Evolving national security strategies of the US and its allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, should be read against the backdrop of new threats to the US and democracies in Asia. The strategies will seek to keep Chinese power in check while their earlier versions were meant to reduce Soviet power during the Cold War.
The economic success of China over the past 30 years or so has given it strong enough influence to lead the Asian continent by consequently weakening the customary US geopolitical objective and challenging India’s intents of ensuring that the South Asian amphitheater remains free of hegemonic control. As far as South and Southeast Asia are concerned, NAM encompasses all 10 member-states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) apart from all 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as 10 non-government organizations. It will be contextual to draw from the NAM summit held in Baku (Azerbaijan) on October 25-26, 2019. The summit stood for “Upholding the Bandung principles to ensure a concerted and adequate response to the challenges of the contemporary world”, recognizing that history reoccurs but with different undertones in a new geostrategic environment. The Baku declaration is likely to resonate at the 2023 summit to be held in Uganda, at a time of increased confrontations between Asian powers China and India and competition for supremacy between the US and China, marking a tectonic shift in geopolitics to the Indo-Pacific Region. Europe played a key role in the Cold War, while in Cold War 2.0, Asia will helm a similar role. In its earlier edition, the US-Soviet contest and European-Soviet played out, while Cold War 2.0 will see Sino-US competition and Sino-Indian dissension. Amid an unprecedented security scenario in Europe, where neutrality is becoming a thing of the past, smaller nations of the continent seem to be repositioning themselves. There was a time when smaller nations in Asia were part of the NAM. With global power shifting in the Indo-Pacific Region, their respective neutral stances may become a thing of the past. What’s more, this shift from neutrality is happening simultaneously in Europe and Asia, giving rise to the question: “Will Asia’s challenges be Europe’s and vice-versa?” Europe neutral no longer Sweden’s 200-year-long policy of non-alignment, that outlasted both World Wars, is now history. Sweden and Switzerland have not been in a state of war internationally since 1815 and 1814, respectively. Another European country, Finland, adopted a policy of neutrality after World War II, recognized first through a treaty between Finland and the USSR in 1948 (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance). The Finnish and Swedish departures from neutrality indicate growing military-political polarization and tensions in Europe. History seems to be repeating as confrontation tends to spread and exert pressure on multiple states, including those not actively involved in “taking sides”, to join one or the other side even as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland continue to remain neutral. What prompts nation states to officially align with or against any major power bloc? Their own defense and security. An illustration is the ongoing war in Europe where the two neutral states—Finland and Sweden—had to take cover for their very own security. That is why Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed a Nordic unified air defense agreement aimed at countering Russia’s rising threat by operating jointly to neutralize threats. As per the new scheme of things, NATO will find an alternative corridor through the Baltic Sea for Nordic countries, given the high possibility of Russia sealing the existing Suwalki Gap, a narrow corridor separating Kaliningrad and Lithuania, in the event of increased hostilities. Relevance of Asia’s neutrality Despite a shift from neutrality to non-neutrality in Europe, non-alignment is very much alive in Asia as India, Indonesia, Thailand and other middle powers have shown. Chances are that neutrality will get a boost once again, with Asia leading it. A 40-year-long ideological conflict established NAM during the Cold War. Today, 120 countries (mostly from Africa and Asia) are on board as its members, 19 nations as observers along with 10 organizations. Together, NAM accounts for 60 percent of the UN. It all began in April 1955, when government representatives from 29 Asian and African nations took part in what is known as the Bangdung Conference under Indonesian President Sukarno to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development and decolonization. Political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality were the guiding principles of this landmark arrangement also known as ‘Panchsheel’ (five restraints) that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru had adopted to govern Sino-Indian relations. NAM primarily gained prominence during the Cold War; these days, the Global South (GS) is hogging the limelight in the wake of a growing opposition against the US-led West and the Sino-Russian clique. The main global challenges of the present—the Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine crisis, the Sino-American rivalry and the Sino-Indian competition—have made NAP more relevant. GS can be a powerful platform to raise common concerns and interests of ‘swing states’, amid global conflicts, particularly between the two emerging Asian powers—China and India. The two countries will surely compete for GS leadership. India’s relatively tensions-free ties with the West and China’s growing diplomatic reach worldwide means the two countries will affect global power dynamics significantly. In this context, it will be relevant to recall part of Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s speech made in January regarding his country’s G20 presidency and GS leadership: “Today, developing countries are worried over issues like rising prices of oil, food and fertilizers. They are also concerned about mounting debt and worsening economic conditions. Thus, it is our duty to become the voice of such countries, known as the GS in diplomatic terms”. Also, India convened a virtual meeting on January 12-13 themed “Voice of the Global South Summit: for Human-Centric Development” with the participation of 120 leaders and ministers. The virtual session raised issues like global economy and climate change, rising inflation, energy, food issues and debt problems. China did not participate in the event. More importantly, India held the 18th summit of G20 consisting of neutral countries as well as countries from the rival blocs—the US-led West and the Sino-Russian bloc. India’s growing influence comes at a time when China’s signature project of global significance—the Belt and Road Initiative—seems to be losing steam with debt problems afflicting many developing countries that have become part of the project. As the Ukraine war rages on, China is seeking a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine, at a time when its ties with the US are at an all-time low. India’s relations with the West are not as hostile as China’s. This means the US-led West may be comfortable with New Delhi leading the GS instead of Beijing, with US foreign policy priorities toward India covering security, defense and technology acting as a bridge between the US and the GS. With more than 1.4bn people, India has become the world’s most populous nation by taking over China for the first time. In terms of the economy, though, India is at a disadvantage as it is just one-sixth of China’s 2022 nominal GDP. GS should not be politicized and focus should be on economic development and improving livelihoods. Receiver-sought assistance for lower-income nations should be a priority. Whoever lands GS leadership will have a greater chance of leading NAM as well, so the race for GS leadership is quite important. Conclusion Neutralism, also called nonalignment in international relations, meant staying out of the war and all sorts of ideological or political interpretations during the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. US Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had first pursued this isolationist policy during the European wars between France and Great Britain after the French Revolution that followed the peace of 1815. It is more or less like the 20th century policy of neutralism that came as a distinct policy post-World War II. Recently, on February 23, one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly, in its 11th special emergency session, adopted a resolution calling for Russia’s immediate withdrawal in line with the UN Charter. Altogether 141 states stood for the resolution, seven (Belarus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria) stood against it while 32 states, including China, India and Pakistan, abstained. For the US and Europe, ‘abstaining’ can also mean neutrality, offering a dissimilar dimension of neutrality when it comes to the world body’s perception. As a concept that aims to foster an independent foreign policy and peaceful co-existence, NAM is still relevant despite the end of the Cold War. As in the past, NAM is likely to find it hard to chart out united strategies on many issues arising due to shifts in global geopolitics. GS is essentially developing nations of Asia, Africa and South American countries, a region caught between a rising China and the US as well as its allies that are seeking to curb this rise. President Xi Jingping is likely to court the GS against the US, while India, with its multi-aligned foreign policy, is likely to do its bit to make smaller nations follow its path. All in all, neutrality is likely to be more relevant in a rapidly-changing world, especially for smaller nations. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand
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