Nepal’s political landing has been one of remarkable transformations but with persistent fragility. From constitutional monarchy to federal, secular republic, the country has continually redefined its system of governance. Yet, the outcomes remain uneven: political instability, fragmented coalitions, patronage-driven governance, economic interruption, diplomatic distrust and declining public trust. The repeated neglect in the people’s noise has brought about the recent GenZ uprising, which has exposed the urgency for a state that delivers stability, accountability and credibility—not just representation.
As Nepal reflects on its political destiny, it must explore a hybrid model of governance — blending the parliamentary accountability of the United Kingdom, the institutional discipline of the United States, and the executive balance of France’s semi-presidential system. Such a synthesis could deliver what neither pure parliamentary nor presidential models have achieved in Nepal: a government that is stable yet accountable, professional yet democratic, and credible at home and abroad.
The limits of the current system
Nepal’s 2015 Constitution institutionalized a parliamentary democracy with federalism, secularism and proportional representation. Yet, it has also produced coalition instability and administrative paralysis. Prime Ministers change with alarming frequency, political parties prioritize alliances over governance, and lawmakers double as ministers, often compromising both legislative oversight and executive efficiency.
In this model, the state has become top-heavy but underperforming. Parliament, intended to be the guardian of accountability, has become an arena of political bargaining. The public perceives politics as self-serving, and governance as synonymous with corruption or inertia. The structural question, therefore, is not just who governs, but how Nepal governs.
Learning from global models
Accountability thru parliament
The Westminster model offers robust parliamentary control but is vulnerable to instability when coalitions dominate. Nepal’s adaptation of this model has suffered from party fragmentation, weak discipline, and limited professionalization of ministers.
Separation and professionalism
The American system demonstrates how a strict separation between the executive and legislature enhances efficiency. Cabinet members are appointed from outside Congress, ensuring that ministers are professionals rather than politicians. This approach insulates governance from partisan instability and rewards expertise and performance.
Balance thru dual executive
France’s semi-presidential model combines a ceremonial President as head of state and a Prime Minister accountable to Parliament. This dualism provides balance and continuity, ensuring that no single institution monopolizes power. It also allows the executive to remain stable even amid political transitions.
For Nepal, the lessons are clear: parliamentary instability can be offset by executive professionalism and constitutional balance. A hybrid framework that draws from these three systems can be tailored to Nepal’s scale, political culture and aspirations.
A proposed model for Nepal
A House-elected chief executive
The Prime Minister would remain the head of the government, elected by a majority of parliament members for a fixed four or five-year term. To prevent excessive politicking, a no-confidence vote should be restricted within the first two years of tenure. The Prime Minister should not hold any party office, ensuring that governance remains above partisan maneuvering.
Subject experts as ministers
A critical innovation would be to separate lawmakers from the executive. Ministers should be drawn from outside Parliament—from academia, civil service, security, intelligentsia, business and other professional sectors—vetted by a parliamentary confirmation committee. This professional cabinet would reflect meritocracy rather than political patronage. It would also help address public disillusionment with political elites and bring expertise into governance.
A lean, unicameral legislature
Nepal could abolish the National Assembly and operate with a unicameral Parliament of 125-150 members. The current size is costly and redundant, while duplication across two houses delays decision-making. A leaner legislature would enhance efficiency and focus on lawmaking and oversight. The electoral system could remain mixed—60 percent direct and 40 percent proportional—to preserve inclusivity.
A ceremonial prez
The President would serve as Head of State and constitutional guardian, with powers to ensure continuity during crises. Elected through an electoral college of Parliament and provincial assemblies, the President’s role would be symbolic but stabilizing—much like the German or Indian model.
Toward a system that works
Nepal could gradually move away from its costly and fragmented federal structure toward a union government system that retains local empowerment but restores national coherence. Federalism, though conceived to promote inclusion, has instead multiplied bureaucracy, diffused accountability, and strained public finances. A Union model—drawing lessons from Japan’s prefectural efficiency, France’s unitary yet decentralized administration, and the UK’s devolution framework—would streamline governance by abolishing redundant provincial layers while strengthening local bodies and professional administration. This approach would preserve representation where necessary but align authority, resources and responsibility under a unified executive and legislative framework, ensuring fiscal discipline, administrative clarity, and national stability.
Strengthened oversight institutions
Parliamentary committees—especially Public Accounts, National Security and Ethics—must become more independent and professional. The judiciary should retain constitutional independence, and the Constitutional Council should include respected professionals, not only party appointees.
Why this model fits Nepal
Stability thru structure:
A fixed-term Prime Minister and a professional cabinet would end the cycle of frequent government collapses. Continuity of governance would allow long-term planning—particularly for infrastructure, economic reforms and foreign policy.
Professionalism over patronage:
By selecting ministers from outside Parliament, Nepal would cultivate an executive focused on performance and delivery. This mirrors the US cabinet system, where expertise outweighs party loyalty. It also reduces corruption by severing the link between lawmaking and resource control.
Accountability sans instability:
Legislative oversight remains robust through committees, but the executive retains autonomy in implementation. This ensures accountability without paralyzing governance.
Efficiency and cost reduction:
A smaller, unicameral Parliament would save public expenditure and improve efficiency — vital for a small, resource-constrained nation.
Institutional balance:
A ceremonial president, an empowered parliament and a professional executive would together prevent both authoritarian drift and chaotic populism. The structure would encourage responsible governance rather than perpetual negotiation.
Challenges to reform
Reforming the Constitution will not be easy. Political elites are unlikely to give up ministerial privileges or the leverage that comes from coalition bargaining. Civil society must therefore drive the national conversation on governance reform—framing it not as a partisan debate but as a strategic necessity.
Another challenge lies in bureaucratic resistance. A professionalized cabinet must work with a reformed civil service, guided by clear performance metrics and ethical standards. Nepal’s success will depend on whether institutions—not individuals—become the true anchors of power.
Finally, there must be a cultural shift in how politics is practiced. Political parties should evolve from patronage machines into programmatic institutions that shape policy and national vision, not appointments and benefits.
Reimagining governance for credibility
Nepal’s quest for stability is not about replacing one form of government with another, but about refining its governance architecture to reflect its realities. The hybrid model offers a balance between democratic representation and administrative efficiency.
It is a model where Parliament governs through oversight, not occupation; where ministers serve through expertise, not entitlement; and where the people measure democracy not by rhetoric, but by delivery.
If Nepal succeeds in building such a system, it would set a regional example—a small state navigating complex politics through institutional strength and meritocratic governance. This would also complement India’s and China’s neighborhood strategies by ensuring Nepal’s internal credibility, which remains the foundation of any external stability.
Toward a governance compact
Nepal can no longer afford the cyclical instability that has eroded public faith and economic opportunity. It needs a Governance Compact 2040—an understanding across parties, provinces, and society that stability, merit and accountability must define the next political generation.
A hybrid constitutional model drawing from the discipline of the United Kingdom, the professional governance of the United States, and the executive balance of France could suit Nepal’s unique needs.
It would keep democracy accountable, insulate administration from partisan capture, and restore credibility to governance. Reimagining governance is not a rejection of democracy but its renewal. A hybrid model—where Parliament elects the Prime Minister, ministers are drawn from merit, and a lean structure is lean and functional that ensures efficiency—could transform Nepal toward “stability and integrity” from a state of perpetual transition to one of strategic coherence and credible democracy.
Nepal’s future stability will depend not on who rules, but on how it chooses to govern.
The author is Maj Gen (Retd) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability
