A seemingly mysterious power-sharing agreement between KP Sharma Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal has been in the news since the unification of the erstwhile CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) in 2018. The agreement is apparently about who leads the party and the government and for how long.

Former UML leaders, including Oli, want to either hide or downplay it, going so far as to publicly claim there is no such agreement. Whenever somebody makes a statement to that effect, a miffed Dahal immediately sees Oli and reminds him of the deal. An uneasy truce prevails after Oli assures Dahal he will honor the agreement. But another disagreement soon surfaces.

The implementation of such an agreement depends partly on what second-rung leaders of the party make of it. This week APEX explored the understanding and positions of some second-rung leaders of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) on the power-sharing deal. When it comes to the agreement, the second-rung leaders are clearly divided into two camps: those belonging to the former UML and those from the former Maoist Center.

Former Maoist leaders claim that Dahal has repeatedly briefed them on the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with Oli. One such leader, requesting anonymity, said,  “In the final days of the unification talks between the two leaders, Dahal had informed us of an agreement on leading the government on an equal basis—meaning Oli would hand over the reins of power to Dahal after two and half years.”

Room for compromise

As far as leading the party is concerned, former Maoist leaders say there had been a deal to chair party meetings on a rotational basis, but Oli has been presiding over such meetings himself, much to Dahal’s chagrin. The leaders suggest there is room for compromise if Oli hands over party chairmanship to Dahal.

“It is unnecessary to change the country’s premiership in the middle of the five-year term if Oli agrees to hand over party chairmanship to Dahal,” says a former Maoist leader close to Dahal. He adds that Dahal has time and again said there is no need for a rotational prime minister system if he gets full responsibility to run the party. Leaders close to Dahal have hence advised him to claim party chairmanship (rather than prime ministership) in order to penetrate deeper into party organizations.

Some UML leaders, however, say they do not know of any gentleman’s agreement between Oli and Dahal; others are of the view that agreements of such nature should be presented in official party platforms.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Ishwar Pokhrel has been fiercely opposing the gentleman’s agreement. He has repeatedly said in public forums that the party does not recognize the deal between Oli and Dahal, if there is such an agreement in the first place.

In light of the opposition by Pokhrel and some senior leaders, Dahal has started reaching out to former UML leaders to solicit their support in implementing the deal. Just after Dashain, for example, Dahal held a long conversation with Pokhrel. But Pokhrel maintains neither Oli nor Dahal has informed him of the agreement. Pokhrel and other leaders close to senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal say the gentlemen’s agreement between the two chairmen should be an official party agenda.

Party capture

According to sources, some former UML leaders are also trying to bring PM Oli and senior leader Nepal closer in order to sideline Dahal. The likes of Ishwar Pokhrel, Shanker Pokhrel, Som Prasad Pandey and Rajendra Pandey, among others, want to see a reconciliation between PM Oli and Nepal. They fear Dahal and his team could capture party structures ahead of the NCP general convention, and are of the view that Oli should not bequeath the party’s legacy to a former Maoist leader. Still, whether Oli’s successor would be a former UML leader or a Maoist remains a matter of speculation.

NCP leader Devendra Poudel, who is close of party co-chairman Dahal, believes PM Oli is committed to the gentlemen’s agreement, and it is rather “some second-rung leaders who are provoking him into repudiating the deal.”

Senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal has not publicly opposed the agreement. But at the same time, Nepal himself wants to lead the party and is likely to clash with Dahal over the matter. Nepal says both Oli and Dahal should inform party leaders and cadres about the gentleman’s agreement.

Other NCP senior leaders like Jhala Nath Khanal and Bam Dev Gautam have not publicly opposed the agreement. And even as many former UML leaders want them close, Nepal’s relationship with PM Oli has instead soured. PM Oli’s nomination of seven province heads without consulting the party rank and file has further irked Nepal.

With Oli’s heath condition worsening, he will face greater pressure to hand over party responsibilities to Dahal. But Oli seems undeterred by his frail health and is in no mood yet to resign from the posts of the PM and the party chair.

While he was in Singapore for medical treatment, PM Oli had entrusted Dahal with the responsibility of chairing party meetings for the first time since party unification. Dahal had used this opportunity to consult a wide range of NCP leaders. Oli had back then apparently almost agreed to hand over all party responsibilities to Dahal but had backtracked following intense pressure from party insiders.

Restless ramblings

This has left the former Maoist supremo chomping at the bit. Dissatisfied with the delay in handing him total control of the party, Dahal vented his ire at a recent program in Banke district. He assured local businessmen that all their demands would be fulfilled “as soon as I become the prime minister.”

Generally, Oli and Dahal jointly chair party meetings, although the former is dominant. As the party structures are dominated by former UML leaders and cadres, Dahal faces the challenge of making his leadership acceptable to them.

NCP leader Deepak Prakash Bhatta, who is close to senior leader Nepal, says there is no reason for dissatisfaction. “We still have 10 months to implement the deal. The pact was reached between two individuals, but its goal was to facilitate party unification. So I do not foresee any obstacle,” he says. Bhatta adds that the party unification process at the provincial and local levels has been smooth, and it would not be hard to reach a power-sharing agreement at the top.

Another leader close to Nepal, however, says there would be no objection to Dahal assuming temporary leadership until the general convention, but Dahal’s election as chairman from the convention floor is still uncertain. But the leaders close to Dahal claim the power-sharing deal would be applicable even after the general convention.

The strategic interest in Nepal seems to be growing by the day, be it the interest of India, China, the US, or the Europeans. But our prime minister was recently in Baku to take part in the NAM Summit. How do you see these twin developments?

On the issue of NAM, it has to account for its own relevance. First, consider the nomenclature. Non- aligned against whom? This is the big unanswered question. The moment we say non-alignment, it means non-alignment with certain powers. It was at the time of Cold War when certain countries came together under the visionary leadership of leaders like Nehru, Sukarno and Tito that the NAM was created. They thought of a group that would not align with the US or the USSR. But after the Cold War, there are no more two superpowers. So why nonalignment? Second, in the multi-polar world, countries like India and China are coming up and there is a larger space for Germany and Brazil, and Russia is resurgent. In that context, where is NAM going to be?

Third, we are hanging on to a past relic. This was also evident in India’s approach. PM Narendra Modi has already skipped two NAM summits. This year he sent a ceremonial vice-president. We also sent our vice-president to the previous NAM summit. This time, despite his ill health, PM Oli decided to attend himself. It was taxing on his health because it was a very short trip. We have not been able to sell the idea that the head of government himself has to participate. But, yes, the summit gives you a platform to interact with global leaders and to forge personal ties with other heads of government and heads of the state.

The Oli government says it adheres to NAM principles as it is still not aligned to any big power, for instance the US, China or India. Can’t non-alignment be defined that way?

Well, it can be. This year’s NAM summit took place in Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. We don’t have any embassy in the Caucasus. So it was a good opportunity to understand the Caucasia region and Central Asia. Those countries have a lot of energy and gas which could be brought to South Asia. If we aspire to expand our foreign relation we can think of new embassies in Central Asia. The countries there should also be encouraged to open embassies here. That way the summit in Baku was an opportunity to expand the horizon of Nepal’s foreign policy. But there was no interaction between Nepal and those countries.

But PM Oli saw it fit to meet the Venezuelan President, didn’t he?

This government has tried to have good relations with countries with left governments. It was evident during the PM’s visits to Vietnam and Cambodia, and in his meeting top leaders from North Korea and Venezuela.

But don’t you think it is still a good idea for comparably smaller powers like Nepal to band together under NAM to protect their interests against the big powers? 

But by sending its vice-president, India has signalled that NAM is more a ceremonial body. So it has significance, it has history, but it is more ceremonial, and has more of a symbolic value. We could have done a similar thing. But the fact that our executive prime minister participated in the summit obviously gave us an opportunity to interact with global leaders. But as far as the utility of NAM is concerned, it is diminishing very fast.

Again, what about the idea of smaller countries coming together to safeguard their interests?

We no longer live in a bipolar world with two superpowers and are slowly entering a multi-polar world.  As I mentioned earlier, there is resurgence of Russia, India and China. The US under Trump shows some unpredictability but right now it is nonetheless the sole superpower. I do not think NAM’s current leadership is up to handling the challenges of this multi-polar world. NAM was initiated by some visionary leaders but they are now all gone. The current NAM leaders do not have that kind of international personality. For NAM to be significant, it has to have an economic component as well. Also, if you look at multilateral institutions like United Nations, WTO, and NAM, they are facing a problem today because everybody is now talking about ‘my country first’. The United Nations is having a serious fund-crunch. There are reports that it may not be able to pay its staff. If the UN is so neglected, does NAM stand a chance?

One concept that is closely linked to NAM is Panchasheel. After his return from NAM summit, our Foreign Minister said Panchsheel principles like peaceful coexistence and sovereignty are still relevant for Nepal.

Panchasheel was actually mooted between India and China for their peaceful coexistence. I have a slightly different take on it. Indo-Nepal relations go back to the time of Ram and Sita, and much before Panchsheel was even thought of. So how can we have India-Nepal relation based on Panchsheel?  Second, our constitution says that our foreign policy is based on the UN charter and Panchsheel, and so we apparently have to abide by it. But we have to look at the practical side of things as well. Our relations with both India and China date back to pre-historic times. Now, we are trying to build connectivity through railway, roads and optical fibers. There is now a direct flight between Kathmandu and Beijing. Foreign policy parameters are also changing. We should not get bogged down with old concepts like NAM.

But NAM is also a platform for Nepal to assert its sovereignty. Our prime minister for instance got prominent space in Baku.

Yes, we have to be active in these multilateral organizations but let us make sure we also have correct representations there. Our diplomats are also highly qualified, not only to project our international image but also to ensure that our economic needs are met.

Who is setting Nepal’s foreign policy priorities right now?

It is the prime minister. It is a top-heavy structure. All vital positions are occupied by Nepal Communist Party. Do NCP leaders have expertise in every field, from economics to literature, from academicians to foreign policy, virtually everything? This is where the problem lies. It looks like NCP does not need expertise from outside.

In the end, how to you evaluate the foreign policy of Oli government in its 20 months in office?

There are both plus points and minus points. The plus points are: the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping which took place after a long hiatus, the government pushing hard for better connectivity with both the neighbors, Nepal being heard and taken seriously by foreign partners because we have become more active, and the visit by Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali to Washington.

On the minus side, the core issues remain. Nepali flights are still banned in European countries. Even though Visit Nepal Year is approaching we have not been able to solve this issue. Our foreign missions remain inactive and there is no clear ToR of some embassies. Regarding Indo-Nepal relation, why has the EPG report not been submitted to the two prime ministers? Why couldn’t we have provided for submitting the final report to the two foreign ministers instead? Some of these core issues  remain unsettled.

As the UN Security Council deadline for the repatriation of all North Korean workers draws closer, a senior US government official says Nepal is making ‘good progress’ in implementing the Dec 22, 2017 Security Council resolution. As per the resolution, Nepal will have to repatriate all North Korean workers by the last week of December this year.

Speaking to media persons on the condition of anonymity, the US government official added that Nepal is on course to meet the deadline. “It is gratifying that Nepal government is taking steps and cooperating with both US government and UN officials to implement sanctions,” he said. In the second week of June this year, Mark Lambert, US special envoy for North Korea, had visited Nepal to take the stock of progress on Nepal’s part. During his stay, he had met lawmakers, government officials as well as ruling Nepal Communist Party Co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal.

According to Nepali officials, Lambert had expressed concerns over North Korean workers and the businesses they ran in Kathmandu. The ruling NCP, however, is divided over cracking down on North Korean activities in Nepal. Many in the party believe that as bilateral relation between Nepal and North Korea is on track, the activities of North Koreans in Nepal should not be restricted. But, as a UN member, Nepal is obliged to implement the UNSC sanctions.  

The US official also discussed the possibility of cyber-attacks by North Korean hackers to steal money from Nepali banks.  The Americans believe North Korean hackers have stolen at least $1.1 billion in a series of attacks on global banks over the past four year, of which $81 million was taken from the central bank of Bangladesh in February 2016. “As other South Asian countries may face the same problem we are ready to support their banks protect themselves from hackers,” the official added.

The UN panel on implementation of sanctions is investigating North Korea’s evasion of financial sanctions to illegally transfer funds from financial institutions and cryptocurreny exchanges, according to a UN report. According to it, such cases were reported in Bangladesh, Chile, Costa Rica, Gambia, Guatemala, India, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Tunisia and Vietnam.  

A senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea also pointed to possible cyber-attacks from North Korea as a major challenge other countries. On Nepal’s part, US officials say they are ready to help it enhance its cyber capabilities. 

Earlier, during his visit to Kathmandu in May this year, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary at US State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Affairs, David J Ranze, had taken up this issue with Nepal. Similarly, the same issue figured in Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali’s visit to Washington in December last year.  

The UN and the US are both concerned that North Korea nationals continue to work in several countries with the goal of generating funds for North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In order to monitor the status of sanction implementation, UN had formed an expert panel. 

After pressure from US officials, Nepal instructed nine companies with North Korean investment to close down and take back their investment after liquidation of their companies. Nepal has also informed North Korea that it is not going to issue any business visa to its nationals after October-end, 2019. 

Available evidence suggests many countries have not done enough to send back North Korean workers. There is also a tendency of changing the North Korean companies’ names to evade sanctions. 

For at least a year North Korea has been at the forefront of global discussions and media coverage in light of its recent engagement with the US, even though the engagement has not helped in the denuclearization of North Korea. Similarly, there have been several rounds of talks between North Korea and South Korea. The ongoing diplomatic engagement, however, has helped reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula.

“The two leaders also agreed to expand ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation, push forward facilitation of regional inter-connectivity, and work with other related parties to strike the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as early as possible.”

This is part of a statement provided by Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on October 13. The two leaders in the statement refer to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But there has been no official response to Yi’s claim that the two leaders agreed to expand China-India Plus cooperation.

But what is the ‘China-India Plus’ concept anyway? No publicly available official document explains it in detail. It came to the fore after the first Xi-Modi informal summit in April 2018 in Wuhan, the capital of the Chinese province of Hubei. The summit had taken place against the backdrop of a 73-day-long standoff between India and China over Doklam, which, strictly speaking, was a bilateral issue between China and Bhutan. India had still deployed its army there on Bhutan’s behalf, stating that any changes in Doklam’s status would affect its security.

In the aftermath of the standoff, China proposed the China-India Plus cooperation in order to minimize the conflict between the two countries over smaller South Asian states. It was also an acknowledgement by the Chinese that India is the dominant power in South Asia, so they need to take the Indians into confidence while pursuing vital infrastructure projects and entering into military and other cooperation in the region. In other words, India is always an important consideration in China’s relations with South Asian countries.

Again, the Doklam issue seems to be the trigger for the China-India Plus concept, which envisions that India and China will be mindful of each other’s sensitivities and security interests in South Asia. During the Wuhan Summit, Xi and Modi agreed to implement joint economic projects in Afghanistan. Last year, they together launched a training program for Afghan diplomats in New Delhi.

China pushing

Nepal’s situation cannot be compared with that of Afghanistan, but India is obviously concerned about the growing Chinese influence here, particularly about big Chinese infrastructure projects. China thus wants to implement the Plus concept in Nepal in order to minimize the risk of confrontation with India over development projects here. Many reckon Xi’s decision to fly to Nepal from India—as opposed to coming here from China directly—indicates Beijing’s desire to execute this concept.

During Prime Minister KP Oli’s visit to China, Xi briefly shared with him the discussions he had had with Modi about the Plus concept. Xi and Modi also discussed it during their second informal summit in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and Xi then shared it with Nepali leaders in Kathmandu. In return, Oli reportedly told Xi that Nepal is in favor of trilateral cooperation, but not the ‘two-plus one’ model. The Chinese side, however, is pushing for it.

PM Oli has rejected this proposition. In an interview with Kantipur, a Nepali daily, he argued that partnerships should be formed on the basis of equality. Experts also think Nepal should not accept this proposal, as it weakens the county's bargaining power with its two giant neighbors, and affects its sovereignty in that it undermines Nepal’s ability to deal independently with India and China on vital infrastructure and development projects. China is keen on the ‘two-plus one’ model as it wants to launch key projects in Nepal, such as the construction of a railway line, by taking India on board. China is also eager to invest in hydropower plants in Nepal and export energy to the Indian market.

Security over economy?

What about trilateral cooperation though? The idea of India and China collaborating on Nepal’s development is not new. Trilateral cooperation has been under discussion for about a decade; co-chairman of the ruling Nepal Communist Party Pushpa Kamal Dahal has been speaking about it since 2010. But how does it differ from the China-India Plus cooperation?

“China-India Plus cooperation entails the two countries taking each other into confidence while developing any projects in Nepal. The goal is to address each other’s concerns in Nepal,” says Pramod Jaiswal, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, a Delhi-based think tank. “Although China-India Plus sounds similar to trilateral cooperation, the two are different. Trilateralism suggests equal share of all three countries and is more economic in nature, whereas the Plus concept is primarily security-driven,” says Jaiswal who has penned a book on trilateral cooperation.

“Genuine cooperation between China and India in Nepal is relatively easy to achieve, and there are multiple ways to do so, one example being a railway line connecting the three countries,” says Bhaskar Koirala, Director at the Nepal Institute of International and Strategic Studies. “The main argument here from a Nepali perspective is that sustained cooperation between its two neighbors in Nepal would almost certainly constitute the key ingredient for the country’s long-term stability and prosperity,” Koirala says. He adds that trilateral cooperation is not a concept proposed by the Chinese, but one that originated in Nepal, so the Nepali side should take its ownership. “I definitely agree that trilateral cooperation is much better for Nepal than the China-India Plus concept,” he says.

Hope and reality

Indian foreign policy experts and commentators, however, claim there is no possibility of India joining hands with China in Nepal. At a summit in Goa, India in 2016, then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal had met with Modi and Xi together. Dahal had projected the meeting as a manifestation of trilateral cooperation.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs quickly batted down any notion that it was a trilateral meeting, saying it was only a coincidence that the three leaders happened to share the same space. This clearly indicates India’s lack of interest in trilateral cooperation—and it will not materialize without India’s buy-in.

China, however, seems open to both the Plus concept and trilateral ideas. “China can invite India to join China-Nepal cooperation projects and develop China-Nepal-India trilateral cooperation. This will not only enhance trust, but also increase the economic value of the cooperation projects,” wrote Long Xingchun, Director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, in an article published in the Global Times on October 13.

“For example, if the three countries can cooperate in hydropower generation, Nepal’s resources, China’s funds and technology and India’s huge market can be leveraged together.” As China-India strategic trust has increased, Nepal, he further argues, can use Chinese and Indian resources to promote its own development and act as a bridge linking the two nations.

The big-power rivalry in Nepal is getting curiouser and curi­ouser. India imposed a crip­pling blockade on the landlocked country for its reservations over Nepal’s new constitution. Gasping for life, the country and the then KP Oli government naturally turned to China, Nepal’s only other immedi­ate neighbor. He went there in 2016 and signed many vital agreements, most importantly the Trade and Transit Treaty and a deal to import a third of Nepal’s oil from the northern neighbor. The goal was to forestall another blockade-like situation at all cost. His policy of ‘diversifying’ away from India paid electoral dividends— and at long last led to Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit. The Indians are worried. What does the growing Chinese presence in Nepal mean? Does it pose a direct threat to Nepali democracy? Does it spell an end to its traditionally dominant role? India and China have seldom cooperated for the benefit of third countries in the region, and it would be naïve to expect them to do so now, never mind Wuhan or Malappuram.

There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the ruling parties in Nepal and China helps bring the two countries closer. “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this mas­sive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge,” writes SD Muni, an old Nepal hand in India for The Quint.

Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army and anoth­er Nepal expert, believes it is more a case of Nepal being “some­what fearful of China and doing things after receiving some signal from Beijing.” Yet most Indian ana­lysts also seem quietly confident that Nepal is trying in vain to overcome the hard constraints of geography.

After the formation of the two-third communist government last year, Nepal has been more assertive in its foreign policy conduct under the new slogan “amity with all, enmity with none”.Mainly, the government is trying to strike a balance among three major powers—India, China and the US—while also reaching out to key development partners. Balanc­ing the three powerhouses, which sometimes have conflicting inter­ests, has proven to be a Herculean task. In particular, Nepal faces the challenge of simultaneously han­dling the American Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Adding to Nepal’s challenge is the growing perception in India and the US that the communist government is steadily tilting toward China.

Despite claims to the con­trary, the Americans and the Chi­nese have introduced the IPS and the BRI respectively in order to augment one’s own clout and contain the other. India, meanwhile, has been main­taining a low profile in Nepal amid the Sino-American rivalry. Although the IPS projects India as a strategic partner, the latter’s position on the American strategy remains unclear.

Southern discomfort

Growing Chinese influence in South Asia has long been a concern for India. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal, a first by a Chinese pres­ident in over two decades, must have added to the worry. Xi sent a clear message that China would help Nepal realize its dream of transforming itself from a ‘land-locked’ to a ‘land-linked’ country. Since the Indian blockade of 2015-16, Nepal has adopted a pol­icy of diversifying its trade and tran­sit options. Xi’s visit and the agree­ments on connectivity projects he signed in Kathmandu have given a boost to the policy.

India has not issued an official state­ment on Xi’s trip to Nepal; Indian officials in Kathmandu maintain that they are still evaluating the broader implications of the visit. But com­ments from former diplomats, for­eign policy commentators and media practitioners suggest that New Delhi is wary of the growing Chinese footprint in Nepal. Indian government officials, however, have been downplaying the import of Xi’s trip and making routine statements that there is nothing out of the ordinary about such visits and India has no reason to be bothered.

Such statements notwithstand­ing, India has had reservations over Nepal’s decision to join the BRI. India also expressed displeasure with Nepali officials when Nepal and China began their first ever military drill in 2017. India is not happy with their growing military ties and says that the Indian and Nepali armies enjoy an unparalleled special relationship.

Following the Indian blockade, Nepal signed a transit and transport treaty with China, ending its sup­ply system’s total dependence on India. The protocol to the treaty has been finalized, and both countries are working to enhance rail and road con­nectivity in order to implement the agreement. New Delhi has felt uneasy over the proposed infrastructures such as rail­ways, roads and tunnels.

Imran Khan and KP Oli

Nihar R. Nayak, a research fellow with IDSA, a New Del­hi-based think tank, says, “It is a bilateral visit con­cerning Nepal and China, so there is noth­ing much for India to comment on. Elevating com­prehensive part­nership to strategic partnership is the only phrase that India could have concern with.” But he adds that India expects Nepal to address its core issues while making agreements with other coun­tries, be it China or the US.

What are those core issues though? “India’s genuine security interest in Nepal, including the perils of terror­ism; big infrastructures built by third countries in Nepal and their implica­tions; and possible threats and chal­lenges to multi-party democracy in Nepal,” replies Nayak. Two other vital Indian concerns, according to him, are the protection and smooth func­tioning of Indian projects in Nepal and adverse climatic impact in Nepal’s Himalayas.

“Xi Jinping is free to visit any coun­try. But if he invites Imran Khan just before he comes to India for an infor­mal summit and visits Nepal just after, people will read meaning into it,” said Ashok Malik, a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, in a recent interview with NDTV.

“As Xi and Oli discuss the CNEC [China-Nepal Economic Corridor], the elephant in the room is PM Modi. It is no secret that Delhi is wary of China’s infrastructure projects in Nepal. On its part, Beijing has often suggested that India must be part of the CNEC; for many projects will not be commercially viable without India’s partici­pation,” wrote C. Raja Mohan, Director at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National Univer­sity of Singapore, for The Indian Express on October 13.

There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the rul­ing Nepal Communist Party (NCP) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) helps bring the two countries closer. Stating that China has posed cultural, ideological and political challenge to Nepal, SD Muni, an expert in Nepal-India relations, writes in a recent article for The Quint: “There is a degree of complacency at the strategic level in India that in the long run, the Chinese cultural push will not last—Chinese language is difficult to inculcate, and Chinese values and lifestyles are alien to the Nepalese. And even if this view stands validated, enough damage might be done by then to India’s vital interests in Nepal.”

Muni adds, “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this massive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge. It is still lick­ing its wounds caused by the most grotesque political intervention in Constitutional affairs in 2015.”

Plus or minus

China has proposed new formulas to mitigate Indian concerns over big infrastructure projects. For instance, it first came up with a proposal of trilateral cooperation, which did not materialize. Last year, China put forward a new proposal of ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation, which entails consulting each other before launching big projects in small South Asian countries. Though India has not reacted to it, Chinese State Councilor and For­eign Minister Wang Yi, soon after Xi’s visit to India and Nepal, said that Modi and Xi discussed ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation.

“The two leaders also agreed to expand ‘Chi­na-India Plus’ cooperation, push forward facilitation of regional inter-connectivity, and work with other related parties to strike the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as early as possible,” Xinhua news agency quoted Wang as saying at a media briefing.

Pramod Jaiswal, Senior Fel­low with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, another New Del­hi-based think tank, tells APEX that there is little India can do to counter Chinese influence in Nepal. “Chi­na’s rise has opened up new space in all South Asian countries. But in Nepal, India has also given additional scope to China through its flawed policies and failed diplomacy.” The best India can do, he adds, is com­plete with China “with better proj­ects, bigger grants and smoother implementation of development programs.”

Interview with Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army

Nepal’s vital infra projects in China’s hands

 How did you view Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal?

The visit had been pending since 2014. We had been hearing different reports that Xi was not happy with the preparations for his trip or that he was not visiting Nepal. Finally, he visited Nepal and conveyed a big message. In my understanding, no foreign leader has had the impact that Xi did during his two-day state visit. When Indian Prime Minister Modi went to Nepal for the first time in 2014, it was billed as landmark. Modi also won the hearts and minds of the Nepali people.

Preparations for Xi’s visit were tak­ing place for a long time. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Kathmandu a month ago. A delega­tion of the Chinese Communist Party had also visited Nepal. And a seminar on Xi’s political thought was recently held in Kathmadu.

Before his visit, Xi himself wrote an article that was published in private and government newspapers. He went to Nepal with a new blueprint for bilateral relations. He said China would help Nepal become ‘land-linked’ instead of ‘land-locked’. He talked about the Nepal-China Eco­nomic Corridor under the Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Con­nectivity.

The visit was the outcome of well-thought-out preparations. Its timing was also significant. Currently, Nepal has a communist government with a big majority in the parliament. In this context, the visit by the paramount leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a turning point in Nepal’s history.

What did you think of the agree­ments signed during Xi’s visit?

The agreements do not have much substance as there are no delivera­bles. The financial assistance, how­ever, is important. There have been agreements to conduct feasibility studies of some connectivity projects, which are significant. But until and unless India gets involved in such vital connectivity projects, China will not invest its money and tech-nology. There is no economic benefit in extending the railway line up to Lumbini, because the flow of tourists only would not sustain it. The main target of the railway line is obviously India’s market. Nepal has always wanted to be a bridge between its northern and southern neighbors. When Baburam Bhattarai was the prime minister, he pushed the concept of trilateral coopera-tion. However, India’s focus is on continuing and enhancing bilateral cooperation because it thinks of itself as the dominant power in South Asia. As far as the economic corridor is concerned, it would gain signifi-cance if India joins it. India-China relationship is tense at the moment and it is poised to remain so for long. Therefore, the feasibility study of China-Nepal-India economic corridor is challenging. Billions of rupees are required for the construction of roads and railway lines.

How do you evaluate the current state of Nepal-India and Nepal China relations?

The two cannot be compared because Nepal and India share an open border, whereas the Nepal China border is a closed one. Nepal and India also enjoy close military cooperation. China, with a closed border with Nepal, cannot demand the same type of relations that India has with Nepal. There may be flaws in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship, but the fact remains that the two countries share an open border. There is frequent movement of people, one lakh Nepalis are currently employed in the Indian security forces and two lakhs of them receive pensions. In terms of geography too, the major Chinese population hubs are much farther from Nepal than are Indian population hubs. With some caution I would say that Nepal fears China. Nepal frequently says Taiwan is part of China, it keeps reaffirming the one-China policy, it strictly curbs anti-China activities, it closes the office of the Dalai Lama, and bars the celebration of his birth-day. All these indicate that Nepal is somewhat fearful of China and does things after receiving some signal from Beijing. Now that Nepal has a communist majority government, there is more pressure than in the past. But China is giving more devel-opment assistance to Nepal as well.

How can India minimize China’s influence on Nepal?

India should focus on completing its development projects in Nepal on time. All its works, be it the Rax-aul- Kathmandu railway line or any other development project, should be of high quality. However, major development projects are already in China’s hands. Nepal is handing over projects to build airports, roads and hydropower plants to China. China-Nepal eco-nomic corridor is under construc-tion. The letter of exchange men-tions investment in infrastructure and hydropower projects. In the past, there was no such focus. Now China is constructing transmission lines in Nepal.

Are you suggesting that Nepal is already in China’s fold?

We cannot say that. My analysis is based on the current political situation in Nepal. What type of political equation emerges in the future cannot be predicted.

(Our India correspondent Asha Thapaliya talked to Mehta in Delhi)

In recent months, top leaders of the ruling parties, including Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, have been speaking about the possible danger to the current political dispensation. Although they assert no one can go back on republicanism, they also claim that some forces are trying to sabotage the current federal democratic republican system. There are also many who argue that ruling party leaders are making such statements to cover their failure to deliver, which has led to growing public frustration.

For the first time after becoming prime minister in February last year, Prime Minister Oli on August 20 summoned an all-party meeting and requested political parties ‘to defend and strengthen’ the federal democratic republican system. In the meeting, Oli claimed that some forces are trying to jeopardize the constitution—clearly hinting at the growing activities of former King Gyanendra Shah.

According to multiple sources, Shah has increased his activities in what could be a last-ditch effort to revive the monarchy. The government has received information that Shah has intensified his lobbying—both domestic and foreign—in order to launch a movement against the current political system. If his activities will lead to something tangible remains to be seen, but they have certainly given rise to many speculations.

Although the monarchy’s revival seems unlikely in the near future, as major parties strongly profess their commitment to the constitution, they also fear that Shah and his acolytes could exploit people’s frustration. 

Ruling party leaders concede that the government’s failure to deliver has led to a rise in public discontent and that regressive forces think of it as an opportune moment to rally people against the current order. They are of the view that although Shah has been trying to roll the clock back for long, the current situation is different as he has intensified his efforts in recent months.

Many campaigns

Besides Shah’s domestic and international lobbying to restore the monarchy and Nepal’s status as a Hindu state, a number of other campaigns that go against constitutional provisions are underway, although it is not clear if or how they are connected to Shah.

There is a vocal and sizeable section in the Nepali Congress (NC), the main opposition, in favor of a Hindu state. In a NC Mahasamiti meeting held a few months ago, around 700 out of 1,500 members had expressed their support for a Hindu state. NC General Secretary Shashank Koirala, Shekhar Koirala and even Ram Chandra Poudel, arguably the most powerful Congress leader after party president Sher Bahadur Deuba, are positive on their demand. It should be noted that this section of the Congress champions the restoration of only the Hindu state, not the monarchy— although the historical connection between the two is strong. NC leaders say that the Hindu state is going to be a prominent issue at the party’s upcoming general convention. Then there is the Rastriya Prajantra Party (RPP) led by Kamal Thapa, whose official position is the revival of the Hindu state and monarchy. Thapa frequently meets Shah, but his party believes that the former king should not be associated with, and dragged into the activities of, any single political outfit. Says Mohan Shrestha, RPP Spokesperson, “People are gradually considering an alternative to the republican system. And neighboring countries might also have thought there is a need for one credible and long-term Nepali institution they can rely on to protect their interests in Nepal.”

But even Shrestha reckons that reviving the monarchy or the Hindu state would be difficult without the support of big parties. Along with Shah’s increased activities, the RPP has also intensified its campaign to garner people’s support for restoring the monarchy. A referendum to decide the fate of the monarchy has long been among its chief demands. Finally, there are a number of less-organized groups that are launching separate campaigns for the revival of the Hindu state and/or the monarchy.

According to sources, former King Gyanendra Shah complains with national and international politicians about the failure of the Nepali political parties to honor the informal agreements reached right before he relinquished absolute powers following the second ‘people’s movement’ of 2006. From 2009 to 2015, in his democracy day message, he used to say that in order to ensure the country’s stability and prosperity, all agreements reached between him and the political parties should be implemented. Shah, however, has not clearly said what those agreements were. Those close to the former king claim that major parties had pledged to keep some form of monarchy alive, but they did not abide by it. Leaders of the major parties deny there was such an agreement.

Tainted figures

Those who demand only the revival of the Hindu state (and not the monarchy) believe that due to the tainted image of King Gyanendra and his son Paras Shah, common people will not accept them as their king. (Many Nepalis suspect the two had a hand in the 2001 royal massacre, and Paras has a long history of waywardness.) “Gyanendra is a major cause of the monarchy’s abolition. Had there been another figure, the institution would probably have survived. Gyanendra and his son Paras are still the main stumbling blocks to the monarchy’s revival,” says a top politician of a pro-monarchy party who has closely worked with the former king. “The then Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had also given their nod to ‘a baby king’, but it did not materialize due to Gyanendra’s opposition,” he adds. Even the elder statesman and leader of the 2006 ‘people’s uprising’ Girija Prasad Koirala had repeatedly floated the proposal of ‘a baby king’.

King Gyanendra is aware of his and Paras’s tarnished image. That is why he has now floated the idea of reviving the concept of ‘a baby king’. According to the people in touch with him, the former king is willing to accept Hridayendra Shah, his grandson, as the new king. He is well aware that people will not accept Paras as their king.

There have been some media reports in the past couple of months that ruling and opposition party leaders are meeting Gyanendra, although such meetings have not been independently verified. There were reports that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Ishwar Pokhrel, and another Nepal Communist Party (NCP) leader Bam Dev Gautam met Gyanendra. NC General Secretary Shashank Koirala was also reported to have met the former king.

In April this year, Gyanendra went to Dhanusha, Sarlahi, Saptari, Udayapur, Panchthar and Ilam districts and visited several temples there. During the visits, he also met local politicians and civil society leaders. On his 73th birthday on July 1 this year, the former king published a book of articles and interviews, which was noted for its exorbitant price. The book has one article by Gyanendra himself, in which he has defended his direct rule. He has also stated that the country is in a state of flux without explaining the term.

External lobbying

Mainly after the promulgation of the new constitution in September 2015, Gyanendra has intensified his domestic and international visits. His stay in Bangkok in August lasted a considerable while. Before heading there, he had held consultations with people from various walks of life.

“In the past three years, former King Gyanendra has had an accelerated series of ‘exploratory’ talks separately and jointly with various levels of political representatives from the two neighbors who have at regular intervals given some frugal briefing to the Americans too,” wrote senior journalist P. Kharel in his Republica column in April. (Kharel often meets Gyanendra.) In January last year, Gyanendra met Yogi Adityanath, Chief Minister of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, at the latter’s residence in Lucknow. The yogi has openly supported the revival of the Hindu state and monarchy in Nepal. The same year, Gyanendra also visited China, but details of his meetings there are sparse. According to sources, Gyanendra is in regular touch with the embassies of the US, India, China and Japan in Kathmandu.

It just does not compute. One is a political party elected by an over­whelming majority to realize the goals of their first fully-democratic constitution. The other reigns over an authoritarian system where the party can chop and change the nation­al charter and curtail people’s free­doms at its will. How can they even see eye-to-eye, much less sign a pact of everlasting friendship and mutual learning? But even while the recent bonhomie between Nepal’s NCP and China’s CPC seems farfetched, the two also have many things in common. Both are communist parties, at least nominally. It makes sense for two communist parties ruling two neighboring countries to try to share ideas and keep the communist flame alive—at a time when the embers of communism are being extinguished around the world, including in South Asia. Then there are domestic com­pulsions. The NCP government came to power on the back of a promise to build stronger relations with Chi­na following the Indian blockade. Likewise, as China’s economic mir­acle loses its sheen, Xi Jinping seeks greater validation for his leadership at home and abroad.

The NCP’s intimacy with China has not been without controversy. Polit­ical analyst Puranjan Acharya says the new proximity between the two parties “raises doubts about Nepali communist parties’ commitment to democracy and pluralism.” Yet another political observer, Shyam Shrestha, cautions us not to read too much into the communist-communist agreement. He reckons Nepali com­munists are far too indisciplined (and perhaps also reluctant) to implement the structured ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. But he also thinks this could be a great opportunity for Nepal to learn from “China’s miraculous material progress” in recent decades.

India and the US, Nepal’s two other important international partners, have been spooked. They view the communist government in Nepal with considerable suspicion, and each is trying to work out its new modus operandi. This decision of one Nepali party could thus have far-reaching consequences for the whole country. After emerging from a long bout of uncertainty and instability, Nepal risks plunging into another, which could be unleashed by a new wave of geopolitical competition.

Has the NCP sold its soul to its Chinese counterpart?

China has built an image in Nepal of a powerhouse that does not overtly interfere in its political affairs. China’s approach has been to cultivate ties with all political parties, with greater focus on the ruling ones. So it has had normal and steady relations with the Nepali Congress (NC), the current main opposition, and other parties, irre­spective of their size or political ideology.In recent times, and particularly after Xi Jinping assumed presidency in March 2013, there has been some shift in China’s approach to dealing with Nepali political parties, mainly the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP). In 2018, at the 19th National Congress, President Xi presented his political blueprint for the next 30 years—‘Xi Jinping Thought on Social­ism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, simply known as ‘Xi Jinpingism’. This ideology has now been officially incorporated into the Chinese constitution.

In China, Xi Jinpingism is being taught to party leaders, cadres, bureaucrats and journalists, and has been included in school curric­ula. Of late, there has also been a concerted effort to export this ide­ology to other countries through the Communist Party of China (CPC). It may be a coincidence, but just when China introduced Xi Jinpingism, Nepal saw the ascendency of the NCP. A big section of the ruling party is in thrall to China’s political and development models.

Life after monarchy

China’s bid to strengthening Nepal’s communist parties began after the abolition of the monar­chy in 2008. During the decade-long insurgency (1996-2006), China did not support the Maoists; in fact it accused them of misusing the name of their Great Helmsman Mao. China even backed the monarchy to suppress the Maoist rebellion. But following the peace process and the monarchy’s abolition, China wanted to see a strong commu­nist force in Nepal. More recently, Chinese leaders encouraged the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center), the two largest commu­nist parties, to unite—or so believe many Nepalis.

When the NCP was born after the merger between the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center) in 2018, the Communist Party of China proposed to orient its leaders and cadres to Xi Jinpingism. “They offered to share his thoughts and we accepted. A further exchange of views will take place in the upcoming delibera­tions,” says Devendra Poudel, a member of the NCP School Depart­ment, which is responsible for the political schooling and training of the party rank and file.

Initially, the Chinese side had pro­posed the NCP School Department to learn its ideology and experience in running the party and the govern­ment. According to Nepali leaders, the Chinese had forwarded its pro­posal a year ago but it was delayed in the absence of the party’s School Department. “This should not be viewed as us embracing the policies of Xi Jinping. But we do also want to learn from China’s miraculous development,” Poudel adds.

This is not the first time the CPC has invited dozens of NCP delegates, both youth and senior leaders, to China to train them. A few months ago, a team led by Dev Gurung, a senior NCP leader, visited China to learn about Xi’s ideology and how the party and the government there function. Currently, the CPC has several training centers across the country to train both Chinese cad­res and representatives from other countries on Xi’s ideology.

Exporting ideas, importing trouble?

The latest bonhomie between the ruling communist parties of Nepal and China worries some. “NCP leaders being indoctrinated on Xi’s thoughts could further alienate a big mass in Nepal that is already suspi­cious of communists of any kind, especially during elections,” says Dr. Mrigendra Bahadur Karki, Executive Director of the Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), a think-tank. According to Karki, if Xi’s thoughts are being embraced as a counter to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it could backfire, giving the US, India and other western powers an excuse to propagate anti-China messages via Nepal. But how? “As it is a one-party state, there can be no meaningful political debates inside China. In this situation, if our ruling party embraces Xi’s thoughts, then other powers can denounce his thoughts in the name of criticizing the NCP. Such criticism could then spill over into China and create a difficult situ­ation there,” Karki clarifies.

In the past one year, there has been a series of exchanges between the NCP and the CPC focused on orientations and sharing ideas. In May 2018, Deputy Director of CPC Ma Zue Song was in Kathmandu to take part in a program mark­ing the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birthday. He said that the NCP could play a big role in advanc­ing nation-building and socialist movements in South Asia. “We are ready to work with the communists and left forces around the world to observe, interpret, and lead through Marxism,” he said.

After party unification, senior NCP leaders such as Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and Jhala Nath Khanal have each visited China twice. Three provincial chief ministers—Mahenra Bahadur Shahi (Karnali), Prithvi Subba Gurung (Gandaki) and Shan­kar Pokhrel (Province 5)—have also gone to China. In April, a team led by NCP General Secretary Bishnu Poudel was in China for delega­tion-level talks. There is now little doubt that China wants a strong NCP-led government in order to secure its interests in Nepal. Cur­rently, 29 mayors elected on an NCP ticket are attending a seminar in Kunming, the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan. The partici­pants were selected by the Prime Minister’s Office.

Such exchanges have raised fears that the NCP could be influenced by how the party and the govern­ment function in China. In the past one-and-half years, there have been some indications that the KP Oli gov­ernment is trying to curtail media and civil rights granted by the con­stitution. The growing influence of the executive on the functioning of the legislature and the judiciary has also been a matter of alarm.

Show or substance?

Observers say a section of the NCP is highly impressed by Xi Jinpingism. Political analyst Puranjan Acharya thinks there is a clear danger of the NCP being influenced by this ideol­ogy. “Now China has a declared pol­icy of exporting the ideology of Pres­ident Xi Jinping, which our ruling party appears ready to embrace,” he says, adding that this raises doubts about Nepali communist parties’ commitment to democracy and plu­ralism. “NCP leaders are saying that they want to learn from China. In political parlance, learning means imbibing elements of the way in which the party system functions,” he says.

Chairman Mao had a declared pol­icy of not exporting ideology. In his first five-year term, President Xi had said that China neither exports nor imports any political ideology. The policy, however, was changed when Xi Jinping’s thoughts were incor­porated into the CPC constitution, and term limits for the country’s president and vice president were abolished.

Another political observer Shyam Shrestha believes China wants to publicize its political and develop­ment model across the world as per the decision of the 19th National Congress last year. “Obviously China wants Nepal to adopt its political and development model. But I do not think Nepali leaders will sub­scribe to this ideology.” Why not, especially as the two communist parties even signed an MoU on extensive sharing of ideas and visits in Kathmandu recently?

“For one, our communist leaders are not used to working in a system. It is hard to believe they will disci­pline themselves just because they now have an agreement with their Chinese counterparts,” Shrestha elaborates. But yes, he adds, our leaders could learn from China’s tremendous material progress in the past 30 years, “which has captured the world’s attention.”

Traditionally, China has built an image in Nepal of a power that does not interfere in its political affairs. China’s approach has been cultivating ties with all political parties, with more focus on the ruling ones. That is why China has a consistent and pretty normal relations with Nepali Congress (NC) and other fringe parties, irrespective of their political ideologies.

In recent times, mainly after Xi Jinping became China’s president, there has been some shift in China’s approach to dealing with Nepali political parties, mainly Nepal Communist Party (NCP). In 2018, at the 19^th National Congress, President Xi presented his political blueprint for the next 30 years, called the Xi Jinping “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” which has now been officially incorporated into the constitution. This ideology is known as ‘Xi Jinpingism’.

Inside China, the ideology is being taught to party leaders and cadres, bureaucrats and journalists, and it has been included in school curricula. This is not limited to China. In recent times, there has been a concerted effort to export this ideology to other countries through Communist Party of China (CPC). It may be a coincidence but just when China introduced Xi Jinpingism, Nepal saw the emergence of the powerful Nepal Communist Party (NCP). A big a section of NCP is attracted to China’s political and development models.

Post-monarchy modus operandi

China’s bid to strengthening the communist parties in Nepal began after the abolition of monarchy. During the insurgency, China did not support the Maoist party; instead they charged the Nepali Maoists of misusing the name of their Great Helmsman. China then backed the monarchy to suppress the Maoist insurgency. When the Maoists emerged as the largest party in 2008, China wanted to see a strong communist force in Nepal. Subsequently, CPC leaders also encouraged CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) to unite.

When NCP was born in 2018 after the unification of UML and Maoists, CPC proposed to orient its leaders and cadres about the thoughts of Xi Jinping. “They proposed to share his thoughts and we accepted the proposal. In the upcoming deliberations, they will share views and we will present ours,” said Devendra Poudel, a member of the NCP School Department that is responsible for political indoctrination of party rank and file.

Initially, the Chinese side had proposed the NCP school department to share its ideology and experience in running the party and government. According to Nepali leaders, the Chinese had forwarded his proposal a year ago but it was delayed in the absence of the party’s school department. “This should not be viewed as us accepting the policies of Xi Jinping. We also want to learn from the miracle development of China,” Poudel added.

This is not the first time CPC has invited dozens of NCP delegates, both youth and senior leaders, to China to train them. A few months ago, senior leader of NCP Dev Prasad Gurung-led team visited China to learn about XI’s ideology and how the party and governments there function. Currently, CPC has several training centers across the country to train both internal cadres and representatives from other countries on Xi’s ideology.

Broader implications

The latest bonhomie between the ruling communist parties of Nepal and China worries some. “NCP leaders being indoctrinated on Xi’s thoughts could further alienate a big mass in Nepal that is already suspicious of communists of any kind, especially during elections,” said Dr. Mrigendra Bahadur Karki, Executive Director of the Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), a think-tank.

According to Karki, if Xi’s thoughts are being embraced as a counter to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it could be counterproductive, giving the US, India and other western powers an excuse to propagate anti-China message via Nepal. But how?

“As it is a one-party state, there can be no meaningful political debates inside China. In this situation, if our ruling party embraces Xi’s thoughts, then other powers can criticize his thoughts in the name of criticizing NCP. This could create a difficult situation for China internally,” Karki clarifies.

In the past one year, there has been a series of exchanges between NCP and CPC focused on orientations and exchanging ideas. In May 2018, Deputy Director of CPC Ma Zue Song was in Kathmandu to take part in a program organized to mark the anniversary of Karl Marx’s birthday. He said that NCP could play a big role in advancing nation-building and socialist movements in South Asia. “We are ready to work with the communists and left forces around the world to observe, interpret and lead through Marxism,” he said.

After party unification senior NCP leaders such as Pushpa Kamal, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and Jhala Nath Khanal, have each visited China twice. Three provincial chief ministers—Mahenra Bahadur Shahi (Karnali), Prithvi Subba Gurung (Gandaki) and Shankar Pokhrel (Province 5)—have also gone to China. In April, NCP General Secretary Bishnu Poudel-led team also went to China for delegation-level talks.

There is now little doubt China wants a strong NCP-led government in order to secure its interests in Nepal.