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Bhattarai for one thinks such suspicions are unwarranted. “We have this tendency in Nepal to harp on small issues and not to look at the big picture,” he says. “What is happening with BIMSTEC is only a part of the practice of greater region­al integration seen in all regions of the world.”

Some chalk up the agreement on a regional power grid as the biggest achievement of the fourth BIMSTEC summit. At least on paper Nepal will now be able to harness its hydropow­er and sell it to other BIMSTEC coun­tries. But thus far there has been no systematic study on whether such cross-border power trade between South Asia and Southeast Asia is even possible. Pretty much the same is true of connectivity via waterways, particularly for landlocked Nepal and Bhutan.

The seven BIMSTEC member states have also agreed to boost cooperation on anti-terrorism. In line with this objective, India is hosting a week-long BIMSTEC mili­tary exercise starting September 12. “Again, there is no surprise there,” says Rajan Bhattarai. “Disaster man­agement and terrorism are problems that no single country can handle on its own and since the national armies are at the frontline of post-disaster management, it is also not surprising that they seek closer cooperation.”

Asked about the military drills, Nishchalnath Pandey, the director of the Center for South Asian Studies, replies, “Of foremost importance for BIMSTEC is to have a governing char­ter without any delay. Any deviation from this task will create controversy and misunderstanding.”

Pandey says that it is hard to talk of meaningful cooperation within BIMSTEC without a char­ter. He also outlines a baseline for BIMSTEC. “At least there could be visa on arrival for BIMSTEC nationals in each other’s countries. Otherwise, why would people value the organization?”

But Bhattarai contends that BIM­STEC, and the fourth summit in particular, has already notched up significant achievements. “We were able to bring down priority areas from 14 to five, we agreed to expand and consolidate BIMSTEC Secretar­iat, we expressed our commitment to come up with a governing charter by the time of the fifth summit,” he responds. “What more can you expect from a single summit?”  

Tamang says it took him altogether five days to get the citizenship of his son. “I had to take out a loan of Rs 10,000, which is all spent now. It does not matter who assumes power, we, the poor citizens, have to suffer,” he laments.

Taldhunga’s Mohan Prasad Timilsina crossed four dis­tricts and spent Rs 9,000 for his son’s citizenship. “To get to the headquarters, one needs to walk through the dense Mahabharat forest,” he says. “I am old and cannot walk on treacherous paths. That is why I took a detour via Mak­wanpur, Dhading, Kathmandu and Bhaktapur districts to get to Dhulikhel.”

He cannot understand why people have to face such hardships to get a piece of paper. Dandapari resi­dents complain that all local office-bearers live in far-off district headquarters.

Khanikhola rural municipal­ity chairman Krishna Baha­dur Khulal says locals have no option but to travel to the headquarters as there are no banking facilities for effective functioning of local bodies close by.

Mahabharat rural munici­pality chairman Kanchaman Jimba rues how the central government has shown no interest in the operation of the area administration office. (A few years ago, the home min­istry had set up an area admin­istration office in Ghartichap VDC to serve a dozen VDCs in the vicinity.) “The local government can only provide land for the concerned offices. It is the central and provincial governments that should pro­vide physical infrastructure and staff,” Jimba adds.

Chief District Officer Krishna Bahadur Raut assures that he is working on it.

The two Eminent Persons Groups (EPGs) set up to review past India-Nepal treaties had come up with a final draft of their joint report on July 4. After this, the report was to be presented first to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then to his Nepali counterpart KP Sharma Oli. But Modi is apparently too busy and he has thus far not given the joint EPG team the time to meet.

When Nepal had raised the prospect of submitting the report during the Indian prime minister’s recent visit to Kathmandu for the BIMSTEC summit, India had reportedly declined as it would not discuss ‘bilateral issues at the side­lines of the multilateral forum’. But then India and Nepal did discuss a host of bilateral issues at the sidelines, including cross-border railways. But, according to Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, the coordinator of the Nepali EPG, there is an alter­native explanation behind Modi’s reluctance.

“When we talk of revis­ing past Indo-Nepal trea­ties we are talking about extremely sensitive issues,” he told APEX. “Since the joint report will be made public immediately after it is presented to the respective prime ministers, perhaps the political leaderships in the two countries are taking their time to closely study the recommendations away from the prying eyes.”

He also cautions against “wild speculations on such a deli­cate issue”. His remark comes in the wake of some comments in the media that the EPG process has been a failure as India is supposedly not interested in heeding its recommenda­tions. Along with revisions in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, for instance in the clause providing for ‘recip­rocal treatment’ of citizens of one country in the other, the EPG report also recommends a level of border management. Some analysts suspect India is not ready for these changes.

Thapa says both the Indian and Nepali political leaderships have invested a lot in the EPG process and it would be pre­mature to suggest that the process has been a failure. Also, he clarifies, the EPG members decided against submitting the report at the sidelines of BIMSTEC summit as that would have “undermined the importance of the EPG process.”

Whatever the EPG members may say, the longer the submission of the report is delayed the stronger will be the perception that the whole process has somehow been futile as India is simply not interested.

 The fourth heads-of-state summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in Kathmandu on August 30 and 31 brings together seven countries, five from South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lan­ka) and two from Southeast Asia (Myanmar and Thailand). BIMSTEC, formed in 1997 in Bangkok, had been moribund for much of its existence, with the last summit held in Naypy­idaw, Myanmar in March 2014. Late­ly, however, the forum has gotten a new lease on life thanks to India’s renewed interest.

India, by far the largest country both economically and militarily in BIMSTEC, has tried to promote the forum in lieu of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooper­ation (SAARC), the eight-country grouping which includes Afghani­stan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as members. The reason for the switch is the growing realization in New Delhi that the India-Pakistan rivalry will never allow for meaning­ful regional cooperation from within the SAARC framework.

All the major decisions in SAARC have to be taken by consensus. Because India and Pakistan sel­dom accept each other’s propos­als, there has been little headway made in terms of bringing South Asia closer economically. India refused to take part in the 19th SAARC summit that had been scheduled for Islam­abad in 2016, saying that there would be no engagement with Pakistan unless the latter stopped providing safe haven to terrorists. India now seems intent on pushing regional initiatives like BIMSTEC that do not include Pakistan.

But while Pakistan could arguably have done more to rein in anti-India terrorism that originates on its soil, India’s overall role within SAARC has also been dubious. When SAARC was founded under the initiative of Ban­gladesh and Nepal, India suspected smaller countries in the region were trying to “gang up” against New Del­hi. Hence, India has never been keen on SAARC. Perennial India-Pakistan tensions only made the situation worse.

Yet there continues to be con­siderable goodwill for SAARC in its smaller member states like Nepal. Traditionally, Nepal has seen SAARC as a forum where it could stand as an equal with India, the “big brother” next door. There is also a feeling that India, the undisputed fulcrum of South Asia, could have done more to promote regional cooperation in South Asia (despite Pakistan’s less-than-helpful attitude). This is why many analysts in Kathmandu are suspicious of India’s intent behind its backing of BIMSTEC.

Most don’t expect anything sub­stantial to come out of the fourth BIMSTEC summit Nepal is hosting. After all, BIMSTEC has not managed to draft a guiding charter in over two decades of existence. Interestingly, the Nepal government has already started chalking up successes on the bilateral front with India, like rail and road connectivity projects, as prospective BIMSTEC success stories. This means Nepal will allow India to place many of these bilateral projects under BIMSTEC, just like it has allowed China to club most of its bilateral projects with Nepal under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The China factor is vital. During the last SAARC summit in Kathman­du in 2014, Nepal, with Pakistan’s support, had proposed that China be included as a full SAARC member state, a development that India did not appreciate. Traditionally, India has seen South Asia as its backyard and has not been ready to let in a third party. There was a perception in New Delhi that Beijing was look­ing to spread its footprints in South Asia via SAARC. This is another rea­son Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wanted to revive BIMSTEC, which, unlike SAARC, has a distinct anti-China whiff.

With this background, Nepal’s foreign policy of late has been rather curious. New Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli seems to believe that if he has both India and China on board he does not need the rest of the international community. So as Sino-India ties have warmed, Oli has relentlessly pushed the idea of Nepal-India-China trilateral coop­eration. Before, the Indians did not even want to hear of it. Now they are more sympathetic.

Nepal will hence look to derive maximum benefit from China’s BRI, while also not desisting from using multilateral forums like BIMSTEC to enhance ties with India. This may not be wise. India and China have never cooperated for a third coun­try’s benefit in South Asia, and it would be naïve to think they will do so for Nepal. But Oli is determined to give it a go.

Just as joining the BRI helped Oli curry the favor with the Chinese, he seems to believe that follow­ing India’s lead on BIMSTEC will help him cement ties with the Indian establishment. With both India and China on his side, he will also feel he has enough inter­national support to serve out his five-year term. (Nepali governments have often been toppled early due to India-China geopolitical tussles.)

The big question that is being asked in Kathmandu is whether India is ready to overcome its security sen­sitivities and allow Nepali trucks and trains to use its territory to directly connect with Bangladesh and Myan­mar. If not, BIMSTEC will prove to be no more than a geopolitical chess­board for bigger powers, and one which has little room for smaller players in the region like Nepal. The Diplomat