Fast track: National pride or another white elephant?

“We can complete the project by the deadline if the government allocates sufficient funds and settles land acquisition-related disputes.” 

This has been the refrain of the Nepal Army, the official contractor of Kathmandu-Tarai Fast Track Road Project, at every press meet since it got the job on 11 Aug 2017. 

Over the years, the project has suffered numerous cost and time overruns, but the army hasn’t stopped repeating this excuse. The initial deadline was Sept 2021. But now it has been pushed to Jan 2025. Similarly, estimated project cost has gone up to Rs 213bn from the initial Rs 86bn. 

In its latest press meet held on Feb 22, the army insisted that the project was “on track despite some hurdles”. It also assured that work would pick up pace in the second half of 2022. 

The army aims for 21 percent overall progress by the end of this year. But with only 16.1 percent physical progress till date, experts doubt the goal will be achieved. In fact, some have even warned that the fast track could turn into another seemingly never-ending project, like the Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Project and Melamchi Drinking Water Project. 

The 72.5km expressway, which will be the shortest route between Kathmandu and the Tarai, comprises 55.5km of road, three tunnels with a combined length of 6.41km, and several bridges measuring a total of 10.59km. 

Also read: Lack of fast track progress raises questions over Nepal Army’s credibility

Tunnel construction is among the most challenging and time-consuming parts of the project. The army has handed over the task to a pair of Chinese firms under two packages. 

The first, for the construction of Mahadevtar Tunnel, was given to China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd. The second package for Dhedra & Lendanda Tunnels went to Poly Changda Engineering Co. Ltd. But the Public Procurement Committee of Parliament says these contracts were issued by breaching the country’s procurement regulations. 

Altogether 22 companies had expressed interest for the second package contract, but the army shortlisted only one of them—Poly Changda Engineering. Procurement regulations say more than one bidder must be shortlisted. 

The parliamentary committee’s direction to cancel the contract and call for a fresh bid was not heeded by the army. 

Questions were also raised over the selection of China State Construction Engineering for the first package of the tunnel deal, as the company had not made it past the pre-qualification bidding phase. 

Pre-qualification is the second phase of the bidding process where companies are shortlisted based on the strength of their technical documents. The third phase is where the shortlisted firms present their financial proposal and the project goes to the one that quotes the lowest price.

Also read: What if… the fast track project was completed on time?

The army has been accused of brazenly disregarding standard procurement practice while selecting these two Chinese companies.  

Earlier in 2019, the army had also courted controversy for allegedly leaking the evaluation criteria for the selection of consulting firms to potential bidders. The decision to select six international companies was eventually scrapped over the leak, which the army termed a “technical error”. 

Similarly, a government review committee in 2020 had opened an investigation after the army was accused of unduly favoring South Korea-based Yooshin Engineering Corporation while selecting a design and supervision consultant for the expressway. Later that same year, the Korean firm was blacklisted by the World Bank Group for fraudulent practices in an aviation project in Vanuatu. But Yooshin Engineering is still associated with the fast track. 

Those closely following the project say the army’s works thus far offer little assurance of the expressway’s timely and cost-effective completion. 

Bharat Kumar Shah, chairman of the parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, says the project would have been completed on time had the army listened to the committee. 

“We had asked the Nepal Army to halt bridge and tunnel works following discrepancies in bidding, but it simply brushed aside our directive,” says Shah. “Had the army listened to us, a more capable company would have gotten the project and it could have been completed on time.” 

There are still elements of the fast track, mainly bridge construction, that the army is yet to invite bids for. 

Also read: Army veers off the environment track

Semanta Dahal, a lawyer and researcher, says the project won’t get the desired momentum until the remaining bids are called. He also stresses the need for procurement transparency. 

Tulsi Prasad Sitaula, a former government secretary, agrees. He says the project will miss its deadline if international contractors are not selected on time.

“The deadline could be pushed back by at least another year if there are more delays,” he says. 

The army, meanwhile, says that should the project get delayed, it won’t be because of its fault.  

Brig. Gen. Bikash Pokharel, the project head, says the government has not allocated enough budget. 

The year the fast track was handed over to the army, the government at the time had allocated Rs 1.35bn. Subsequent governments then earmarked Rs 8.6bn, Rs 5.97bn, Rs 4.46bn, and Rs 8.93bn respectively. To date, the army has only received Rs 25.4bn—and it requires almost Rs 63bn annually hereon in for timely completion. 

Hence the army’s contention that the expressway is not getting enough budget is not unfounded. 

Experts worry the more the project is delayed, the more the costs will rise. The National Planning Commission has already projected the expressway cost to balloon to Rs 300bn even if it is completed by the Jan 2025 deadline.   

The completion of Kathmandu-Tarai fast track is important for Nepal to meet its development goals. For this, the country must invest 13 to 15 percent of its GDP in infrastructure over the next two decades. But it has consistently failed to allocate the required budget. 

Also read: Destroyer of civilization?

In 2020, the government needed to allocate around $1.3bn on roads and highways alone. The eventual allocation fell well short of that. The country’s annual infrastructure spending is expected to reach $5.6bn by 2025 and $7.5bn by 2030. It’s clear that the government cannot finance such expensive infrastructure projects. 

With elections of all three tiers of government approaching and the country staring at a possible economic crisis, some observers already doubt the project’s feasibility. 

Govinda Raj Pokharel, a former NPC vice-chairman, says it is hard to believe the fast track will be completed on time, particularly in the current economic climate. 

“Construction materials need to be imported and with our foreign reserves depleting, the fast track’s fate hangs in the balance,” he says. 

There is also concern about the expressway’s feasibility. Separate feasibility studies by Japan and the Asian Development Bank had suggested the route could be underutilized, given the existence of many other road links between Kathmandu and the Tarai. 

Also, the estimated 90-minute travel time is applicable only for passenger buses and cars, not cargo trucks, which could take 5-7 hours to traverse the route.

Also read: What’s driving up land prices along the fast track?

A former government secretary says the expressway is not viable economically.

“The fast track cannot generate profit and will thus be a burden for the government,” he says. “The fast track also runs through an earthquake-prone area, presenting additional challenges.” 

The land acquisition and rezoning dispute in Khokana and Bungamati areas have also halted progress. The people of these two ancient Newa villages in Lalitpur district have long been protesting against the expressway, which, they fear, could destroy their culture and heritage. 

Moreover, the fast track is connected to other mega projects like Nijgadh International Airport, Outer Ring Road, dry ports, and other supporting highways. All their fates are tied to the expressway. 

But sluggish progress, ballooning cost, lack of transparency, and doubts about economic unviability threaten to turn the fast track into the proverbial white elephant.