President Vladimir Putin’s ninth visit to India starting from 2000—his first after 2021—has arrived at a moment of extraordinary strategic recalibration. Only two days before the visit began (Dec 4), Washington released its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), a document that signals the United States’ shift from expansive values-based foreign policy to a sharper, interest-driven approach rooted in economic security and technological primacy.

The simultaneity is not accidental; it symbolizes a transforming global order in which India, Russia, and the US are pursuing overlapping but divergent strategic goals, and South Asia sits at the fulcrum of this new geopolitical geometry.

The Putin-Modi meeting carries implications not only for Eurasian stability but also for how the US interprets India’s strategic autonomy and recalibrates its own Indo-Pacific playbook.

India at the center

The NSS 2025 acknowledges bluntly that the US cannot “secure every geography nor stabilize every region”; instead, it will prioritize critical partners capable of shaping the global economy, technology ecosystems and regional balance. India stands at the top of this list, described as a “system-shaping middle power” whose partnership is essential for US economic resilience, defence innovation and Indo-Pacific balancing.

Yet Putin’s visit demonstrates that India’s ascent is anchored in multi-alignment, not alignment. India has neither abandoned Russian defense ties nor restricted Eurasian dialogue despite Western pressure. Instead, New Delhi has widened all channels—deepening defense co-production with the US, sustaining energy ties with Moscow, and managing a complex relationship with China across competition, deterrence and cooperation. This can be accounted precisely for the behavior Washington anticipated, but perhaps underestimated in intensity.

Why Putin’s visit matters 

To the US, the optics of a confident, sanctions-resistant Russian leader receiving a warm Delhi welcome carry three strategic messages: one, that Russia retains influence where the West expected decline. India continues to leverage Russian defense support—particularly spare parts, legacy system maintenance and co-development initiatives that Washington cannot fully replace in the short term. Energy cooperation remains robust, and discounted Russian oil has been crucial to India’s inflation management.

Two, India will pursue autonomy even when US pressure peaks. Despite the growing US–India defense technology partnership—jet engine co-production, UAV collaboration, semiconductor cooperation—New Delhi refuses to limit strategic options. Putin’s visit reinforces India’s unwillingness to become a pillar of a US-led bloc.

Third, Eurasian consolidation remains a live possibility. Moscow’s outreach to India is not merely bilateral. It connects to broader projects—International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) dialogue, Arctic shipping and Asian energy integration—areas Washington must now monitor with renewed seriousness. India and Russia interact through UN and G20 in the global forums, regional groups such as Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), East Asian Summit (EAS), financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and extensive bilateral mechanisms (annual summits, Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC), 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue  and Strategic Economic Dialogue. In addition, in the sector-specific cooperation platforms like the Nuclear Energy, Defense Working Group, Space cooperation, energy and Education and cultural exchanges. 

These messages have direct consequences for how the US implements the NSS 2025. The US will respond by deepening India’s economic incentives. While NSS 2025 downplays ideological diplomacy, it elevates economic security and supply-chain diversification as central pillars. Putin’s visit will accelerate US efforts to firstly to expand critical mineral cooperation with India, secondly to attract Indian companies into US industrial ecosystems, thirdly to increase joint research platforms under QUAD and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for prosperity (IPEF), and lastly to fast-track bilateral trade negotiations previously stalled.

Washington will double down on offering India economic and technological leverage that Russia cannot match.

 Stricter defense technology protocols 

The US understands that India operates Russian-origin systems and engages in sensitive defense exchanges with Moscow. To prevent potential technology leakage, Washington is likely to introduce a more robust end-use monitoring, tighter controls on dual-use technology, and clearer segregation between US-led and Russia-linked Indian projects. 

This will not stall US–India defence cooperation, but it will make technology firewalls more prominent.

Acceptance of India’s strategic autonomy 

The NSS 2025 subtly accepts that India will not become a formal ally. Putin’s visit reinforces that assumption. Washington’s emerging approach is pragmatic: work with India where interests converge, avoid friction where they don’t. This opens space for a more mature, less expectation-heavy partnership.

A more fluid strategic landscape 

Putin’s India outreach reshapes the region in ways Washington will study closely.

Pakistan’s strategic relevance to Washington continues to decline. With India strengthening ties with both the US and Russia, there is little incentive for the US to return to older patterns of Pakistan-centric engagement. Islamabad’s utility becomes more functional—counter-terrorism, nuclear risk management—not geopolitical. 

A more competitive Eurasian environment gives these states greater bargaining power. The US, following its new NSS, will adopt: project-based engagement, maritime capacity-building, debt sustainability support, and supply-chain diversification with Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

These states will increasingly play China, India, Russia and the US against one another to secure economic benefits.

Quiet leverage in a multipolar moment

Nepal stands to gain more subtly than other South Asian states. 

A triangular pattern—India maintaining Russian ties, strengthening US partnership and managing China rivalry—creates strategic breathing room for Kathmandu. For the US, Nepal becomes valuable not as a geopolitical frontline but as a functional partner in sectors aligned with American priorities under NSS 2025: green energy and cross-border power trade, digital governance, cyber security, critical mineral mapping, private-sector investment in hydropower, and disaster response and counter-crime cooperation. 

Engagement will neither surge nor decline—but it will deepen sectoral, with fewer political expectations and more performance-based cooperation. This aligns with Washington’s new doctrine: selective, focused, outcome-oriented. 

For Nepal, the key is to maintain balanced diplomacy while leveraging its position within the India-US-China triangle and the emerging India–Russia connectivity frameworks.

A triangular future

Putin’s visit does not derail US-India cooperation. Instead, it forces Washington to adjust expectations, respect India’s independence and compete more intelligently. The NSS 2025 already anticipates this; the visit accelerates it. 

India emerges not as a camp follower but as a sovereign pole—the only major power capable of engaging Washington, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously without aligning with any. 

For South Asia, this means greater flexibility. For Russia, it preserves Eurasian influence. For the US, it demands strategic patience and economic creativity. 

And for the emerging world order, it signals a future defined less by blocs and more by fluid alignment, selective partnerships and overlapping spheres of cooperation.

The author, a Maj Gen (Retd) and strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu, writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy and stability