Nepal’s democratic journey over the past seven decades has been neither linear nor easy. From autocracy to democracy, from monarchy to constitutional monarchy, from civil conflict to republican federalism—and four constitutions between them—the country has continuously reinvented its political system in search of legitimacy, inclusion, and stability. Though all the constitutions marked their own milestone, the 2015 constitution was a historic milestone by institutionalizing inclusion, secularism, federalism, and republicanism, forethought to be correcting centuries of political exclusion and autocracy. Yet two decades later, a hard truth confronts us: Nepal has achieved representation, but not governance stability; inclusion, but not delivery.

The frustration is most visible among Nepal’s youth especially after the Sept 8 uprising. Their demand is not ideological. It is practical and the voices of the people. The Nepali people seek a state that governs competently, delivers services, and plans beyond electoral cycles. The message is unmistakable: representation alone is no longer enough.

Democracy isn’t the problem

Nepal’s political instability is not a failure of democracy itself, but of its institutional design. Since Nepal became a federal republic in 2008, it has seen significant political instability, revealing around 13 to 14 different governments formed by shifting coalitions, none completing a full five-year term, highlighting frequent leadership changes, alliance breakdowns, coalition fragility, and executive paralysis. Prime Ministers rise and fall not due to electoral verdicts, but due to internal party bargaining, shifting alliances determined more on expanding autocratic behaviour for power rather than people’s need and national priorities. Ministers are often selected for loyalty rather than competence. Parliament is crowded yet weak, while oversight institutions are politicized.

This instability has damaged Nepal’s credibility—both domestically and internationally. Policy continuity is weak, capital expenditure remains chronically low, and administrative morale has eroded. In such an environment, inclusion risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

The answer, however, is not authoritarian nostalgia nor democratic rollback. Nepal does not need less democracy; it needs better-designed democracy.

A hybrid governance model

Nepal must now transition from a transitional constitution to a performance-oriented democratic state. This requires a hybrid governance model—one that preserves parliamentary accountability while ensuring executive stability and professional administration.

First, Nepal should consider a fixed-term Prime Minister, elected by Parliament for a full five years and insulated from premature no-confidence motions except under extraordinary constitutional circumstances. Such a provision would allow governments to govern, not merely survive. To reinforce neutrality, the Prime Minister should relinquish party office upon election, separating state leadership from factional control.

Second, executive professionalism must be restored through a professional cabinet. Ministers should be appointed from outside Parliament—drawn from academia, civil service, business, public policy, and national security. This is neither radical nor undemocratic; it is practiced in many parliamentary democracies. By breaking patronage networks, Nepal can replace political loyalty with performance accountability.

Third, Nepal’s legislature must be leaner and more effective. A unicameral Parliament of 165 representatives comprising the current First Past the Post members would be better suited for lawmaking and oversight than today’s bloated bicameral structure. Fewer legislators, properly resourced committees, and stronger oversight would enhance both efficiency and public trust.

Fourth, the Head of State should remain ceremonial but constitutional—a neutral guardian of constitutional balance, elected through an electoral college, not a political competitor.

Finally, Nepal should revisit its federal design. A Union model of administration—preserving strong local governments while eliminating redundant provincial layers—could deliver services more efficiently. Countries like Japan and France demonstrate that decentralization does not require multiple political tiers; it requires empowered local administration and fiscal clarity. 

It would install institutional reinforcement by, first, strengthening Parliamentary Committees—particularly the Public Accounts Committee, the National Security Committee, and an independent Ethics Committee. Second, it would uphold judicial independence through transparent, merit-based appointments to constitutional bodies. Finally, it would introduce clear performance metrics and enforceable ethics codes across the civil service to ensure professionalism, accountability, and public trust.

The PR debate

As Nepal’s interim government, Election Commission, and political parties move toward finalizing a modality for proportional representation (PR), it is time to pause and ask a difficult but necessary question and confront another uncomfortable reality: Has PR, in its current form, strengthened Nepali democracy—or weakened it?

PR was introduced to correct exclusion—and it succeeded in the purpose. Women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis and minorities—limited in state power—gained more visibility in Parliament.

But today, PR increasingly produces representation without accountability, legitimacy without competition, and inclusion without voter consent.

Without internal party democracy, PR becomes a tool of patronage, Members of Parliament (MP) enter the Parliament not through public trust, but through party lists—rewarding loyalty over leadership, not downward to voters, proximity over performance. Inclusion turns symbolic, and democracy thins out. The result is a Legislature where presence is inclusive, but power remains centralized and insulated. This is not an argument against inclusion. It is an argument against unaccountable inclusion.

Comparative democracies offer a clear lesson. In countries such as Germany and New Zealand, PR functions because political parties are internally democratic, transparent, and institutionally disciplined. Party lists are regulated, leadership is accountable, and institutions enforce standards. The result is legitimacy without competition, inclusion without voter choice. Nepal adopted the mechanism—but not the safeguards.

A smarter path forward is not abandoning inclusion, but embedding it directly into the electoral contest. Instead of allocating representation through party lists, Nepal should require political parties to meet mandatory, percentage-based inclusion thresholds within the 165 First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) seats. Let women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest, campaign, and win elections through political party’s nominations. This approach would ensure that inclusion is not a nomination—but a mandate.

It would move our democracy: From nomination to election; from protection to participation; from symbolism to legitimacy. Such a reform would also justify reducing Parliament from 275 members to 165—making it leaner, more accountable, and directly answerable to the people.

Inclusion must mature as a Parliament that represents Nepal’s future must be chosen by its people—especially its youth. Democracy deepens when every MP knows they owe their seat to voters, not party headquarters. Inclusion is not a favor granted by elites. It is a right—earned through votes.

Nepal can no longer postpone this debate. A smarter Parliament begins when every MP is directly accountable to the people.

A safer path: Inclusion thru polls

The solution is not abandoning inclusion. That would be both unjust and politically destabilizing. The solution is to embed inclusion directly within the 165 First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) seats.

Political parties should be legally required to allocate candidates in percentage terms—ensuring women, Dalits, Indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest elections across constituencies. Let inclusion be achieved through ballots, not appointments.

This approach preserves diversity while restoring accountability. Candidates must campaign, engage voters, and win mandates. MPs gain legitimacy not from party lists, but from public trust.

Inclusion must evolve: from nomination to election, from protection to participation, from symbolism to legitimacy.

A Parliament that claims to represent Nepal’s future—especially its youth—must be chosen by the people.

Why this moment matters

Nepal stands at a strategic crossroads. Economic vulnerability, demographic change, geopolitical pressure, and public disillusionment converge at a moment when incremental tinkering is no longer enough. Governance reform is not a technical exercise; it is a national necessity.

Reducing Parliament from 275 to 165 members, streamlining administration, professionalizing the executive, and reforming PR together form a coherent strategy: stability with inclusion, authority with accountability, and democracy with delivery.

Conclusion: From transition to coherence

Nepal’s credibility will ultimately be measured not by who governs, but by how the state performs. A democracy locked in perpetual transition cannot fulfill the aspirations of a young, ambitious nation.

The task ahead is to refine Nepal’s democratic architecture—without abandoning its inclusive spirit. A hybrid model that is stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit offers a pathway out of political survival and toward strategic coherence.

This is not a debate Nepal can afford to postpone. Inclusion is not a favor. It is a right—earned through votes.

The expected outcomes arrive for a structural stability that enables long-term policy continuity. Second is professionalism over patronage in executive decision-making. Third is the fiscal efficiency through reduced bureaucracy and institutional duplication. Finally, to renewed public trust and strengthened diplomatic confidence in Nepal’s governance integrity.

The concept ca be implemented through a roadmap. Firstly, by convening a National Governance Reform Dialogue for Constitutional reforms to build consensus and draft reform principles. Secondly by establishing a Constitutional Review Taskforce to recommend structural and procedural reforms. Lastly by adopting a Governance Compact 2040—a multi-party and civic commitment prioritizing stability, merit, and accountability as national objectives.

Nepal’s future credibility rests not on who rules, but on how it governs. By embracing a hybrid model—stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit—the country can move decisively from perpetual transition to coherent, credible democracy.

The author is Major General (Retd) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability