Trump 2.0: Boon for smaller South Asian states?

In the intricate geopolitical landscape of South Asia, the potential for smaller nations like Nepal to assert their influence and leverage their positions has never been greater, particularly under the Trump 2.0 administration. The political climate fostered by Trump has been characterized by a focus on bilateral relations, economic pragmatism and an “America First” approach, in addition to “Make America Great Again”, which has opened new avenues for smaller South Asian nations—countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka—to enhance their diplomatic and economic prospects. Trump’s intent has both domestic and international policy approaches. 

The administration is in the middle when South Asia is being re-imagined with cooperation, competition, crisis and conflict. Standing in times of change in the interconnected world, South Asians are confronting an exceptional array of new political-security-economic challenges.  

The second day for the new administration (Jan 21) commenced with a commitment from QUAD Foreign Ministers: “Our four nations maintain our conviction that international law, economic opportunity, peace, stability and security in all domains, including the maritime domain, underpin the development and prosperity of the peoples of the Indo-Pacific. We also strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.”

A day after Trump’s inauguration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, affirming a shared commitment to continuing to strengthen the partnership between India and the US. 

The US’ 2017 “South Asia Policy”, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022 will continue to be the bedrock of the US South Asia policy with India playing the role of a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific. 

It will be a continuation of the policy of provoking China and embracing India as a major ‘defense partner’ (since 2016), establishment of India-US 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2018 and a contest to smaller nations in South Asia like Nepal.

The context

The geopolitical dynamics in South Asia have been shaped by historical rivalries and alliances, with larger powers like India’s relations with Pakistan often dominating the narrative. From the 1950s to the 1970s, South Asia had a special significance in great power competition between the US and the Soviet Union. But the analogy in the region is returning to the geopolitical space of the 1970s, where China and the US both supported Pakistan during the ‘1971 third war’ between India and Pakistan that created the independent state of Bangladesh. China and India have had turbulent and sometimes friendly relationships. Through the 1954’s ‘Treaty of Coexistence’, the two sides emphasised the ‘Five Principles’ of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, only to engage in a war in 1962. 

US anxiety at the height of the East-West Cold War with the declared alliance between China and the Soviet Union and Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik led to two strategic approaches. One, it greeted the rise of a strong China. Second, Pakistan was driven by multifaceted US interests manifested, among others, through support to Pakistan in the 1971 war with India. 

India signed the ‘Treaty of Friendship’ with the Soviet Union in 1971 and annexed Sikkim as its “22nd” state four years later. 

The change of US policy with China in 1971 and the tilt to Pakistan as well as change of the Soviet Union’s policy with closer relations with India, disintegration of Pakistan and the announcement of Sikkim becoming part of India altered South Asia’s regional and international relations. Under China’s foreign policy radar, South Asia had a low profile, though the country established diplomatic relations with several South Asians. At that time, the South Asian geostrategic environment transformed the balance of power irreversibly in India’s favour. 

Anyway, the US engagement with India is paramount to achieve the intent of “Making America Great Again”. India has her own constraints to counter the challenges from China and Pakistan, who have maintained their cordial friendship to an ‘all-weather’ partnership. Meanwhile, China and India agreed on 18 Dec 2024 to continue taking measures to safeguard peace and tranquillity along the border and promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations and to continue seeking a package solution to the boundary question that is fair, reasonable and acceptable. 

However, under a future Trump administration, the approach to foreign policy could shift, encouraging greater engagement with smaller nations. This shift may stem from several factors, including the need to counterbalance China’s growing influence and India’s foreign policy approaches with strategic autonomy, foster economic partnerships and establish a stable regional environment that can contribute to US interests.

Countering China

One of the most pressing issues for South Asian nations is the increasing presence of China, especially through the global governance mechanism, the Global Common Shared Future. One segment of its Belt and Road Initiative is furthering inroads. Smaller nations like Nepal in the continental and Sri Lanka in the maritime have found themselves in precarious positions as they navigate their relationships with China and the Trump 2.0 administration could leverage this anxiety, providing alternatives to Chinese investments and increasing American influence in the region.

For example, smaller nations could benefit from increased American investment in infrastructure projects, thereby reducing dependency on Chinese funding and creating opportunities for sustainable economic development. The US could work collaboratively with South Asian nations to identify projects that align with their national development goals while promoting American technological and investment interests. This dual approach not only empowers smaller nations but also helps the US establish stronger ties in the region.

Economy and trade

There is a high likelihood of renewed discussions surrounding trade agreements that might favour smaller nations in South Asia. The focus on “fair trade” and economic sovereignty resonates with many countries looking to diversify their economic partnerships.

Countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have historically benefited from trade preferences under programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Renewed American leadership could facilitate deeper trade relations through customized agreements that emphasize mutual benefit while ensuring that smaller nations are not sidelined in favour of larger economies. Enhanced trade relations could see smaller South Asian nations gain access to the American market while simultaneously attracting US investments.

Strengthening alliances

The prospects of a Trump 2.0 administration also bear significance in terms of international alliances. Strategically-placed smaller South Asian nations like Bangladesh could find themselves in favourable positions to strengthen regional alliances, particularly through platforms like the QUAD as well as potential new initiatives aiming to unite nations against common regional challenges.

By aligning with larger democracies and leveraging US strategic interests, smaller nations can increase their visibility on the global stage. For instance, Nepal, which maintains a delicate balance between India and China, could use its unique position to advocate for increased focus on climate change and sustainable development, receiving support from US initiatives that align with their national interests.

Défense-security collaborations

Security concerns are paramount in South Asia, with issues ranging from terrorism to territorial disputes impacting the region’s stability. A renewed commitment under Trump 2.0 to support smaller nations could manifest through enhanced military training exercises, defined equipment transfers and intelligence-sharing agreements.

The Maldives, for instance, has been a critical actor in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean. An American focus on collaborating with such nations to enhance maritime security operations can significantly bolster their defined capabilities while ensuring a more secure sea-lane for international trade—an issue of major strategic interest for the US.

Promoting democracy

Another area where smaller nations in South Asia can seize opportunities is in the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. The Trump administration has often balanced its foreign policy between realism and idealism, sometimes prioritizing strategic interests over democratic principles. However, under the influence of prominent policymakers focused on human rights issues, smaller nations could find an ally in the US.

For countries like Nepal and Bhutan, which have made significant strides in democratic governance, partnerships that emphasize political reform, civil society engagement and anti-corruption measures could have long-lasting effects. By aligning with US interests in promoting democracy, they can enhance their own legitimacy and international standing.

Conclusion

The implications of a hypothetical Trump 2.0 administration on smaller nations in South Asia present a landscape full of opportunities. While challenges remain—particularly regarding regional stability and external influences from China and Pakistan—the potential for economic growth, enhanced security collaborations and stronger democratic institutions could define a new era of engagement for these nations.

Small countries have historically been overshadowed by larger neighbours, but the dynamics driven by US foreign policy could empower these nations to carve out a significant role in regional affairs. As they navigate this complex landscape, it is crucial for smaller South Asian nations to seize the moment, engaging proactively with the US to ensure their voices are heard and their needs met in a rapidly changing global environment.

Ultimately, in an era where national narratives are being redefined, Nepal and other smaller nations can play critical roles by acting as bridges between larger powers, advocating for their interests while contributing to a more stable and prosperous South Asian region. As these countries position themselves strategically, the tenets of collaboration, mutual respect and shared objectives will be essential to building a coalition that can navigate the complexities of 21st-century geopolitics.

Under all potential geopolitical scenarios, the convincing intervention in outlining the relationship’s progression eventually dwells with New Delhi and Beijing, not Washington. But for Nepal and other smaller nations, Washington is and should be secured as the strategic potent partner. 

The implications of a potential ‘Trump 2.0’ for small nations encompass a complex interplay of political, security, economic factors with justified diplomacy. The situation would necessitate a careful balancing act, as it navigates its relationships with major powers while striving to maintain its sovereignty and ensure national interests are prioritized. The overall impact would depend greatly on the specifics of Trump’s policies and the regional dynamics at play during his second term. Then again, Nepal must be in existence with national interests in both competition and coexistence without falling into the strategic trap in the long game.

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand