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King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, once stated, ‘Nepal is a yam between two boulders.’ This statement has become an evergreen mantra for understanding and managing Nepal’s foreign affairs. According to him, the ‘two boulders’ are India and China, and Nepal’s strategy has always been the ‘strategy for survival,’ as rightly pointed out by Leo E Rose. In realpolitik, all strategies are inherited within the geography of the country—‘Geography is the mother of strategy’. Secondly, geography stands as the most prime factor in implementing the foreign policy of any state because, in most cases, it is ‘fixed’.

Within Nepal, the sentiment of the people has always been a fear of two dynamics: the fear of foreign intervention and natural disasters/earthquakes. To elaborate further, Nepal shares close ties with India in many aspects, from geography to politics, economy, and culture. People in Nepal often find themselves in a forced position to balance ‘sovereignty and integration’ with India. At the same time, China is no longer an ‘inactive’ force in global politics and has an interest in South Asia. That ‘interest’ is sometimes ‘hard’ too. As a Nepali, the fear of being caught in the ‘radar’ of these giants, including the impact of extra-regional powers like the US, can’t be ignored. Nepal resides in an earthquake-prone area, and the foundation of every development must focus on earthquake resilience. These two ‘fears’ have been haunting Nepal and its people for quite a long time.

Power centers have a ‘natural’ interest in the country located between two giants with a comparatively low level of governance efficiency and societal development, allowing foreign aid  ‘projects’ to flourish, thanks to an unfavorable investment climate that curtails FDI in the country.

Nepal-India development partnership

Since the 1990s, India’s foreign aid to Nepal has been largely guided by the Gujral Doctrine. The doctrine states that, “India does not ask for reciprocity with its neighbors like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Instead, it gives and accommodates what can be given in good faith and trust.” However, as a neighbor, India has not effectively translated these narratives with its smaller neighbors, resulting in tensions from time to time.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power in 2014, he endorsed the Neighborhood First policy, making five trips to Nepal—unprecedented in the past 17 years for any Indian Prime Minister. These visits symbolized strong ties and demonstrated a commitment to collaborating with Nepal based on its development needs. Since May 2014, there have been 17 exchanges at the level of Head of State/Head of Government. Aligned with the ‘Neighborhood First’ policy, Indian Prime Minister Modi has visited Nepal five times, and the Nepali Prime Minister visited India eight times since Jan 2015.

Since 1954, after the establishment of the Indian Aid Mission in Nepal, India has supported Nepal in the development of major infrastructure projects, including the construction of Tribhuvan International Airport, water supply systems and hospitals.

After India’s economic blockade in 2015, India has been actively involved in the development of connectivity with Nepal through construction of Integrated Check Posts and Railways in Nepal. To facilitate the construction of two broad-gauge cross-border railway links—Jayanagar-Bardibas and Jogbani-Biratnagar—financial and technical assistance was provided to Nepal. Furthermore, MOUs were signed to conduct the Final Location Survey for the proposed broad-gauge line between Raxaul and Kathmandu in October 2021. The Draft Detailed Project Report resulting from this Final Location Survey was submitted to Nepal in July 2023 for review and consideration. In FY 2020-21, India provided a grant of $10.93m, a loan of $60m, and $1.38m as Technical Assistance.

India’s shift

The year 2015 marks India’s shift away from engagement in politically sensitive issues with Nepal (in most cases), replacing it with a focus on development agendas. Additionally, India’s grassroots engagement has been facilitated through High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs). In Jan 2024, the cap of each project under HICDPs was increased to Rs 200m. Due to India’s intense engagement in Nepal’s political affairs since 1950, HICDPs have been at the center of debate in Nepal, with concerns about India's alleged intervention at the grassroots level to promote its vested interests.

Challenges

Despite such collaborative efforts, Nepal’s trade deficit with India has been steadily increasing. In 2015-16, Nepal’s trade deficit with India stood at $3,581m, with exports amounting to $419m and imports reaching $4,000m. By 2021-22, Nepal’s exports to India had increased to $1,330m, while imports surged to $9,580m, resulting in a trade deficit of $8,250m. In May 2024/25, Nepal’s trade deficit with India reached $9.63bn. This growing trade deficit is primarily due to Nepal’s heavy reliance on Indian petroleum products, vehicles and consumer goods, while Nepal’s exports, mainly agricultural products, struggle to compete in the Indian market.

In April 2022, both countries released a ‘Joint Vision Statement on Power Sector Cooperation’ to enhance power cooperation. However, within Nepal’s political circles, many Nepalis perceive this vision statement as India’s attempt to control Nepal’s water resources while discouraging investment from other foreign players. This perception has been reinforced by India’s consistent reluctance, both in actions and statements, to purchase electricity generated through Chinese capital or contractors in Nepal.

Way forward

Concluding all of the above, India has been focusing on connectivity issues between Nepal and India after India’s economic blockade in 2015, moving away from hardcore political issues. The increasing connectivity with India will help Nepal unlock new potentials, but due to Nepal’s own internal limitations and turbulence, this has resulted in a deeper economic dependency on India rather than interdependence.

India’s involvement at the grassroots level, aimed at empowering local communities through foreign aid and accounting for 35 percent of FDI stock, undeniably highlights its significance in Nepal. Furthermore, Nepal’s geographical positioning—surrounded by India on three sides—places it in a ‘locked’ relationship with India. The interplay between geographical proximity and distinct national identity has led to numerous fluctuations in their political dynamics since the 1950s.

From Nepal’s side, there is a growing perception that India is accelerating its connectivity development projects in Nepal at a time when Nepal is overwhelmed by multiple development commitments from China. Whether India is responding only after Chinese pledges to Nepal or if this is merely a coincidence remains a matter of debate. However, the narrative in Indian media and public discourse about Nepal shifting toward a pro-China stance is a fabricated attempt to undermine bilateral relations between Nepal and India.

Summing up, Nepal and India should move ahead by taking into account each other’s security sensitivities resulting from the open border.

Public delivery is key for any government to survive in people’s sentiments. If there is no delivery by the government or if it disrespects people’s aspirations, public anger against the government rises. People may be forced to use online or offline sources to express their dissatisfaction. In this hyper-connected world, the internet is a powerful means to amplify public frustration through videos or text on various social media platforms. When public frustration multiplies with the help of the internet and social media, the government typically feels threatened and may attempt to curtail it. Countering opinions expressed on social media by the government is common these days. Even in full-fledged democracies, governments often justify such actions in the name of national security. However, there is a thin line between national security and public expression. That said, in a democratic setup, the right to express and learn from differing opinions is fundamental to democracy.

Concern over Social Media Bill

Considering these powerful features of social media, the Nepal government is planning to table a bill aimed at curtailing rights and freedom of expression online. There are many disagreements regarding the provisions of this bill. A study carried out by the Dignity Initiative (DI), an emerging Dalit Think Tank in Nepal, highlights that some provisions are intended to silence the voices of Dalit, women and marginalized communities. As we know, Dalits in Nepal have historically been excluded, oppressed and have had limited access to mainstream media. Social media platforms have become a powerful tool for expressing opinions, sharing thoughts, voicing dissatisfaction and fostering public discourse against the discriminatory caste system. If such a bill comes into effect, it will likely roll back the progress made in amplifying the voices of these people. 

Several policies and directives already exist to regulate social media, including the Electronic Transactions Act, 2008, the National Penal Code, 2017 (Prohibition on disclosing confidential matters-Section 294, Prohibition of taking and disfiguring photographs of any person without their consent-Section 295, Prohibition of breaching privacy through electronic means-Section 298, Prohibition on committing libel-Section 307), the Copyright Act, the Social Media Management Directive, 2023, a Regulation to Regulate Advertisements, 2020, the National Cyber Security Policy,2023, the Social Media (Usage and Regulation) Bill, 2023, and the Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill, 2024.

According to Santosh Sigdel, who is associated with Digital Rights Nepal, new legal frameworks for regulating social media are currently being discussed by the government. The government has already implemented the “Guidelines for Regulating the Use of Social Media, 2023” and now aims to develop a more comprehensive “Social Media Act.” The Ministry of Communications & Information Technology has called for public responses (allowing just 15 days) to the draft bill introduced in Dec-Jan 2023. By providing only 15 days for public response, the government intended to limit the broader consultative process among concerned stakeholders, thereby avoiding major comments and feedback. 

The proposed bill aims (claim made by the government) to promote the safe, dignified, and orderly use of social media, addressing issues such as cyber-bullying, hate speech and misinformation. The bill seeks to define terms like “social media,” “social media platform,” and “cyber-bullying” and emphasizes the healthy use of social media to enhance social harmony and good governance. Further, the bill includes establishing a Social Media Management Council alongside other bodies like the Department of Information and Broadcasting, the Press Council and Nepal Police to oversee content regulation and address grievances. As we already have several bodies in place, the addition of another council could jeopardize the effective functioning of the organization due to a lack of inter-agency coordination. In Nepal, we are already facing this issue, with the coordination between the federal and provincial government structures being a prime example. Therefore, the government should not only propose additional bodies but also clearly define the concrete duties, responsibilities and powers of these bodies.

However, this proposed bill has faced significant criticism, particularly regarding its real intent and public dissatisfaction over unnecessary restrictions on freedom of expression, communication rights, and the right to privacy. There is also concern that the bill could lead to censorship, excessive executive power and restrictions on online anonymity. The government's aim to impose over-regulation on the internet and social media networks could limit access to the internet. Furthermore, the bill is silent on the protection of users' data and does not mention a statute of limitations, leading to potential legal challenges that could hamper its effective implementation. Ultimately, this proposed social media bill raises vital questions about its impact on fundamental rights and its potential to violate the constitutional principles of Nepal.

Impact on marginalized communities 

When the government attempts to implement repressive policies to limit online freedom of expression, marginalized communities, including Dalits and women, will be among the most affected. Traditional media are controlled by elites and often disregard the voices of marginalized communities. However, with the rise of social media, people from oppressed classes have found a better way to express their concerns without fear. Social media restrictions are also detrimental to companies, as they can reduce customer engagement and harm the revenue base of these companies. This is an era of government facilitation and de-regulation.

Moreover, in line with the rights of marginalized communities to online freedom of expression, it is important to ensure their dignity so that they are not humiliated, discriminated, harassed, or bullied based on their surname, religion or gender. We need content moderation and monitoring on these aspects rather than a blanket approach to content surveillance. The bill should ensure that digital platforms or social media do not become platforms that intensify discrimination against particular caste, ethnic or gender groups. 

The question of inclusivity is paramount in the overall implementation of social media strategies, involving users, government and digital platforms. From a user’s perspective, there is an urgent need for digital literacy to enable marginalized people to safely express, share and learn from the various opinions circulating on the internet. However, limited digital literacy sometimes presents significant challenges; the marginalized communities may become trapped in the vast network of misinformation and disinformation. Despite this, social media remains a powerful tool without gatekeepers, especially for bringing out the voices of marginalized communities. 

Way forward

Any social media regulation or digital media policies should ensure the right to freedom and the right to live with dignity for marginalized communities. Underlining this fact, DI, in its report, has proposed several recommendations for improving the functionality of social media in Nepal for a positive cause. First, by abiding by international best practices, Nepal can align with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework that respects human rights (by focusing on marginalized communities). Secondly, a Principal-Agent Relationship model can be implemented, where the government allocates the power to regulate social media platforms based on clear delegation mandates and control mechanisms. Thirdly, a Public-Private Partnership approach, in which social media platforms develop their guidelines, content moderation standards and other regulatory mechanisms, can lead to better coordination between self-regulation by companies and local regulations. Fourth, there is a need for Transparency and Accountability for social media platforms to provide insight into content moderation practices and decision-making processes. Additionally, a Child-Centric Approach should be adopted, aligning with the UN Best Interests of the Child principle, to ensure protection from harmful content when preparing social media regulations. Furthermore, periodic reviews and modernization of existing legislation should take into account international best practices and technological advancements. Lastly, regional cooperation with neighboring countries and regional organizations is essential for facilitating information sharing and harmonizing regulations for cross-border content issues.

The most potent technical hardware is chip or semiconductor, which has been buzzing around in recent years, particularly after the demand and supply side shock of Covid-19 halted its production. That is, we are approaching a ‘Chip War’ between China and the United States, with Taiwan and South Korea acting as intermediaries. The story is being written in such a manner that whoever rules the global semiconductor or chip manufacturing sector controls the complete technological warfare of the 21st century. Chip is essential in everything from mobile phones to electric cars and satellites to artificial intelligence. China, the world’s largest chip user, also desires to be the top microchip manufacturer. The Chinese government has devised a number of covert and overt tactics to accomplish this goal. The Sino-US competition is increasing not only on land, but also under the sea, with the American Subsea cable firm SubCom LLC granted a $600 million contract to construct a 10,500-mile fiber optic subsea cable linking France to Singapore via Egypt and the Horn of Africa. The main competitor in this deal, HMN Technologies, a Chinese firm, was forced out due to Washington's lobbying. According to a majority of cybersecurity experts, undersea cables are ideal for eavesdropping because they are located beneath the sea in an untamed environment with limited surplus for everyone. In Nepal, cross-border optical fiber lines between Nepal and China will be more likely to face Sino-US rivalries, putting the Nepali government under pressure to evaluate this operation line in the coming days. History has shown that great powers' big games have proxies in weaker countries. Semiconductors or microchip When production and supply of semiconductors or chips were stopped due to demand and supply side shock during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Sino-US technological conflict accelerated to a new level. It further deteriorated when the CHIPS & Science Act, a $52.7bn industrial strategy to support research and revive chip manufacturing in the US, was approved by the Biden Administration in August 2022. The US even moved ahead with restricting the sale of advanced chips to China after August 2022 to prevent it from gaining skills to fuel its AI. Such a slew of restrictions imposed on China by the US were firmly grounded in the belief that China's technological prowess would eventually undermine US national security because the Chinese government might jeopardize crucial data. In 1990, the US used to produce 37 percent of the world’s chips; by 2021, that percentage had dramatically dropped to 12 percent. The rising Asian nations benefited from the participatory globalization that the US once initiated when all of its jobs were exported abroad. Global companies are the drivers of globalization, and tech businesses are becoming the point at which nations clash. As an illustration, consider Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which produces 58.5 percent of the semiconductors in the world. Samsung comes in second with 15.8 percent of the market. Because of this, China and the US have suddenly established a zone of control over Taiwan to gain access to the most important technology in the world. China's chances of winning this chip war decreases as Taiwan advances further toward the US and ties with China deteriorate. In line with this, TSMC had already announced the opening of the company’s second chip plant in Arizona,US with raising its investment from $12bn to $40bn. So, as long as Taiwan moves closer to the US, the intensity of the tech war heats up. Path ahead The Sino-US geo-technological conflict has centered on the technological products created by the two countries over the last few years. During the 2016 US presidential election, potential 'Russian-backed' forces promoted materials on Facebook to the TikTok data security mechanism, where the Chinese app is accused of accessing Americans' data for the Chinese government's covert operations. From the Hi5 era to Facebook and Tiktok, and now to the rise of the Metaverse, the safety and protection of public vital data has taken a blended form of a country's national security and personal liberty spectrum. Rights-based organizations in the Western nations are demonstrating for full data security and privacy against the military industry, which has opposing views on the issue. For the military-industrial complex, any regular critical comments by citizens can be suspicious. For liberal business users, it can be just expressing one’s views. As a result of the mix of suspicious viewpoints and hard edge weapons, conflict is blown up. Sometimes such points of view lack cross-checking and result in catastrophe. The US's Iraq disaster story with nuclear weapons disinformation is a prominent illustration. The US and China both wanted to profit from chip manufacturing while also having access to the data of each other’s nation to devise defense strategy. At the same time, both countries sought to safeguard their public information. For the United States, maintaining its dominance is a critical concern, and China’s effort to undermine it is the new normal. This is the Thucydides Trap, which is completely founded on technological adventurism (previous Thucydides Trap was on territory). Within the United States, there is a schism between corporate interests and national security supporters, which has different views on developing unified policies that have both national security characteristics as well as a business flourishing process with its competitors. Despite the fact that China is the leader in global supplies, disruption with it could harm the US economy. On the basis of harmonious ties itself, the US already has a larger trade imbalance with China ($382.9bn, 2022). Politicians from Nepal to India, and from the United States to the United Kingdom, are experts at inventing an ‘enemy’ and enacting anti-policy. US lawmakers are also under duress to enact harsh anti-China policies. Republicans have been more outspoken in their resistance to China than Democrats. Of course, Biden earlier considered “Competition and Collaboration (2C)” with China, but due to China's growing influence, he was pressed to formulate many policies against China. Although the US economy is resilient, rivalry with China comes at a certain and significant expense. This has caused the entire policymaking and business groups in the United States to rethink whether the country wants to totally disengage with China on entire frontiers, thereby constructing a new global economic ecosystem. Are all of the US' European allies ready for creating a newer global structure countering China? At a moment when Europe is gripped by conflict and Eastern Europe’s bad economic performance, China's footprints are difficult to ignore. Engaging with China and keeping all important information-intensive sectors tightly controlled by the government so that theft of public information is not feasible. That can be an option. In addition, technological conflicts have once again highlighted the importance of ‘protectionism’ over the free market. Are we returning to protectionism at the expense of national security interests, in which the US has spent heavily? Public liberty versus national security is a hotly discussed subject with opposing viewpoints in the contemporary world. At last, there is no one-line answer to the Sino-US technological conflict because conflicts are intended to create superiority over others. One thing is certain: Great powers’ global tech adventurism will have many proxies in vulnerable countries like ours. It is tough to escape.

Four major international crises are pointing at an increasingly volatile world.  First, Sino-US competition is centered on the growth of Chinese domination versus retention of American supremacy. However, this division does not seem much relevant to broader geo-economic interests of China and the US as bilateral trade continues.  As a result of globalization, interdependency has reduced the world to the size of a small village, and any sort of supply chain disruption poses a greater threat to the world economy; which therefore requires a higher level of resilience in the supply chain.  For instance, the Black Sea Grain Corridor is still operating despite Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Millions of Africans in fragile states would face a food catastrophe if it were blocked. The need for a diversified supply chain system has arisen as a result of recent global events, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and potential economic slump in coming days, with the shutdown of the Silicon Valley Bank and the Credit Suisse crisis ringing alarm bells. In absolute Western understanding, the pandemic made us rethink about moving the world's industrial center from China to another location so that the rest of the world won’t suffer.  However, shifting the center of production or diversifying the supply chain has a geopolitical significance. The idea was to relocate the base to India during the Covid-19 pandemic, which worked out nicely in terms of narrating the alleged Chinese involvement in the Covid-19 virus eruption that caused significant damage to the world economy. In the larger picture, China is rising as the greatest fear factor in the US. From think tanks’ documents to the Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy Paper (released on October 22) outrightly describes, China has both the intent and the power to reshape the international order. That fear factor becomes deadly when Sino-Russian eternal friendship goes on without disturbance. However, China and Russia both have divergent objectives in global politics yet converged in countering the US with Russia’s dire need of investment in the Siberian region’s gas plants development and Chinese interest in getting Russian energy uninterrupted. Reading from the Chinese body language, it’s clear that China will continue to be Russia’s friend until and unless her economic interests aren’t hurt globally. Second, China is not only concentrated in Russia for alliance building but also focusing on the Middle East. Despite being applauded by the US, the China-brokered Saudi-Iran deal has its own implications for reshaping Middle Eastern politics away from a purely British-American sphere of influence, given that regional powers like Saudi Arabia are increasingly diversifying their relationships away from the US security umbrella to other dominant powers in Asia—Saudi is handling herself wonderfully.  In an effort to draw in another emerging international power, Riyadh is purchasing American weapons and ammunition and selling her fossil fuel to China—complete strategies to create a win-win situation for them. Saudi Arabia, with its massive profits earned from the ‘production and price control strategy’ of oil during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, knows that this is not sustainable. So, diversifying economic activities from oil to non-oil sectors is necessary and here comes the Saudi-Vision 2030—a complete remake of Saudi in the areas from Tourism to Telecommunications. For this, getting an abundant amount of Chinese investment and tourists is a boon for the Saudis. Riyadh’s growing alignment with Russia-China and the operation of OPEC+ with Russia—the price and production control strategy of oil—is irritating Americans.  When the US was preparing for the midterm election in November 2022, OPEC + countries decided to cut oil production to 2m barrels per day. This was designed completely under Russian interest to put the Biden administration in trouble.  A number of think tanks and politicians in the US have accused Saudi Arabia of supporting fundamentalist groups throughout the Middle East and of having a poor record on human rights and even requested the US government to cut ties with that country. This has frustrated Saudi Arabia, which has opened doors for China.  Before Saudi-Iran resetting of ties, China-Saudi ties were bolstered to pave the road for future partnership. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Iran's support for opposing forces in the Yemen War and the former’s improvement of relations with Israel cast doubt on Israeli efforts to discredit Iran's nuclear program as a serious threat to Israel’s internal security and stability, particularly by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. With hidden inside-outside players, the Middle Eastern political landscape is deeply muddled by the confluence of oil, the petrodollar, and religion. Drawing from the lesson of Western sweat and blood history in managing Middle East politics, China needs to work hard. Third, the interests of Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are progressively converging in Asia; both security theaters are primarily focused on containing Chinese supremacy. IPS primarily carried forward by the United States’ and  QUAD and NATO under the Euro-Atlantic Security vision may be centered on the ‘believed’ flash points of Asia, namely Taiwan Strait, Iran, South China Sea, Nepal and the Korean Peninsula. One of the crucial flash points that circle around India and China is Nepal, where Sino-US rivalry has increased to a greater extent. The delicate geopolitical position of Nepal might provide a safe haven for international political adventurism, but this dark cloud could be troublesome for Nepal itself to manage, given its economic and political fragility. Interestingly, a number of localizing IPS ideas are taking shape amid all this. While Japan's recent declaration to alter its wartime security policy and get ready for new challenges is exciting in itself. This announcement raises concerns for the stability of Asia. In addition, India has adopted a rather unique strategy in the current world politics. Being a Middle Power, it has developed a tendency to fit in any circumstance. Example includes India’s ever-growing relations with Russia and its rival, the US, despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine. India got waived in the US Countering American Adversary Through Sanction Act (CAATSA) despite its continuing trade relations with Russia. This is because India can be a very important partner for the US in South Asia in the context of increasing Sino-US rivalry. Fourth, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought up an urgent need for a new security architecture in Europe, the lesson learning of energy dependence on a single supply, the reaffirmation of energy as a strategic commodity (this is also completely relevant in Nepal’s hydro sector as partners in Nepal are understanding it as simple commodity goods despite India’s repeated stance that this is a strategic matter) and growing unified voice of the global south for multilateralism. The global economic recession ignited by the Covid-19 pandemic added heavily by the Russian invasion of Ukraine resulted in higher inflations. This forced central banks to raise interest rates, which took a toll on economic growth. Above all, economic pundits rely on the fact that relaxation of Covid-19 restrictions and the rise of demand in the Chinese economy could keep the global economy on track. At last, all these four crises are the product of the friction between the West versus Sino-Russia.

In the midst of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in May 2022, Sweden and Finland formally wrote to NATO seeking the defense-security alliance’s membership. Against the backdrop of a precarious situation in Europe resulting from the Russia-Ukraine War, 28 out of 30 NATO member-states welcomed Finland and Sweden with open arms. However, Turkey and Hungary (Hungary's ratification, considered just a formality, is expected shortly) put a stop to Swedish and Finnish attempts to join the bloc by refusing to ratify the latter’s bids. This means NATO's article 5 (one for all—an attack on a member-state is an attack on all member-states) won't be activated (unless Turkey and Hungary ratify the membership bids) even if unforeseen events affect these two nations, posing major dangers to the European security architecture. Turkish objection After Turkish objection to the ratification process, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey worked out a Trilateral Memorandum in June 2022, part of which states: 1. Sweden and Finland shouldn't support groups like YPG, PYD, and FETO 2. Sweden and Finland should lift their arms embargo against Turkey 3. All future exports of weapons to Turkey must comply with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. 4. Terror suspects from Sweden and Finland should be extradited to Turkey in the numbers of 21 and 12, respectively. Turkey claims that none of these people have been extradited despite five years of requests. In accordance with the memorandum's initial terms and conditions, Sweden passed the Terror Offenses Act, allowing the prosecution of anyone associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). A few days after the agreement, Sweden's center-left government restricted the freedom of associations with the PKK. While Turkish President Erdogan praised these actions, Sweden relaxed its ban on the sale of weapons to Turkey in November 2022. Turkey also sought the extradition of top FETO members, but the Swedish Supreme Court rejected the government's plea for the extradition of a Turkish journalist pointing that he would face prosecution at home. The court pointed out that this violation of political nature had broken no Swedish law, so there should be no extradition. The results of a survey showed 79 percent of Swedish respondents agreeing that the government should uphold the legislation even if it means delays in acquiring NATO membership. While main Turkish concerns with Sweden are over the Kurds, Finland said it would wait for redressal of Turkish-Swedish concerns before joining them. Turkey believes that more than 100,000 Kurds residing in Sweden are affiliated with the PKK, which Turkey, the EU, and the US consider to be a terrorist outfit. According to the most recent accord, Sweden has to extradite 130 persons associated with the outfit, though only one has been extradited thus far. Sweden and Finland have also expressed concerns about a Security Zone that Turkey plans to establish in northern Syria. According to the Middle East Council, Turkey views the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), the Syrian affiliate of the PKK based in Turkey, as a terrorist group whereas the US backs the YPG, describing it as the most successful force fighting ISIS on the ground. This has strained bilateral ties. Turkey has been lobbying for an end to American financial and military support for the YPG. The country is also looking to bargain with the US for securing advanced aircraft by raising Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership issues. Turkey’s gameplan Turkey is acting as an intermediary in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, embracing sanctioned Russian oligarchs as tourists and investors as long as their commercial operations comply with international laws. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu endorsed this interpretation. At a time when both Russia and Turkey are trying to survive financially, Turkey is in desperate need for investment, and such a resource is life-saving. Russia and Ukraine both conduct their international navigation through Turkey, which connects the Bosporus Strait to the Sea of Marmara, Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea via the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The Bosporus Strait will be challenging for Russia to cross if Turkey closes it, whose rights have been safeguarded by the Montreux Convention. This allows Turkey to close the strait to all foreign warships if it feels threatened. Second, as the Baltic Sea is the principal route for Saint Petersburg navigation, Finland and Sweden joining NATO will present problems for Russian export-import business. This is because both Sweden and Finland have a sphere of influence in the Baltic sea due to coastal lines. According to expert opinion, Turkey will most likely accept the membership demands after the Turkish elections in May-June 2023. If done earlier, it must answer pointed questions from the opposition political parties in the parliament, which may hamper Erdogan’s electoral performance. Critics say Erdogan is doing it to divert public attention from the country’s economic underperformance. One of the Turkish ambassadors, Sinan Ulgen, has stated that “Erdogan wants to foster his image as someone, who is devoted to advancing Turkey's interest and forceful in international discussions." Turkey is actually employing a dual strategy to secure its interests. On one hand, it is making the West provide advanced fighter planes in acknowledgement of its crucial role in the Syrian conflict. The Turkish leadership has personalized relations with Putin, enabling Russian oligarchs to park their money in Turkey and helping with its development. Turkey thinks accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO is pivotal for all NATO member-states and playing rightly on this could deliver it juice from the fruit. In realpolitik, all parties try every bit to advance their interests. But authorities should think of innocent Finns and Swedish civilians living under the specter of war. Concerns for Nepal Nepal’s strategic autonomy in setting its foreign and defense policies matters a lot because of her two immediate giant neighbors. Nepal has shown chronic symptoms of falling under the radar of both New Delhi and Beijing while setting its priorities, a situation similar to Finlandization (Though a Cold War concept, it is relevant even today). In a positive sense, such a radar effect helps Nepal as a bilateral partner in development and stability whereas in a realistic sense, this might create multiple complexities.  Growing distrust between our northern and southern neighbors in the case of Nepal’s flagship projects is affecting Nepal’s national development. If this continues, every development project in Nepal may suffer from our mismanagement internally and geopolitical complexities externally, like in the case of Pokhara International Airport and Gautam Buddha International Airport (built with the Chinese Exim Bank loan and by the Chinese contractor). In such a scenario, Nepal’s national development can become a matter of bargain for both neighbors. But there’s no one-liner solution to this problem. For resolution of this problem, Nepal’s political leadersehip should opt for continued negotiations with the neighbors.

Puspha Kamal Dahal has secured an overwhelming majority in Nepal's parliament, with 268 votes out of 275 members, which is unprecedented in the country’s history. For the first time in Nepal, there will be no official opposition in the House of Representatives, thanks to the Nepali Congress’ decision to support the ruling coalition in the vote of confidence. This move may have major implications for the integrity of democracy and its practice. In this context, how will the new leadership and fellow parliamentarians be able to address vulnerable economic conditions, foreign policy as well as new innovations in the field of Information Technology such as Machine Learning (ML) under Artificial Intelligence (AI)? This question is pertinent because ML has an important role in Political Science and International Relations (IR). ML in Nepali politics ML may be utilized in Nepali politics to evaluate vast quantities of data and forecast future political events, according to Chat GPT. This might involve examining political trends in Nepal, such as the possibility of political stability or instability, forecasting election results, finding trends in economic statistics, and gauging public opinion on important matters impacting the nation. Sentiment analysis of social media data is one way of applying ML to understand Nepali politics better. This may be used to monitor how public opinion evolves over time or to pinpoint the main concerns influencing public opinion on a certain subject. This can give political parties, candidates, and decision-makers critical information about the problems of the Nepali people and ways to address them properly. ML comes handy also in analyzing voting trends. Voting data may be analyzed using ML algorithms to spot trends, such as which demographic groups are most likely to support a specific candidate or party and what concerns are most significant for these groups. This can offer insightful information for political campaigns and aid in more effective message targeting. Economic challenges   Millions of people are leaving Nepal due to a bleak poor economic scenario resulting from a growing trade deficit brought on by excessive imports, inflation, and increased government spending on oil imports as well as other multidimensional factors affecting the economy. The conditions will degrade further if Nepal slips into the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) gray list making the country unable to issue USD. This will hamper our foreign trade, affecting our borrowing capacity at the international level. While analyzing macroeconomic data, in mid-Dec 2022, Nepal Rastra Bank reported that the year-on-year consumer price inflation was at 7.38 percent, and non-food and service inflation increased to 8.59 percent. Remittance inflows grew 23 percent to Rs 480.5bn during the review period, and the current account recorded a deficit of Rs 37.91bn. The gross foreign exchange reserves grew by 6.3 percent and the overall foreign exchange reserves in US dollars climbed three percent. Economist Bishwash Gauchan states that remittances account for 57 percent of total foreign exchange profits and that there are no urgent government plans to boost or diversify the reserves. He suggests fundamental reforms and the implementation of a medium-to-long-term plan within the next 5-10 years to address these issues. The pills for these ills, per Gauchan, are these: The business sector must put in greater effort in Nepal and the economy should shift away from a credit-centric one, toward investments in the productive sector. Foreign policy challenges The China-led security architecture known as the Global Security Initiative (GSI), a counterweight to NATO, is putting increasing pressure on Nepal to join the initiative. In this context, Nepali President mistakenly took part in the GSI summit. The government has not spelt out its stance on the GSI, though Chinese government websites have made mention of ‘Nepal’s agreement with the concept of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and GSI in terms of her participation and study’. All this points to some serious confusion about the Chinese initiative. Secondly, Chinese economic assistance is explicitly on loan basis (more than two percent), which is higher in terms of cost compared to western multilateral institutions. Recently, the Chinese side announced that the Pokhara International Airport is the flagship project of BRI, leaving Nepal government authorities puzzled as the airport was never part of the BRI. Thirdly, due to Nepal’s increment toward Debt to GDP (around 41 percent), the government is under pressure to reduce its debt by lobbying for concessional loans with the Chinese side. The rise of India with her mounting intimacy with the US, the EU and Japan on a number of fronts, including trade, technology, and military means Nepal may come under pressure to join the group because of India’s comparative advantage over Nepal. Joining the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) on non-strategic/non-military areas such as climate change, food security, trade and tech startups/unicorn may be an awesome idea as it may help to bolster Nepal’s development initiatives. Path ahead It is difficult to expect long-term policy changes and their implementation for development of Nepal, given the country's hyper-volatile political environment and unpredictable personalities, who come and go from positions as Prime Ministers or Ministers without having any prior education or experience in the relevant ministries. The hunger for power has now replaced all other political principles, leaving the nation in a precarious position amid geopolitical and technological growth (such as ML) in a world where Nepali leaders are uninformed. How will our new generation of lawmakers react to issues such as Cold War Season 2 (involving the US and China), which will seek to use Nepal as a proxy, AI & ML, Sino-Indian rivalry, and the world economic downturn. Here, some discussion related to ML in our newly formed parliament is appreciated, to begin with. Overall, ML has the potential to transform the area of Nepali politics by giving academics and political figures new resources for data analysis and scenario planning. ML may assist political players in better understanding the complex political and social phenomena and making more precise forecasts about upcoming political events, thanks to the availability of growing quantities of accessible data. Social media also played a key role in the election of personalities like Rabi Lamichhane and Gyanendra Shahi as lawmakers. The two lawmakers offer an example of how social media helps shape public opinion. At last, it is crucial for our foreign policy mandarins to successfully negotiate intricate connections we have with China, India, and the United States in light of the present political climate on the international stage. A continuous struggle between the US-led and Chinese-led development initiatives highlights the need for a sophisticated strategy in our interactions with the two powerful nations. Additionally, Nepal's geographic location presents a considerable barrier to commerce, since the population along its northern border with China (3.5m) is far lower than that along its southern border with India (UP and Bihar), which is home to more than 360m people. Because of this, it is crucial for those in leadership positions to be able to negotiate these difficult economic and foreign policy realities, provide a picture and implement it all within a span of 10-15 years. Let us hope for the best. The author is a PhD student of International Relations & Diplomacy at Tribhuvan University