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For a party that reaped maximum political benefit from the 2015-16 border blockade, the re-emergence of Kalapani as a national issue could be a godsend for the ruling NCP, and its leader KP Oli. Despite some success in foreign policy, the two-third Oli government has underperformed, and fallen short of honoring its ‘Happy Nepalis, Prosperous Nepal’ commitment. The reign of mafias has tightened in virtually all sectors, impunity is sky high, and threat to civil liberties increasing. And the prime minister’s health is unstable, to put the finest possible gloss on it. To make amends, the PM has ‘fired’ all his advisors and is reshuffling the cabinet.

But there will be nothing like being seen as standing strong against an ‘expansionist’ India to reestablish his nationalist credentials. When the updated map of India showing Kalapani as Indian territory first emerged, the government seemed unsure of how to react. The foreign ministry mandarins were so terrified of speaking against India that the statement condemning the Kalapani encroachment was not even issued in English, an unprecedented event. But the government soon realized that it had much to lose by staying silent, and a world to gain by loosening its tongue.

To be fair, it is not just the ruling NCP leaders who have been crying foul about the Indian encroachment. The main opposition has come out as strongly against it and vowed full support to the government. If the problem is amicably settled in Nepal’s favor, or if the government is seen as raising it strongly even as India is unmoved, most of the credit will go to Oli and company, which they can again cash in on during the next general elections.

But there is also a danger. India is determined to keep Kalapani, given its high strategic value in monitoring the Chinese in Tibet. Nor can Modi afford to be seen as ‘losing’ such a vital territory to what many Indian strategic thinkers consider China’s ‘puppet government’ in Kathmandu. Even if he were willing, state politics in Uttarakhand, where Kalapani is now placed, rules that possibility out. In this situation, New Delhi will ignore Nepal’s demands up to a point. But when it has had enough, there is no guessing how it will react.

The best-case scenario for India is to maintain the status quo on Kalapani and wait for the noise in Kathmandu to die down. But until the next election cycle in 2022, there will also be no bigger political issue in Nepal for those in the government as well as the opposition. As Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali recently put it, the two-third government cannot fail in its most basic duty: maintaining the country’s territorial integrity. In this, the Oli government, boosted by the recent high-level engagement with China, has been emboldened to stand up to India. Otherwise, it would have been inconceivable for a Nepali foreign minister to label a decades-old issue of encroachment as Indian ‘bullying’.

With Nepal now its ‘strategic partner’, will China stand as firmly with Nepal on Kalapani as it does with, say, Pakistan on Kashmir? (Not inconceivable.) Or will India and China agree to settle Kalapani without Nepal’s consent, as they have seemingly done on Lipulekh? (More likely.) Small powers seldom win important geopolitical battles. Whatever the case, the sparks from Kalapani will fly for some time yet.

As Sam Cowan, an ex-British Army officer and a scholar with an intimate knowledge of Nepal, has pointed out, this is not the first time a political map issued in India has shown Kalapani as Indian territory. British India had first published such a map in 1879, he says, a map which independent India inherited. Successive governments of Nepal, whether the autocratic ones under Ranas or the democratic ones later, over many generations, ignored the inclusion of Kalapani in Indian maps. They had various favors to curry with the Indians, whether for themselves or for their country, and the de facto loss of Kalapani was apparently a price worth paying. 

So Cowan does not understand the fuss around the new map of India issued by its Home Ministry. He is right to an extent. But any real or perceived loss of a country’s territory, even a teeny bit, can be an explosive development in this social media-controlled, alternate-fact reality world. The Chinese take the cases of publication of China’s map without Hong Kong or Taiwan mighty seriously (and I speak from experience). The same has traditionally been the case with the Indians and publication of the de facto map of Jammu and Kashmir in international outlets. In fact, no government today can countenance any real or perceived loss of national territory. 

And just like the mainstream media elsewhere, Nepali media know how to whip up a good nationalist story, however old, to get maximum eyeballs. The old public suspicion of India does not help. After three blockades, Nepalis have come to instinctively mistrust New Delhi. Interestingly, the map now brought out by the Indian Home Ministry was strictly for domestic use and not an international map, as even Nepal’s survey department officials have clarified. Yet the uproar over it refuses to die down. 

India is unlikely to give up Kalapani, which gives it a vital strategic advantage from which to closely monitor the movement of Chinese troops in the region. As Kalapani also falls on the route to the Kailash Mansarovar, an important Hindu pilgrimage, the Hindu nationalist government in New Delhi will be keen to retain it. Perhaps the most it will do is agree to keep the maps ambiguous while continuing to occupy Kalapani. If the push comes to shove, it might even agree to a land swap for Kalapani with Nepal. As an immediate sop, the spokesperson for Indian foreign ministry has said that there has been no change in status quo on the border with Nepal and all disputes will be settled through later negotiations. But will that suffice? 

It is a hard fact of geopolitics that the interest of smaller countries like Nepal are often compromised in the larger strategic battles between bigger powers like India and China. In the worst case, the big powers completely overlook the interests of small powers (cue: Lipulekh). The ongoing protests over the occupation of Kalapani is a diplomatic tinderbox for the communist government. It was the mother party of KP Oli that first officially informed India of its ‘illegal occupation’ of Kalapani back in 1996. The prime minister who came to power on the back of the 2015-16 blockade can ill afford to be seen as weak before the old hegemon on the eve of important by-elections.

As the UN Security Council deadline for the repatriation of all North Korean workers draws closer, a senior US government official says Nepal is making ‘good progress’ in implementing the Dec 22, 2017 Security Council resolution. As per the resolution, Nepal will have to repatriate all North Korean workers by the last week of December this year.

Speaking to media persons on the condition of anonymity, the US government official added that Nepal is on course to meet the deadline. “It is gratifying that Nepal government is taking steps and cooperating with both US government and UN officials to implement sanctions,” he said. In the second week of June this year, Mark Lambert, US special envoy for North Korea, had visited Nepal to take the stock of progress on Nepal’s part. During his stay, he had met lawmakers, government officials as well as ruling Nepal Communist Party Co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal.

According to Nepali officials, Lambert had expressed concerns over North Korean workers and the businesses they ran in Kathmandu. The ruling NCP, however, is divided over cracking down on North Korean activities in Nepal. Many in the party believe that as bilateral relation between Nepal and North Korea is on track, the activities of North Koreans in Nepal should not be restricted. But, as a UN member, Nepal is obliged to implement the UNSC sanctions.  

The US official also discussed the possibility of cyber-attacks by North Korean hackers to steal money from Nepali banks.  The Americans believe North Korean hackers have stolen at least $1.1 billion in a series of attacks on global banks over the past four year, of which $81 million was taken from the central bank of Bangladesh in February 2016. “As other South Asian countries may face the same problem we are ready to support their banks protect themselves from hackers,” the official added.

The UN panel on implementation of sanctions is investigating North Korea’s evasion of financial sanctions to illegally transfer funds from financial institutions and cryptocurreny exchanges, according to a UN report. According to it, such cases were reported in Bangladesh, Chile, Costa Rica, Gambia, Guatemala, India, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Tunisia and Vietnam.  

A senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea also pointed to possible cyber-attacks from North Korea as a major challenge other countries. On Nepal’s part, US officials say they are ready to help it enhance its cyber capabilities. 

Earlier, during his visit to Kathmandu in May this year, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary at US State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Affairs, David J Ranze, had taken up this issue with Nepal. Similarly, the same issue figured in Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali’s visit to Washington in December last year.  

The UN and the US are both concerned that North Korea nationals continue to work in several countries with the goal of generating funds for North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In order to monitor the status of sanction implementation, UN had formed an expert panel. 

After pressure from US officials, Nepal instructed nine companies with North Korean investment to close down and take back their investment after liquidation of their companies. Nepal has also informed North Korea that it is not going to issue any business visa to its nationals after October-end, 2019. 

Available evidence suggests many countries have not done enough to send back North Korean workers. There is also a tendency of changing the North Korean companies’ names to evade sanctions. 

For at least a year North Korea has been at the forefront of global discussions and media coverage in light of its recent engagement with the US, even though the engagement has not helped in the denuclearization of North Korea. Similarly, there have been several rounds of talks between North Korea and South Korea. The ongoing diplomatic engagement, however, has helped reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula.

WANG LI, HIMAL NEUPANE 

In the joint statement signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal, the two countries agreed to elevate their relationship to a ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’. A number of questions have been raised in Nepal about the real meaning of the Chinese strategic partnership approach and how it will affect bilateral ties.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli said in a newspaper interview that strategic partnership is not a military or a political alliance, and that its purpose is socio-economic development. Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali also remarked that ‘strategic partnership’ is just a new terminology for bilateral diplomacy.

Yet some political actors and scholars have argued that ‘strategic partnership’ can have far-reaching impact on Nepal and its foreign relations. So it is necessary to clarify things and be aware of the various dimensions of Chinese strategy and diplomacy. Since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1955, Nepal-China relations have been characterized by equality, harmonious coexistence, everlasting friendship and overall cooperation. 

In line with this historical spirit of mutual respect and equality, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Nepal on October 12-13, during which the heads of the two states agreed to announce that they had elevated the ‘China-Nepal Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation’ to ‘Strategic Partnership of Cooperation’. It was reported that President Xi even said to his Nepali counterpart that Nepal would be transformed from a land-locked to a land-linked country because of the trans-Himalayan connectivity network. This is not only a promise from a large neighbor, but an expression of responsibility from the world’s rising power that aims to create an international community with a shared future.

However, in light of several concerns and even suspicions, it is necessary to review the concept of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ in China’s foreign policy. First, neither ‘strategy’ nor ‘partnership’ is a new term; both have been widely used in international affairs for a long time. Robert Gilpin has defined ‘strategic cooperation’ as a shared attempt or response to find more efficient and less costly approaches to realize common interests. China initially used the phrase ‘strategic partnership’ in the 1990s, and has done so more frequently since 2003. 

Words and meanings

According to the Chinese official line, there are three major categories of strategic partnership: 1) The ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation’ currently covers Russia, Pakistan and many African states alongside Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; 2) The ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ embraces more than 30 countries across the world; 3) And the ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ includes South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Brunei. Nepal’s involvement in the last group was inevitable, for it is not only a South Asian state but also a close neighbor of China. As China aspires to be a modernized country by 2050, the ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ emphasizes Beijing’s overriding concerns with Nepal’s sustainable and balanced economic growth. President Xi has said that China’s development cannot take place in isolation from the rest of the world.

Now the inquiry is directed at the political dimensions of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ in the Chinese discourse. Officially, it has three aspects: stressing cooperation over rivalry; promoting long-term cooperation rather than an expedient one; and building constructive relations. To these ends, both parties are required to work together in multiple fields, be they political, cultural or technological. China seeks dialogue with all partners, which is a key feature of classical diplomacy. 

As the goal is a win-win outcome, China and Nepal have agreed to take the BRI as an opportunity to deepen mutually-beneficial cooperation in all fields, including their attempt to advance the construction of a trans-Himalayan connectivity network. As a country nestled in the Himalayas, Nepal indeed needs to expand its infrastructures by integrating itself into the BRI so as to explore and harness its huge potential in hydropower. 

Financially, the two countries are committed to a multilateral trading regime and China will take measures to import more Nepali goods and to encourage Chinese banks to provide financial services in Nepal. Politically, the Chinese side has reiterated firm support to Nepal to uphold the country’s independence and respect its governance system. The Nepali side, in turn, has reasserted its long-standing commitment to a ‘one-China policy’, acknowledging that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are China’s internal ones.

Focus on NEWS

Strategically, China and Nepal need to maintain peace and stability in their border areas. In line with its ‘NEWS strategy’, China urgently needs to consolidate its entente with Russia in the ‘North’ and pacify its ‘East’ coast, while sustaining the BRI projects in the ‘West’ and the maritime silk route in the ‘South’. This is the core of the NEWS strategy initiated by the Chinese elite since President Xi assumed office in 2013. Considering Nepal’s strategic location and political stability, China was sure to promote bilateral ties to the level of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’. And as a strategic partner, Nepal will get substantial help from its northern neighbor. 

For sure, as states are first and foremost committed to their own interests, a close relationship between China and Nepal will never be purely bilateral. There will always be local, regional and international concerns, suspicions and even hostility toward either China or Nepal or both. India is naturally the first to feel uncomfortable. This is why President Xi made a trip to India before visiting Nepal. China has reiterated that it would not use its economic or financial leverage to dictate the internal affairs of its partner countries. In addition, Chinese firms need to move in prudently and observe the local political norms before setting up their businesses.

As Xi has said on several occasions, China is the largest developing country and also one that is learning all the time. Mutual respect and equality are the preconditions for promoting China’s strategy and foster long-term cooperation. Xi’s state visit to Nepal is expected to unlock new strategic opportunities for bilateral relations, as well as promote ties with India and explore the prospects for trilateral cooperation. 

Nepal-China economic integration through the BRI is unstoppable, so it is sensible for India to take the opportunity to extend the proposed high-speed railway all the way down to the port in Kolkata in order to more closely tie the three countries in a complex web of economic interdependence. It might be just the right time to enhance trilateral understanding among Nepal and its two giant neighbors.

In brief, Nepal, though a much smaller state than China and India, could play a positive role as a bridge for building more trust-based relationships across this region. Geopolitical factors should never be an obstacle to elevating bilateral ties to ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ between Nepal and China.

Wang is a Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at Jilin University, China; Neupane is a China expert based in Kathmandu