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The first part of this series looked at some foreign powers and their interests in the Afghanization of Nepal. While it's tempting to blame foreigners for the mess we are today (and for our chaotic future ahead), it does not help us understand why the foreign actors are doing what they are doing in Nepal. Therefore, we also need to be aware of the mistakes on our part. Here are a few of them:

Flawed analyses and faulty intelligence

Read any article on Nepal’s relations with India and China and you will come across a line, “after the fall of monarchy, China has been searching for a friend in Nepal.” This faulty line, more than anything, has affected how we view our relations with our neighbors and how they view us. It makes us think we need to be submissive to China if we want to protect ourselves. For outsiders, it makes them think they need a submissive friend to maximize their real and imagined interests in Nepal. Moreover this line does great injustice to the legacies of King Mahendra and King Birendra. Both pro-India and pro-China analysts use this statement with no historical basis whatsoever to justify the claim of our neighbors’ undue interference in our domestic affairs.

Mahendra was on good terms with Beijing but that doesn't mean he was a very good friend of China. It is a myth invented by the Indian establishment and promoted by its academics that absolutely refuses to view Nepal’s actions as independent and necessary for its survival, and to acknowledge that King Mahendra was sympathetic to India’s strategic interests. Further, it's easy to blame their failures on Chinese in Nepal than to admit they (Indians) were (and are) wrong on Nepal. But sadly, our own scholars seem to have accepted the line and parrot it all the time.

There is hardly any evidence that Mahendra was China’s trusted friend. For the Chinese, its problems with India in the 1960s made Nepal a perfect venue to prove to the Indians that the Himalayas ceased to be a security barrier between the two countries and it was closer to India than the Indians thought. From Mahendra’s perspective, given the Indian reluctance to give legitimacy to his direct rule as well as the belligerent nationalist rhetoric of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, along with India's support for the “resistance movement” of the Nepali Congress, it was necessary to involve China to thwart any untoward incidents from either the Indian establishment, or from the Nepali Congress that had active support of the Indian government.

In August 1962 India “restricted its exports to Nepal on the pretext that the border situation was too disturbed to permit free movement of goods…” To foil any sinister designs India may have had on Nepal, Mahendra lobbied successfully with the Chinese. And China gave the king what he wanted on 4 October 1962 in the form of a strongly worded statement against India. On the first anniversary of the Sino-Nepali Boundary Treaty, Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, declared: “On behalf of the government and People of China, I assure His Majesty King Mahendra, His Majesty’s Government and the Nepali people that if any foreign forces attack Nepal, we Chinese people will stand on your side.”

Not only rebuffed by India on his desperate pleas to support the Panchayat, but with the Indians also threatening the system he introduced by supporting the rebels and by blocking essential supplies to Nepal, the king was justified in feigning closeness to China. Given its own impending war with India, China was happy to play along. And two months later when China and India went to war, “the border attacks on Nepal by the volunteers of the Nepali Congress ceased forthwith, and the Indo-Nepali border trade was resumed. India acquiesced in a new relationship with Nepal based on the understanding that it was for Nepal to decide for itself the type of government that it should have and that Indian territory was not to be allowed for anti-government activities.”

With this, the clever king, who wasn't either anti-Indian or pro-Chinese but a patriot, got what he wanted from both India and China. He then immediately tried to distance himself from China, because he feared it would affect Nepal’s relations with India and the outside world, which he viewed as more important for Nepal; and he wasn't quite sure about Chinese designs on Nepal either. (He told the Chinese leadership that Nepal’s relations with China were not be viewed as China calling the shots in Nepal, nor should the Chinese harbor any sinister designs on Nepal, as evidenced by the remarks Mahendra made while addressing a public gathering in Beijing the previous year.)

Therefore, “while proclaiming neutrality in the Sino-Indian struggle”, he was quick to let India know that Nepal was on its side by declaring “it is, however, an inborn virtue of the Nepalis to be sympathetic in a friend’s distress because the Nepalis are a gallant people, and treachery is totally alien to their nature.” As such the King resisted the Chinese “pressure to disallow the Gurkha recruitment in the Indian army”. Similarly, “Nepal banned the re-export of all goods of strategic value, as well as of certain specified essential commodities and consumer goods imported from India. These were clear hints that it was prepared to give thought to and protect India’s strategic interests.”

And much has already been written on the Chinese insistence on building the Kodari highway at the earliest, whereas the king wanted to delay it.

Further, the King was blessed with yet another opportunity to prove to the world that his relationship with China was more a short-term pragmatic alliance to get what he wanted (and let the other side too get what it wanted, i.e., psychological pressure on India of a two-front war) rather than a permanent strategic one.

(All direct quotes in this section are from Ramakant’s Nepal-China and India)

The Khampa rebellion

While our historians and international relations experts never tire of recounting and reminding the Chinese, to their chagrin, that we defeated the Khampa rebels acting against the Chinese interests during King Birendra's reign, we seem to have miraculously erased events of the years preceding 1974 from our collective memory.

The CIA and the Indians had been supporting the Khampa rebels in Mustang since the early 1960s. King Mahendra was aware of the operation and he did nothing about it, calculating correctly that it would not help Nepal’s relations with the US and India; the king was aware that Mustang was a joint US-India operation. But owing to Chinese pressure, “in 1964, the Nepalese Government dispatched a three-man commission to investigate the situation there [Mustang], and demanded the Tibetans surrender their arms. The Tibetans denied that they had any arms and the Nepalis accepted the surrender of 12 rifles. The Nepalis knew this was just a charade for the benefit of the Chinese and they duly informed the Chinese that they were satisfied with the situation in Mustang. In 1969 Crown Prince Birendra visited the Tibetan camps and met the new leader, Gyatho Wangdu.” Nepal didn't act against the Khampas until President Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi fell out and US-China relations thawed.

It acted only when it was fully assured by the US and China that the two countries were now strategically aligned against the Soviet Union and the Indo-Soviet dismemberment of countries (the creation of Bangladesh). China assured that Nepal’s action against the Khampas wouldn't dampen its relations with the US, actually it would bolster Nepal-US ties as well as help China by stopping the Indo-Soviet alliance from dismembering other countries in South Asia. And Nepal too feared that ambitious Indira Gandhi, now further emboldened by the defense pact with the Soviet Union and the creation of Bangladesh, would replicate the same thing in the Tarai region of Nepal. The responsibility to protect Nepal’s territorial integrity fell on King Birendra after the patriotic King Mahendra died of a heart attack in 1972.

Nepal needed China's assurance yet again to safeguard its territorial integrity and China, fearful of the Indo-Soviet designs on Tibet through the use of Khampa rebels in Mustang (who were now acting independently of the US) was happy to acquiesce. Again there was no option for China and Nepal other than to appear close to each other and the 1970s again witnessed the Chinese side telling Nepal that it would “firmly support’ Nepal’s struggle against foreign interference, in defense of her national independence.” Nepal then moved against the Khampas and “by the middle of 1974 most of the men had surrendered to the Nepalese Army” and Gyatho Wangdu, their leader, was killed in Jumla the same year.

Again, both China and Nepal having gotten what they wanted from each other, Nepal displayed diplomatic maturity when “it invited the international press to an exhibition of the captured weapons in a park in Kathmandu… It was conspicuous that Nepal refused to name any third-party involvement in the Mustang affair, and neither the Indians nor the Americans were accused of aiding the Tibetans.”

These examples suggest neither King Mahendra nor King Birendra were too friendly with China and both the monarchy and China used each other to address their immediate concerns without any assurance on either’s part of a long term strategic alliance against India. This explains why China didn't back the monarchy/Panchayat in 1990, nor was it of any real help during the Indian embargoes of the late 1980s and 2015, and also easily accepted the abolishment of monarchy in 2006. Had monarchy been a trusted ally or had they agreed on permanent strategic alliance against India, China would surely have protected it by pumping money and weapons into Nepal.

But of course admitting that the monarchs acted on Nepal’s interests and Panchayat survived for 30 years because of popular support isn't democratic or sexy in new Nepal. Years of Indian propaganda that China viewed Nepal’s monarchy as a trusted friend, the monarchy was always eager to please China, and that's why the Panchayat regime lasted that long has been accepted as truth by Nepali scholars.

(All direct quotes in this section are from Tshering Shakya’s The Dragon in the Land of Snows)

Faulty intelligence and self-fulfilling prophecy

Newspapers are one of the major sources of information for intelligence agencies. What gets published reflects the mood of the society and helps them analyze policy options for their respective governments. But when faulty narratives based on faulty premises gets published every day, linking everything that happens here with geopolitics and one outmaneuvering the other, the intelligence agents here too have no option but to believe them. Further, Nepal studies isn't a lucrative career choice and real Nepal analysts are in short supply in China, India and the US, which makes it doubly difficult for their respective governments to analyze the garbage collected from the media here.

Add to the fact that Nepal isn't exactly an attractive a place for junior and mid-level operatives and diplomats, they have little enthusiasm to learn about the country they are operating in. (Or it could be that Nepal’s total lack of concern for diplomatic conduct makes some ambitious diplomats and agents exceed their mandate by coercing our leaders to do/say what they think would enhance their country’s image and role in Nepal. This way, they prove their loyalty and ability that could in turn land them a promotion or a future posting somewhere nicer.)

The same goes for think tank analysts in Washington, Beijing and New Delhi. Hardly anyone working there has a degree in Nepal studies (and only a handful of universities around the world offer it anyway). They may have taken a class or two on Nepal and suddenly they have to analyze the events they know little about. The solution: rely on media and Nepali journalists and scholars and tell the funding agencies what they want to hear. They forget we Nepalis are quite adept at telling scholars, diplomats and intelligence agents exactly what they want to hear. And that has created a rather scary narrative: China wants a trustworthy friend and the other two powers are working hard to deny it to the Chinese.

Therefore, the risk of hypotheses/theories and policy options on Nepal for the three powers based on inductive reasoning alone rather than structured analytic techniques (SAT)—that require brainstorming and looking at alternative hypotheses and scenarios, as encouraged by US intelligence agencies after the spectacular failure of intelligence in Iraq—are quite high. But what can the operatives do when we are ourselves promoting the wrong theory and making them view Nepal as a venue for a modern-day Great Game straight out of Peter Hopkirk’s books—without taking into account the advances in military and intelligence technologies? And the danger of our narrative becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy is quite high.

Or could it be that the brilliant analysts and diplomats of the three countries know the exact situation here and they are encouraging us to believe the mistaken theory that Nepal is important geopolitically for their security. This way, they can justify whatever they do here as protecting their national/security interests. Maybe we are being hoodwinked but there’s no way to know for sure as what they send back to their countries are classified material. (So the assertions in this piece are based on articles and newspaper reports and some freely available think tank reports on the internet, as well as my interpretation of those. I am no Seymour Hersh!)

We have now created a situation in which all three powers are forced to find the leaders who will address their concerns, more imagined than real.

The fact is, nobody wants a trusted friend in Nepal. All they want is a submissive friend who will only deal with them, rely on them and seek their blessing all the time—and not even look or talk to the others with whom India, or China or the US have issues elsewhere. This is why a section of our leaders and intellectuals oppose the MCC compact, and make it appear like a sinister plot by the US and India to encircle China, while another section views the Chinese BRI as a grave threat to Indian interests. We have made both BRI and MCC appear more sinister than they really are. Of course no country is going to invest money in another country for no reason, but these reasons need not always be sinister.

What is China's interest anyway then? Tibet, many in Nepal will be quick to answer. But again, viewing Tibet as China's Achilles’ heel is to undermine China's military might and question its control over its own territory and loyalty and patriotism of its Tibetan population. The fact that China isn't angry about the way we view Tibet should make us wonder: maybe Tibet is just a pretext for the Chinese to dictate policies here. Maybe they want us to assume that we play a major role in safeguarding China’s territorial integrity, and hence they have every right to interfere in our affairs and dictate our foreign affairs. But if China is perfectly fine dealing with India and the US and other European powers that directly or indirectly support the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan government-in-exile, the whole idea of Nepal playing a major role in Tibet's security appears absurd. Even when King Mahendra turned a blind eye to the Khampa activities in Nepal, China continued to provide us aid.

The US and India realize that supporting any armed insurgency as they did in the 1960s is going to backfire and in retaliation China could create problems for the US in Taiwan straits and for India in its northeast. And China would have no problems destroying the ragtag rebel army operating from Nepal in hours. So Tibet couldn't be the real Chinese concern here.

Trade then? Nepal’s trade with China is miniscule and Nepal doesn't produce or have anything China can't live without, so trade is out of question. Investment? While Chinese investment is growing by Nepali standards, the amount it has invested in Nepal is way less than what it has invested in other countries. Connectivity? China does not view present-day Nepal or the Nepal of foreseeable future as a major trading route with India. Otherwise, Nepal would have been included in the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) corridor. And the Keyrung-Kathmandu train link has been as for the moment downgraded to a highway.

And what's the Indian interest anyway? Water? All our rivers except one flows to India and we have no way of stopping them. Electricity? We are actually buying electricity from India at the moment. Security? So long as Nepal does not have a pro-Beijing regime and allows China to station its troops and missiles here, it doesn't really affect India security-wise. If India has what it claims to have, Agni short and medium range missiles, it can realign those to target China's installations in Nepal and close its borders with Nepal. Nepal’s international isolation, then? India tried it and failed then, and it won't succeed now. Islamic terrorism from Nepal? Nepal, even with its limited resources, has done everything to control terrorism in its territory and our security forces routinely arrest and hand over terrorists and criminals wanted by India who are hiding in Nepal.

And what's the American interest anyway? Support for the Free Tibet movement? As mentioned above, any support for Tibetan independence only threatens America's interests in Taiwan, Japan and India. America knows that even if the CCP were to be replaced by another pro-western government, Tibet would still remain part of China. Encircle China, as some argue? Of what strategic use would that be when China can realign its Dong Feng (DF) missiles toward Nepal and the US and Taiwan, Japan and India (again assuming that China too has what it claims)? Containment of China via Nepal? China sells stuff, does not promote ideology and  has no qualms trading with all, including its current adversaries in the US and India. As Nepal isn't even a minor point of trade between China and the world, what difference does it make to China even if the US decides to have bases all over Nepal?

So what could be the real motive?

It is to protect their imagined interests by creating a puppet regime. And it's due to faulty alarmist reports that one is being out-maneuvered by the other and that each needs to have its own puppet regime to safeguard its interests. These reports are written by our extremely smart or extremely gullible (depending on your perspective) scholars, and parroted by our leaders. The situation is so pathetic that even minor investments by the Chinese are seen as against India and the US, the MCC as a move against China, and any government change as a move by India against China.

Contrast this to what happened in the 1960s and the 1970s. Nepal managed to get the aid from all competing powers, the Soviet Union, the US, China and India for its national development. Ever wondered why? Because the leadership proved to all that Nepal only looks for its own interests and most importantly Nepal decides what it does and happens in its territory. Nepali leaders worked to gain legitimacy and support of their own people than that of foreign governments. And when they did seek foreign legitimacy, it was on Nepal’s terms. That's why the Panchayat survived for 30 years and the new system we have now is already in “danger” because our leaders have turned to foreign powers for legitimacy at the cost of our sovereignty.

They openly invite foreign powers to interfere in our domestic affairs by promising loyalty and total submissiveness to whichever power they think will help them by exaggerating the others’ role and intentions in Nepal. They have created a situation where all powers have been forced to realize they need to have their yes man in Singhadurbar to protect their imagined interests. (In reality, they are themselves capable of protecting their interests. We cannot resist the military and economic might of any of the three powers).

Now, each country has its favorite party/leader and they don't hesitate to let us know who they prefer. India didn't invite Jhalanath Khanal when he was prime minister, and China didn't invite Baburam Bhattarai when he was prime minister. China, it seems, is looking for a new friend after the NCP split and India and the US seem to be relying on KP Oli to do their bidding.

What's pathetic though is that our experts concerned about the others’ imagined interests have forgotten our real concerns. The three powers’ unwarranted involvement in Nepali politics is a real security threat for us. They have started to view Nepal as their own extension, and Nepal is hardly in a position to decide what happens in its territory and risks whatever it does as being interpreted as contrary to the interests of one of the powers.

It seems that having lived a lie that we play a major role in relations among big powers and having amplified our importance by a million-fold, we have actually forgotten what we really are: poor and weak. We have also forgotten our real needs, i.e., weapons and money and a pro-Nepal government that will deliver us out of poverty and make this country strong and truly sovereign. How many pieces do we get to read on the need to modernize the military or for short and medium range missiles to safeguard our sovereignty? How many pieces we read telling the major powers to stop viewing us as their extensions? How many pieces urging foreign powers to take our security concerns seriously?

This total lack of concern for our own national security and prestige and letting the three chose their favorites or submissive friends in Nepal is going to cost us dear. It even puts our survival and sovereignty at risk. So what would India-US/China do if, tomorrow, someone who's not in its friend list wins an election here? It could very well create a political turmoil by arming the opposition (because the polarization is more or less achieved). And when the situation gets out of hand, send in its military to maintain “order” and protect its imagined interests?

If things are to go on like this, the proxy war begins and Afghanization of Nepal will be complete. This isn’t a farfetched scenario. Even if they bomb Nepal 20 times over, it is not going to harm their real interests, nor affect any country in the world. We ourselves don't care about our interests, security and sovereignty seriously and that makes it easier for major powers to do whatever they want here, whether bringing their war to us or creating perpetual chaos by supporting their proxies to protect their imagined interests.

“For a country that had no oil, no ports, no gold or diamonds, no strategic relevance, Afghanistan attracted more than its share of attention. The great powers almost seemed to want to send their armies into this unforgiving land just to prove they could.” (The Prisoner, Alex Berenson)

Replace Afghanistan with Nepal and you get the point.

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Not trying to be a doomsayer, but with the US and India getting closer militarily against China, things are going to get bleaker for Nepal. And if we don’t get our house in order and our priorities straight, we run the risk of feeling the horrors of a superpower rivalry. Not because we are important, but because we are unimportant and insignificant due to our poverty and weak military. That makes it a perfect proxy battleground for major powers.

They may not be eager to make us their enemies’ Afghanistan or Vietnam or Korea. But as things stand, and from a realistic perspective, events beyond our control, and even the control of big powers, could lead to an ugly situation here. Time has come to study the not-so-distant history of China’s role in the Cold War, the Soviet mistakes, the plight of Afghanistan, and how they all led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are lessons for Nepal.

Let’s first look at the nature of the US-India defense cooperation: Weapons apart, one of the most important aspects of the recent US-India defense pact is information-sharing, under which India will have access to satellite images and other intelligence gathered by the US. Similarly, India will also get accurate GPS coordinates to target military installations in China, if things come to that. So, what's the big deal, you may ask? The big deal is that a real military alliance often starts with intelligence sharing because, information, as it was in history, is still a tool that decides the outcome of any war.

Sharing of sensitive intelligence between two friendly powers signals to the opponent that it now has to deal with the combined strength of the two (or more) powers and runs the risk of a two (or more) front war. China today finds itself in the position the Soviet Union did in the 1970s. Today’s India is what China was then, and China today is what the Soviet Union was for the US and China back then.

Let’s then look at the Sino-Soviet relations to better gauge what is in store for all powers—and for us.

The People’s Republic of China pursued the policy of yibian dao (“lean to one side”) immediately after its founding in 1949 and allied with the Soviet Union. But owing to various reasons the Sino-Soviet partnership started to crack and by the 60s they were sworn enemies. With the Soviet sympathizers in the Communist Party purged or killed or sent to reeducation camps during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Chairman Mao faced no opposition in the party to get closer to the United States.

Soon, the two sides were openly talking and President Nixon’s China visit in 1972 led to the US-China strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. As expected, a major component of this alliance was modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The US began providing modern arms and technology to China, and China in turn allowed the US to maintain CIA posts in Xinjiang to gather intelligence against the Soviet Union. This kept both countries abreast of the Soviet military movements.

A slippery Soviet slope

This strategic alliance was what led to the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were now forced to deploy more forces along their borders with China. The cost of deploying troops in harsh terrains was not cheap, but the Soviets had no option. Similar to what China is faced with now.

The Soviets had to justify their rising military spending and prove they were not to be taken lightly and that they were not to remain quiet when an openly pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was threatened. The USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and the US—supported by China, among others—decided to get involved to give the Soviets their own Vietnam. Also, through its proxies—the various factions of the Afghan resistance, the Mujahedeen—the US mounted a formidable defense. The Soviets were forced to retreat and soon after the Soviet Union became history.

But how does what happened then apply to today’s Nepal, you may ask? And that’s a valid question.

First, China will have to deploy more troops along its rough and harsh borders with India, which is not going to be cheap.

China’s defense spending will have to increase because despite being a major military power it is years behind the US in military technology. China understands that the US is not a power to be taken lightly and it always has a new weapon or two in its arsenal that most have not even dreamed of or have only vague knowledge about. And it’s always safer and better to avoid a direct confrontation. But China will have to operate with the assumption that the US could get involved in its military confrontations with India and that China could be subjected to a multiple-front attack. And the military spending has to go further up.

Rising military spending with trade restrictions imposed by the US and its allies could lead to economic problems and China will find itself, like the Soviets, having to justify its military spending to its people, to prove its international standing. As it also wants to avert direct confrontation against India and the US, it will be forced to look for less risky battlegrounds in its neighborhood.

If history is any guide, major powers refrain from directly confronting each other in their territory and even outside. They rather use proxies. China sent volunteers to Korean War, the Soviet Union and China provided money weapons and intelligence to Vietcong during the Vietnam War, and the US provided weapons and money to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.

Nepal, the natural choice

Russia still dominates much of Central Asia, and China wouldn’t want to get involved there. South East Asia is a major economic powerhouse and it makes no sense to get involved there as well. Pakistan is a nuclear power and a sworn ally, therefore out of question. India is big and not as weak and now with the US as an ally isn’t to be touched. Afghanistan, with the presence of the US and NATO forces, isn’t a good option either. And other South Asian countries don’t share land borders with China. Naturally, in this case, Nepal appears to be the best choice to settle things with its opponents.

From the perspective of US-India alliance too, it makes sense to lure China in Nepal. India needs to find a way to end its rivalry with China or it would be faced with major economic consequences. The US too would have to find a way to work with China as well, lest other ‘rogue states’ side with China and create problems for the US elsewhere. (Or, for that matter, it could as easily be China luring US-India alliance in Nepal.)

Nepal, an ally of none and as such of no significance to any, is a poor economy with a weak military. Its political leaders have no long-term vision. Top party leaders are constantly embroiled in intra-party feuds concerning their positions on India or China. This allows the US-India alliance or China to wage a proxy war in Nepal. From the superpower perspective, it only makes sense. Not that they are waiting for it to happen but there’s nothing they can do to avoid it either.

Therefore let’s not be too optimistic and talk about peace and how India and China would settle their differences soon and all that.

The surge in Hindu and Han nationalisms in India and China respectively would make any amicable solution to their problems difficult, if not impossible. And things are unlikely to return to pre-Ladakh days soon. Both need to appear tough and now India, with the US by its side, is in no mood to back down, and for the Chinese inching back would signal weakness and the CCP doesn’t want to be portrayed as weak. Same with the Indian leadership. Add arms race to this dangerous mix and one has to snap sooner or later. They would both be glad to take their fight elsewhere, and Nepal is the most convenient battleground they can hope for.

Revolutions and counter-revolutions

Maybe Nepal will witness revolutions supported by one of US-India or China and counter-revolutions by the other, each side linking change here with their national security. And that is what is going to bring the superpower rivalry to us. Even if Nepal is totally destroyed, it’s not going to affect the world economy and security even a bit. One will instill its puppet regime and withdraw and the other would support the forces against the puppet regime, and that’s about it. The real fighting powers would have reached settlements and be in good terms with each other, and as big powers they need to be in good terms—and a messed-up Nepal then (just as it is now) will be no one’s immediate priority.

Maybe this is the reason Nepal has remained or been forced to remain weak—and is constantly being reminded of how insignificant it really is. While others get billions in aid and FDI and weapons and choppers, all we get are old discarded weapons, field hospitals, buildings to teach languages to our soldiers, and just enough aid to survive.

So, yes, Nepal is important in unimportant ways and this country can be bombed right and left to settle scores elsewhere.

And who do we blame for this? Without a doubt all leaders who ruled us after King Mahendra. Although he paid lip service to it, the king was no fan of non-alignment. He believed in pragmatic alignments. For instance, he was addressing the US Congress on 28 April 1950, the same day Nepal and China signed the treaty of friendship. Yet King Mahendra also refused to comply with the Chinese request to do something about the Khampa rebels in Mustang.

Sadly no one after him followed his policy and years of mismanagement have made us a friend of none—and reduced our status to a battleground where superpower strengths are tested and their rivalries settled.

Let’s just hope people living off our tax money are aware of this clear and present danger.

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Many are blaming the Chinese government for the rather undiplomatic press statement issued by the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu over a syndicated article in The Kathmandu Post and the accompanying illustration of a masked Mao on a 100-yuan bill. But it can be argued that the statement has nothing to do with Beijing and in fact it’s a diplomatic faux pas on the embassy’s part.

China is going through a difficult time and maybe the embassy wrongly calculated that a firm stance on the article or the picture would make it appear patriotic.

It can also be argued that the blunder was due to unexperienced press secretary or those in charge of it here and s/he sought advises from the Nepali journalists close to the embassy who were against The Post and its Editor-in-chief Anup Kaphle, who, by the way, was to leave the newspaper the very next day. The Post’s assertion that the embassy had raised many objections to its articles before proves this point. Maybe some Nepali “advisors or friends” thought that they would benefit from a rift between the embassy and the newspaper. (And it’s a given and acceptable for embassies to maintain local network of friends to make sense of what’s happening in their host countries.)

Or maybe some staff of the embassy are influenced by meng zi’s idea or the nativist nationalist theories that state: big countries should love small countries and small countries should respect big countries. It’s the kind of nationalist humbug Beijing dislikes and discourages, but is popular among certain segments of the society. Maybe this group saw the article as an affront—or blatant disrespect by the small brother.

The interesting Cultural Revolution-era language also makes anyone familiar with Chinese history ask or make a wild guess: could it be that there was some sort of a factional rivalry in Beijing and the embassy people wanted to prove they stand with President Xi at this time of national health emergency?

Or the embassy thought it would ‘kill the chicken to scare the monkey’? You issue a statement against a newspaper to scare others in Nepal and elsewhere. Just like President Xi said during his Nepal visit: “We’ll crush the bones of those trying to destabilize China.”

Otherwise, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post regularly publishes articles critical of the Chinese government but Beijing doesn’t care. Beijing is a smart power and it understands it cannot control what people outside the Chinese mainland think of it. Also, it is a confident power that’s not affected by what gets published in newspapers worldwide. Or most of its embassies would be working overtime issuing statements. It also knows such statements backfire and affect its soft power abroad.

In Nepal’s case, we’ve had people from most diplomatic missions overstep their boundaries to prove their loyalty to their political masters—often to the chagrin of and embarrassment to their respective governments. The Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu too has at times overstepped its boundary. At one point it wanted the Nepal army to stop training foreign soldiers in its mountain warfare in Mustang. Whoever suggested this idea made it appear that it was coming from Beijing. But NA knew it had nothing to with the Chinese government but with someone at the embassy here who wanted to raise their profile by overstepping their mandate.

Therefore it will be a major folly to associate Chinese government with what transpired in Kathmandu recently. Foreign Ministry in Beijing under Wang Yi, a very capable diplomat, would have never approved a statement like that. Beijing is a very confident power and it has its own public support, and doesn’t care what some foreigners think about it.

But if the criticism was too much to handle, which is rarely the case, it would have written a letter to the editor and or used other ways to voice its dissatisfaction, most likely over dinner and drinks with the concerned parties, or via other indirect ways without any traceable links to Beijing.

Let’s just hope the embassy has learned its lesson and would be careful in its dealing with the press. Smart people in Beijing want just that, not firebrand statements affecting the excellent ties between the two countries.

And the embassy here needs to investigate the vested interests of some Nepalis who are more Chinese than the Chinese themselves. These people regularly poison its relations with Nepal’s mainstream media.

If they were the reason that led to such a strong and frankly undiplomatic and bizarre statement, it should tell them zai bu jian (let’s not meet again) and cut them loose. And if the push came from some Chinese citizens in Nepal who used the op-ed to prove their patriotism for whatever reasons, the embassy should not be swayed by them either in the future. You represent Beijing and its policies not what some random Chinese influenced by nationalistic writings think.

Let’s not let some crafty, overly emotional and nationalist people ruin our excellent bilateral relations and the stellar image China has in Nepal.

Ni zhong you yi wan sui.

Once again, we have invited the Chinese president Xi Jinping to Nepal and once again we got the same reply: That the visit will take place at a suitable time. And once again, we are all pumped up about the proposed Kathmandu-Keyrung train, as if the project is almost complete. But as things stand, both Xi’s visit and Kathmandu-Keyrung train are wishful thinking or, as the Chinese say, bai ri meng. China is reluctant to help Nepal or have its president visit Nepal because our uber-nationalists and more-Chinese-than-the-Chinese-themselves intellectuals and leaders have been promoting a narrative that is disastrous to our ties with both India and China.

The major flaw in the popular narrative is that it views Sino-Nepal ties as strengthening Nepal’s position vis-à-vis India and unnecessarily drags China into our bilateral relations with India. We are made to believe China is more than happy to help Nepal stand up to India. We should be all excited about the proposed train because it will end our dependency on India and that will drastically weaken India’s stranglehold on Nepal. As such, we have linked the Chinese president’s visit to Nepal and the train with weakening Indian influence, to feed anti-Indian nationalism and to bolster the nationalist credentials of the political leaders—and some intellectuals.

This makes it difficult for China to either move forward with the train project or have its president visit Nepal because it fears Delhi will interpret those as China’s endorsement of anti-Indianism in Nepal—something Beijing wants to avoid at all cost, especially when it is hoping for the Indian support, if not outright membership, of the BRI.  

Thus the Chinese have been dropping hints that they are not comfortable with our approach to viewing China as a solution to all our issues with India. They have been openly—symbolically and verbally—advising our leaders to maintain good relations with India, and making it clear they don’t want to have anything to do with our problems with India. That’s why they didn’t give us any real help during the Indian embargo in 2015-16.

The first major non-verbal signal was having then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “accidentally” bump into President Xi back in 2016. Not just that. Indian Prime Minister Modi accidentally walks into the hotel suite where the two leaders are talking, and a photo is allowed to be taken and posted on Dahal’s son’s Facebook page. The Chinese are known to use photos to signal change in attitudes or drop indirect hints about what they think.

For example, when China wanted to improve ties with the US, it invited to Beijing Edger Snow—an American journalist who presented the communists in a good light to American readers through his articles and, most famously, through his book, the Red Star Over China. The occasion was the National Day celebrations in 1970, where a photo of Snow standing next to Chairman Mao was published in the People’s Daily to signal that China was ready to normalize relations with the US.

Just like us, the Americans were also slow to understand the symbolism behind the photograph. Domestically too, the Chinese regularly use photos to tell the people which leader has fallen out of favor with the supreme leader or has risen in the party hierarchy.

There’s a memorable photograph of the late King Birendra’s meeting with Mao in 1973, in which all but premier Zhou are seated in comfortable sofas. Zhou is made to sit in a strangely placed wooden chair to signal to the Chinese people that the chairman has serious issues with the premier. “In February 1972 Chou had a comfortable armchair when US president Nixon came calling. By December 1973, Mao had banished Chou to a humiliating hard chair when meeting the Nepalese king,” (Jung Chang and John Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story).

Then came a clear verbal signal with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi going into the 2+1 (China + India) model on Nepal during our foreign minister Pradeep Gyawali’s visit to Beijing last year.

We need to understand that no real Chinese help will come unless India feels comfortable. In a popular Chinese question-answer website, zhi hu—which serves as a platform for Chinese public intellectuals to discuss and debate issues and answer interesting questions—Mr Long, who wants us to call him “Xiao Xuosheng,” posted a lengthy and possibly the most well-informed reply in China to the question: ‘How to view the Keyrung-Kathmandu train plan?’ As we are not getting the perspective of ordinary Chinese people or public intellectuals on the issue, allow me to translate the conclusion from his well-informed post from July 2018.

“One major problem facing the Keyrung-Kathmandu train is Indian obstruction… Railway line to Kerung is 100 percent certain… Let’s not doubt it. It’s in China and no other country should care what China does in its territory. 

“But in the Kathmandu-Keyrung stretch there exists international political risks. [Only] Nepal’s effective handling [of pressure] and China’s determination will make the extension possible. If Nepal backs down or chickens out [note that he uses the phrase song le, which can mean many things but in online Chinese lingo, it mostly means back down due to fear], then it can’t be constructed. The probability of no extension to Kathmandu is around 40 percent.

Not optimistic, not pessimistic, just an objective analysis.”

And 60 percent likelihood is not a very optimistic scenario, just as Mr Long is cleverly implying. But the more we keep viewing it as a must to upset India’s role in Nepal, the greater the chances that China will back out of the project although it is on the BRI agenda. Antagonizing India over Nepal will not be a smart move for China. Also there’s no guarantee that Nepali politicians will be able to withstand the Indian pressure. We need to accept that much can change in Kathmandu in the days ahead and between India and China in the months ahead. The train is still a decade away. 

In the meantime, if we want the Chinese president to come calling, our politicians and scholars must delink India from Sino-Nepal ties. Let’s ask ourselves: Why does President Xi feel comfortable visiting the countries that China has territorial issues with, namely, India, Vietnam and the Philippines, but is reluctant to come to Nepal, a country that never tires of reiterating its historical ties with China?

 Although many of us writing on international affairs won’t accept or acknowledge this, we are no different to the astrologers who write horoscopes for various newspapers and magazines. As you may have noticed, no two horoscopes are the same because the astrologers tend to focus on the planets that they consider important and base their predictions on the movements of those planets.

Similarly, we, predicting Nepal’s future, tend to put either China, India or the US at the center and write really long pieces, with examples from faraway places to let you, the readers, know that we know what we are talking about. I am no exception.

Something interesting is happening in the Nepali sky these days. One of the central planets, the US, seems to be in ‘retrograde motion’ all of a sudden and hardly anyone has taken notice.Maybe, in their calculation, the US is a faraway planet in perfect harmony with another planet, India, or that it is overshadowed by the planet China. I for one believe that the sudden retrograde US is going to have consequences for Nepal, just as the movements of Rahu and Ketu made a clown from Kashmir a terrorist in Salman Rushdie’s ‘Shalimar The Clown’.

It is now obvious that there is a major difference on Nepal between the US Department of State and the Department of Defense. Two months ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia Joe Felter,during a visit to Kathmandu, warned us of the dangers of Chinese aid under the Belt and Road Initiative. Less than two months later, the US Ambassador to Nepal Randy Berry told us we need to utilize help from all and that we don’t have to choose one country over the other. The ambassador’s tweet is a clear indication of the differences between the State Department and the Defense Department coming to the fore.

Those interested in American foreign policy know that the two major organs of the US government are at odds with each other most of the time and when it comes to difficult and messed up places their difference is all the more pronounced. The realists at the Department of Defense, given the nature of their work (and academic and professional training), are concerned about America’s security interests.For them, protecting America and its allies’ security interests by show of force and multiple security alliances are the only ways to go about achieving American foreign policy objectives.

But the liberals at the Department of State tend to look at the world as an interconnected whole and are willing to sacrifice its hold over some countries if it leads to solving the immediate problems, or be less active in places where they believe it’s wiser to work with the allies than go solo. They want to minimize the cost by avoiding military commitment and involvement.

If we analyze the most recent US stance on Nepal, maybe one of these or something else played an important role in the sudden volte-face: Maybe the Department of State feels it’s useless to spend its resources in Nepal and that its interests are better served by working with India. That way, you are letting your ally know you are not invading its turf.

Maybe the Department of State feels that it makes no sense to challenge China in its backyard and to solve the immediate issue at hand, i.e., North Korea, it shouldn’t be provoking China too much. The failure of Hanoi talks between President Trump and Chairman Kim can be linked to the US-China trade war and now it’s obvious that there’s no North Korean denuclearization without some active Chinese involvement.

If President Trump can reach an agreement or make some immediate progress with North Korea on denuclearization by working with China, it would be a major foreign policy achievement for him. It might even get him reelected for another term. So to get the Chinese help, the US first needs to assuage Chinese fears by not being too active in China’s neighborhood. One less member, that too weak and poor, in the Indo-Pacific Strategy is not going to make much difference if it leads to the solving of the Korean problem.

Third likely possibility is that we have been too passive and indecisive on what we really want. The US has run out of patience and both the Defense and State departments feel it’s in the best US interest to keep a low profile here. Maybe our fate has already been decided by the Big Three, a la what the Big Four did to small and weak countries in Versailles a century ago.

The chances are, the US will now be passively watching how the cooperation and competition between India and China is played out in this country and could very well be thinking that it will again be active in Nepal once the bigger problems elsewhere get sorted out. But the question is: will there then be any space for it to play any constructive role here? Probably then,both the State and Defense departments would be on the same page on Nepal but it will be fait accompli and the US involvement then is not going to amount to anything. 

Let’s hope, we will be spared the fate of Shalimar, the clown, and the planetary alignment over our sky will lead to something good, and when Nepal is discussed in the US academia they will not be discussing, “Who lost Nipple?”

 Just like in other countries, foreign missions, especially the rich and powerful ones with interests here, spend a lot of money on psy ops, or dissem­ination of “positive propaganda” to influence public perceptions about them, which may in turn affect government decisions.

There’s nothing wrong with it and many countries do it. While psy ops are getting sophisticat­ed and intelligent in other coun­tries, in Nepal’s case, for some strange reason, foreign missions seem reluctant to move beyond the traditional method, i.e., paying influential local writers and leaders to portray them in good light.

This method may have worked in the past, but times have changed and now we have a sig­nificant number of bright young students and scholars who are not easily brainwashed. Further, the years of reliance on this meth­od has only led to the creation of an army of pro-this and anti-that experts, and we the people have been forced to read and hear extreme views that hardly make any sense.

Maybe it’s already late for those of you working in foreign mis­sions’ intelligence desks in Kath­mandu to rethink your approach to dissemination of positive pro­paganda. I urge you to produce genuine thinkers, not some fanat­ically pro-you and anti-them you foes, who, for a few dollars more, will love your country more than you do. It’s your taxpayer money going to waste.

Therefore, how about creating people who genuinely like you and can’t stop talking good about you, or care about your concerns without you having to be directly bribed?

Too good to be true?

Actually it’s quite easy. Work with the academia to establish a major related to your country. Area studies is in decline in many countries, but young Nepali stu­dents and professionals these days are really into understanding their neighbors and the US. Peo­ple are buying books and reading about you. What they lack is a real academic program to help them put in perspective what they read in international bestsellers. For this you have to have academic programs that expose the real you to students.

Teach them your history, lan­guage, culture, foreign policy, lit­erature, and all things you. Teach them where you went wrong and where you are still wrong, but also where you are right. You can also make arrangements for the students here to interact with the students in your country, and have renowned professors teach them over the internet.

All you got to do is find area studies academics in your coun­try, devise a course and find a will­ing academic partner in Nepal. This is quite easy and won’t cost much—maybe a few computers, desks and chairs and, this being Nepal, some bribe money and fine wine and dinners. Enroll 10-15 students who meet strict academic requirements from all backgrounds—bureaucrats, junior diplomats, military officers to journalists, businesspeople and young people who are just curi­ous about you and would also be willing to pay for an academic degree.

For the first few years you need to bring in professors from your own country to teach us. But after that we will have enough people to do the teaching our­selves. Provide scholarships for a year to study at your finest insti­tutes to the best and the brightest students.

This shouldn’t cost you extra either given that you are already providing scholarships to medi­ocre students and the ones with political connections or those rec­ommended by your “old hands”. Therefore, just send two brightest students studying about you to your country and limit the num­bers of “highly recommended mediocre students.” The two real students will make the best of the opportunity and significantly boost bilateral relations at the people’s level.

If you do this, in 10 years, you will have more than 100 profes­sionals from all fields saying good things about you. The risk is, some may only focus on your flaws and be critical of you, but many who study about you will be support­ive and they will understand why you do the things you do.

This is probably the best and the cheapest way—think of the money you will be saving in jun­kets, scholarships to undeserving candidates, seminars and con­ferences where no one says any­thing new or of value, drinks and dinners and payments and gifts to some to show yourself in a good light.

Also, you will be doing our gov­ernment a favor by providing it with the manpower that under­stands and speaks your language, which in turn will help this coun­try be more sensible in its deal­ings with you. And for those of us outside of the government and academia, we will be getting to read something sensible about you that doesn’t reek of stale pro­paganda. Now that will help to better understand and like you.

No matter what others will have you believe, all of Nepal’s problems result from strategic miscalculation. It is to be blamed for our messy pol­itics and the rise of angry groups every 10 years or so that want to overthrow the system, and it is to be blamed for our poverty.

Strategic miscalculation results from not asking the right ques­tions essential to the country’s survival and well-being, and not making decisions that help us achieve political stability and eco­nomic growth and have the world take us seriously. The first ques­tion to ask is: Who/what is our biggest security threat?

National security isn’t just about securing our borders and ensur­ing territorial integrity. Political instability instigated by non-state actors is also a security threat and so is growing foreign influence and dependence. For every coun­try in the world, its neighbors are its biggest security threats.

Our neighbors have their own interests and agendas and they care more about those than they do about us. This doesn’t neces­sarily mean they will invade but, if they feel attacking us ensures their safety and security, or they think political instability and vio­lence work to their advantage, they will definitely do it.

The second question we need to be asking is: Who can then guarantee our survival by ensuring our neighbors do not implement their sinister designs, if and when they have any? Or who can garner enough inter­national support and act for our cause if we fall victim to one of our neighbor’s aggression?

Sadly, this question, which must have been at the heart of our foreign policy and directed our interactions with the world, is seldom considered by our policy­makers as they fear angering our neighbors. Naturally, the neigh­bors don’t want us to spread our wings. So far, they have succeeded in their plan. Nepal’s world is now sadly limited to our neighbors and we have hardly any real friend outside. The more real friends we make, the more difficult it will be for our neighbors to control or bully us into submission.

The third question we need to be asking is: Who can help us achieve economic growth and prosperity by investing here or by allowing us unrestricted mar­ket access, and what would be expected of us in return? Nepal lies between two Asian giants; it is a gateway to South Asia for China and to East Asia for India; we are a perfect place for investment—these arguments aren’t going to bring in enough investment for our sustained growth and prosperity. Before we ask investors to come, we need to find markets for our products. And market access is all about pol­itics—your use for the country that grants you market access.

That utility almost always has to do with security. The bottom line, if you want investment you need to have access to markets and that comes when you align with a power and are willing to go with its foreign policy. This means, you are willing to fight alongside if it goes to a war, and the power you align with wants you to be strong militari­ly so it will allow your products access to its and its allies’ markets. This power wants you to spend a significant part of the profits thus earned in strengthening your defense, which it thinks will be to its advantage when things turn messy with others.

Who wouldn’t want a friend with well-equipped military in times of war? If you are lucky and if you don’t have to fight your trading partner’s war, then too, you end up being strong both economically and militarily, deterring your neighbors from creating problems.

All developed countries (or the currently developing coun­tries) have followed this path. It doesn’t mean you stop inter­acting with your neighbors, but rather that you also develop a healthy skepticism of your neigh­bors intentions and are serious about your security. Once you start taking yourself seriously, others will take you seriously as well.

If not, even 50 years down the road, we will be grappling with the same-old issues and our major income source will continue to be the money sent by our young men and women working abroad (if that option is still available). The choice is ours.

Ever since the DC meeting between our foreign minis­ter and the American Sec­retary of State, Kathmandu, as news reports suggest, has had more than its fair share of sym­posiums, conferences and what not on Nepal’s foreign affairs and diplomacy. And we have had our experts suggest the same thing over and over: “It’s a delicate sce­nario and Nepal needs to cau­tiously balance its relations with all major powers.”

It makes everyone happy. The organizers keep on getting fund­ing for more such discussions and what not. The experts don’t need to think at all, and say the same thing again and again. The jour­nalists don’t even need to listen and take notes, and instead focus on lunch and drinks because they know exactly what is coming.

This is why nobody bothers to ask any of the experts what exact­ly is balance in our intent and how Nepal can balance its relations with all.

The answer to this simple ques­tion is: There is no way Nepal can balance its relations with all. It’s impossible. In fact the whole idea of balance is ridiculous. Nepal could pretend to balance if it had a strong economy and defense, but, for a poor and weak coun­try, balancing relations with the superpower and regional powers is like making a 5-year-old run a marathon with a 50-pound load. Unless the kid is a Hercules or Bhimsen or Pangu reincarnate, he will collapse in under a second.

For the record, no country has been able to balance its relations with competing and conflict­ing powers. And those who try become wrecks. Then how come our otherwise well-versed and intelligent experts are hung up on the impossible and quite laugh­able idea?

There are two major reasons. The first being the government does not fund think-tanks. So, the think-tanks, of which there are many, rely on foreign money to run their organizations and host the discussions. And they need to make everyone, most importantly their donors or the funding orga­nizations which have offices or operations in both India and Chi­na, happy by not rocking the boat.

Also, the interest of foreign intelligence agencies in organiz­ing conferences and arranging visits of our experts abroad, or of foreign experts to Nepal, through various research centers and think-tanks cannot be ruled out. It’s the best and safest way to identify experts who can be used and to put words in their mouth. Many intelligence agencies have been employing this tactic as a way to influence the popular nar­rative which directly and indirect­ly influences government deci­sions. As everywhere some smart experts in Nepal know they are being used, and they want to be used, in exchange for material benefits.

We cannot blame the intelli­gence agencies as they are doing what is expected of them. Intelli­gence operations promote your national interests and one of the most gullible targets are the experts, as highlighted in Daniel Golden’s Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Univer­sities. Suffice to say, some agen­cies have their own “national” interests in keeping us the way we are so that they can go on with whatever they have planned for us. If domestic politics is all about deception, then interna­tional relations are an even bigger deception, and journalists and experts come in handy in weaving the deception web.

Hence, the discussions end with “Nepal needs to balance” pre­scription and don’t even touch on how to achieve that balance. Because then you will need to touch on making Nepal stronger than it is today by focusing on defense modernization, strength­ening our intelligence and count­er intelligence capabilities, look­ing beyond the immediate neigh­bors, a proactive foreign policy and sensible economic planning, and many other things, even to achieve pseudo neutrality and balance.

If the government of Nepal is serious about what it needs to do in the complex regional and global scenario and wants some­thing doable and achievable than the “balance” solution, it needs to invest in think-tanks. If it has billions to spend on luxury for the VVIPs, it certainly has some millions to spare on think-tanks and intelligence. All countries have been doing it and we are late in the game already.

The ultimate buyer of knowl­edge is the government and when you find that your government has no interest in buying or valu­ing your knowledge, you have no option but to sell it to whoever wants to buy it or values it. And that has been happening in Nepal for the past 50 years.

Perhaps when our government learns to value the experts by interacting with them and buying their knowledge with money, din­ner and drinks, then they will talk the talk and we will be hearing and reading something refresh­ing. The government may start making sensible decisions too.