malfunction. In most of the stories, women are often repressed and maybe even unaware of what they want.

Some stories were a let-down. They felt a bit too cliché, like ‘Dear Hyunnam Oppa’ where a woman writes a letter to her boyfriend of 10 years, who has just proposed to her, listing out all the reasons why she doesn’t want to marry him. It felt too generic and forced. In ‘Puppy Love’, which explores love during Covid-19, the narrative ends abruptly, leaving you feeling unsettled. But that could have easily just been me and not a problem with the stories. Perhaps, I couldn’t relate to them. Maybe you will. With Cho, you never know, as her writing has the potential to tap into long-dormant emotions.

Short stories

Miss Kim Knows and Other Stories

Cho Nam-Joo

Translated by Jamie Chang

Published: 2023

Publisher: Scribner

Pages: 218, Paperback