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Sixty-four political parties are contesting the House of Representatives election under the proportional representation (PR) system. However, the closed PR candidate lists submitted to the Election Commission (EC) have come under sharp criticism, with many describing them as an assault on the very spirit of proportional representation.

In the past, traditional political parties were widely criticized for nominating family members, relatives, and privileged elites through the PR system. This time, both established and newly formed parties have once again allocated PR seats to individuals who, in one way or another, have enjoyed access to state power over the past four decades.

New and emerging political forces have followed the same pattern. Just three months ago, a youth-led movement against “nepo kids” brought down a powerful government, raising hopes that established parties would reform and that new political actors would break away from this chronic practice. Contrary to those expectations, the PR candidate lists submitted by both old and new parties are now being widely dismissed as “Nepo Lists.”

Nepal adopted a mixed electoral system—first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR)—to ensure meaningful representation of marginalized and underprivileged groups in Parliament. However, political parties are openly undermining this principle by nominating relatives and wealthy business figures who financially support party activities.

Even new political forces that had promised change have failed to escape criticism. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), which has brought together many new and alternative voices, has faced widespread backlash over its PR list. Similarly, Balendra Shah and Ujyaalo Party Nepal, led by Kul Man Ghising, have been accused of favoring relatives in their PR nominations.

Dr Toshima Karki, a senior leader of the RSP, remarked: “The very concept of proportional representation was introduced so that geographically marginalized regions could find space. The list should also include the disadvantaged. The existing PR list has raised serious questions about its legitimacy.”

Several leaders have also accused Kul Man Ghising of effectively selling PR positions in exchange for money. Many Generation Z leaders have echoed these concerns, criticizing new political parties for reproducing the same nepotistic practices they once opposed.

Similar questions surround the major traditional parties—the Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Centre). While these parties have introduced some new faces through the PR system compared to the past, the selection of certain candidates has continued to raise concerns. For example, Nepali Congress leader Arjun Nara Singh KC has faced scrutiny for being placed high on the PR list under the Khas-Arya cluster.

Chief Adviser of Bangladesh, Professor Mohammad Yunus, has said that the spirit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains alive, despite the regional bloc’s prolonged inactivity, according to Bangladesh Sangbad Sanstha (BSS).

Yunus made the remarks during separate meetings with high-level delegations from South Asian countries who visited Dhaka to attend the funeral of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. He said he was deeply moved by the respect shown by SAARC member states toward the three-time prime minister, who was also the world’s second female Muslim head of government.

“We witnessed a true SAARC spirit at the funeral yesterday. SAARC is still alive. The SAARC spirit is still alive,” Yunus said during his meeting with Maldives Minister of Higher Education and Labour Ali Haider Ahmed, according to BSS.

He echoed similar sentiments in his meeting with Sri Lanka’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Employment and Tourism, Vijitha Herath. “SAARC was in action yesterday. We shared our grief and sorrow together,” Yunus said.

Delegations attending the funeral from SAARC countries included Nepal’s Foreign Minister Bala Nanda Sharma, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, Maldives Minister Ali Haider Ahmed, and Speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly Sardar Ayaz.

During the meetings, Yunus repeatedly underscored the need to revive SAARC as a platform for regional cooperation. He also recalled his earlier attempt to convene an informal meeting of SAARC leaders on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

“I wanted to hold a get-together among SAARC leaders, even if only for five minutes,” he said, expressing hope that SAARC could be revitalized as a meaningful forum for nearly two billion people in South Asia.

Established in 1985, SAARC was created to promote regional cooperation among South Asian countries. However, the organization has remained largely dysfunctional in recent years, with no summit-level meeting held since 2014. Tensions between key member states, particularly India and Pakistan, have stalled progress and prevented the convening of leaders’ summits.

Despite occasional diplomatic engagements and symbolic gestures, the prospects for the revival of SAARC in the near future remain slim, analysts say. Still, Yunus’s remarks reflect a renewed call for regional unity at a time of shared challenges across South Asia.

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah, popularly known as Balen, continues to enjoy significant support among young voters, though his popularity has shown signs of decline following the GenZ protests. Critics argue that his inability to respond effectively to incidents of vandalism and arson during the Sept 8–9 protests dented his image as a mayor.

As a result, it remains uncertain whether Shah commands the same level of public support he did during the 2022 local elections. Despite this uncertainty, Shah remains a key political figure among emerging and alternative political forces, at least in perception.

Several newly-formed parties appear eager to secure his backing ahead of upcoming elections. A few weeks ago, Kulman Ghising, who recently launched the Ujyalo Nepal Party, met Shah seeking his support whereas on Dec 22, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chair Rabi Lamichhane held discussions with Shah, fueling speculation about possible political collaboration.

Balen has given a clear signal that he supports emerging political forces challenging traditional parties, but it remains uncertain whether he will publicly endorse or align himself with any of them. So far, his message suggests support for new political parties but it is unclear whether he would engage in active politics like Rabi. 

To unite emerging political forces, Balen has initiated consultations with political leaders, Gen Z representatives, artists, media professionals, and members of civil society. Over the past few years, he has remained in continuous dialogue with people from all walks of life.

A case in point: After the GenZ protests, the Nepali Army reportedly offered him the premiership, but he declined it.

Although it is unclear whether these new political forces will unite, there is a growing sentiment among them that electoral cooperation is essential to challenge the dominance of traditional parties—namely the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML.

This view has also come from several self-proclaimed GenZ leaders, who are pressing alternative political groups to form a united front. Among the new parties, the Rabi Lamichhane-led Rastriya Swatantra Party remains the most influential.

Emerging as the fourth-largest party in the House of Representatives in the 2022 elections, the RSP disrupted Nepal’s conventional political landscape.

Although the party faced internal setbacks after the GenZ movement, including the departure of some key leaders, it partially recovered through unification with the Bibeksheel Party.

After his recent release from jail, Lamichhane has intensified political consultations. He met Prime Minister Sushila Karki to pledge the RSP’s support to the government.

However, his meeting with Mayor Shah attracted wider attention and triggered renewed debate over the possible consolidation of new political forces ahead of the March 5 elections. Such an alliance, if it materializes, could pose a serious challenge to Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML.

Despite facing multiple charges related to cooperative fraud, Lamichhane continues to enjoy personal popularity. A strong communicator, he has a distinct ability to dominate headlines and connect directly with the public. He is skilled in the art of communication as he can share his ideas, feelings and information clearly and effectively, while also listening to and responding to his supporters.

Unlike leaders of traditional parties, Lamichhane’s appeal is largely personality-driven rather than party-based. Many supporters voted for him as an individual rather than for the RSP as a political party. Therefore, whether the RSP can sustain its growth in Lamichhane’s absence is a moot question.
In contrast, Balen does not directly communicate with the masses.

Since becoming the mayor of Kathmandu, he has rarely engaged with the public or faced the media. Instead, he often uses social media platforms to vent his anger and criticize mainstream political parties. Like Lamichhane, Balen also stokes anti–mainstream party sentiment. At the same time, he has not shown any clear ideological inclination.

But Lamichhane and Balen both are non-ideological.  Their stance on key constitutional issues—including federalism and full commitment to the 2015 Constitution—remains ambiguous. Notably, during last year’s pro-monarchy protests, the RSP maintained silence. 
Nevertheless, Lamichhane avoids conventional political jargon and focuses instead on governance failures and everyday problems facing the people—a strategy that resonates with frustrated voters. Lamichhane was widely popular until two years ago; however, allegations related to cooperative fraud have affected his public standing.

This populist appeal gives Lamichhane the potential to draw voters away from the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, particularly in urban constituencies. If the RSP, the Ujyalo Nepal Party, Balendra Shah and other alternative forces form an electoral alliance, it could significantly erode the traditional voter base of mainstream parties, at least in urban areas.

However, these new political forces face structural limitations. Their organizational presence in rural areas remains weak, and they lack strong networks in the Tarai region. While they managed notable urban victories in 2022 despite a limited organization base, sustaining and expanding such success will be more challenging without strong grassroots foundations.

Since the 2022 elections, the RSP has expanded its organizational reach, but its rural penetration remains limited. Still, rising anti-establishment sentiment and public frustration with traditional parties may push alternative forces toward unity.

If these parties manage to coordinate effectively, they could emerge as a serious electoral threat—if not by winning outright, then by decisively weakening the dominance of Nepal’s long-established political parties.

Leaders argue that if there is an electoral alliance among the new political forces, with open backing from figures like Balen, it could force the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML into an electoral alliance of their own.

The two key developments—Rabi Lamichhane’s release from jail and his meeting with Shah—have alarmed mainstream political parties. At the same time, major political parties are holding regular meetings to chart their strategies.

A new report released by U.S Department of Defense has said that U.S seeks to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate US and its allies. 

The new report titled Annual report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China says that U.S intends to open a wider range of military-to-military communication with the PLA with a focus on strategic stability as well as deconfliction and escalation, more broadly. We will also seek other ways to make clear our peaceful intentions. 

At the same time, we will ensure that the Joint Force is always ready and able to defend our nation’s interests in the Indo-Pacific, the document says. 

 As we do so, it bears emphasizing that U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are fundamental—but also scoped and reasonable. We do not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China, according to the document. 

Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s National Security Strategy, we seek only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate us or our allies, the document reads. 

That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved. 

The document says: “The Department of War will therefore prioritize bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and the Department of War will ensure that he is able to achieve these objectives from a position of military strength.” 

 In the process, we will forge and sustain a balance of power that will enable all of us to enjoy a decent peace in an Indo-Pacific—one in which trade flows openly and fairly, we can all prosper, and all nations’ interests are respected.

The document says that China has likely also considered basing Bangladesh and Pakistan.

KP Sharma Oli has won the intra-party election for a third consecutive term. The party’s 11th General Convention, held this week in Kathmandu, is widely seen as a test of Oli’s popularity within the party following the GenZ protests of September 8–9, which had ousted him from power.

His re-election with a two-thirds majority signals that Oli continues to wield strong influence and remains popular among party cadres, if not in public. Party leaders say Oli’s resounding victory also serves as an endorsement of the political position he took against the GenZ movement.

Over the past 100 days since the September protests, Oli has consistently argued that the protests were directed against the party itself and that the party must resist forces conspiring to weaken it. His re-election suggests that a significant majority of party members have subscribed to this view.

Oli believes his victory is a response to claims—widely circulated after the September protests—that the era of traditional political parties and veteran leaders is over. During this period, both inside and outside major political parties, there was intense debate suggesting that current leaders should retire in recognition of the GenZ protests. Addressing the convention, Oli said, “Some forces are engaged in deceitful conspiracies against us; now such reactionaries have been crushed.”

A clear indication of this sentiment is the success of leaders who were vocal critics of the GenZ protests. For instance, General Secretary Shankar Pokharel, who strongly criticized the protests in their early days, was re-elected after defeating former Finance Minister Surendra Pandey. Similarly, Mahesh Basnet, who had publicly confronted GenZ leaders, was elected party secretary.

Soon after the GenZ protests, senior leaders including Ishwar Pokharel, Surendra Pandey, Gokarna Bista, Astha Laxmi Shakya, and Yubaraj Gyawali and others had urged Oli to step down as party chair, arguing that the killing of 19 students on September 8 had triggered a public backlash. Oli, however, remained defiant and chose to seek internal legitimacy through the party’s general convention.

Convention representatives ultimately re-elected him with nearly a two-thirds majority. Of the 2,277 delegates who voted, Oli secured 1,663 votes—almost 75 percent—while his challenger, Ishwar Pokharel, received only 564 votes. Only a handful of leaders who favored leadership change and were sympathetic to the GenZ protests succeeded in the elections.

For example, Gokarna Bista was elected vice-chairperson and Yogesh Bhattarai deputy general secretary. Both leaders had earlier advocated for age and term limits for the party president—two terms and a maximum age of 70. Both leaders have taken softer stance towards the demands of GenZ protestors. Bista and Bhattarai have expressed a relatively conciliatory approach toward the demands raised by the GenZ protestors. 

Since the beginning, Oli has framed the September 8–9 protests as a conspiracy by “foreign powers” aimed at dislodging him and his party from power. He has maintained that while he would accept the student-led protest held on the morning of September 8, he rejects the events of September 8–9 as a people’s movement, as characterized by the Sushila Karki-led government.

Without elaborating, Oli said after his re-election that his party was “betrayed” on September 9, the second day of the protests, and vowed not to allow a repeat. He instructed party organizations to ensure security at the community level, citing a lack of trust in the current government.

“We could be deceived again, so we must take responsibility for our own security. Form security teams in society,” Oli said, dismissing the current government as unconstitutional.

While Oli has not directly opposed the March 5 elections, he has expressed skepticism that the current government will be able to conduct them. He has warned the government to either make credible preparations for the polls or step down.

The CPN-UML has already filed a writ at the Supreme Court demanding the restoration of Parliament, and the largest party, Nepali Congress, has followed suit. Lawmakers from both parties are now preparing to jointly approach the Supreme Court seeking parliamentary restoration.

Following his re-election, Oli has adopted an even more aggressive posture toward both the government and the GenZ movement. Last week, the Sushila Karki-led government and GenZ representatives signed an agreement recognizing the GenZ movement as a people’s movement. Oli rejected the agreement, calling it “mere drama” and saying he would not accept it.

As a probe commission formed to investigate the September 8–9 events prepares to summon Oli, he has declined to appear. The document endorsed by the party convention has declared the commission invalid and demanded the formation of an independent investigation commission led by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court.

After consolidating his position as party chair, Oli’s immediate priority appears to be dislodging the current government and exerting pressure on the judiciary to revive Parliament. However, if the government proceeds with the planned March 5 elections, the UML is likely to participate in the polls.

The United States has maintained a notably low-key profile in Kathmandu amid policy uncertainty under the Donald Trump administration and shifting political dynamics in Nepal.

Washington’s decision to rebuke or roll back several longstanding policies, including the dismantling of USAID and the absence of clear strategic guidance, left US embassies abroad uncertain about their priorities. As a result, US engagement in Nepal declined sharply, accompanied by a noticeable drop in high-level visits between Kathmandu and Washington.

It was only in Aug 2025 that President Trump appointed Sergio Gor as the next US ambassador to India and special envoy for South and Central Asian affairs. During this interim period, the US Embassy in Kathmandu worked largely behind the scenes to persuade the new administration to continue the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.

Shortly after State Department officials began re-engaging on South and Central Asia, Nepal experienced major political upheaval that led to the fall of the KP Sharma Oli-led government. Unverified reports and rumors alleging the involvement of US-backed non-governmental organizations in Sept 8–9 GenZ protests further reinforced Washington’s cautious approach and contributed to its subdued public posture.

Following the formation of a new government under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, the US formally welcomed it. Since then, however, there have been no public US statements on elections or Nepal’s internal political developments. While the ambassador and senior embassy officials continue to attend public events, they have largely refrained from commenting on domestic politics or the broader trajectory of bilateral relations.

This restraint has fueled concerns in Kathmandu about the Trump administration’s priorities toward Nepal. Addressing these concerns this week, senior State Department officials said the US is recalibrating—not withdrawing—its assistance. They indicated that future support will be narrower and more selective, focused on areas that serve US national interests and align with President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Allison Hooker, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The US is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, emphasizing that Washington’s commitment to the region remains firm.

As senior US officials step up visits to other South Asian countries, diplomatic sources suggest Kathmandu could see similar engagements in the coming days, potentially offering clearer signals of Washington’s evolving approach to Nepal.

Amid reports of serious impacts on critical sectors such as health and education in developing and least-developed countries following cuts in U.S. aid, senior State Department officials have said that Washington has not pulled back assistance but is instead recalibrating it.

Speaking at a conference on U.S. foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific held in Washington, the officials said the United States continues to provide support in the Indo-Pacific region in line with U.S. national security interests and President Donald Trump’s foreign policy priorities.

Allison Hooker, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy in the region represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The U.S. is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, highlighting that Washington’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific remains unwavering.

In his second term as president, the Trump administration dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a move that has stressed the health and education systems of scores of countries that had long relied on American aid.

“Our foreign assistance needs to be a force multiplier as we safeguard our national security with the greatest military in the world, along with our allies and like-minded partners,” Hooker said.

Speaking at the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael DeSombre said, “We never got out of the foreign assistance business as some media narratives have claimed. During the review period of foreign aid, however, we saw an opportunity to fundamentally reimagine how foreign assistance is done, which required us to step back and examine the underlying principles that would guide our work.”

The resulting principles, he said, form a strategic framework aligned with the core tenets of the National Security Strategy and will guide U.S. efforts to ensure programs remain focused and effective. The statements by senior officials clearly indicate that the U.S. will continue to provide support in selective and narrow areas that align with its national interests.

The Trump administration issued a new National Security Strategy in November that places the Indo-Pacific region high on its list of priorities.

The document states: “The Indo-Pacific is already the source of almost half the world’s GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), and one third based on nominal GDP. That share is certain to grow over the 21st century, which means the Indo-Pacific is already—and will continue to be—among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds.”

“To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there—and we are,” the document says, noting that President Trump signed major agreements during his October 2025 travels that further deepened ties in commerce, culture, technology, and defense, reaffirming U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The strategy also emphasizes improving commercial and other relations with India to encourage New Delhi’s contribution to Indo-Pacific security, including continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States under the “Quad.” It further states that the U.S. will work to align the actions of its allies and partners to prevent domination by any single competitor nation.

In Nepal, as in other countries, more than 80 percent of USAID assistance has been cut, though Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) investments have continued. Nearly a year after Trump returned to power, no senior U.S. officials have visited Nepal, even as there have been frequent visits to other smaller South Asian countries, notably Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Similarly, following the Gen Z movement, the U.S. has maintained a low-key profile in Nepal.

India has been closely engaging with the Sushila Karki-led interim government since its formation. New Delhi was the first to welcome her leadership. On Sept 18, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Karki, expressing India’s readiness to “work closely to further strengthen the special ties between the two countries” and reaffirming India’s support for Nepal’s efforts to restore peace and stability.

Although the Karki government is interim and time-bound, New Delhi is working with it as a full partner: signing key agreements, convening bilateral mechanisms, and facilitating high-level exchanges. Ministers have been traveling to New Delhi, and diplomatic activity in Kathmandu has intensified. 

This week, Munu Mahawar, additional Secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs, visited Kathmandu, the first high-level foreign official to do so after the Sept 8–9 GenZ protests.  He met Prime Minister Karki and all cabinet ministers, pledging India’s logistical support for the March 5 elections. Notably, Mahawar did not meet leaders of the major political parties, even though the Indian Embassy continues to quietly engage with the broader political spectrum. 

Many members of the international community in Kathmandu remain hesitant to meet political leaders publicly. According to leaders, New Delhi has been encouraging them to view the March 5 elections as the only credible path to ending the current political deadlock. 

The Karki government has also signaled goodwill toward India by not recalling Nepal’s Ambassador to New Delhi, Shankar Sharma, despite recalling ambassadors to 11 other countries, including China, the US, and the UK. 

Oli’s exit from power may also have been welcomed in strategic circles in New Delhi, where he had long been perceived as leaning toward Beijing. As Kathmandu’s engagement with Beijing has slowed and the US has taken a low-key approach to Nepal’s internal political developments, Nepal–India ties have grown significantly stronger.