On the contrary, Xi’s neighborhood policy in the southeast is principled on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national rejuvenation slogan. Clearly, China has shown an uncompromising and firm stance on issues that it perceives in its core national interest. Whether the question of the South China Sea, Taiwan or India, China has taken a more assertive stance, and Xi himself has shown reluctance to follow his predecessor's “hide-bide” dictum. His pattern of action suggests he has concluded China is too big to hide now, and therefore assertiveness is the only chance it has to continue its ascendance.
Do you think there will be any changes in his neighborhood policy in his third term? The Chinese Communist Party is a mysterious black box. It's always hard to anticipate the party’s precise policy direction, but I think the general trend of China’s neighborhood policy will remain unchanged. Beijing may take further positive steps to stabilize its relations with the US. I think it will even be willing to make significant concessions to the US. But I also think that China will try to isolate its US policies from its policies in other domains, including neighborhood policy. The so-called fang (relaxing) and shou (tightening) cycle suggests Xi’s third term might be more inclined to relaxing its policy toward the West in general. But it is less likely to succeed as the West now sees China as more of a competitor than a prospective partner. So, the prospects for status quo ante vis-à-vis US-China relations remain slim. How do you see the growing US-China rivalry in South Asia and where does India stand on it? In South Asia, there are two ways to understand the US-China rivalry. First is the misleading way of looking at South Asia as a synonym of India. Many get tempted to see the region that way, but this analysis misses the fact that South Asia consists of eight countries. This clearly underappreciates the power and strategic value of seven other countries of the region. If we see it in a superficial way, it appears as though in the US-China competition, India is increasingly aligning with the US, though with significant reservation on how far and how much substance that alignment could bring for the US and its allies. But if we take a careful look, not a single country in South Asia supports India’s regional leadership. These countries are resistant to coercive tactics that India deploys, and they see India as a bigger concern for them than China. But they generally appreciate US-extended engagement in the region. The problem is that India doesn’t welcome extra-regional power in the region, and that includes the US. This makes the US regional approach in South Asia complicated and really doesn’t advance US regional objectives. What is your take on the engagement of South Asian countries with China, particularly on BRI? South Asian countries generally welcome extra-regional powers to play a greater role, as India, despite being the largest in terms of size, lacks resources. India’s economy is just a fraction of China’s. In terms of modernization, India is at least three decades behind China. Still, India is perhaps the only major country in Asia that opposes the BRI, yet interestingly, it takes the highest amount of loan from Beijing-based AIIB. The rest of the South Asian countries are in dire need of the kind of assistance that China’s BRI offers such as infrastructure, physical and visible development, connectivity, and investment in industries. However, I do not see that South Asian countries, in general, have any particular affinity to China. They are just acting in their own national interest. If other extra-regional powers such as the United States could offer a better deal on those fronts, South Asian countries would prefer US investment. Sadly, there are no substantial offers, except only from Japan, which is playing some sort of balancing act against China’s inroads. However, South Asian countries are also cautious of the excessive reliance on China. Sri Lanka is not a good example when they think of extensive engagement with China. Smaller countries in this region are feeling the heat of great power rivalry, what are your suggestions for small countries in the conduct of their foreign policy? Every country is feeling the heat, regardless of how big or small they are. Australia is not a small country, but it is experiencing the consequences for taking a strong stance against China. Truth is, if a country’s national power is significantly weaker than either China or the US, it will certainly suffer. As Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere reminded us decades ago with an African proverb: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. Seeing from this lens, some observers are trying to define this competition only in security terms and argue that in a shooting war, no one else really matters much, except the great powers. Maybe there is some truth to the argument, but the fact remains that in the era of proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons, direct military confrontation between great powers is highly unlikely. And this is where the opportunity as well as danger lies for the non-great powers. If the rivalry turns into a confrontation, great powers will fight but that fight will take place beyond their own borders, essentially in a third country. For example, what is going on right now in Ukraine. However, there is a way out for non-great powers. They could blunt the pressure from both the US and China by attracting more secondary states into their own orbit. They could form an alliance, even if informally, among themselves and decide not to take either side. In the end, each country has to care about its national interest first. Secondary states’ national power is weaker than either China or the US when compared on a one-to-one basis, but they can put up a strong resistance if they could form a coalition. ASEAN has so far shown considerable success in that direction. During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement also showed that. Not taking sides serves the best interest of non-great powers. But in this current world order, how this will unfold, is yet to be seen.
