Most Nepali migrant workers still go to India. According to informal estimates, 6 to 10 million Nepalis are living and working in India. Migra­tion to countries other than India is a more recent phenomenon. (But as Nepalis don’t need permits to work in India, Nepal does not consider it a labor-importing country.) The trend of going to Gulf countries started with the 1990 political change, when Nepal opened up to the outside world. In the past decade, around 3.5 million Nepalis have left to work in various Gulf and some other countries.

Most of these workers are unskilled and do menial jobs, which still pay more than what they would get for similar jobs in Nepal. Among the top Nepali labor importing coun­tries are Malaysia (700,000 workers) and Saudi Arabia (400,000). There have been many reports of exploita­tion and even deaths of Nepali work­ers abroad, as the jobs they land are often different and more difficult than the ones stipulated in official papers. Yet labor diplomacy to bet­ter look after the wellbeing of its cit­izens toiling abroad has never been a government priority.

Many reckon a change to the pattern of Nepali labor migra­tion is urgently needed. Former Nepali ambassador to Qatar Surya Nath Mishra says time has come to explore job markets for highly skilled workers such as engineers, nurses, and doctors. “Our current focus is on sending unskilled man­power. Around 97 percent of Nepali migrant workers are unskilled,” he says. Why can’t we better train our people and send them to do high­er-level jobs, he asks?

Such a shift has also become necessary as unskilled labor migra­tion, and the national economy it sustains, can be disrupted at any time, due to multiple factors outside Nepal’s control. It would be won­derful if Nepal could employ these people for its own development. But that’s another story altogether.

Risks abound as globalization scatters Nepali migrant workers

The Gulf and other countries that host a large number of Nepali youths are apparently not a big priority. Unlike previous governments, the Oli-led government may have adopted a policy of looking beyond India and China, but there has been no significant change in its labor diplomacy. Besides the Gulf countries, there are thousands of Nepali workers in South Korea and Malaysia, but bilateral engagements with the two countries are minimal.

The first priority of Nepal’s for­eign policy, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has always been its immediate neighbors India and China.

The second, third and fourth priorities are its extended neigh­borhood, development partners or major powers, and destination countries for overseas employment, respectively.

The last group is comprised of the Gulf and other countries that host a large number of Nepali youths, and which apparently are not a big pri­ority. Unlike previous governments, the Oli-led government may have adopted a policy of looking beyond India and China, but there has been no significant change in its labor diplomacy.

Besides the Gulf countries, there are thousands of Nepali workers in South Korea and Malaysia, but bilateral engagements with the two countries are minimal. While the government is reaching out to more and more countries to attract invest­ment and technology, South Korea and Malaysia do not figure promi­nently in Nepal’s foreign policy.

The number of Nepali youths going abroad for work is increasing every year. But numerous issues—ranging from cheating in the home country to exploitation in the destination countries—render overseas employ­ment problematic. The issue of female housemaids is arguably even more complex.

“Nepal needs to be cognizant of the fact that the global eco­nomic slowdown and a reduc­tion in major infrastructure proj­ects will reduce the demand for manpower and, in turn, remit­tances,” says Ramesh Nath Pandey, who closely worked with these coun­tries as Nepal’s foreign minister in the early 2000s. As ruling parties seek big investment from big coun­tries, they pay less attention to remit­tances, which in recent years have been the backbone of Nepal’s econ­omy—contributing 26 percent to the national GDP.

136 countries now

“By the early 2000s, Nepali migrant laborers started going in large num­bers to Qatar and the UAE, where a lot of construction work had started, resulting in huge demand for able manpower,” Pandey recalls. The current Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, was the Crown Prince when Pandey visited Doha as Nepal’s foreign minister in 2005.

“I apprised him of the sincer­ity and excellent work ethics of Nepalis and told him about the need for a government-to-gov­ernment labor agreement,” Pandey recalls. The Department of Foreign Employment issues labor permits for 136 countries. Between July 2018 and July 2019, as many as 476,705 males and 32,123 females received a permit to work abroad. In the past decade, more than 3.5 million labor permits were issued.

An instance of Nepal’s lackadai­sical approach to labor diplomacy is the vacant ambassadorial posi­tion in South Korea, which hosts 40,000 Nepali migrant workers. A related problem is the flawed selec­tion process for ambassadors. Often, ambassadors are selected based not on their expertise or experience, but partisan loyalty.

In some cases, Nepali ambas­sadors have also caused con­troversy. For example, Maya Kumari Sharma, then ambassador to Qatar, was recalled in 2013 for her remark that the Gulf state was an open jail, alluding to the plight of Nepali migrant workers there. The ambassadorial posi­tion in the Nepali embassy in Doha remained vacant from 2013 to 2017. Observers highlight the need for a foreign policy that gives due prior­ity to labor migration. They suggest that instead of merely issuing work permits for unskilled laborers, Nepal needs to analyze the vision of desti­nation countries, the technologies they are adopting, and the kind of manpower they need, which will give us a better bargaining position.

Former Nepali ambassador to Qatar, Surya Nath Mishra, reckons it is about time the government explored job markets for highly skilled workers such as engineers, nurses, and doc­tors. “We are just focusing on sending unskilled manpower. As many as 97 percent of Nepali migrant workers are unskilled,” he says.

Mishra adds that migrant workers are facing a lot of problems, and most often the source of these problems is in Nepal. He points to the unholy nexus between the Foreign Employ­ment Board and ‘manpower’ agen­cies, which facilitates the sending of laborers in illegal ways. As a result, workers face problems when they reach destination countries. “Things will not improve until labor is made a major plank of our economic diplo­macy,” he suggests.

Nine most popular destinations for Nepali migrant workers

Malaysia

Nepal and Malaysia established diplomatic relations on 1 Janu­ary 1960. At present, an estimat­ed 700,000 Nepalis are working there. There are also prospects of Foreign Direct Investment from Malaysia to Nepal. “Malaysian business companies are investing in the areas of telecommunication, tourism, education, training, trad­ing, and services sector,” according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another area of cooperation be­tween the two countries is tour­ism. In 2018, over 23,000 Malay­sian nationals visited Nepal.

In light of the multiple reports on the problems Nepali migrant workers face in Malaysia, the two countries are working to reform the recruitment process.

Saudi Arabia

 Nepal and Saudi Arabia formally established diplomatic relations on 15 March 1977. Around 400,000 Nepali nationals have been work­ing in Saudi Arabia, the highest among Gulf countries. There used to be high-level visits between the two countries during the Pancha­yat era. Nepal’s engagement with Saudi Arabia increased substan­tially when we started sending la­borers a decade ago.

According to official data, the volume of trade between the two countries is about $100 million. Another possible area of coop­eration is tourism. From 2017, a direct flight has been connecting Kathmandu with Dammam.

Qatar

Nepal and Qatar established diplomatic relations on 21 Janu­ary 1977. Qatar currently hosts nearly 365,000 Nepali migrant workers, mostly in services and construction sectors. The prospect of employment in Qatar is ev­er-growing due to the massive in­frastructure-building for the FIFA World Cup 2022. There have been concerns about the exploitation of Nepali workers.

UAE

Nepal and the UAE established diplomatic relations on 22 Janu­ary 1977. About 250,000 Nepali migrant workers have been work­ing in the UAE, mostly in the fields of security, transport, sales, hospi­tality, construction, and cleaning. There are frequent bilateral visits between the two countries, which signed an MoU on Recruitment, Employment and Repatriation of Workers on 14 June 2019. The MoU has established a framework for transparent recruitment, ethi­cal employment, and safe repatri­ation of Nepali migrant workers, and replaced the 2007 MoU.

Kuwait

Nepal and Kuwait established diplomatic relations on 25 Feb­ruary 1972, but Nepal opened an embassy in Kuwait only in 2010. Kuwait’s ambassador in New Delhi is accredited to Kathmandu. There are around 70,000 Nepali work­ers in Kuwait, 40 percent of them women.

South Korea

Diplomatic relations between Nepal and the Republic of Korea (RoK) was established on 15 May 1974. There are around 40,000 Nepali workers employed in the ROK. While South Korea opened its embassy in Kathmandu in 1974, Nepal established its own in Seoul only in 2007.

Nepal and the RoK reached an agreement on recruiting Nepali workers under the Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2007. Ne­pal’s participation in the EPS sys­tem has been mutually rewarding for both countries. Nepal-South Korea cooperation encompasses the areas of health, women em­powerment, disaster recovery, poverty alleviation, and education, among others.

Bah­rain

Nepal and the Kingdom of Bah­rain established diplomatic rela­tions on 13 January 1977. There are about 25,000 Nepali nationals in Bahrain. Of late, Bahrain has become one of the most preferred destinations for jobs for Nepali workers.

Oman

Nepal and Oman established diplomatic relations on 21 Janu­ary 1977. The flow of Nepalis to Oman is steadily increasing; there are now around 20,000 of them.

Israel

Diplomatic relations between Nepal and the State of Israel were established on 1 June 1960. Israel opened its embassy in Kathmandu in March 1961. Currently, around 3,000 Nepali nationals are em­ployed in Israel, which has become one of the favorite destinations for Nepalis, particularly female work­ers. Israel has proposed recruit­ment of Nepali caregivers through a G2G process.

India considers both Nepal and Bhutan as falling under its exclusive sphere of influence. Nepal’s case, however, is different as it has started adopting a balanced approach toward India and China, and has been reaping maximum benefits from China’s economic growth. Bhutan, on the other hand, does not have diplomatic relations with China even while it enjoys ‘special relations’ with India.

But public opinion in Bhutan is gradually changing. The Bhu­tanese seem to have realized that total dependence on India may not always be tenable and that their country should reach out to China. Mainly after the Indian block­ade on Nepal in 2015, there are growing voices in Bhutan calling for an end to complete dependence on any one country. China has been offering economic assistance to Bhutan under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Trade, tourism and transport

Although Nepal and Bhutan established diplomatic relations in 1983, they do not have embassies in each other’s capital. The Nepali and Bhutanese ambassadors in New Delhi are accredited respectively to Thimpu and Kathmandu. High-level exchanges between Nepal and Bhutan are rare. Although Nepal and Bhutan engage in some trade, the prospects of expanding cooperation remain largely unrealized.

Nepal exports to China sculptures and statuary, electric transform­ers, soaps, garments and footwear. Major imports from Bhutan include gypsum, coal and cement. Even though the balance of trade has traditionally been in Nepal’s favor, Nepal has sustained trade deficit in recent years, according to Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two countries signed an Air Ser­vice Agreement in February 2004, and Druk Air and Bhutan Airlines operate scheduled flights between Paro and Kathmandu. While 5,428 Bhutanese tourists visited Nepal in 2015, as many as 10,923 of them came here in 2017.

In 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Federation of Nepal­ese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) and its Bhuta­nese counterpart to promote trade and enhance economic relations between the two countries. The first meeting of the Nepal-Bhutan Bilat­eral Trade at the level of Joint Secre­taries of the ministries of commerce was held in Kathmandu on 17 March 2010. The second meeting, held to discuss the draft agreement on bilat­eral trade, took place in Thimpu on 24-25 May 2011.

Lhotsampa logjam

Summing up Nepal’s relations with Bhutan, an official at the Minis­try of Foreign Affairs, who declined to give his name as he was not authorized to speak on the matter, says, “Ties are neither cordial nor strained. In the past three decades, the issue of Bhutanese refugee dom­inated the bilateral agenda. While Nepal brought up the issue in every bilateral meeting, Bhutan was reluc­tant to take its citizens back.”

The issue of Bhutanese refu­gees has been a contentious topic between the two countries. Even after 16 rounds of ministerial-level talks, Bhutan did not agree to repa­triate the Lhotsampas (Bhutanese people of Nepali descent), who fled their country three decades ago and lived in seven UNHRC-spon­sored camps in eastern Nepal. Since 2007-08, about 113,000 Bhutanese refugees have been reset­tled in the US and a few other coun­tries under a UN third-country reset­tlement program.

There are still about 6,600 refu­gees in two camps in eastern Nepal who have rejected third-country resettlement. While the refugees enjoy limited freedoms, Nepal has refused to integrate them locally and has been asking Bhutan to resolve the issue through talks. Thimpu, on the other hand, has been trying to persuade Kathmandu to integrate the refugees permanently.

“Nepal wishes to solve the Bhuta­nese refugee problem with all sin­cerity and expects the same degree of response from Bhutan,” says the official document of Ministry of For­eign Affairs. “Among other things, Nepal has been requesting Bhutan for the revival of the Ministerial Joint Committee for resolving the problem. Nepal holds firm view that the refugees should be repatriated to their homeland at the earliest with dignity and honor.” Nepal also main­tains that Bhutan has not demon­strated interest in talking further about the refugee issue.

But Dr. Nishchal N. Pandey, Direc­tor at the Center for South Asian Studies, says Nepal and Bhutan need to move beyond the refugee issue, which he thinks has been an obstacle to furthering bilateral ties. “We have many commonalities with Bhutan. There is a dire need to explore opportunities in trade, tourism and investment, including in hydro-power development. More and more students from Nepal and Bhutan are studying in each other's educational institutions,” says Pan­dey, who wrote his PhD dissertation on Nepal-Bhutan relations.

The right Nepal has given to the Bhutanese airlines to fly to Kath­mandu and then to India has helped promote Bhutanese tourism, Pan­dey points out. “But Bhutan does not give Nepalis easy on-arrival visas the way we do to the Bhutanese,” he says.

On the issue of the Bhutanese refugees, Pandey believes the resettlement in the US and other countries of the bulk of the refu­gees is a relief for Nepal. “Lately, we can see the resettled Lhotsampas actively offer their views on democ­racy and human rights on social media,” adds Pandey.

Back to the future

While Nepal is a secular coun­try with a Hindu majority, Bhu­tan is predominantly a Buddhist nation. The first visit of the king of Bhutan to Nepal took place in 1987. While he was here to partici­pate in the third SAARC summit, he also went on a pilgrimage to Halesi Madhadev in the district of Khotang. Late King Birendra visited Bhutan in 1988 for consultations on SAARC issues. When Nepal was a mon­archy, royal members of the two countries frequently visited each other's country.

Following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, Bhutan contributed $1 mil­lion to rehabilitation efforts; Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay travelled to Kathmandu to personally hand over the aid money. A 78-member relief team was also deployed in the aftermath of the quake on the request of the Bhutanese king.

Many are of the view that the two countries should hold more high-level visits. “The Swambhunath is an epitome of our age-old ties. The stupa has been renovated several times in history, and each time the Bhutanese ruler of the day has sent help,” Pandey continues. Many other monasteries and stupas in Nepal receive regular support from Thimpu. “We need to pass down such aspects of bilateral relations to the future generations. A high-level visit is long overdue. As close neigh­bors in almost the same geo-strate­gic location, we need to look toward the future and not allow the past to hold us back,” argues Pandey.

There is only limited potential for expanding bilateral relations because of the refugee issue. The sooner it is resolved, the better the prospects of Nepal-Bhutan ties.

Nearly a year and half into the mega-communist merger, there seems to be no end to factionalism in the Nepal Communist Party.

Unfortunately, the message of growing factionalism is not good for the party or the country. People voted for the Nepal Communist Party with expectation of change in the country and in their daily life. Factional feuds have betrayed their trust and affected both party and government functioning. 

Why so many factions? 

It is difficult to say why factions thrive in political parties. However, there is a tendency in all political parties not to accommodate all leaders and cadres. People who are leading the party are guided by personal interests. Party leadership often prefer to confine themselves to a certain circle of leaders. Certain people influence overall politics. That is why factionalism flourishes. 

Will it be right to say that the process of the merger is still incomplete and that there are clear UML and Maoist lines in the party?

The situation is quite different. It seems that there could be consensus between former Maoist and UML on power sharing, from center to grass-roots. It would not be difficult to bridge the gap between the two and we have already settled several issues. The agreement between two parties before the unification is being implemented. More worrying are sub-factions within factions and exploiting those sub-factions to get to power in the government and the party. There is a tendency of putting pressure on leadership on the basis of factional power and position. Leaders from both former UML and Maoist parties engage in such behavior. This could sideline emerging and capable leaders as people from certain factions are likely to be elevated in party and government. 

What about the power-sharing deal between Prime Minister Oli and Chairman Dahal? Is that settled for now? 

Though late, this issue has been settled and it should be taken positively. The principle of one man one post has been implemented. This principle should be implemented in all structures and it has started from top leadership. Allocation of powers between two parties has helped speed up party works.   

Can we say that in party affairs Oli functions like a ceremonial chair while Dahal enjoys executive rights? 

I would not put it like that. When we arranged for two chairmen, there was no mention of ceremonial and executive chairman. There was no clear demarcation of authority between the two chairs. Both chairmen are executive but the nature of work and allocation of responsibilities differ. Now, Prachanda will help the prime minister to make government functioning effective, while PM Oli will help Prachanda make with party-related works. 

How long will this arrangement hold? 

This will be valid till another decision is made. We are planning our General Convention in a year’s time. It would be better if current agreement continues till the convention. But we cannot say anything about the convention’s outcome. 

There is still lack of clarity about selection of party leader from general convention. Will it be as per the power sharing agreement between Oli and Prachanda, or there will be free competition? Will Oli help Prachanda be party leader? 

I think there will be consensus between the two leaders. The party cannot progress without managing the unification between two parties and the existence of sub-factions. Only the electoral process cannot ensure representation of all capable leaders and cadres. Therefore the first convention of the united party will be held on the basis of consensual democratic process. 

Are you suggesting that Oli should help Dahal be the sole party chairman in the next general convention? 

We are hopeful that this happens. To make the party more united and dynamic, Prachanda needs to be elected chairman from the convention floor. But it does not mean Oli’s role in the party would be minimized because he is an elected party chair. The only option is drawing a clear line between the roles and responsibilities of PM Oli and Prachanda. 

PM’s health condition is badly affecting government functioning, isn’t it? 

Cabinet meetings have been held solely due to the strong willpower of the prime minister. Right now all we hope for is speedy recovery of PM Oli. 

Now is it settled that Dahal will not stake his claim for prime minister?

The party has entered a new chapter with the agreement between PM Oli and Prachanda about the allocation of responsibilities. Therefore, till the next decision, Oli will remain the prime minister and Prachanda the party’s executive head. 

You say there are no power-sharing disputes between former UML and Maoists. What about over the election of new Speaker? 

There have been intensive discussions in the party over this. The President has already summoned the House and we will take a decision soon. Decision will be taken through consensus between Prachanda and Oli. 

Will a former Maoist or UML leader get the coveted post? 

This is also a part of the larger power sharing agreement reached between Oli and Prachanda. So, obviously, the Speaker falls in the Maoist party. But there is also a school of thought that decisions should not be taken on the basis of former divisions but rather based on the basis of merit and contribution to the party. But without them responsibility, how can a person prove his or her capability? Some leaders have multiple responsibilities while others are being deprived of even a single responsibility. 

There are reports that former Maoists are holding a series of meetings and have decided to put pressure on Oli to secure the position of Speaker for themselves. 

The spirit of party unification should be kept intact. We have forwarded such views as a suggestion to PM Oli but not as a pressure tactic. 

So former Maoists will get the speaker for sure? 

The majority of party leaders and cadres think so. There has been no discussion on specific individuals. This is not a difficult issue. The two chairmen can immediately settle it. 

How do you evaluate the government’s performance?

Performance of both party and government has been dismal. They have failed to meet people’s expectation. The past one year was totally wasted. The Standing Committee meeting has taken place after one year. Hopefully things will now change. 

The political document presented at the Standing Committee talks about the growing tussle between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Could you please elaborate? 

We have mentioned two things. First, we have emphasized the principles of Panchasheel and continued importance of non-alignment for Nepal. There is rivalry among big powers. Now, the BRI and the IPS have emerged. The BRI, launched in 2013, is focused on human development, physical development, and bridging the mental divides. The US fears losing its influence in Asia if the BRI succeeds. That is why the US came with the IPS last year. Though IPS America seems to be pushing military-type activities. We should not engage in them. The IPS tries to dictate our relationship with India. The main leader of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) compact is the US but Nepal and India will have to implement it. If it is a matter between Nepal and India, there is need to sign a contract with the US. It rather suggests the US wants to increase its influence in Nepal. If we are not cautious, it could affect our sovereignty. 

In a June interview with the BBC World Service during his UK visit, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli faced a question on the environmental impact of the proposed Nijgadh International Airport. Oli responded: “If we cut 2.5 million trees, we can plant five million of them by acquiring necessary lands.” 

That PM Oli was asked the question indicates growing international concern over the possible impact of the Nijgadh airport, which is projected as Nepal’s second international airport after the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA). Despite government assurances that more trees will be planted than felled, environmentalists are not convinced. Besides the lobbying to change the airport’s proposed site, a group of environmentalists have knocked on the Supreme Court’s doors.

Last Friday, the court ruled that the government had to hold the entire construction process, including the felling of trees. Next week, the apex court will hear arguments from both from government and the environmentalists, and deliver a final verdict. Government authorities defend the plan of an airport in Nijgadh, arguing that it is the best airport location in the plains.

The plan to build a second international airport goes back over 25 years. Two major plane crashes in 1992—Thai Airways, which claimed 310 lives, and Pakistan Airlines, which claimed 300 lives—highlighted the need for another international airport, according to government officials. Subsequently, the Nepal Engineering Consultancy Services Center Limited was entrusted with identifying a suitable location for an airport in the plains. The company submitted its report in 1995, suggesting that Nijgadh could be appropriate. In the late 1990s, there were efforts to build an airport, but they failed to make any headway.

2,500,000 deaths

After the formation of the current government in 2018, then Tourism Minister Rabindra Adhikari revived the initiative. But when the Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIA) was endorsed and made public last year, the airport’s construction suddenly became a major concern for environmentalists. Earlier, environmental impact was not a prominent issue, but has become a global concern of late thanks to the growing impacts of climate change. 

Environmentalists cite a few issues to justify scrapping the plan for an airport in Nijgadh. First, they allege, the EIA report is flawed, as it was prepared by copy-pasting sections of the EIAs for other hydropower projects. Second, a huge number of trees—2.5 million according to the EIA report—will be felled for the airport. Following the protests, government officials have been trying to convince the environmentalists (and others) that they do not plan to cut down so many trees. Third, the proposed area is a wildlife habitat and many endangered and important animals are likely to be affected. Fourth, 8,045 hectares of land has been allocated for the airport, raising questions over the necessity of such a huge area. (See box for other environmental impacts.)

Government officials, however, accuse the environmentalists of trying to block the airport at the behest of foreigners. They say compensatory trees will be planted by identifying possible areas, but progress on negotiations remains elusive.

Arguing that Nijgadh is the best location for the airport, former Captain Prachanda Jung Shah, who worked in aviation for 40 years, says the government has failed to come up with a concrete plan for the airport. “There is no clarity on the Detailed Project Report (DPR). It seems the government’s only focus is on cutting down the trees without any credible plan, which has raised doubts,” he adds.

White lies?

To justify the selection of Nijgadh, the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) has come up with a whiter paper, which says: “The TIA’s capacity has reached a saturation point, so we urgently need a second international airport. Nijgadh provides wider airspace.” What also enlarges the airport’s scope, the white paper further argues, is that passengers from the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh can use it. Additionally, it says, fuel price will be lower, given the shorter distance to the border town of Birgunj, the main trading point between Nepal and India. The paper further states that air and sound pollution will be minimal as the proposed site is located in a dense forest region.

The government has designated the airport as a national pride project. The present EIA comprises airport, its infrastructures and airport city. The proposed second international airport is rated as an ICAO category 4F, comprising two parallel runways with a minimum length of 3km, taxiways, airline set-up, hangers, communication, water supply and sanitation services, as well as a provision for hotels and residential facilities in adjacent areas. “Building an airport in Nijgadh will have a big environmental impact,” says Prabhu Budathoki, an environmentalist. “So we are requesting that the site be changed.”

He cautions that as our domestic resources are insufficient for the airport, we have to raise funds from international investors, “who are unlikely to fund projects that have a big environmental impact, a prominent global agenda now.” The proposed site has major tiger and elephant corridors, he adds, arguing that an old feasibility study cannot reflect the changing national, regional and international environmental contexts and issues.

And then there is the Madhes factor. Nijgadh lies in Province 2, the stronghold of Madhes-based parties, which say that the government is building the airport without consulting them.

“The federal government has not consulted us on such a big airport in Province 2. We also want to build an airport but environmental concerns should be first addressed,” says Raj Kishor Yadav, a senior leader of the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal. “The government has failed to take important stakeholders into confidence”

APEX Series:
Nepal’s relations with ‘smaller’ powers

1     Pakistan and Bangladesh 

2    Bhutan (December 20)

3    Labor importing countries (January 03, 2020)

4    Africa (January 17)

5    The Americas (February 7)

The KP Oli government that swept to power with a two-third majority has made foreign policy diversification one of its main priorities. Its stated goal is to reduce the country’s overreliance on India. This, it reckons, is possible only with greater engagement with China, a superpower in the making and also Nepal’s only other immediate neighbor. But Nepal is also looking farther afield. The government seems as keen to engage the Americans as it does to host Russian President Vladimir Putin. The prime minister has also visited other smaller powers like Cambodia, Vietnam and Switzerland. 

In this multipolar world with multiple political and economic systems, diversification is the right strategy to pursue. Yet there also has to be a method to it. Just like we do with big powers, we should engage smaller powers strictly based on our national interest. Closer ties with Cambodia and Vietnam are desirable. But why aren’t we bolstering ties with neighbors like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan? We should also examine the spreading of our diplomatic wings: can we justify embassies in South Africa and Brazil, for instance?

Our new APEX Series “Nepal’s relations with ‘smaller’ powers” looks to explore our relations with countries other than India, China and the US, the big powers that are constantly on its radar. How should we pursue our relations with labor-importing countries? Or with Africa or the rest of the Americas? In this first article of the series, we discuss Nepal’s relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, two countries physically close to Nepal but farther than many European and American states in terms of trade and connectivity. 

Can Nepal overcome India’s reservations over greater engagement with Pakistan? And why aren’t Nepal and Bangladesh, separated by just 27 km, trading more? Nepalis are constantly expanding their horizons, as is clear by their growing presence across all six inhabited continents. A record number of us are venturing abroad to work, to travel, and to settle down. It is only right that our government embraces the global ambitions of its citizens.
 

Pakistan: Difficult balancing with India

In his 2004 book Pakistan Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy, Bidanda M Chengappa, Associate Professor of International Relations at Christ University in Bangalore, writes, “Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Nepal has evolved over the five decades, with India as an important factor in their ties… both the countries attempted to cultivate cordial relations with each other only in order to dilute India’s influence in South Asia.”

As Chengappa elaborates, there have been several instances since the 1960s when India has been an important factor in Nepal-Pakistan ties, and Nepal has always maintained a neutral and cautious approach to Indo-Pak conflicts. The most recent example concerns India’s revocation of the special status of India-administered Kashmir. Nepal initially refrained from issuing any statement. Later, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali made a vague statement calling for resolution of the problem through dialogue. Nepal maintained a neutral position amid pressure from both India and Pakistan to side with them.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between Nepal and Pakistan on 19 March 1960, bilateral relations have neither progressed substantially, nor have they faced major setbacks. It was King Madhendra who took the initiative to establish diplomatic ties with Pakistan as part of his broader policy of diversification. In June 1959, Mian Ziauddin, then Pakistani High Commissioner to India, visited Kathmandu and had long discussions with King Mahendra and PM BP Koirala about establishing diplomatic relations. These talks bore fruit a year later.

In the initial phase, the Pakistani High commission to New Delhi was also accredited to oversee Kathmandu. During the Panchayat era, there were some high-level visits between Nepal and Pakistan. King Mahendra paid a visit to Pakistan in 1961 to seek Pakistani support for the Panchayat system, which Islamabad extended. Subsequently, Pakistani President Ayub Khan made an official visit to Nepal in 1963 and spent almost two weeks here.

Pakistan’s approach has always been to support Nepal on issues over which Nepal has difference with India. For example, when King Mahendra imposed the Panchayat system, India expressed its reservations over it whereas Pakistan fully backed it. Similarly, while India objected to King Birendra’s proposal to recognize Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto welcomed it. Bhutto had said, “We ourselves initiated certain proposals on the same lines and we welcome any proposal by a friendly country and a friendly sovereign like Birendra.”

Nepal, on its part, has always been cautious about its approach to Indo-Pak disputes. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Nepal faced a difficult situation. Pakistan complained that Nepali Gurkha soldiers were used against the Pakistan Army. “King Mahendra expressed his inability to intervene in the matter and the Nepalese foreign minister KN Bista even visited Pakistan in the post-conflict phase to personally explain the issue,” writes Chengappa. Similarly, Nepal has persistently maintained a neutral position on Kashmir.

However, there has been little progress on trade, investment and tourism between Nepal and Pakistan. After 1990, leaders of the two countries have met on the sidelines of various regional and global forums, but the frequency of high-level visits has gone down. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi visited Nepal on 5-6 March 2018 after almost 15 years; before that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had visited Nepal in 1994.

There is some cooperation between the two armies. In May 2018, Nepal Army Chief Rajendra Chhetri called on the prime minister and defense minister of Pakistan, and discussed possible cooperation between the armies. Similarly, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan Armed Forces General Zubair Mahmood Hayat visited Nepal in June.

The Pakistani government also provides scholarships for Nepali medical students.

Nepal exports black tea, woolen shawls, leather, hides and skins, optical lenses, herbal medicines, lentils and cardamom to Pakistan. Nepal’s imports from Pakistan include refined leather, machinery and parts, shoes and sandals, spices, poppy seeds and medicines. But overall trade is just $5 million. On average, around 3,000 Pakistani tourists visit Nepal every year.

In 1994, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, on her visit to Nepal, had pledged support for joint ventures in the industrial, agricultural, technical, and technological fields. “We aim to increase our trade, which at present represents only a small fraction of the trade of Nepal and Pakistan with third countries,” she had said. There has been little progress so far.

Bangladesh: Alien a stone’s throw away

When Bangladesh was created after its split with Pakistan in 1971, Nepal was the seventh country to recognize the new Bangla state by establishing diplomatic relations on 8 April 1972. Following this, Pakistan had severed diplomatic relations with Nepal, but reestablished it later.

Five months after Nepal recognized Bangladesh, then Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad came to Kathmandu, and his Nepali counterpart Gyanendra Bahadur Karki visited Dhaka the same year. In 1977, Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman came to Nepal, and King Birendra paid a state visit to Bangladesh in 1980. An example of close cooperation between the two countries in this period was the founding of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Dhaka in 1985. Nepal had strongly backed the formation of this regional grouping.

Soon after its creation, Bangladesh faced a huge food crisis and Nepal provided 15,000 tons of rice to it. In 1976, the two countries signed four memoranda of understanding (MoUs), covering trade, transit, civil aviation, and technical cooperation. They also agreed to collaborate on power generation and water resources. Although possible areas of cooperation were identified, little progress was made in subsequent years.

Nepal-Bangladesh relations have thus been characterized by high-level visits and discussions on potential areas of collaboration. Bilateral ties remain cordial but with little to show for it. Although Nepali and Bangladeshi leaders have met frequently on the margins of regional and multilateral summits, rarely have they made high-level visits to each other’s countries.

Bangladeshi President Abdul Hamid visited Nepal last month after a long gap, but there was no in-depth discussion on bilateral issues. Still, diplomats say, it could herald an era of more high-level visits, which could pave the way for greater engagement between the two countries.

A potential area of cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh is hydropower. On 10 August 2018, they signed a much-awaited agreement for energy cooperation. Some Bangladeshi companies have shown interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower. “Bangladesh is keen to buy electricity from Nepal in order to address its power shortage,” says former Nepali Ambassador to Bangladesh, Choplal Bhushal. “There has been some progress as well. We can either use the Indian power grid or construct a separate grid with India’s consent for the purpose.”

However, Sunil KC, Chief Executive of Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs in Kathmandu, has a different take. “Without signing a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protect Act (BIPPA), we cannot bring much investment from Bangladesh,” he says.

Bangladesh and Nepal are separated by 27 kilometers of Indian land. Following the opening of Kakarvitta-Phulbari-Banglabandha transit route in 1997, Bangladesh has permitted Nepal to use the port in Mongla. Bangladesh has also provided an additional rail-transit corridor to Nepal via Rohanpur-Singhabad, but this too has not been adequately utilized. “We can fully utilize those transit facilities, which are nearer to us than Chinese ports. And the Bangladeshi government is ready to offer us more facilities,” says Bhushal.

Various studies have also been conducted on the possibility of railway connectivity between the two countries.

There are some hindrances to the import of Nepali products in Bangladesh. While Nepal readily imports Bangladeshi goods such as industrial raw materials, chemicals, fabrics and textile, jute products and electronic items, Bangladesh is blocking most of our products. Still, Nepal exports some amount of yellow lentils, oil cakes, large cardamom, wheat, vegetable seeds, handicrafts and pashminas to Bangladesh. Total bilateral trade today stands at some $10 billion. Given Bangladesh’s huge population, there is undoubtedly much scope to export a lot more to Bangladesh.

Then there are thousands of Nepali students who are studying in Bangladesh, particularly medicine, and the number is rising. Tourism is another potential area of cooperation. Yet the number of Bangladeshi tourists in Nepal has been declining. In January-October period this year, a total of 19,279 Bangladeshi tourists visited Nepal, a 1.9 percent decline from the previous year. Over 29,000 Bangladeshi tourists had visited Nepal in 2017.

As Nepal is preoccupied with big powers like India, China, and the US, the country has made little or no effort to enhance ties with smaller South Asian countries. Lack of homework on exploring areas of cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh, for example, is a huge missed opportunity.

Why could the two transitional bodies make no headway?

The intent itself was flawed. You cannot expect good results from a wrong approach, and this is what happened in the past four years. The law was formulated to serve the interest of leaders who were themselves human rights violators. The core purpose of the law was to provide blanket amnesty on war-time cases instead of justice to victims. The law granted the commission rights to make recommendations to the government irrespective of the position of conflict victims. The concerns of the victims were ignored. We knocked on the door of the Supreme Court against some of its provisions but the government hurriedly endorsed it and the commissions were subsequently formed. The people who have in-depth knowledge of and experiences with transitional justice were blocked and office-bearers were appointed along political lines. Later, the Supreme Court asked the government to amend the flawed provisions but the parties ignored the verdict. The commissions thus became platforms for parties to appoint their loyalists and show the international community the transitional justice system was functioning. There was the tendency of delaying the process and tiring the victims out.

How do you rate the performance of the two commissions in the past four years?

We were consulted only six months after the two commissions were formed. There were questions over whether the conflict victims were a priority for the commissions. We were saying the law itself was flawed but those who were appointed claimed it was fine. The terms of the office-bearers were repeatedly extended for no good reason and without any concrete work plan. The timeframe the commissions needed to complete their work was not properly defined. There were inter- and intra-commission fights. And they did not coordinate with national and international rights organizations. The government did not allocate enough resources.

In your view what were the legal hurdles to investigating war-era cases?

Obviously, the law was the key. The United Nations, the National Human Rights Commission, several NGOs and the international community have repeatedly been saying that the law should be amended in line with the 2015 Supreme Court verdict. But political parties and successive governments have chosen to ignore the ruling.

Now the government is again preparing to appoint new office-bearers to the two commissions. What is your take on this?

First, we have to analyze why the previous commissions could not work. There should be a comprehensive review without any prejudice. Whose mistake was it? The governments, the political parties, or the commissions? The Recommendation Committee had pledged to review all aspects of previous commissions but there has been no progress so far. The previous commissions were not able to settle even a single war-era case, which is a shame. More than that, the commissions cannot work if new laws are not formulated in line with the Supreme Court verdict and the victims’ suggestions. Without meaningful participation of the conflict victims, the TJ process can never reach a logical conclusion. The government and the commissions alone cannot drive the process. If you try to impose something from the political level, the results will be unproductive, as was evident in the past four years.

How should the transitional justice process proceed then?

First, the job of the Recommendation Commission should be put on hold. There should be meaningful consultations with all stakeholders, and we should have the right to fix the modality of those consultations. The government cannot dictate anything. The new act should accommodate the outcomes of such consultations. Similarly, the two transitional justice commissions should have a clear working calendar. The people who have in-depth knowledge of transitional justice should be given the responsibility, for which the government needs to prepare a roster of possible candidates.
 

Are you suggesting that as things are conflict victims have no hope of justice?

Obviously. Under the current circumstances, there is no room for hope. There are attempts to reappoint those who were removed earlier from the commissions. This will be a futile exercise.

A lot obviously depends on the political will of the major political parties. What is their stance on it?

They either want to scrap the whole process or settle it as per their wish. They do not intend to provide justice to the victims or to settle war-era cases. Politicians are saying all war-era issues should be forgotten in the ‘new Nepal’.

What is the position of the conflict victims on this?

First, all the appointments and processes should be credible and transparent, and convey a clear message to the victims that their genuine concerns will be addressed. The Recommendation Commission invited us for consultations twice, but did not heed even one of our suggestions. The consultations were just a show. The most important factor is to build trust. The people appointed based on political quotas cannot investigate the complaints filed against their political masters. Without a trustworthy process, we cannot expect a trustworthy result. There are around 63,000 complaints with the commission; we first have to identity the modality of settling them. There should be clarity on whether all complaints should be handled individually or whether some should be dealt with collectively.

Are you suggesting that you have no platform on which to voice your concerns?

We don’t have such a platform. The society does not listen to us. Politicians often want to avoid this issue. Even media coverage has decreased. There should be public hearings in different places where the victims can express their plight and concerns.

How do you evaluate the concerns of the international community toward transitional justice?

Their concerns have gradually dissipated, particularly after the formation of a strong government led by Nepali Communist Party Chairman KP Oli. Though they still issue statements in our support, their concerns are now marginal. The country now has a stable government, which is saying that transitional justice is a purely domestic issue and as such the international community should not speak about it.

What should the conflict victims do if war-era cases are not settled through national mechanisms? Any plans to take them to international platforms?

It is an issue of humanity and not confined to national boundaries.  For now, conflict victims want to settle all issues domestically. But if the government continues to ignore us, we will have no option but to seek justice elsewhere.

The Chinese train may or may not be coming to Nepal soon. China has only just agreed to a feasibility study of the Keyrung-Kathmandu railway. But is the train the best way to ensure better cross-border connectivity? What about improving the condition of our roads leading to China, at far less cost and time? The locals of Rasuwagadhi on the border with China don’t understand the federal government’s push for a train when improving the state of border roads could immediately work wonders to boost Nepal’s trade with China. 

They have a point. The Chinese have been keen on developing Rasuwagadhi into a major trading point between the two countries after the closure of the border point at Tatopani, over security concerns, following the 2015 earthquake. On the Chinese side of the border, high-tech immigration and custom facilities are ready. On the Nepali side, work has barely begun. Without a customs office, Nepali traders face many hassles. Says Choten Sherpa, a Rasuwagadhi resident, “Chinese officials and tourists come here frequently, and they always request us to press our government to speed up the upgrade of the roads.” 

But seldom do the visiting Chinese talk of a rail line, he says. The Chinese have let their Nepali counterparts know that building a rail line via Rasuwagadhi will be mighty difficult, and yet Nepal keeps insisting on it. The Chinese see no option but to go along with the Nepali request, perhaps hoping that Nepalis will see sense once the feasibility study is completed and the real costs become clear. 

Back in Rasuwagadhi, “the Chinese are asking us to hurry, but the Department of Roads is delaying the process citing budgetary constraints,” says Dawa Dorjee Tamang, Chairman of Ward 2 of the Gosaikunda rural municipality near the border. He says the work could be further delayed as the government needs to follow a public tender process.

The road versus rail debate continues to make news in Kathmandu. Meanwhile, the residents of Rasuwagadhi are confident that despite all the delays, it is only a matter of time before the roads to China are repaired and their lives, and the lives of their compatriots, become progressively easier.

Rasuwagadhi folks want roads now than railways later

The impatient Rasuagadhi locals, though dejected with the slow work of their government, have their fingers 
crossed. Most are optimistic that even though it may take some time, better roads to China are an inevitability

“Chinese officials and tourists come here frequently, and they always request us to press our government to speed up the upgrade of the roads between the two countries,” says Choten Sherpa, a resident of Rasuwagadhi, an area in Rasuwa district bordering China. “Seldom do they mention the railway.”

Interestingly, many locals have no clue about the possible routes of the much-hyped cross-border railway and the progress on it so far. They are instead worried about the roads. The Chinese side had officially opened the Gyirong Port on the Rasuwagadhi border in 2014 as an alternative to the Tatopani border point. Locals say there has since been little progress on Nepal’s part in improving road conditions.

“In the name of railways, we may continue to ignore these vital roads for another 20 years,” laments Dawa Dorjee Tamang, Chairman of Ward 2 of the Gosaikunda rural municipality near the border. “The government collects billions in revenue from this border point. Why not spend some of it in maintaining and repairing our roads?”

He also advises the federal government to focus more on roads rather than railways. The pre-feasibility study of the Keyrung-Kathmandu railway line has already identified the big hurdles on its way—hard rocks, snowfalls and greater chances of earthquakes. China has informed Nepal that a railway line may be possible, but only after considerable homework. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit in October, the two sides agreed to a feasibility study for a cross-border railway. The visit also emphasized road and tunnel connectivity.

“The Chinese side conveyed its readiness in initiating the repair of Syaphrubesi-Rasuwagadhi Highway,” states the joint statement issued after Xi's visit. “Realizing the importance of enhanced level of connectivity between the two countries, the two sides agreed to proactively cooperate on the feasibility study for the construction of tunnels along the road from Jilong/Keyrung to Kathmandu.”

Roads not easy too

Yet even the operation of roads year-round in this area presents formidable challenges because of the difficult terrain and snowfall. There are three main road linkages between Kathmandu and Rasuwadadhi.

The first one, between Kathmandu and Betrawati, are connected by three different roads: a) Kathmandu-Galchi-Betrawati, b) Kathmandu-Kakani-Betrawaiti, and c) Kathmandu-Tokha-Betrawati. Expansion of all three is underway. In parts of the Kathmandu-Galchi-Betrawati highway, a four-lane-road has already been built.

The second section comprises the route between Betrawati and Syabrubesi, an old, 41-km-long road via Dhunche (see the map alongside). A new road, which is 24 kilometers shorter than Betrawati-Dhunche-Sybrubesi, is under construction, connecting Betrawati with Sybrubesi via Mailung.

Although there is regular bus service between Betrawati, Dhunche and Syabrubesi, it is frequently obstructed—sometimes for two to three months—because of snowfall and landslides. The under-construction Mailung-Syabrubesi road is being built over hard rock, and it will take time to make it work. But this section via Mailung offers two benefits: it is shorter and sees less snowfall than the road via Dhunche.

The Betrawati-Dhunche-Syabrubesi road section is now under operation and buses and trucks plying between Kathmandu and Syabrubesi are routed this way. But the road is in a pathetic state and the government has paid scant attention to its maintenance, compelling people to make a risky journey.

The third section between Syabrubesi and Rasuwaghadi is also in a bad shape. The Chinese side has already agreed to financial assistance to upgrade this 16-km stretch. The agreement states that the section will be upgraded to two-lanes and blacktopped. Although the inauguration of the upgrade works took place in September, work is yet to start because of the delay in removing electric pylons and shifting human settlements on the Nepali side.

Betting on the hare

“The Chinese are asking us to hurry, but the Department of Roads is delaying the process citing budgetary constraints,” says ward chair Dawa Dorjee Tamang. He says the work could be further delayed as the government needs to follow a public tender process. “Even though the local sentiment is in favor of improving roads, five years since this border-point officially came into operation, there has not been much progress except for the opening of the Mailung-Syabrubesi track,” adds Tamang.

Not only roads, Nepal is yet to build other infrastructures needed to operate the border point. For instance, the foundation stone of the Integrated Customs Office was laid in 2014, but construction has not moved beyond the initial stage. The absence of such an office has made life difficult for Nepali traders and security officials, who face countless immigration-related hassles at the border. Proper lodging facilities for border forces and other staff deployed there are also lacking. China, on the other hand, has already built high-tech immigration and custom facilities on its side of the border.

The Chinese have been keen on turning Rasuwagadhi into a major trading point between the two countries after the closure of the border point at Tatopani following the 2015 earthquake.

But on Nepal’s part, despite frequent and loud talk about connectivity with the northern neighbor in the past few years, mainly after the Indian blockade of 2015-16, there has been no substantial progress.

In the absence of proper roads and other infrastructures, traders and locals alike face a plethora of problems. But the impatient Rasuagadhi locals, though dejected with the slow work of their own government, have their fingers crossed. Most of them are optimistic that even though it may take some time better roads to China are an inevitability.

On 26 December 2018, North and South Korea held ‘a groundbreaking ceremony’ to start a project to re-connect their railways and roads and to modernize North Korea’s old railway line. The two have also agreed to carry out a joint survey. 

These developments are considered meaningful in North-East Asia as South Korea plans to extend its railway line to China and Russia, which will potentially have huge geopolitical impact in the region.

The blueprint for the ‘New Economic Initiative’ prepared by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification was shared with a group of international journalists in the last week of October. 

It clearly mentions South Korea’s plan to connect with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through North Korea. “We are seeking a new engine for economic growth and North Korea is focusing all its efforts on its construction industry, so we have given top priority to railway connectivity,” said officials at South Korea’s Ministry of Unification. 

“The launch of the railway and road project also had symbolic meaning because it marked a starting point for [South Korean President] Moon’s proposal for the establishment of an East Asian rail network linking the Koreas with China, Russia and Mongolia,” wrote The Korea Times in its editorial published on 27 December 2018, a day after the ceremony. Since then, there have been several rounds of talks between the two Koreas about the railway line. 

Officials say the ambitious railway line will be costly, although exact figures are not available yet.  The Chinese province of Liaoning, which shares a border with North Korea, has already proposed a railway line connecting it with the North Korean capital Pyongyang and to extend it to Seoul under the BRI. 

“This railway line will be costly, but it will be worth it,” said an official at South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The railway lines of the two Koreas remain largely broken since the Korean War (1950-1953). China and North Korea have also signed an agreement to link Dandong, a city in Liaoning Province, with Pyongyang with a high-speed rail line. 

Experts say such developments will bring about significant changes in North-East Asia’s geopolitics. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has emphasized enhancing cooperation between the two Koreas since he assumed office in 2017. He has embraced a policy of greater engagement with North Korea amid lack of progress on denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang. 

Moon also came up with the ‘New Economic Initiative’, whose core and long-term objective is to connect with China’s BRI, Russia’s New Eastern Policy, and Mongolia’s Prairie Road Initiative. More than that, South Korea, which has a military alliance with the US, is willing to enhance cooperation with China in order to boost its economy, which is currently stagnant. Therefore, South Korea’s policy right now is to join the BRI by reconnecting its railway line with North Korea’s.

Chinese companies’ direct investment in South Korea surged 240 percent in 2018, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. China invested $2.74 billion in South Korea in 2018, up 238.9 percent from 2017 when China cut its investment by 60 percent. Chinese nationals also account for 31 percent of foreign visitors to South Korea, and South Korean officials say the railway line would help bring more tourists from China and increase other economic activities. 

The main obstacle to implementing the ‘New Economic Initiative’ is the slow progress on denuclearization. Said another South Korean official, “Denuclearization can lead to huge economic cooperation between the two Koreas.”