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When the current govern­ment took office in Feb­ruary this year, there was excitement over the prospect of stability and a new era of ‘pros­perity.’ Five months later, even though it is too early to give a definitive judgment, much of the excitement has evaporated. The promise of an end to ‘business as usual’ has failed to materialize; the tough talk of ending ‘syndi­cates’ in transport sector died down. Instead there are whis­pers of allowing the status quo to remain until a new arrangement, and outsourcing of public poli­cy to interest groups. Likewise, the talk of overhauling the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has been limited to just that and the idea of forming think-tanks within the PMO to generate policy options hasn’t left the drawing board.Much of this chaos and criti­cism stems from lack of adequate decision-making structure and absence of institutionalized deci­sion-making culture. Ad-hocism may sometimes have its merit, but in general it does more harm than good. The first priority for this government should have been putting together a structure to streamline decision-making as well as implementation process­es. Instead ministers and Nepal Communist Party officials have been busy unraveling the exist­ing structure without ensuring a proper replacement.

It isn’t too late to undo some of the early missteps provided that the members of the govern­ment have the humility to review and reflect on their actions so far. Instead of seeing this sudden surge in protests as a grand con­spiracy, they should ask them­selves: where have we failed?

The solution is still the same: putting together a proper struc­ture. This should start at all levels simultaneously but most impor­tantly at the nerve center of the government: the PMO. Currently the PMO has too many cooks—both political appointees and civil servants—working at cross-pur­pose with no integration of their services and accountability.

While the political appointees have may the prime minister’s ears, it is the career civil servants who have authority to get things done. And there has historically been mutual hostility between the two sets of staff—affecting the efficacy of the PMO, as well other ministries and departments.

The reporting and accountabil­ity structure in the PMO and oth­er ministries and departments should be streamlined. There should be a clearly designated Chief of Staff or Head of Staff who acts as a buffer between the exec­utive and the entire team. This allows for structured flow of infor­mation, inputs and decisions.

Such a structure will make the entire team responsible—lead­ing to increased likelihood that any announcements the prime minister or the executive makes is backed by due-diligence and homework, thus ensuring its success. It will also minimize the risk of party officials leveraging associations with the prime min­ister for personal gains. Such a structure will also lend credence and status to prime minister’s numerous advisors while deal­ing with foreign government and their entities—providing a clear pecking order for others to see and interact with.

In the United States, almost all executive-level offices have a designated chief of staff, includ­ing Congressmen. The position combines functions of private secretary, confidante and advi­sor—giving the office bearer broad authority to decide who gets to see the executive or what informa­tion reaches his or her desk.

There is an urgent need to streamline the PMO and oth­er executive offices through a Cabinet decision—laying down the standard operating proce­dures and hierarchy—integrat­ing the roles and responsibilities of both career civil servants and political appointees. In the long run, this should be institutionalized through a parliamentary act.

Over the past few years, I have repeatedly heard from western diplomats one par­ticular observation about Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) that runs along following lines: During their tenure in other countries many diplomats invari­ably end up displeasing the host government for one reason or the other. But during troubled times the foreign ministry in these host countries helps sort things out, not so in Nepal. In fact the foreign ministry in Nepal pursues perceived violations of Vienna Conventions with great zeal, they say, issuing public ulti­matums instead of delivering a démarche privately. On many occasions foreign dip­lomats in question are publicly humiliated through coordinated leaks to the media of the blow-by-blow account of the dressing down. In leaking these exchanges, MoFA officials forget that diplo­macy is an art of disagreeing, con­structive ambiguity and allowing the other side to save face. It is also about calling in quid pro quo favors in national interest when circumstances demand. Unlike in Nepal, the permanent estab­lishment in most countries take note of treatment meted out to their folks.

In an interview towards the end of this tenure in late 2011, former US Ambassador to Nepal Scott H. DeLisi had pointed out in reference to Nepal’s foreign policy outlook that ‘the world is big­ger than India and China.’ While the US ambassador was clearly worried about declining US and western influence in Nepal, he did have a point.

In the years since DeLisi’s friendly reminder, Nepal has become even more myopically focused on the two neighbors, to disastrous consequences in 2015-16 in the form the Indi­an economic blockade. As we didn’t have friends, no other traditional power sided with us to protest New Delhi’s actions, at least publicly. There was no discussion in any of the inter­national forums or any power­ful western capital of the cost of India’s punitive actions.

The eerie international silence over Nepal’s suffering had been preceded by a series of poor judgements on the part of the MoFA. We have seen a repeat of these poor judgments in the past several months—beginning with the childish reaction over the EU statement on election oversight. While Nepal reserves the right to disagree and even rubbish any statements issued by entities of foreign governments, in doing so some civility and decorum needs to be maintained. Publicly vilifying a whole bloc of 27 EU nations and their representatives may earn some brownie points at home, but it does nothing to further Nepal’s interest abroad. What it does is perpetuate certain image of Nepal and it hampers Nepal’s national interest. Take for instance the EU ban on Nepali airlines from flying into their air­space. Sure it may have started on technical grounds of Nepal’s poor safety record, but its continuation seems political.

The second instance has been the chest-thumping over the gov­ernment decision to close down the UN Department of Political Affairs Liaison Office in Kath­mandu. No one is contesting the sovereign right of government of Nepal to ask bilateral or multi­lateral entities to pack their bags and leave when their relevance has been exhausted, but it didn’t warrant so much of bragging and leaks designed to cast aspersions on the DPA activities as a whole. The government could have sim­ply thanked the UN and asked it to close shop, if it felt strongly about it.

The third instance, perhaps not directly related to MoFA but where it is nonetheless complicit with its inaction: the attempt to portray projects supported by UNDP and others at the request of government of Nepal as an ‘infiltration in the hallowed halls of the government’—through a series of leaks. The media has also done a poor job by not trying to report the other side of the story or to question the motive behind the leaks or to contextualize this assistance. In its gung-ho jingo­istic fervor, it has forgotten the basic principle of journalism—balance and some basic research. Equally troubling is the failure to distinguish between donors, bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies and NGOs.

In not coming to the legitimate defense of the bilateral and multi­lateral agencies that have signed multi-year framework agreements with the government of Nepal, clearly spelling out the areas of their support, MoFA continues to abandon its responsibility. This cements certain perception that Nepal government entities are at best unreliable and at worst feckless. And you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to calculate how this translates into Nepal’s standing or lack thereof in the international arena. How do you conduct proper diplomacy with respective capitals/headquar­ters when their representatives routinely cable not-so-positive reports on Nepal?

Even as Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is in Beijing on an official visit, there has been much speculation over the supposed Chinese noncha­lance. Some even had issues with the press release issued by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which made no mention of Oli meeting General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi Jinping—and therefore a proof of Chinese lukewarm response to Oli’s vis­it. But in Beijing on Wednesday Xi and Oli had delegation level talks and one-on-one for over an hour; this despite the presence of two other important dignitar­ies in town: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Bolivian President Evo Morales. But it is true that the Chi­nese side is wary of the gap between Kathmandu’s words and deeds—particularly on project implementation. Nepali side’s tardiness, even childishness, in proposing projects to be built under the Belts and Roads Initia­tives (BRI) has been of concern for them. For example, a certain Nepali ministry had reportedly floated the proposal of building a Disney-style theme park in Nepal under the BRI. Clearly there is gap in understanding between the two sides on what the BRI is and isn’t.

Xi-Modi Summit

There is more to the optics from the Chinese side and it isn’t related to what Oli did or didn’t. If anything, as former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai pointed out in his article in Kantipur Daily on June 18, the Xi-Modi Wuhan summit in April is likely to cast shadow on Chi­na-Nepal relations for sometime—at least in terms of optics.

While there is no word on what was discussed in relation to Nepal, there are speculations that Modi ‘acknowledged Chinese strategic interest in the Maldives and Sri Lanka,’ while urging Xi to ‘go slow on Nepal and Bhutan.’ This may explain both the sort of toning down of rhetoric on the Maldives in the Indian media as well as some of perceived Chinese nonchalance towards Nepal in the Nepali media. According to this theory, if Beijing has accepted Delhi’s request, the reciprocal high-level visit to Nepal from the Chinese side will happen at Premier Li Keqiang’s level, not at Xi’s level.

China also needs Nepal

Those who see Chinese cold shoulder forget that China needs us as much as we need them. Chinese overture towards Nepal is part of a long strategy—further buttressed by Nepal’s blockade-in­duced strategic autonomy in its foreign policy.

As Sudheer Sharma observes in his brilliant article in Kanti­pur on June 15, China wants over­land access to Indian markets [and parts of Bangladesh] and a route through Nepal is the easiest way.

Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal that border Nepal are highly popu­lous, with around 400 million people between them, which comes to roughly the size of European Union and bigger than the United States. Bangladesh has another 163 million people. These are potentially huge mar­kets for mass-market goods as their already sizeable middle class continues to grow.

This presents Beijing with unique opportunity to develop its Tibet and even Xinjiang as production and trading hubs—with some production capacity outsourced to Nepal. For com­parison, Nepal can be a nodal point to bigger markets than Paki­stan and Central Asia combined. Pakistan has population of 193 million and five former Central Asian Soviet Republics have a combined population of 70 million. Nepal can and should leverage these facts as it deepens engagement with China.

Clearly Beijing could put on a show out of respect for Modi, leader of one of its biggest trad­ing partners, but what matters is the substance (or lack of it) on Nepal-China front. That depends as much on Nepal as it does on China. As Beijing is wary of Nepal’s poor implementation capacity, the idea of establishment of a bilateral oversight mechanism is a significant first step.

Last week Shahidul Islam, Secretary General of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Eco­nomic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), met Nepal’s prime minister, the sub-regional grouping’s current chair, to firm up a date for the fifth BIMSTEC summit. The summit was supposed to be held in Nepal last year but wasn’t, as Nepal expressed its inability to host it—citing three different elections taking place in the country.As Nepal begins a period of sta­ble government after those elec­tions, it no longer has an excuse to defer this important summit. In fact, the current Nepali gov­ernment enjoys a very strong mandate at home, so it has an unprecedented opportunity to pursue win-win cooperation under all emerging bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Increas­ing engagement with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is definitely one avenue, but there is no reason Nepal should limit itself to one bloc. The lesson from the 2015 economic blockade, if anything, is that Nepal should diversify its trade, connectivity and engagements.

SAARC continues to be held hostage to India-Pakistan rival­ry and many in the region are increasingly looking toward new regional configuration as a vehicle for expediting regional integra­tion and achieving a degree of prosperity. But like SAARC, even BIMSTEC and BBIN have not been free from the typical South Asian malady: inserting politics where it does not belong. BIMSTEC, though it includes Thailand and Myanmar, is dominated by South Asian countries.

In its 21 years of existence, only three summits and one mini-sum­mit (BRICS-BIMSTEC Summit on the sidelines of BRICS Summit in Goa in 2016) have been held. Two of these were held in Thai­land and Myanmar, which means South Asia has hosted only one summit so far. Another issue with BIMSTEC is the lack of leader­ship. While technically the rotat­ing chairs would have to provide leadership, in reality, one or two countries with outsize influence or a bloc of smaller countries need to continuously push the engagement forward. In recent years, India has shown an interest in promoting BIMSTEC and BBIN as an alternative to SAARC and even as a way to counter the BRI, but New Delhi appears non-com­mittal at times.

Sectoral approach

BIMSTEC has a sector-driv­en approach and all member countries have technically been assigned as a sectoral lead. As of today, member states have signed on to 14 different sectors for cooperation, yet there has been very little progress. And it took 17 years for the member states to establish the permanent secretariat in Dhaka.

If this sectoral approach is to work, each sector needs to have its own secretariat, staff and funds to function. What BIMSTEC needs now is not more agreements but a clear implementation modality for the existing agreements. As the chair until the next summit, Nepal can influence the shap­ing of the agenda for the summit itself—which in turn can lead to a course correction in the tried and failed ways of the regional jambo­rees. For starters, Nepal should work with the Secretariat to put together a small preparatory team to work on the agenda for the next summit—which then could be floated among the BIMSTEC member countries. Even though Nepal will pass on the leader­ship to another member state, it can continue to work with other smaller countries to push the big­ger states to take initiatives as well as allocate resources.

How Nepal benefits?

Nepal and Bhutan stand to gain tremendously from BIMS­TEC, particularly on transport and connectivity. Their status as landlocked countries can become land-linked and water-linked if the full potential of this forum is exploited.

BIMSTEC Transport, Infrastruc­ture and Logistics Study conduct­ed with the ADB’s support has identified 167 projects at an esti­mated cost of US $ 45-50 billion to enhance connectivity in the region. This includes six projects in Nepal.

Prime Minister Oli has been widely mocked for saying that ships with Nepali flags would sail in the high seas. In fact, some of the items under discussion in BIM­STEC Transport Working Group include a draft Coastal Shipping Agreement. Combine this with the agreement to build inland waterways with India during Oli’s recent visit to the southern neighbor and his dream might just come true.

Nepal can also benefit from cooperation in other sectors such as energy, tourism and agricul­ture. The only question is whether Nepal is prepared to take advan­tage of the favorable environment at home and in the region—by tak­ing a proactive approach.

During the event organized in the City Hall to announce the formal unification of the two parties—CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—on May 17, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli argued that ‘flying a jet plane requires two pilots’, in an attempt to justi­fy the provision of two chairmen in the new unified party, Nepal Communist Party (NCP). Those who closely follow Oli’s peculiarly quotable quotes know better than to take them at face value. His use of the jet plane met­aphor carries more meaning than one would generally think. While it is true that a jet plane has two pilots, the power dynamic between the two is not of equals. One is a captain and the other is a co-pilot or the first officer. There are no prizes for guessing who between the two NCP leaders is the captain at the moment.

The smooth cruising of the new NCP jet certainly faces many chal­lenges, the primary one being the topsy-turvy relationship between the two pilots. This is not the first time that the two have had grand plans for party unification; during Oli’s first tenure as prime minister in 2015-16, the two leaders had extensive discussion on forming a single party for all the left forces of the country.

But the plan soon fell apart as personal relations between Dahal and Oli took a bitter turn, and Dahal joined the Congress camp, ousting the Oli government. Those familiar with the developments then say that Dahal felt deeply humiliated by Oli’s regular jibes, particularly ones suggesting that he would protect Dahal, a veiled reference to conflict era cases and personal property that Dahal is said to have amassed.

But as they say, politics makes for strange bedfellows. The rap­prochement this time was a cul­mination of political necessity and their personal ambitions. In a way, it was a writing on the wall.

Political necessity

Oli knew that without the Mao­ists’ support, his party would not return to power. The Indian design to keep him out of power by encouraging the Maoists and Nepali Congress to stick together is an open secret.

For Dahal, as the local elec­tions showed, without a decent seat-sharing arrangement, his party would see the worst per­formance in national elections since entering mainstream poli­tics in 2008—destroying any legit­imate claim for remaining at the helm of his party. While Nepali Congress and Sher Bahadur Deuba remained non-committal about a 60:40 seat sharing, Oli was eager to pay the price for an electoral alliance.

Personal ambitions

Both Oli and Dahal are keen to leave their mark behind. At this juncture in Nepal’s history, both realize that they need each oth­er to get things done their way. The only question is how far their ambitions converge and at what point they begin to diverge. Temperamentally, they are far from similar, yet both have a tenacity that makes them each other’s comrade-in-arms in an unusual way.

Oli cultivates loyalty to a point of sycophancy and goes out of his way to protect people who are close to him—and whose support­ers worship him, while detractors mock and loathe him. Dahal is charismatic but utilitarian; his closest supporters often remain unsure about where they stand with him. In fact some of Dahal’s harshest critics are those who have worked closely with him in the past.

Both Oli and Dahal are very decisive and can bend the party to their will.

Writing on the wall

Both have seen the writing on the wall about Nepal’s moment in the sun as post-blockade Nepal-In­dia relations have unwittingly accorded Kathmandu a degree of strategic autonomy in dealing with third countries, particular­ly China. If handled correctly, the current geo-political envi­ronment provides Nepal tre­mendous leverage in attracting development finance and increas­ing connectivity and trade with both its neighbors.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary in the Indian media, New Delhi appears to have concluded that India stands to gain more from engagement and cohabitation with Beijing than by aligning with Washington—given the current US leadership or lack thereof. Increasingly, the concern in New Delhi seems be over the potential warming of ties between Mos­cow and Islamabad, its nemesis numero uno—and some sort of China-Russia-Pakistan alliance.

Against this backdrop, Oli and Dahal, by taking a broad view and discarding short-term temp­tations, decided to push on with the unification. The flexibility, finesse and dogged determination both leaders have shown this time is a rare sight in Nepali politics. But only time will tell if it will last.

Twitter @johnparajuli

Barely six months into the implementation of the federal structure, the first signs of conflict between the three tiers of government are visible. State governments are openly criticizing the federal government for what they see as the Cen­tre’s attempt to ‘hoard resourc­es’. While not unexpected or unnatural, these early manifesta­tions of conflict require a careful handling if our federal journey is to be smooth. There are two primary sources of conflict: resource and respon­sibility. Instinctively, all tiers of government want to have as much of both as possible. But the principle is clear: federalism is both a self-rule and a shared-rule—with downward delegation of basic services. As such the fed­eral government bears as much responsibility as subnational gov­ernments to ensure that there is adequate resource.

As both the federal and provin­cial governments begin prepa­rations for the next fiscal year’s budget, the Ministry of Finance’s ceiling of Rs 15 billion budget to each provincial government is being challenged. The current formula for sharing revenues between the federal and subna­tional governments is also being contested. Under the Intergov­ernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act, the federal government keeps about 70 percent of the revenue from taxes and 50 percent of the royalty from natural resources.

Four types of transfer

As experiences from other federal countries show, about two-thirds of all spending takes place at the subnational level. Even in Nepal’s context—as the functional analysis carried out by a UNDP-supported project sug­gests—out of the 1,796 services that the Nepal government provides, more than half are functions of the subnational governments. The four different types of transfer that the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act has provisioned will provide additional resources to the lower levels of government to meet their responsibilities: equalization, matching, condi­tional and special grants.

While the first three grants are aimed mostly at delivering basic services and maintaining certain national standards set by the center, the last grant seems to be aimed at supporting the sub­national governments for infra­structure development. It is obvi­ous there aren’t enough public funds to meet the infrastructural requirement of all states. This is what seems to worry the state governments the most.

PPP model

As the states are in formative stages, building infrastructures is a key priority for them. This is where private capital—both foreign and domestic—can come into play. Bridges, highways, drinking water projects and sewage plants can all be construct­ed under a public private partner­ship (PPP) model. This requires a strong legal framework and the capacity to design projects and provide regulatory oversight at both the federal and state levels. There are many variations of the PPP model that have been tried and tested by other countries. And there are several multilat­eral organizations that can help bring in the expertise initially to build our national capacity to design and execute these PPPs. The private sector can not only fill the funding gap, but can also create a virtuous cycle of employ­ment creation and revenue base expansion for the state govern­ments—which in turn can be used for funding additional services and infrastructure.

While the state governments are within their rights to press the fed­eral government for more funds, they may also want to explore alternatives. Instead of merely tweaking the revenue distribution formula, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Council should also look into other emerging approach­es to development finance. The shortage of public finance is also an opportunity to engage the pri­vate sector more effectively in national development.

James T Walsh is a former US Congressman with strong links to Nepal. He represented New York for over 18 years in the US House of Representatives. He served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal in 1970-72, speaks fluent Nepali and maintains his links with this country. Walsh was instrumental in drawing congressional attention to the pro-democracy movement in April 2006 by organizing congressional hearings. He was also closely involved with the Northern Ireland peace process. In this email correspondence with John Narayan Parajuli, Walsh spoke about current US policy towards Nepal, Nepal-India-China relations and the rudderless state of the US State Department.

 How do you see current US policies towards Nepal?

I don’t see any specific activity related to Nepal. Trump is very focused on international trade, but on bilateral deals only. Among countries in the region, China is the big focus. US-China relations are cool. US-India relations, on the other hand, are warm. Our State Department is rudderless right now. I see no significant activities focused on Nepal.

Nepal is also more and more focused on relations with India and China—often seemingly at the expense of relations with other countries. Does that worry you and other friends of Nepal in the US?

China and India are competing, as you know. Relations with these two countries are far more important for Nepal. Nepal’s friends would want you to get the best from each country, but caution about quid pro quo. But we like India better.

With China now asserting its presence, including by using its considerable financial muscle, the power balance in Nepal has truly changed. What kind of rela­tions can the US have with Nepal in such a changed context?

The US at the moment is very inwardly focused. Brexit shows that the UK is too. Same with Russia. China is acting imperialistic. I am worried about where this is all going

Nepal is transitioning from a uni­tary system to a federal system. Are there things that it can learn from the US experience?

It is a delicate balance between the states and the federal govern­ment. An all-powerful federal gov­ernment would be bad. Power likes to consolidate itself at the top, so beware! Our judicial system and the free press are real strengths. There seems to be in the world today a real trend towards strongman govern­ments. Look at Russia, China and the US. That is bad for the world. Smaller countries may want to emulate them, especially if charis­matic leaders are involved. The role of the press is key. Don’t let your government control the press.

A powerful executive isn’t necessarily a bad thing. But with the provision of such a strong president, how does the system of checks and balances between the different branches of govern­ment work in the US?

The legislature needs to control the money, with no opportunity for interference by a republican executive.

Control the money. We call it the power of the purse. Reject any idea of a line-item veto. The exec­utive must accept the budget as voted on by the legislature or he can veto it and possibly be over­ridden. If the executive gets to pick and choose what gets spent, he will have too much control.

Anything you would like to add at the end?

My son was just elected Mayor of Syracuse. He has 3,000 ethnic Nepali Bhutanese as constituents (former Bhutanese refugees). It is wonderful to have Nepali spoken in my hometown. I plan to volunteer for language training and help them with English.

Prime Minister KP Sharma’s India visit, for all intents and purposes, was heavy on sym­bolism. Both sides were keen on resetting bilateral ties that fell to historic lows after the 2015 blockade.In Nepal the fear of a Nepali Prime Minister compromising on ‘national interest’ during an India visit is ever present. There is a perception that Indians try to extract their pound of flesh from the occupant of Baluwatar in exchange for their support. Since the 1990s, virtually all Nepali lead­ers have looked to the South to get into Baluwatar. As soon as a new prime minister is elected, visiting Delhi to shore up support becomes one of the first acts of duty. Since New Delhi extends the customary invitation along with its congratulatory call, one can argue that New Delhi demands this homage. With the exception of Puspha Kamal Dahal’s first ten­ure, no other Nepali prime minis­ter has deviated from Delhi’s strict political choreography.

What’s different this time?

Well Oli, despite his team’s rhet­oric to instead bring the Indian PM to Nepal first, did stick to tra­dition. But unlike in the past, the Nepali PM was able to deal with his Indian counterpart from a position of strength. The Joint Statement and the joint press con­ference have telltale signs of Oli successfully resetting India-Nepal ties on a more equal footing. Of course, at this stage, all we can see is the form, not the substance.

During the joint press confer­ence, Modi made subtle sugges­tions to accommodate all sections of society in Nepal’s develop­ment—perhaps an indirect refer­ence to the Madhesi demand for constitutional amendment. PM Oli, on the other hand, stressed the ‘principle of equality, justice and mutual respect’—indirectly telling New Delhi to stay out of Nepal’s internal politics. Oli also took a swipe at India’s cross-bor­der power purchase guidelines that he said wasn’t consistent with free market principles and the PTA signed between the two coun­tries. The fact that both prime ministers agreed to disagree openly, albeit politely, points to a more mature relationship. This clearly shows, at least for now, that New Delhi has become a bit more accepting of its declining influence and limits in Nepal.

But the biggest acceptance on New Delhi’s part appears to be the expanded role of the ‘big ele­phant in the room’—China, as SD Muni puts it. That was reflected in the agreement to expand Indian connectivity with Nepal through Inland Waterways and a rail line to Kathmandu.

What this agreement on con­nectivity allowed Modi was to control the narrative on China’s increasing engagement in Nepal.New Delhi appears to have accept­ed that Oli would inevitably sign a railway agreement in Beijing soon after his Delhi visit. By pre­empting Beijing, New Delhi hopes to counter any narrative about it losing its traditional sphere of influence. Domestically, this helps the BJP to frame its messages as it faces general elections next year.

As Oli ran on a nationalist plank and secured a substantial major­ity for his coalition, the political leadership in New Delhi appears to be willing to do the dance for now. But it may not stay that way if Kathmandu fails to maintain high-level political communica­tion and Nepal affair gets delegat­ed to the bureaucratic and intelli­gence levels in India.

Rajapaksa’s playbook

Perhaps not the best person to emulate, but there certainly were things in former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s diplomatic playbook that the Oli administration would do well to learn from. As Rajapaksa’s gov­ernment began the campaign of a final push against the LTTE in 2008, Colombo needed a lot of arms and ammunition. The Chi­nese and the Pakistanis came in with an open offer. But Rajapak­sa initially sent his two brothers to New Delhi with a shopping list, which India declined to offer. Still he kept sending his brother Basil and his foreign minister to New Delhi at regular intervals. Rajapaksa is said to have con­veyed to Mahmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee in 2008 that his government would readily accept a deal with India if New Delhi offered equally favorable terms as Beijing. India wouldn’t or couldn’t match the Chinese offer. As a result, India was forced to accept, if not tacitly support, the campaign against the LTTE.

As Nepal’s engagement with China grows, the onus of reaching out regularly to New Delhi at the political level falls on both the incoming National Security Advi­sor and Foreign Minister. Only such an approach can sustain the current symbolic resetting of ties and a degree of strategic autono­my Nepal seems to have gained—and ensure another disagreement does not lead to a recurrence of blockade-like hostility.

twitter@johnparajuli