Contrary to claims that the Gauri Bahadur Karki-led probe commission report ignored the second day of the GenZ movement, the 898-page document provides a forensic account of a state in collapse, a security vacuum that invited chaos, and a ‘criminal hijacking’ of a peaceful protest that has now led to criminal charges against the highest levels of the former government.

The Karki Commission report draws a clear distinction between the ‘peaceful’ protests of Sept 8 and the ‘criminal’ activities of Sept 9. 

The Karki Commission draws a sharp, definitive line between the two days of the uprising. Sept 8 was characterized as a ‘reform-oriented and anti-corruption’ movement that was largely peaceful until it reached the gates of Federal Parliament. However, the report characterizes Sept 9 as a day when the movement was ‘hijacked’ by what it calls ‘criminal elements’.

According to the report, the crowd on Sept 9 was no longer just the frustrated GenZ youths who had mobilized over a social media ban and systemic corruption. Instead, the riots were joined by street vendors, garage workers, transport drivers, construction workers, and even individuals who had just escaped from police custody or prisons. This shift transformed a political protest into a nationwide spree of arson, looting, and targeted destruction.

The report provides a chilling inventory of the damage inflicted on Sept 9. The violence was not random; it followed a tactical pattern across 18 districts, from east to west.

In Kathmandu Valley, ‘criminal elements’ targeted the very heart of the Nepali state. Beyond the Federal Parliament, mobs attacked Singha Durbar and its various ministries, Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General, Sheetal Niwas (President’s Residence), Official Residence of Prime Minister in Baluwatar, and the Minister’s Quarter in Bhaisepati.

The commission’s field visits revealed a calculated method of operation. In almost every instance, attackers first destroyed CCTV cameras and government Data Centres to erase evidence before proceeding with the destruction. They emptied water tanks to ensure fire-fighting efforts would fail, then used ‘Molotov Cocktails’ and other highly flammable chemicals to torch buildings.

Private property was not spared. The report details the looting and burning of star hotels (including the Hilton and Hyatt), political party offices, shopping malls (notably Bhatbhateni stores), and the private residences of politicians and civil servants. In some instances, the looting was so frenzied that individuals were trapped inside burning buildings and died while attempting to steal goods.

Perhaps the most damning section of the report is the analysis of the ‘security vacuum’ that emerged on Sept 9. By 10:00 am that day, police presence across the country had essentially vanished from the streets, withdrawing into their stations.

The commission found that top police leadership had issued orders to use ‘minimum force’ and, if the situation worsened, for personnel to strategically withdraw to save their own lives and protect their weapons. While this may have limited casualties, it created a psychological victory for the mobs. “The crowd felt that they had won, that they could do anything, and that no one was coming to stop them,” the report notes.

This vacuum led to the collapse of police infrastructure. In the Kathmandu Valley alone, 39 police units, including circles, divisions, and posts, were looted, burned, or vandalised. Large quantities of state weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment were seized by ‘non-state actors’. The report highlights the brutal murder of three police officers, two at the Maharajgunj Circle and one at the Koteshwor Division, who were beaten to death by the mob.

The commission specifically critiques the lack of a ‘unified command’. While the Nepali Army was eventually deployed, it did not happen nationwide until 10:00 pm on Sept 9, long after the nation’s most vital installations had been torched.

The chaos of Sept 9 culminated in what the report calls a ‘grave security challenge’: the mass escape of prisoners. Across the country, mobs attacked jails, overwhelming staff and forcing gates open.

The most high-profile incident occurred at Nakkhu Jail, where protesters demanded the release of Rabi Lamichhane, the chairperson of Rastriya Swatantra Party. The jailer’s statement to the commission describes a scene of intense pressure where, fearing a total massacre, administration officials eventually allowed the crowd to take Lamichhane. Lamichhane himself claimed he was ‘pushed out’ by the crowd against his will.

The scale of the escape was staggering. A total of 12,440 prisoners and detainees fled their cells on Sept 9. As of March 30, the government has managed to return 8,225 to custody, but 4,215 remain at large, continuing to pose a significant threat to public safety. 

Contrary to claims that the state has halted its pursuit of the Sept 9 rioters, data from Police Headquarters reveals an extensive and ongoing nationwide crackdown. To date, law enforcement has taken 951 individuals into custody and registered 801 cases, of which 690 have already been resolved. The judicial system remains actively engaged in these proceedings, with 210 individuals currently held in jail pending trial.

Kathmandu Valley has emerged as the primary focal point for these legal efforts, accounting for 259 cases and 409 arrests, including those tied to the murder of three police officers. Notably, the police revealed that 48 of the individuals arrested in the capital had prior criminal records for serious offenses such as attempted murder and drug trafficking. This finding lends significant weight to the commission’s theory that the movement was systematically infiltrated by criminal elements rather than being a purely spontaneous protest.

The arrest of former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak on March 28 is the direct result of the commission’s recommendation for criminal investigation into their ‘negligent conduct’. The commission argues that in a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister holds the ultimate responsibility as the ‘guardian’ of the citizens.

The report is particularly scathing regarding Oli’s testimony. It notes that even as gunfire continued for four hours outside Parliament on Sept 8 and riots consumed the city on Sept 9, no effective efforts were made to prevent human loss. The commission termed Oli’s responses during questioning as ‘irresponsible’.

For Lekhak, the commission recommended action for negligence that led to the loss of life. While Lekhak argued that he provided ‘policy guidance’ and that the protests were ‘infiltrated’, the commission concluded that the failure to coordinate a unified response and the subsequent ‘security vacuum’ constituted a criminal lapse in duty.

The report also identifies the government’s own actions as the primary catalyst for the explosion of anger. The ban on 26 social media platforms was the ‘triggering factor’ that drove the youth onto the streets. 

However, the commission also criticizes the government for its handling of the ban’s lifting on Sept 9. It argues the government lifted the restrictions without studying how misinformation and ‘negativity’ would spread. This allowed false reports—such as the claim that 32 bodies of protesters were hidden inside the Parliament building—to go viral, further inciting the mobs to attack government structures.

The commission identifies a critical turning point on Sept 8 when a peaceful protest transitioned into a violent siege. According to the report, at approximately 12:00 pm, a group of about 100 motorcyclists arrived from various corridors, including Chabahil and Gaushala. Many members of this group were wearing black T-shirts with ‘TOB’ written on them.

These individuals—believed to be the members of the gang that goes by Tibetan Original Blood— acted as provocateurs, revving their motorcycle engines to create loud noise and aggressively inciting the crowd. Following their arrival, the protesters became significantly more violent, attacking police lines with water bottles, stones, rods, bricks, and slingshots in a concerted effort to breach the Federal Parliament.

For the TOB group and other individuals involved in vandalism, arson, and looting, the commission has made several specific recommendations aimed at ensuring systematic prosecution.

To address the widespread destruction of state and private property on Sept 9, the commission has outlined a series of rigorous recommendations targeting general vandals and criminal elements. Central to this strategy is the formation of a high-level Special Investigation Team under the Ministry of Home Affairs, composed of forensic and technical experts. This team should be tasked with utilizing primary evidence already collected, specifically Base Transceiver Station (BTS) data from Nepal Telecom and NCell, to identify telephone numbers present at vital riot sites like Singha Durbar and the Supreme Court. 

Meanwhile, the government of Balen Shah, in its first cabinet decision, has said that it would form a probe committee regarding Sept 9.

To ensure accuracy, the report directs investigators to cross-verify this digital data with CCTV footage, social media videos, and victim-provided clips to confirm the identities of those involved in arson and looting.

Furthermore, the commission emphasizes the need for specialized focus on the systematic tactics used by rioters, such as the strategic destruction of Data Centers and CCTV cameras intended to erase evidence. 

The report recommends severe criminal prosecution for individuals who utilized Molotov cocktails or targeted sensitive government documents. Accountability also extends to the security breach, with a specific probe recommended to identify both the ‘non-state actors’ and negligent police involved in the theft of state weaponry.

Despite its nearly 900-page length and extensive evidence, the Karki Commission report explicitly acknowledges several critical areas where it lacks data or definitive findings. 

The most significant admission in the report is that the commission failed to collect enough solid evidence to recommend formal prosecution for most individuals involved in the Sept 9 violence. The commission cited its ‘short mandate’ and a severe ‘lack of time and human resource’ as reasons it could not conduct a detailed investigation into every incident nationwide. Instead of identifying all perpetrators, it recommends that the government form a special investigation team to finish the work.

The commission reports a lack of cooperation regarding security data. Specifically, it states that police and the Armed Police Force (APF) did not provide detailed logs regarding which officers used what ammunition or the specific circumstances under which weapons were looted. The report notes that despite repeated requests, these agencies provided ‘reports citing arson’ rather than the forensic details required to determine if ammunition was used responsibly or negligently.

The report highlights a gap regarding the movement’s origins. While the commission mentioned suspicions that foreign funding may have been directed to certain NGOs to fuel the unrest, it explicitly states that it found no ‘concrete evidence’ or ‘solid proof’ to support these claims. It notes that while the geographic location of Nepal makes such influence a ‘natural suspicion’, the state’s regulatory mechanisms currently lack the transparency to confirm these financial trails.

In a damning critique of the state’s internal systems, the commission reveals that it did not receive a single intelligence report from any government or non-governmental agency to assist in its investigation. This left the commission to rely almost entirely on testimonies and raw BTS (cell tower) data, which only proves physical presence at a scene rather than specific criminal actions.