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Nepal’s political evolution, from its unification in 1768 to the establishment of a federal democratic republic in May 2008, has been a tumultuous journey marked by significant milestones and setbacks. This transformation has been shaped by a complex interplay of historical, socio-political, economic, and geopolitical factors. As Nepal stands at the edge of change, it faces a dynamic landscape—some forces pushing it toward progress, while others present formidable obstacles. The country’s political environment remains volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous, with the resurgence of pro-monarchy sentiments adding a new layer of complexity to its democratic experiment.

Resurgence of monarchy

Former King Gyanendra Shah, who abdicated his throne in 2008 to facilitate Nepal’s transition to a secular federal republic, has re-emerged as a focal point in the nation’s political discourse. His recent activities—returning to Kathmandu after spending two months in Nepalganj and Pokhara, and consulting with Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath in Lucknow—have sparked widespread speculation about the possible restoration of the monarchy. Adityanath, a vocal advocate for a Hindu Kingdom in Nepal, has further fueled these discussions. Meanwhile, regional powers like China and India, as well as global democratic forces, are closely monitoring the situation.

The former king’s appeal to the people to rise for the nation has resonated with some segments of society, creating fertile ground for a renewed debate about Nepal’s political future. His message emphasizes national unity, credible democracy, and a renewed sense of identity—elements that are crucial for Nepal’s strategic stability. However, the dysfunctional democracy, characterized by poor governance, corruption, and self-interest, remains a significant obstacle to achieving these goals.

Polarization and elusive stability

Nepal’s democracy is currently caught between two opposing forces: pro-monarchist electorates advocating for the return of the kingdom and republican forces, which have been marred by allegations of inefficiency and corruption. This polarization has left Nepali society deeply divided. While the people yearn for strategic stability, questions linger: Is Nepal ready for change, or is it still awaiting cues from external powers like Beijing, Delhi, or Washington? The current political system, plagued by poor governance and a lack of meritocracy, has eroded national trustworthiness. The intertwined issues of political, economic, and security affairs demand collective solutions, yet time is running out.

The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), which holds 14 seats in the 275-member House of Representatives, has been vocal in its support for the monarchy. Alongside the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal (RPPN) and businessman turned activist Durga Prasai, the RPP has actively participated in rallies demanding the restoration of the monarchy and the abolition of the federal republican system. Slogans like “We want our King back” and “The King and the country are dearer than our life” have become rallying cries for pro-monarchy supporters.

Republican forces on the defensive

The resurgence of royalist sentiment has alarmed republican forces, who view it as a threat to the federal democratic system. Leaders from the three major parties—former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress (NC), Prime Minister KP Oli of the CPN (UML), and former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the CPN (Maoist Center)—have dismissed the pro-monarchy movement as insignificant. However, their own unpopularity, stemming from allegations of institutional corruption, has weakened their stance.

Deuba downplayed the recent pro-monarchy rally in Kathmandu as a “regular event,” while Oli emphasized the need to focus on democratic and constitutional activities. Dahal, on the other hand, criticized both the pro-monarchy forces and the ruling alliance, blaming the government for failing to address public frustration. The Samajbadi Morcha (Socialist Front), a coalition of leftist parties formed on June 19, 2023, is preparing to hold a protest rally on March 28 to defend republican values. Meanwhile, Madhav Kumar Nepal, chairperson of the Unified Socialist Party, has blamed Prime Minister Oli for the resurgence of “reactionary elements” and called for a two-month-long protest to address the country’s political and social issues.

Historical context

To fully understand Nepal’s current political landscape, it is essential to consider its historical context. The Treaty of Sugauli, signed in 1815, reshaped Nepal’s borders and relations with the British Empire, marking the beginning of a long period of external influence and internal struggle. The Rana regime (1846–1951), characterized by hereditary authoritarian rule, further entrenched feudalism and autocracy. The dawn of democracy in 1951, marked by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, laid the foundation for bilateral relations but also sowed the seeds of dependency.

The 1990 People’s Movement (Jana-Andolan) reignited democratic aspirations, but the triangular conflict between monarchist forces, democrats, and Maoists complicated the transition. The 12-point agreement in Delhi in 2005, which brought Maoists into the democratic framework, was a turning point. However, the transition to a federal democratic republic introduced new complexities, including unaccountable leadership and governance challenges.

Fragmentation and governance challenges

Nepal’s political landscape remains fragmented, with multiple parties representing regional, ethnic, and ideological interests. This fragmentation has led to unstable coalition governments and frequent changes in leadership—13 prime ministers in 16 years. The lack of policy continuity and institutional development has further undermined governance. The pro-monarchy movement, while gaining traction, faces internal divisions. RPP Chair Rajendra Lingden has distanced his party from Navaraj Subedi’s People’s Movement Committee, despite senior RPP members joining the mobilization effort. The former king’s attempt to unify pro-monarchy forces under Subedi’s leadership reflects a last-ditch effort to gauge public support for a royal comeback. However, the movement’s success remains uncertain.

The role of civil society and grassroots movements

Civil society, activists, and grassroots movements play a crucial role in driving political transformation. By advocating for transparency, accountability, and civic engagement, they can help bridge the gap between the people and the political establishment. Initiatives aimed at promoting democratic governance, human rights, and social justice are vital for holding the political elite accountable and fostering a culture of active citizenship.

The way forward

Nepal stands at a critical crossroads. The current political system, characterized by corruption, inefficiency, and fragmentation, has failed to deliver good governance. The people’s frustration with the status quo has created an opening for alternative political discourses, including the restoration of the monarchy. However, the success of any political transformation depends on addressing the root causes of instability: poor governance, institutional corruption, and socio-economic disparities.

Reforming the constitution to create a more functional democracy is essential. This includes ensuring greater accountability, transparency, and representation for all citizens. Geopolitical integration can also play a role in supporting Nepal’s democratic aspirations, but it must be approached with caution to avoid external interference.

Nepal’s political transformation is a delicate balancing act. The country must navigate its historical legacies, socio-economic challenges, and diverse aspirations while fostering dialogue and cooperation among stakeholders. The success of this transformation hinges on the ability of political leaders to prioritize democracy, justice, and development over self-interest and geopolitical maneuvering.

As Nepal moves forward, it must strive to unite its diverse voices and create an inclusive political framework. The current system, with its flaws and failures, cannot sustain the nation’s aspirations. Whether through constitutional reform, a national unity government, or a renewed commitment to democratic values, Nepal must seize this moment to redefine its future. The ball is in the court of its political leaders, and the choices they make will determine whether Nepal emerges as a resilient, inclusive nation or remains trapped in a cycle of instability.

The author, a retired Major General of the Nepali Army, is a strategic analyst

In the intricate geopolitical landscape of South Asia, the potential for smaller nations like Nepal to assert their influence and leverage their positions has never been greater, particularly under the Trump 2.0 administration. The political climate fostered by Trump has been characterized by a focus on bilateral relations, economic pragmatism and an “America First” approach, in addition to “Make America Great Again”, which has opened new avenues for smaller South Asian nations—countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka—to enhance their diplomatic and economic prospects. Trump’s intent has both domestic and international policy approaches. 

The administration is in the middle when South Asia is being re-imagined with cooperation, competition, crisis and conflict. Standing in times of change in the interconnected world, South Asians are confronting an exceptional array of new political-security-economic challenges.  

The second day for the new administration (Jan 21) commenced with a commitment from QUAD Foreign Ministers: “Our four nations maintain our conviction that international law, economic opportunity, peace, stability and security in all domains, including the maritime domain, underpin the development and prosperity of the peoples of the Indo-Pacific. We also strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.”

A day after Trump’s inauguration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, affirming a shared commitment to continuing to strengthen the partnership between India and the US. 

The US’ 2017 “South Asia Policy”, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022 will continue to be the bedrock of the US South Asia policy with India playing the role of a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific. 

It will be a continuation of the policy of provoking China and embracing India as a major ‘defense partner’ (since 2016), establishment of India-US 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2018 and a contest to smaller nations in South Asia like Nepal.

The context

The geopolitical dynamics in South Asia have been shaped by historical rivalries and alliances, with larger powers like India’s relations with Pakistan often dominating the narrative. From the 1950s to the 1970s, South Asia had a special significance in great power competition between the US and the Soviet Union. But the analogy in the region is returning to the geopolitical space of the 1970s, where China and the US both supported Pakistan during the ‘1971 third war’ between India and Pakistan that created the independent state of Bangladesh. China and India have had turbulent and sometimes friendly relationships. Through the 1954’s ‘Treaty of Coexistence’, the two sides emphasised the ‘Five Principles’ of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, only to engage in a war in 1962. 

US anxiety at the height of the East-West Cold War with the declared alliance between China and the Soviet Union and Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik led to two strategic approaches. One, it greeted the rise of a strong China. Second, Pakistan was driven by multifaceted US interests manifested, among others, through support to Pakistan in the 1971 war with India. 

India signed the ‘Treaty of Friendship’ with the Soviet Union in 1971 and annexed Sikkim as its “22nd” state four years later. 

The change of US policy with China in 1971 and the tilt to Pakistan as well as change of the Soviet Union’s policy with closer relations with India, disintegration of Pakistan and the announcement of Sikkim becoming part of India altered South Asia’s regional and international relations. Under China’s foreign policy radar, South Asia had a low profile, though the country established diplomatic relations with several South Asians. At that time, the South Asian geostrategic environment transformed the balance of power irreversibly in India’s favour. 

Anyway, the US engagement with India is paramount to achieve the intent of “Making America Great Again”. India has her own constraints to counter the challenges from China and Pakistan, who have maintained their cordial friendship to an ‘all-weather’ partnership. Meanwhile, China and India agreed on 18 Dec 2024 to continue taking measures to safeguard peace and tranquillity along the border and promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations and to continue seeking a package solution to the boundary question that is fair, reasonable and acceptable. 

However, under a future Trump administration, the approach to foreign policy could shift, encouraging greater engagement with smaller nations. This shift may stem from several factors, including the need to counterbalance China’s growing influence and India’s foreign policy approaches with strategic autonomy, foster economic partnerships and establish a stable regional environment that can contribute to US interests.

Countering China

One of the most pressing issues for South Asian nations is the increasing presence of China, especially through the global governance mechanism, the Global Common Shared Future. One segment of its Belt and Road Initiative is furthering inroads. Smaller nations like Nepal in the continental and Sri Lanka in the maritime have found themselves in precarious positions as they navigate their relationships with China and the Trump 2.0 administration could leverage this anxiety, providing alternatives to Chinese investments and increasing American influence in the region.

For example, smaller nations could benefit from increased American investment in infrastructure projects, thereby reducing dependency on Chinese funding and creating opportunities for sustainable economic development. The US could work collaboratively with South Asian nations to identify projects that align with their national development goals while promoting American technological and investment interests. This dual approach not only empowers smaller nations but also helps the US establish stronger ties in the region.

Economy and trade

There is a high likelihood of renewed discussions surrounding trade agreements that might favour smaller nations in South Asia. The focus on “fair trade” and economic sovereignty resonates with many countries looking to diversify their economic partnerships.

Countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have historically benefited from trade preferences under programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Renewed American leadership could facilitate deeper trade relations through customized agreements that emphasize mutual benefit while ensuring that smaller nations are not sidelined in favour of larger economies. Enhanced trade relations could see smaller South Asian nations gain access to the American market while simultaneously attracting US investments.

Strengthening alliances

The prospects of a Trump 2.0 administration also bear significance in terms of international alliances. Strategically-placed smaller South Asian nations like Bangladesh could find themselves in favourable positions to strengthen regional alliances, particularly through platforms like the QUAD as well as potential new initiatives aiming to unite nations against common regional challenges.

By aligning with larger democracies and leveraging US strategic interests, smaller nations can increase their visibility on the global stage. For instance, Nepal, which maintains a delicate balance between India and China, could use its unique position to advocate for increased focus on climate change and sustainable development, receiving support from US initiatives that align with their national interests.

Défense-security collaborations

Security concerns are paramount in South Asia, with issues ranging from terrorism to territorial disputes impacting the region’s stability. A renewed commitment under Trump 2.0 to support smaller nations could manifest through enhanced military training exercises, defined equipment transfers and intelligence-sharing agreements.

The Maldives, for instance, has been a critical actor in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean. An American focus on collaborating with such nations to enhance maritime security operations can significantly bolster their defined capabilities while ensuring a more secure sea-lane for international trade—an issue of major strategic interest for the US.

Promoting democracy

Another area where smaller nations in South Asia can seize opportunities is in the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. The Trump administration has often balanced its foreign policy between realism and idealism, sometimes prioritizing strategic interests over democratic principles. However, under the influence of prominent policymakers focused on human rights issues, smaller nations could find an ally in the US.

For countries like Nepal and Bhutan, which have made significant strides in democratic governance, partnerships that emphasize political reform, civil society engagement and anti-corruption measures could have long-lasting effects. By aligning with US interests in promoting democracy, they can enhance their own legitimacy and international standing.

Conclusion

The implications of a hypothetical Trump 2.0 administration on smaller nations in South Asia present a landscape full of opportunities. While challenges remain—particularly regarding regional stability and external influences from China and Pakistan—the potential for economic growth, enhanced security collaborations and stronger democratic institutions could define a new era of engagement for these nations.

Small countries have historically been overshadowed by larger neighbours, but the dynamics driven by US foreign policy could empower these nations to carve out a significant role in regional affairs. As they navigate this complex landscape, it is crucial for smaller South Asian nations to seize the moment, engaging proactively with the US to ensure their voices are heard and their needs met in a rapidly changing global environment.

Ultimately, in an era where national narratives are being redefined, Nepal and other smaller nations can play critical roles by acting as bridges between larger powers, advocating for their interests while contributing to a more stable and prosperous South Asian region. As these countries position themselves strategically, the tenets of collaboration, mutual respect and shared objectives will be essential to building a coalition that can navigate the complexities of 21st-century geopolitics.

Under all potential geopolitical scenarios, the convincing intervention in outlining the relationship’s progression eventually dwells with New Delhi and Beijing, not Washington. But for Nepal and other smaller nations, Washington is and should be secured as the strategic potent partner. 

The implications of a potential ‘Trump 2.0’ for small nations encompass a complex interplay of political, security, economic factors with justified diplomacy. The situation would necessitate a careful balancing act, as it navigates its relationships with major powers while striving to maintain its sovereignty and ensure national interests are prioritized. The overall impact would depend greatly on the specifics of Trump’s policies and the regional dynamics at play during his second term. Then again, Nepal must be in existence with national interests in both competition and coexistence without falling into the strategic trap in the long game.

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

All G7 member-states are members of G20, while China is at the center of G77. Of the BRICS nations, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil was the only head of the state and the government present at the Havana G77 summit whereas South Africa sent a cabinet minister for the summit. More than 100 countries, including 30 heads of state and government and those aligned with the Non-Aligned Movement, were present at the summit of the grouping that has 18 of the 25-member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, observer states or dialogue partners as members in addition to seven of G20 member-states. 

The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres participated in the recent summits of BRICS, G20, G77 and the 78th UN convention. Guterres’ emphasis was on a new global order with increased participation from the Global South in the global governance system.

Guterres has asked G20 to assume leadership on two fronts: Emission reduction and climate justice. Eighty percent of emissions is from G20 countries, he pointed out, stressing the need for the latter to reduce emissions and build resilience in communities suffering the impacts of climate change. 

“This multiplicity of summits reflects the growing multipolarity of our world,” Guterres observed ahead of the Havana meeting and warned, “Multipolarity could be a factor in escalating geostrategic tensions, with tragic consequences.” 

At the G77 summit in Havana, pointing to climate and foreign debt, he articulated that the Global South was “trapped in a tangible global crisis.” The world is failing developing nations, he said, describing the grouping as “a champion of multilateralism”. Guterres stressed that G77 should “champion a system rooted in equality that is ready to reverse the injustice and neglect of centuries and deliver for all humanity and not only for the privileged”. 

China stated that it “will always make South-South cooperation a priority” in its dealing with the outside world.  Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, the chair, said, “After all this time that the North has organized the world according to its interests, it is now up to the South to change the rules of the game.” 

In the realm of international relations and global governance, the roles of India and the US in the G20 and China in the G77 have significant implications. Fostered by G77, the ‘South bloc’ challenges traditional great power dominance and undertakes collective action to shape global politics. As India, the US and China navigate these blocs, their actions influence geopolitics and contribute to the ongoing dynamics of great power rivalry. Understanding these dynamics is critical for policymakers and scholars seeking to comprehend the changing landscape of international relations.

The US holds significant political influence within the G20 by virtue of its long-established global leadership and diplomatic reach. India has emerged as a voice representing developing nations and brings its unique political perspective to the forum. The US and India bring their distinct foreign policy priorities with connectivity and North-South cooperation. The US focuses on maintaining its global dominance and shaping the international order, while India emphasizes multilateralism, inclusivity and regional stability.

China pursues a distinct political strategy within the G77. Its active role, along with economic support, allows it to garner political influence, further reinforcing its position within the bloc. China seeks to promote its vision of development, connectivity and cooperation among developing nations through G77. Chinese foreign policy objectives concentrate on strengthening ties with these nations, including shaping economic relationships and securing access to resources

In contemporary geopolitics, international organizations play a crucial role in shaping global governance and power dynamics. China and the United States have reached an ideological stalemate as they are entrenched in shaping global governance through intergovernmental groupings by influencing the Global South. A contested US, an emerging China and a rising India have been openly trying to stabilize their relationship with renewed dialogues and regular diplomatic engagements, which have been at their lowest in the last 50 years with the risk of war. The Group of 20 (G20) and the Group of 77 (G77) are two prominent blocs within the international community. 

The triad diplomacy between China, Russia and North Korea is an endeavor of Russia to globalize the war in Ukraine. President Putin’s ambition and strategic misstep is costing the world colossal losses, together with Sino-American rivalry. Putin is rooting for an international system that is multipolar, upholds conservative values, is largely delinked with the US and gives space to Russia as a dominant player in a new era of global politics. In the Cold War, the inclination of the ‘Third World’ toward the Non-Aligned Movement was phenomenal. 

But in the era of Cold War 2.0, India’s influence in the Global South is more visible as the G20 summit, just concluded with North-South cooperation, has shown. Like India, China also has plans to lead the Global South for South-South cooperation. 

It is important to compare India’s role in the US-governed G20 with that of the China-led G77. Additionally, discussions on the concept of the ‘South bloc’ and its implications for geopolitics and great power rivalry are essential for international relations.

Geopolitical significance

The G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States along with the European Union. This bloc, accounting for more than 80 percent of world GDP, 75 percent of global trade, and 60 percent of the global population, was established in 1999 as a platform for Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to discuss international economic and financial issues and address major issues related to the global economy, such as international finance stability, climate mitigation and sustainable development. India and the US are key players in the G20, which comprises major economies of the world. Both countries possess significant geopolitical and economic clout. India represents a large emerging market with tremendous growth potential, whereas the US remains a global superpower with vast influence.

The Group of G77 (G77) was established in 1964 and originally consisted of 77 member-states, hence its name. 

Over the years, the membership has grown to include 134 developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. China’s membership in the G77 in 1994 grants it a platform to represent the interests and aspirations of developing nations to promote economic cooperation, coordinate positions on international issues and advocate for development needs of member-states.  As the world’s second-largest economy, China’s growing influence in G77 gives it a considerable geopolitical leverage.

Global politico-economic connection

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) approached around after the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development or the Group of 24 (G24) was recognised in 1971 as a chapter of the G77 to harmonize the opinions of developing countries on international monetary and development releases, which then envisaged North-South cooperation in 1973 in the Algiers Conference of non-aligned countries. The sixth Special Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), established in 1964 as an authorities’ body of the UN General Assembly in stimulating trade and development predominantly in developing countries or the Global South, adopted a program of action while the Paris talks (North-South Dialogue of 1977) negotiated North-South cooperation by setting up the Willy Brandt Commission with an understanding to revitalize the issues of international economic development emphasized by the World Bank Commission Report (1980) for North-South cooperation.

 In G20, both India and the US possess strong and diversified economies. With the nominal GDP of $25.46trn in 2022, the US has a higher GDP and greater economic influence globally. India’s GDP of $3.39trn in 2022-23 with economic growth rate and potential offer has vast opportunities for investment and development. The G20 is composed of most of the world’s largest economies’ finance ministries, including both industrialized and developing countries. It accounts for around 80 percent of the gross world product (GWP), 75 percent of international trade, two-thirds of the global population and 60 percent of the world’s land area.

G77 accounts for 80 percent of the world’s population. Within the grouping, China’s economic strength is emerging with the GDP of $18trn and its Belt and Road Initiative aims to channel financial aid, infrastructure projects, and investment among the G77 nations o 

This is Part I of a two-part series.  

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

One of the factors behind the 2008 financial crisis was the liberalization of mortgage lending. Banks would give out mortgages to people who should not have qualified for a mortgage out of greed. They wanted more and more people locked into repaying them loans for the rest of their lives! But the banks’ greed came back to bite them in 2008 when so many people couldn’t pay back their mortgages that many banks and insurance firms went bankrupt, causing a global financial crisis.

Nepal was striding toward good governance with the reinstatement of democracy in 1990. But the Maoist insurgency that began at that time took a toll on that stride. These days, greed, a strong desire for more wealth and power and its evil twin envy—the desire for what other people have in the society—seems to be gripping the Nepali society, especially those at the upper echelons. 

A slide into survival culture

Nepal’s ‘rich culture’ is converting into a ‘survival culture’. 

Rich culture is the source of national pride that contributes to the diversity and identity of a community and plays a significant role in shaping its values, social norms, and history, fostering intercultural understanding, and enhancing global diversity. It encompasses various traditions, customs, arts, and practices aspects like language, art, music, dance, literature, cuisine, clothing, and religious beliefs that have been developed and passed down through generations within a society and often celebrated through festivals, rituals, and other cultural events.

Whereas survival culture refers to the knowledge, skills and practices necessary for individuals or communities to endure challenging or threatening situations. It is often associated with indigenous or marginalized groups, who have adapted to harsh cultural and less opportunistic upbringings. Survival culture includes maintaining the communities’ own cultures, practices and skills like religious beliefs and traditional practices. It ensures the survival and sustainability of communities in an ongoing unfavorable condition and helps preserve their unique identities and ways of life.

The social foundation of Nepal is ever changing. The country’s ‘rich culture’ is ‘exhausting’ and steering into a ‘survival culture’. The change in behavior patterns to self-centeredness at the cost of losing Nepal’s identity is in the making. 

Rebecca Henschke, BBC’s Asia editor and Korean journalist Kevin Kim in the ‘Heart and Soul’ episode, said Nepal has one of the fastest growing Christian communities in the world with South Korean missionaries like Pang Chang-in and his wife Lee Jeong-hee helping to drive the growth. This is a rare insight into an organized and increasingly controversial Korean mission, spreading the Christian faith with new churches and cultivating the next generation of Nepali Christian leaders in the Himalayas. It is a risky undertaking as those found guilty of converting people face up to five years in jail in Nepal. 

Moreover, Nepal’s culture and traditional practices are giving in. Nepal’s strategic positioning with faith as a factor for political influence cannot be overlooked. The majority Hindu inhabitants, fast growing Christians community and rising Muslim residents are all carving their spaces in the region as never before. This is a very complex problem with no easy solutions. It will add to the fragile national security environment with complexities unless the nation focuses on answers when liberties of the minorities are raised in a decade to come. 

Conclusion

This is also a behavioral approach to national security with direct implications for regional security. National character is led by fear, greed, incompetence, ineffectiveness, inefficiencies and shortsightedness. Secure national character contributes to national security when insecure national character furthers to national insecurity. Simple questions that arise or can be asked about behavior science for national security and nation building are: Was federalism endorsed as a national requirement or a greed-led distribution of power? Was secularism meant to preserve and enhance the cultures, traditions and religious practices and national desire or was it an influenced endorsement for other’s aspirations? 

Other cases in point are the debates in the society and the Parliament of how Nepal is insecure with the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Nepal Compact between the American aid agency MCC and the government of Nepal that is designed to increase the availability of electricity at lower costs as well as the State Partnership Program (SPP) to assist the Nepali Army on fulfilling its responsibilities with humanitarian assistance, improving capabilities contrary to the disinformation that it was part of the Indo-Pacific strategy and a geopolitical tool to contain China. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is another concept that is contested when strategic infrastructure development is a need and assistance with grants is a viable approach.   

The point is national characteristics such as greed and fear in policy-making should be taken as risk and how behavioral approaches to growth alienate and antagonize nation-building. Negative behavioral approach to nation building is bad. So “national character building” must be addressed. Winston Churchill said “Fear is reaction. Courage is a decision”.

There is a tendency to criticize, finger-point and deflect the citizenry with self inventions about the roguish foreign interference, when in reality it is the fallout of fear, greed, incompetence, ineffectiveness, inefficiencies and shortsightedness, which are complex problems with no easy solutions. 

The utmost menace big or small is a perception rather than realism with an insecure frame of mind, with confidence to make up rationality and strategic wisdom to recompense for own contentment, incompetence and absence of self-knowledge. Indeed, more often than not, the biggest threat is one’s own fears and own greed. Threat has also increased almost in parallel with the decline of self-confidence.

Preserving and safeguarding the cultural richness of Nepal requires various measures and efforts. They include, documentation and research, education and awareness, legal protection, community involvement, sustainable reasonable tourism that respect cultural values and finally invest in training programs, workshops, and capacity-building initiatives and community engagement with internationally supported programs.

Greed-led national policies can have profound consequences, impacting various aspects of society, from the economy, social order to governance. It is critical to recognize the risks and potential drawbacks related to giving precedence to individual gains over collective welfare. By promoting ethical governance, striking a balance between self-interest and public welfare, and fostering inclusive policy-making processes, nations can mitigate the negative consequences and inconsistent behavior. 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

When greed and shortsightedness are primaries in scheming economic policies and adopting other policies that have their roots in political instability and political impulses, nations fail, nationals are dissatisfied and the private sector is discontented.

Greed is reflected in policy-making and policy implementation. Sectors like infrastructure development, administration processes and contract administration offer examples. Greed has been the root cause for institutionalization of corruption and bribery. Incompetence, ineffectiveness and inefficiencies are on the rise in Nepal where economic policies derive through political desires to acquire wealth for political parties as well as for individuals. Unwarranted and self-interested longing for wealth and power on the part of powers that be results in poor infrastructure development works that takes a huge toll with development efforts producing sub-standard and unacceptable outcomes. 

Institutionalization of corruption, greed-led policies, programs and contracts is emerging as one of the major ‘threats’ for Nepal’s sovereignty, national identity and stability. 

Scams like the Lalita Niwas land-grab offer an example. Nepal’s Parliament remains susceptible to greed-led policies even as some voices continue to challenge such policies. 

In national policies, the occurrences of greed can have across-the-board outcomes. The aim is to observe the repercussions of greed-led national policies and examine their prospective magnitudes on numerous compasses, including economics, social welfare and governance.

Characterizing good governance

The availability of international aid and loans largely depends on the extent of good governance in a recipient country and efforts toward development. Good governance-documented literatures are as old as human civilization. They lay stress on curbing corruption, hearing the voices of the marginalized/underrepresented peoples in decision-making, addressing the needs of the society and maintaining applicable standards of the finished work. Good governance is accountable, consensus-oriented, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, follows the rule of law, is participatory, responsive and transparent. 

Governance is often led by fear and greed and an insecure personal character. Fear that an individual is not capable enough to be placed in a favorable position where there is more budget. Personal behavior, also known as the greed personality trait (GPT), is personified by the craving to obtain further and the discontent of not ever having adequate, a trait associated with negative emotions/effect characteristics and aggressive conduct. These negative traits are turning into a national character, a setback for policy-making and forming a greed-free society in the long run. 

There is an involvement of several formal and informal actors as well as the civil society in governance. It may be a political cadre, who can influence decision-making in the interest of international donors that come with monetary pledges. Governments at various levels are one of the actors. Other actors can be landlords, heads of various associations, cooperatives, NGOs, INGOs, research institutions, religious structures and leaders, finance institutions, political parties and the military. They all can play important roles in making/shaping policies. Also, organized crime syndicates have influence particularly in government structures at the national level where decisions are arrived at and implemented. Informal decision-making structures like informal advisors, kitchen cabinets, land mafia and powerful families can influence decision-making, which often result in corrupt practices. 

The 21st century global economic crisis or financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the obsession and eventual ferocity of greed. It was an illustration of the type of recurrent greed that is prevalent in the economic system. The Asian Financial Crisis 1997 is another example of political inaccuracy in economic policies that impacted Southeast Asia.

Democracy sold out

Nepal has her own characteristics and own identity that need strengthening through democracy, but the opposite is happening. Greed-led practices to gain wealth for personal well-being are rampant, causing the investment meant for the nation to go waste.  It can be argued that the nature of corruption in democracies and autocracies for reforms are mere facades as there is corruption in infrastructure, tax collection, cross-border trade and government procurements.

This is part I of a two-part-series. 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

Private Royal Guards in the UAE are not the nucleus of the defense forces. There are private companies involved in providing protection and security to the VIPs and important installations in coordination with national defense or the UAE police forces. For example, a specialized and high-tech defense solution company, the International Golden Group, has been supplying human resources to the UAE armed forces, ministry of interior and other defense-security authorities. Nepalis are part of the Royal Guard Abu-Dhabi and Royal Guard Dubai, but their numbers are hard to get. The civil security in the UAE has a troop strength exceeding 100,000, with approximately 1000 employed as armed guards. 

There are many private international and national contracting involved in recruiting armed guards in different parts of the world to lower the costs of war. The personnel needed for long-drawn-out military involvements in troubled nation states like Afghanistan are outsourced to countries whose GDP relies heavily on remittances from labor migration like Nepal. 

Repercussions on stability 

Nepal has a population of around 30m, and it is expected to reach 35.32m by 2050. It is a young country with 20.8 percent of the national population aged 16-25 years and 40.68 percent aged 16-40 years, pointing at a population surplus or a youth bulge.

But the downside is that the unemployment rate for youths aged 15-29 is 19.2 percent compared to 2.7 per cent of the whole population. According to estimates, over 500,000 Nepali youths enter the labor force every year. These figures indicate the quantitative dimension of the employment challenge, something which the state, including political leadership, needs to deal with.

Pensions and salaries are received in large amounts when a nation relies heavily on remittance. There are 125,000 Nepali retirees from the British, Indian and Singapore security forces, who received a total of Rs 61.9bn in pensions in 2021.

Over the years, the government of Nepal, along with the international community, has demonstrated commitment to addressing the root causes of violence and terrorism, focusing on economic development, political inclusivity and social harmony while dealing with armed outfits. 

Initially a rebel group, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged a decade-long (1996-2006) insurgency but transitioned into mainstream democratic politics after a peace agreement with the government. 

Some other outfits include the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) that advocates for the rights of the Madhesi community and the Nepal Defense Army (NDA), a splinter of the Maoists that opposed the peace process and resumed armed activities in the mid-2000s. 

Conclusion 

Historically, Nepalis have become part of the defense forces of other nations through treaties or agreements. Contractors and agents have been part of the warfare mostly visible after the Gulf War. Of late, Nepali youths’ vulnerability to unwanted recruitment and undesired migration has become a matter of serious concern. This situation has arisen due to the lack of relevant domestic policies, lack of political accountability and domestic governance priorities, in the wake of Russia’s offense in Ukraine ignoring the obligations as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5).

Given this context, the government should take immediate action and implement measures to prevent Nepali citizens from joining the armed forces or forces that are not part of treaties and/or bilateral  agreements reached through memorandums of understanding or agreements.

Nepali citizens becoming part of the Russian armed forces is contrary to the spirit of the position that Nepal took at the UN Security Council meeting in March 2022. Such participation goes against Nepal’s foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment. 

Nepali citizens being part of Russian defense forces has four facets in the international geopolitical situation. It leads to the loss of international political trust as well as diplomatic unease and apprehension; contradicts Nepal’s non-aligned foreign policy as well as long-held stance at the UN, gives rise to political unaccountability and increases the risk of terrorist organizations, political parties or non-state actors using trained personnel. 

So, the government of Nepal and the Parliament need to keep a close watch on the activities of the citizens and circumstances surrounding them within the country and abroad. First, the government should revisit the rules and regulations regarding migration by adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 Dec 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217A). Secondly, it should ensure the repatriation of Nepali citizens if they are part of any contradicting treaty or bilateral arrangement, entered particularly through agencies and contractors. Thirdly, for the country to effectively benefit from weapons-trained youths, a number of measures can be taken. 

They include the formulation of a clear transition and reintegration plan for the weapons-trained youths; implementation of a dedicated program for utilizing their skills in service of the country; their mobilization for strengthening intelligence cooperation; amendment in recruitment policies and procedures for assimilation; induction into reserve forces with attractive compensation packages; career progression opportunities and partnerships and collaborations with foreign armed forces where Nepali individuals are serving to exchange knowledge, training methodologies, and best practices. This can contribute to the overall professional development of Nepal’s security forces and help in leveraging the skills of weapons-trained individuals.

Overall, a comprehensive approach is required to address the social, economic, and psychological aspects of the reintegration process to maximize the benefits of weapons-trained Nepali youths for Nepal’s security. Such measures can contribute to a strong and capable security apparatus, ensuring the safety and well-being of the nation and its citizens.

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on August 1 cautioning and asking the Nepali youths not to join mercenaries of any country in violation of existing treaties and agreements. Nepali citizens have been a part of several foreign defense forces since the colonial era. Shifting geostrategic dynamics, global rivalry, rise in global migration and conscription through different methods and routes are a matter of concern. As per media reports, it is estimated that youths have been recruited in the Russian forces and other defense forces and may also be part of non-state actors or armed groups that contradict national priorities and policies. The shift in warfare besides other support also has implications for defense enrollment that comes with lucrative offers. The youth’s desire to join foreign forces emanates mainly from the Nepali state’s failure to provide ample jobs to its growing young population. But what happens to the national security and credibility of a relatively small country like Nepal when its youths choose to become part of a group or another by violating international norms and values in a deeply divided world?

This question calls for serious thinking on the government’s part.   

The presence of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces not only serves as an employment opportunity but also contributes to the economic well-being of Nepal through remittances. Additionally, these individuals gain exposure, training and experience that can benefit Nepal's own security forces and contribute to the nation's overall development.
However, it's worth noting that there have been discussions and debates about the repercussions of large-scale recruitment of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces with the state’s agreement. Some argue that it leads to brain drain, depriving the country of skilled human resources, while others highlight the economic benefits and the opportunity for youths to gain valuable training and career prospects.

The Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) has allowed Nepali citizens to work in 110 countries, but our youths have been working in almost 172 countries. Still, our political elites do not appear ill at ease. Perhaps this does not qualify as an issue requiring serious attention.     

Rising labor out-migration is a grave issue, but more worrisome is the trend of the youths becoming part of foreign defense forces and law enforcement in the absence of necessary bilateral diplomatic arrangements.

Per statistics, around five lakh youths in Nepal seek job opportunities every year and more than 1700 Nepali citizens travel for work every day. The state encourages the youths to go abroad for jobs, laying bare its incompetence. 

As per the national census 2021, approximately 3.5m migrant workers (14 percent of the national population) are working abroad. Of them, 2.2m are aged 25-35 years and 18.72 percent of them are female. International migration, emerging as a means of livelihood for the poor, has also become a source of foreign currency ($8.2bn) revenue, which makes up 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Top five remittance sources are Saudi Arabia (20.6 percent), Malaysia (20.5 percent), India (19.3 percent), Qatar (13.4 percent) and the US (8.3 percent). 

In the last 10 months of the fiscal 2022/23, the DoFE issued work permits to 660,255 Nepali citizens, of which 600,000 have already left the country. 

What’s more, UNESCO data show an increasing number of Nepali students leaving the country to study abroad. The number of foreign-bound students more than doubled from 44,225 in 2017 to 95,268 in 2022. 

A good number of Indian citizens have found jobs in Nepal and so have the Nepalis in India, due to bilateral arrangements, the open border, cultural factors and contemporary reality. Per the World Bank’s Bilateral Remittance Matrix of 2017, while the Nepalis working in India send home around Rs 102bn every year (this includes Rs 72.57bn from 35,000 serving and 180,000 Gurkha veterans), the Indians working in Nepal send home almost triple the amount—Rs 302 bn. For India, Nepal is one of the top 10 sources of remittance. 

The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu estimates that 8m Nepali citizens are living and working in India and puts the number of Indian workers in Nepal at 600,000, whereas independent estimates suggest that 1 to 3m Nepalis are working in India. High mobility of workers across the border, cross-border marriages and a significant Indian population with family linkages in Nepal have made the picture unclear. There’s no denying the fact that migrations affect national stability and security.  

Youths in foreign forces 

The trends of warfare are evolving with technology and modern equipment, including nuclear, but human resources still play a crucial role.

Men aged 17 to 40 years from 140 nations can join the French Foreign Legion to safeguard French interests and secure French domains. Though the government of Nepal has no records nor settled accords, it is estimated that 300-350 Nepalis are serving as French Legionnaires on a singular premise. The US Army reportedly has more than 1000 Nepalis. 

The Tripartite treaty signed in 1947 concerns the rights of the Gurkhas recruited in military services of India and the United Kingdom. More than 4000 Gurkhas are serving the British Crown with a few hundred selected every year and 32,000 Nepali soldiers are serving in 40 Indian Gurkha battalions. Apart from providing jobs to individuals, these forces also help augment Nepal’s foreign currency reserves.

The path of fire

The ‘Agnipath Scheme’ meant to reduce India’s defense expenditure seems to have failed to impress the government of Nepal. The scheme has implications for job opportunities, the economy as well as the rights mentioned in the Tripartite Agreement, given that salary of the serving and pensions of the retired soldiers is an important source of Indian currency for Nepal’s economy, which relies overwhelmingly on imports from India. The scheme will permit only a quarter of the 46,000 soldiers between the age of 17-23 years to continue in service after four years and bid others adieu with a golden handshake of INR 1.7m.

Absence of diplomatic steps prior to the scheme’s announcement has created problems that India and Nepal would have been better off without. Three points should be noted in this context: The new entry scheme was not part of the tripartite agreement; it adds to the unemployment data after four years and that the trained returnees would be vulnerable to non-state actors. 

There are many more Nepalis serving in Singapore, Brunei, UAE and other destinations. 

The Gurkha Contingent or the Singapore Police Force, with roughly 2000 Gurkha personnel, has a role in maintaining law and order. Formed on the basis of a deal between Singapore and the British Government on 9 April 1949, which entrusts the British government with the recruitment, the contingent was mobilized to quell communal riots between the Chinese and Malays of Singapore. After the 9/11 attacks, these soldiers have also been providing security to the President and Prime Minister and guarding vital installations. 

The sultanate of Brunei is another nation that accommodates more than 500 Gurkha in the Brunei Reserve Unit or the Royal Brunei Gurkha Reserve Unit, a special elite guard force previously led by the British Commanders to protect the Royal family, the citizens and major oil installations. Known as the “Praetorian Guard”, it works as a special forces unit directly under the command of the Sultan as well as alongside the Special Forces Regiment and Special Combat Squadron of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. 

This article is Part I of the two-part series 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand