Much has been said about Comrade Prachanda’s “anti-imperialism” state­ment on Venezuela and Nepal’s reluctance to join the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and their collective impact on Nepal’s relations with the US, and India and China. In light of global and regional events, the three powers won’t let us off the hook easily. No matter what our wishy-washy leaders and intellectuals believe, there is no way to sweet talk our­selves out of the new Cold War. India and China have invested heavily here and now we are on the US strategic radar again after almost 60 years. Therefore, the chance of Nepal having to deal with one of the following three scenarios is very likely. Scenario A: India and China, despite their geopolitical rival­ry, will be on the same page on Nepal, i.e., keep the US out of it. Each of our neighbors believes that given its influence in Nepal, it will be able to use the country as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the other. Neither would want Nepal to have any US back­ing as it will lead to a confident Nepal, which makes it harder for them to view it as their own exten­sion/satellite.

 

Scenario B: The US will make “further inroads” here with India’s help. Since India finds itself sur­rounded by China in South Asia, it could very well be open to the US’s idea of roping Nepal into its strategy. As India and the US are “allies”—maybe difficult ones, but allies nonetheless—India probably won’t see the US as infringing on its interests in Nepal, but rather acting on its best interest by keep­ing China out. The two will think their partnership in Nepal helps curb Chinese activities, interests and influence in Nepal.

 

It will signify a major diplomatic victory for India because China then won’t be able to play the Nepal card in its dealings with India. And the US can prove to the Chinese that it still has influence worldwide including in China’s “strategic backyard.” Further, if the Indo-US partnership is suc­cessful in Nepal, the model can then be applied to other South Asian countries that too face a difficult choice between India and China.

 

Scenario C: The US will go solo in Nepal. From the US strategic perspective it makes a lot of sense too. It knows the country well, enjoys immense soft power, and the American intelligence has already used our terrain against China 60 years ago. Now imagine being the most influential play­er between the two major Asian powers and with all the latest in surveillance and monitoring technology! Given our location, we could be an excellent listening post for the US to gather intel on missiles and other strategic pro­grams of both India and China— and to mobilize its field agents— just as China’s Xinjiang was used in the 80s to gather intel on the soviet missiles program.

 

The US can then play the Nepal card to coax India into going with it on many global issues. If things blow out of proportion in the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean between China and the US, it can also thwart any Chinese strategic plans against India in or through Nepal—in case India sides with the US against China. Alternately, a strong US presence in Nepal will restrain India and China and make them seek peace­ful ways to resolve their “issues,” thereby sparing it a significant military adventure or cost as India’s ally.

 

The only option left for us is to decide who we choose as our ally and set terms favorable to us before any of the three decides for us. Therefore we need to ask each power what’s in it for us if we side with them. Whoever provides us more, we selfishly and shameless­ly side with it, just as many third world countries have done for their development—and survival and security. Without a firm com­mitment to one of the powers we will only be getting paltry sums that neither significantly aid our development at best and are det­rimental to our survival at worst.

 

Just as my good friend Bhaskar Koirala, the director of Nepal Insti­tute of International and Strategic Studies, recently said, “The US MCC grant of 500 million dollars although previously part of the Asia pivot is now being channeled through the Indo-Pacific strate­gy.” We need to acknowledge it as such and accept that the money we receive from India and China is also part of a named or unnamed strategy. Then decide on where the big money—and less micro­management— is and be part of it.

 

If we want stability, peace and development, we need to be cold, calculating and objective—and that can only be done when we shed the useless peaceful and neutral cloak. It’s time to imagine the worst and ask very difficult— and impolite—questions.