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 On 19 November 1951, King Tribhuvan announced the formation of a government that “would be popular and rule according to the wishes of the cit­izens.” The king’s statement also said: “Until the views of the citi­zens can be ascertained through elections, we feel the government should be headed by the leader of the largest outfit approved by the people, and someone who can carry out duties in an ideal and noble manner.” It was Matrika Prasad Koirala whom Tribhuvan chose as the first civilian prime minister following the downfall of the Rana oligarchy and the resignation of the last Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher.

Matrika was the president of the Nepali Congress and the main com­mander of the armed revolution against the Rana regime. But he was not a party ideologue. It was his younger brother Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala who led the party’s ideological front. But BP could not be the prime minister then, as he was not in the good books of internal and external forces.

Mohan Shumsher continued hold­ing the prime minister’s post fol­lowing the overthrow of the Rana regime on 18 February 1951. But disputes between him and the Con­gress persisted. On 2 October 1951, King Tribhuvan formed a 35-mem­ber ‘advisory board’ to assist and counsel the Cabinet, but without consulting with PM Mohan Shum­sher or any cabinet member. This hurt Mohan Shumsher no end.

He announced his resignation on 12 November 1951 amid political disputes and discontents. Congress ministers had already resigned by then. The resignations opened the door for King Tribhuvan to form a new government, which he asked the Congress to lead.

Within the Congress, there were arguments over whether Matrika or BP should be the prime minister. Matrika reasoned that neither the king nor India would accept BP. The reason Tribhuvan was angry with BP was that he had resigned from the home minister’s post with­out consulting with the king. Mean­while, Nehru sent a letter to King Tribhuvan saying India too would not accept BP. BP then agreed to Matrika’s nomination as the prime minister.

Matrika’s cabinet had eight Con­gress representatives and six inde­pendent ones. The latter consisted of Rana courtiers and King Tribhu­van’s loyalists.

The majority of Congress lead­ers were unhappy with Matrika’s selection as the prime minister. The candidate of their choice was BP, who not only had a clear political perspective and some experience as a home minister, but was also closer to party members.

Also unhappy with Matrika was a senior Cabinet minister, Keshar Shumsher, who was on the Rana prime ministerial roll and had eyed the top post.

Following the formation of the government, the Congress started issuing more and more instruc­tions to it. It even had a debate on whether the government was bigger than the party.

The fact that Matrika was both the prime minister and the Con­gress president became a topic of contention within the party, which subscribed to a policy of ‘one indi­vidual, one post’. This meant limit­ing Matrika to the prime minister’s post. Congress leaders also started making loud demands for a General Convention. Matrika insisted that the GC should not elect party lead­ership and that he should be chosen unopposed.

Next week’s ‘Vault of history’ column will discuss the tussle between Matrika and BP over party presidency

 The Indian military mission did not leave Nepal as easily as it had entered. During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the Indian army occupied Kalapani without even offi­cially informing Nepal. The war had prompted India to adopt a hawk­ish defense policy. Although the establishment of Indian check-posts on our northern border did not go down well in Nepal, it could not get rid of them easily.

Or rather the Nepali rulers could not gather the courage to close them. Those who had been grate­ful for their establishment were no longer part of Nepal’s ruling circle. King Mahendra wanted the Indian army to leave, but he too had been unable to muster the requisite cour­age. Indira Gandhi had emerged as a powerful prime minister in India and she pretty much did what pleased her.

It would be 1969 before the then Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista finally adopted the policy of remov­ing the Indian check-posts, and made a public statement to that effect in an interview with The Ris­ing Nepal.

Bista was close to both Mahen­dra and Birendra. He took the deci­sion without consulting with the Indians, who although unhappy with it, did not criticize or respond to it publicly. But India punished Nepal in an indirect manner. The 1969 Indian blockade was partly a response to the expulsion of its army from Nepal. Getting the Indian military mission to leave is con­sidered an important event of the Panchayat era.

I had had an extensive conversa­tion on politics and diplomacy with Bista on 18 August 2013. He told me he was able to convince King Mahen­dra that the political fallout of the decision to expel the Indian military mission could be resolved. “Getting rid of the Indian check-posts would enhance your glory. I can manage the Indian protests. In case it courts a lot of controversy and you face strong pressure, you can tell the Indians that I am to blame for the bad decision,” Bista recalled telling the monarch.

King Mahendra agreed. Later, Bista met Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, who asked him, “Why did you take the decision in such a hurry? We could have managed it through talks.” Bista told her that getting the Indian army to leave was necessary in order to win the hearts of the Nepali people, and that the decision was in the interest of both the countries.

As a result, Bista gained the image of being a ‘nationalist’ leader and was counted among those Nepali politicians India disliked. Attempts were also made to brand him ‘pro-Chinese’.

Besides its displeasure with the expelling of its military mission, there was otherwise no big reason for India to impose the blockade then. India resorts to blockading Nepal when it needs to apply strong pressure on Kathmandu or to get it to bow down. But because Nepal was not heavily dependent on India in 1969, the blockade fizzled out.

Before the 1950s, Nepal did not seek Indian assistance or con­sultation on its internal matters. Things changed when democracy dawned on Nepal on 18 February 1951, following the Delhi agree­ment. Gradually, the tradition of India mediating in Nepal’s domestic affairs—sometimes on Indian soil—was established.

Whenever Nepal took a big deci­sion without India’s involvement, the big neighbor tried to derail it or get us trapped in a crisis. India liked interfering in Nepal, either overtly or covertly. Nepali rulers, instead of solving the country’s problems, got accustomed to ‘understand­ing’ Indian sentiments. The Indian military mission stayed in Nepal for many years, even though that required issuing various threats.

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will discuss the life and times of Matrika Prasad Koirala, the first post-Rana prime minister of Nepal.

 No one had imagined the Indian mission would stay here long, as Nepal’s official decision included the statement: “The team of the Indian military will, in a year or possibly less, help our army offi­cers train and restructure the Nepal army.” But the Indian mission ended up staying here for 18 years—by set­ting up check-posts on Nepal’s bor­der with China.

Bhadrakali Mishra, the minister for transport and forest, had pro­posed an even more alarming idea. On 13 April 1952, he made a proposal to the Cabinet that our newly gained democracy be protected with the help of Indian police and civil offi­cers, since the army, bureaucrats and even some citizens of Nepal can­not be fully trusted after K.I. Singh’s rebellion. Mishra suggested that two Indian tanks and 500 Indian soldiers equipped with modern weapons be kept in Kathmandu in order to protect the country and its nascent democracy. He also suggested that Indian forces guard the airports at Simara, Tumlingtar, Biratnagar, Pokhara and Taplejung. (Grishma Bahadur Devkota, Nepalko Rajnitik Darpan, Part 1, Page 165). (The Cab­inet did not pass all the points in Mishra’s proposal.)

That was the time when Sir Chan­deshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, the Indian ambassador to Nepal, exercised enormous clout in Kath­mandu. Nepal was buffeted by comments and speculations about Singh’s hand in picking ministers and shaping Cabinet decisions.

Mishra and his deputy minister Dharma Ratna Yami frequently bick­ered about forest clearances and the contracts for them. A majority of the contractors were Indians. Mishra had been appointed a minister by the Congress, but he was let go on 6 June 1952 on the basis of a prime ministerial report alleging ‘increas­ingly irreconcilable differences’. But about two years later, he was again included in the Cabinet reconsti­tuted under Matrika Prasad Koirala.

Disputes and suspicions within Nepali political parties escalated following the arrival of the Indian military mission in Kathmandu

Disputes and suspicions within Nepali political parties escalated following the arrival of the Indian military mission in Kathmandu. At the time, another Indian mis­sion—the Buch Commission tasked with reforming Nepal’s bureau­cracy—was active in Kathmandu as well. Moreover, King Tribhuwan’s advisor-cum-secretary was also an Indian administrator. The presence of the Indians in Nepal’s ruling circle had thickened.

The Indian military mission did not remain confined to moderniz­ing Nepal’s army. The Indians led the government to believe that K.I. Singh could mount an armed attack from China and that the Chinese communist revolution could pene­trate Nepal. They impressed upon the government that both Nepal and India faced threats from China. Sub­sequently, under Indian strategic planning, 18 check-posts were estab­lished, and occupied by the Indian army, on Nepal’s border with Tibet.

The Indian military mission showed no sign of leaving after a year, which caused infighting in the ruling Congress. Its leader BP Koi­rala issued a statement saying that “the Indian military mission, which had come here for a year, should be sent back”. Opposition political outfits were also obviously unhappy with the continued presence of the Indian forces.

Earlier, Indian Prime Minister Nehru had caused a stir in Nepal by saying, “From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers.” And when India actually sent a military mission to Nepal, no one, besides those in government, took it lightly.

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will discuss how the Indian military mission was eventually expelled and how India reacted to it

 Upon an ‘urgent request’ from Nepal, the Indian Army entered Nepal on 10 March 1952, ostensibly to train and restruc­ture Nepal’s army. Nepal made an official statement saying that it was grateful to the Indian government for sending the officers. But it was branded “foreign interference” by Nepali Congress leaders outside the government as well as by other political forces. The entry of Indian forces into Nepal took place against the back­drop of K.I. Singh’s rebellion (about which I have written in previous issues). The Rana fam­ily and their courtiers wielded enormous power and influence in the army and the upper echelons of the state apparatus. Unhappy with the regime change, many Rana major generals, who had lost their perks and prestige, had resigned voluntarily.

With the ouster of Mohan Shumsher, Matrika Prasad Koirala had become prime minister on 19 November 1951, and the new government was comprised of Nepali Congress leaders and palace loyalists. The Ranas and those under their patronage wanted to destabilize democracy, and the government was scared of them. It was put under the impression that a reactionary plot was a distinct possibility, and it sought an Indian military mission within three months of its formation.

That was the time the commu­nists had come to power in China—something that did not go down well with India and the democratic West. The Congress government in Nepal was made to believe that K.I. Singh could return from China and bring communism along. Afraid of a potential revolt, the government readily accepted the Indian military mission.

King Tribhuvan also agreed to it. Having won back his crown with Indian help, Tribhuvan felt obligated to return the favor. Many believe he accepted the Indian mission to repay India for its support. At the time, Tribhuvan was virtually all-powerful, and the government could not have taken key decisions without his consent. The palace posed no obstacle to the entry of the Indian military mission and the establishment of Indian check-posts on Nepal’s border with China.

Amid fears of K.I. Singh and China as well as a counter-revolu­tion from the Ranas, the Matrika Prasad Koirala government felt the acute need for training and restruc­turing the Nepali army. The gov­ernment’s formal decision states, “Our freedom is sacred to us. Safe­guarding our newly won democracy from internal and external threats requires a well-trained and modern army. To meet this objective, we welcome our neighboring country India’s assistance.” (Nepal Gazette, 14 April 1952).

About a month prior to the pub­lication of that statement, Indian army officials had visited Nepal to discuss the matter with their Nepali counterparts. Nepal Gazette states that the Indian military mis­sion came here with the consent of the head of the Nepal army. It further says, “The Nepal govern­ment decided to invite a team of 20 Indian army officers and their staff. The Indian government has kindly accepted Nepal’s request to pay their salary.” The Indian contingent would later expand.

Some argue that the Indian army personnel were in Nepal to help with the building of the Tribhu­van International Airport and the Tribhuvan Highway. But the Indian army officers appeared more eager to become Nepal’s de facto rulers than to train the Nepali army. They started concocting various agen­das to call Nepal’s prime minister, ministers and high-level officials for meetings.

Many did not like the attendance of PM Matrika Prasad Koirala in the meetings they summoned. But such attendances gradually became reg­ular. It wasn’t that the arrival of the Indian Army attracted no public crit­icism. In fact, there was widespread criticism of “foreign interference” from even within the ruling Con­gress. The entry of the Indian mili­tary mission was also seen as a plan to gain command of Nepal’s foreign and defense policies.

The next column in the ‘Vault of his­tory’ series will discuss the duration and the political implications of the Indian military mission in Nepal

 On 19 Feb 1951, the day after the establishment of democracy, the rebel group led by K.I. Singh mounted an armed attack in Bhairahawa on government offices with the intent of capturing them. When state forces retaliated, nine of Singh’s supporters and four Nepali soldiers were killed. To suppress Singh’s rebellion, Nepal asked the Indian Army for help. Subsequently, Singh and many of his supporters were arrested. But at the same time the Indian Army got permission to enter Nepali territory (up to 30 miles from the border). All Nepali political forces, save the Congress, had vehemently opposed letting in the Indian force.

Singh escaped from the Bhairahawa Prison on 11 July 1951, whereupon he was declared a ‘dacoit’ and a huge security force was deployed to find him. The government even announced a bounty of Rs 5,000 to anyone who would help get Singh arrested. Nearly a month after his escape, when he was finally apprehended in Syanja, it was believed that the troubles in western Nepal were over. He was imprisoned in a jail in Kathmandu, where he cajoled members of the Rakshya Dal into joining his rebellion—which finally ended after he fled to Tibet.

He was then declared a ‘traitor’. After spending three and half years in exile in China, he came back to Nepal through Rasuwa, from where he sent a letter to King Mahendra appealing for a pardon. The letter said, “I would rather die in my own country than live elsewhere, and I will forever remain loyal to the king.”

By that time, the country no longer had a multi-party government. King Mahendra had dissolved the government led by Matrika Prasad Koirala and imposed direct rule. Using ‘residual royal power’, he pardoned K.I. Singh. Two days later, Singh entered Kathmandu, where demonstrations were staged in his support. A huge crowd had gathered in Sundarijal to welcome him. Yet many suspected he had been influenced by communism during his stay in China.

Many suspected he had been influenced by communism during his stay in China. Singh tried to allay such suspicions

Singh tried to allay such suspicions and founded the ‘United Democratic Party’ within a month and half of his return. The country had been unable to hold parliamentary elections; the polity was in a state of extreme flux and King Mahendra was experimenting with all kinds of governance models. And on 26 July 1957, he appointed Singh as prime minister, entrusting him with the task of conducting polls. Among those in that Council of Ministers was Mahakabi Laxmi Prasad Devkota.

Unfortunately, the cabinet did not survive long, and Singh became known in Nepali history as the prime minister with the shortest tenure. On 14 November, just shy of three months into his term, the palace issued a statement approving Singh’s resignation. The statement read: “We have all accepted that only frequent changes in government cannot lead smoothly to nation-building. We were hoping that we would not have to dissolve this government. However, we regret that we have been compelled to do so.” (Nepal Gazette, Part 1, 14 November 1957).

The reason that Singh’s tenure did not last long was a conspiracy he hatched, which is mentioned in detail in a memoir by General Nara Shumsher Rana. It says Singh wanted the general’s help in plotting a coup against the king and relegating him to a ‘puppet king’, just like in the Rana days. Singh said to Rana, “This childish king of ours cannot govern. Let’s you and I rule together—I as the prime minister and you as the commander-in-chief. What say you?” (General Nara Shumsher Ranako Jeevani (2058), Lalitpur, Pages 90, 91, 92).

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will discuss K.I. Singh’s part in the Panchayat era, including the 1980 referendum.

 A government led by Matrika Prasad Koirala, Nepal’s first civilian prime minister after the fall of the Rana regime, was formed on 16 Nov 1951. Congress leaders as well as those close to King Tribhuwan were part of that government. It had just completed two months when, on the night of 23 Jan 1952, there was total anarchy in Kathmandu. Electricity lines were suddenly cut. Ministers were hotfooting it; while some looked for a place to hide, others took refuge at the Narayanhiti palace. Rumors about their arrest were circulated. Singha Durbar, the Nepal Bank, the civil court and the gunpowder house were captured.

Jails were attacked and prisoners whisked away. Street demonstrations demanding that K.I. Singh be declared the prime minister and Agni Prasad Kharel the home minister were staged. Terror spread throughout the city.

That was the rebellion mounted by the Rakshya Dal, a party that fought for democracy. Leading it was Kunwar Indrajeet Singh, popularly known as Dr K.I. Singh. The army was deployed from the wee hours of the morning to suppress the rebellion. Two people died in the incident. A curfew was imposed and demonstrations and mass assembly were prohibited.

 Leaders like Tanka Prasad Acharya, Dilli Raman Regmi and Rishikesh Shah maintained that Singh was a patriot, not a dacoit

After capturing Singha Durbar, K.I. Singh sent a six-point demand to King Tribhuwan. Singh was summoned to the Narayanhiti Palace for talks. He declined the invitation, citing a possible betrayal, and announced that he would meet the king only when he was declared prime minister. The correspondence between Singh and King Tribhuwan was being facilitated by Ganesh Man Singh and Tanka Prasad Acharya. Singh’s condition was formation of an all-party government under him, but with the Gorkha Dal, a party with a Rana majority, left out.

But fearing arrest, Singh disappeared from Singha Durbar in the middle of the negotiations and fled to Tibet. Born in the district of Doti and educated in India, Singh had risen to instant fame after capturing Singha Durbar for 24 hours. He was known for being an intrepid leader. Many saw him as a Robin Hood-type character.

The government decision to designate him a ‘dacoit’ was denounced. Leaders like Tanka Prasad Acharya, Dilli Raman Regmi and Rishikesh Shah maintained that Singh was a patriot, not a dacoit.

There was no dearth of his supporters, with the exception of Congress leaders. But even some Congress leaders held that Singh’s selflessness and integrity should not be questioned. Singh was skilled at keeping the rank and file happy and had worked hard at expanding the organizational base of the Congress. Taking this into account, the Congress had given him charge of the Bhairahawa Command during the revolt against the Rana rule.

But Singh was not happy with ‘the Delhi agreement’ between the Congress and the Ranas. He had even written to King Tribhuwan that any accord should take place inside the country. He demanded that the new government be fully democratic. As the agreement was not to his liking, he continued with the revolt and persuaded a sizeable number of people to do so, even though they had been promised attractive incentives—up to the post of a Colonel—to end the revolution. Singh’s actions constituted a clear violation of the Congress policy. As a result, the party took disciplinary action against him. His rebellion finally came to an end after he fled to Tibet.

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will discuss the royal pardon King Mahendra granted K.I. Singh

Congress leader Bishwesh­war Prasad Koirala was not pleased with the Indians’ growing interference in Nepal and had written about it in an Indian weekly. Dharma Ratna Yami, a dep­uty cabinet minister, showed that newspaper to Govind Narain, the Indian advisor of King Tribhuwan, in order to curry favor with him. Yami told Narain that Koirala, after losing his home minister’s post, had turned anti-Indian. Not just that, Yami got a Kathmandu-based maga­zine called Aawaj to publish a story that warned against “BP Koirala’s ill attempts at spreading anti-Indian sentiments.” (Dharma Yatna Yami, 2014, Nepalkaa Kura, Page 216) After that, Yami and Congress were locked in a nasty competition to get stuff published in newspapers. Responding to Yami, BP’s brother Tarini Prasad Koirala published a piece in Gorkhapatra under an alias, saying someone with a ‘brain full of cow dung got the broken chair of a deputy minister’ by acting as a syco­phant to the Indian embassy and the Narayanhiti Palace.

The war of words was intensi­fying. Tarini Prasad Koirala, who was the director of Radio Nepal at the time, wrote stinging com­mentary on the Indian Embassy and the Narayanhiti Palace in var­ious government newspapers. He was suspended after Yami insisted that he be brought to book. “If no action is taken against a traitor to the monarch and to the friendly neighbor, I’ll also write whatever I please,” declared Yami. In the wake of Tarini’s suspension, Chan­deshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu, said to Yami, “Just wait and see. We and even your king could not escape vilification. Your time is coming too.” (Dharma Yatna Yami, (2014) Nepalkaa Kura, Page 217).

BP argued that the Indians were here to impose their system of governance, which he held to be unsuitable for a poor country like Nepal

BP had publicly criticized the role of Narain and other Indian advi­sors. He demanded that they be sent back to India on the grounds that they served little purpose compared with the costs they incurred. BP argued that the Indians were here to impose their system of gover­nance, which he held to be unsuit­able for a poor country like Nepal. “Instead of resolving our problems, the Indian advisor has made them more complicated by creating false­hoods or impractical nuisances. If it is because of his ignorance, let him remain quiet and step back. Let him not interfere in our affairs. We can solve our problems on our own. We Nepalis shall chart our own course with our own intellect,” wrote Nepal Pukar, the Congress mouthpiece. (Grishma Bahadur Devkota, Nepalko Raajnitik Darpan, Part 1, Page 175).

On top of that, BP warned what­ever friendship that remained between Nepal and India could be severed if the Indian mission did not leave. Anecdotes about the presence of the Indian advisor and ambas­sador in Nepal’s cabinet still keep resurfacing. A general perception till date is that India creates problems in Nepal and then designs formulas to solve them.

In the first half of the 1950s, India held much sway over every little decision Nepal made. Indian influence gradually declined after Mahendra ascended to the throne in 1955. Nepali prime ministers, ministers and bureaucrats were helpless in the face of the Indians’ proximity to the kings and the clout they wielded.

Nepal’s ruling circle still cannot get over a past steeped in politi­cal schemes and fails to formulate appropriate policies. To further their vested interests and personal ambitions, they become tools of foreign powers .

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will cover the anti-government rebellion of Kunwar Indrajit Singh, popularly known as Dr KI Singh, a short-lived prime minister of Nepal in 1957

Govind Narain had received offi­cer training during the British rule in India. He was sent to Nepal precisely because he was extremely clever and active in matters of governance. After his stint in Nepal between 1951 and 1954 as King Tribhuwan’s advisor, he was appointed India’s defense and home secretary, as well as the chief secretary of Uttar Pradesh, the most populous Indian state. Later, he also became the gov­ernor of the southern Indian state of Karnataka.

King Tribhuwan had instructed his ministers to consult Narain, his advi­sor-cum-secretary, on state matters and all documentary work. “Govind Narain, ICS has been appointed as the secretary to the king. He will be undertaking such tasks as advising Nepal’s Public Service Commission. Secretary Govind Narain will have to be consulted on all the matters pertaining to the following rules…,” as per the Nepal Gazette.

Narain was authorized to look at the cabinet’s decisions and he was the one who prepared the king’s instructions to the cabinet. The monarch exercised his residual pow­ers based on the recommendation of Narain, who also had the authority to arrange the king’s meetings with foreigners. Moreover, it was through his secretary that King Tribhuwan carried out public-relations exer­cises and social welfare activities. Not only that, Narain could also appoint palace officials and oversee their work and conduct.

Given the influence Govind Narain wielded, it was natural for Nepalis who aspired to political power to try to get close to him

A few months into Narain’s appointment, a three-member team led by N.M. Buch, another Indian civil servant, came to Kathmandu on 14 May 1952 to help reform Nepal’s bureaucracy. The ‘Buch Commis­sion’ was authorized to oversee all government decisions, which deep­ened Indian bureaucrats’ involve­ment in Nepal’s ruling circles.

Given the influence Narain wielded, it was natural for Nepalis who aspired to political power to try to get close to him. They started fawning over Narain in the hope of getting coveted posts. People could get an appointment with King Tribhuwan only with Narain’s consent. Earlier, it was the Ranas who acted as gatekeepers to the monarch; now Narain played that role. Nepali politics and governance started being dominated by the triangular alliance between King Tribhuwan, his secretary-advisor Narain and the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu.

At the time, the ruling Nepali Congress was mired in infighting, with Prime Minister Matrika Prasad Koirala and his brother BP Koirala locked in a power struggle. Ani­mosity between the Congress and other parties was also at a peak; they could not stand each other.

Rumor mills were churning out speculations that the infighting was being fueled by Govind Narain and the Indian ambassador, both of whom were trained under the British rule that followed a divide and rule policy. Such speculations were not without foundation; it was clear as daylight that those close to the two had become ministers. There also are historical accounts of Nepal’s forests being exploited by Indian contractors.

The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will cover the war of words between the Congress and Dharma Ratna Yami, a deputy cabinet minister