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A couple of weeks ago, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) released Nepal’s election observation report 2017. The report drew the attention of the government and onlookers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong press statement condemning it, urging the authors of the report to withdraw some controversial recommendations which ‘violated the mandate of the election obser­vation mission’. The report brought to surface—once again—the undercurrents of regional and ethnic polarization in Nepal. Many Madhesi and Janajati political parties and activists sup­ported it, while the rest of the coun­try launched into a tirade against the EU EOM, going so far on social media as to say the EU should be kicked out of Nepal for good. According to the government and the opposition, the EOM not only misinterpreted Nepal’s PR (Proportional Represen­tation) system as a ‘quota’ system, but dived into ‘unauthorized’ terri­tory in their suggestions. However, despite some poor choice of words and issue focus (possibly guided by misinformed political advisers or analysts), the report was in fact rich in content. But that content was overshadowed by the towering bold fonts and strong language used to highlight a couple of recommenda­tions. The need to reform Nepal’s electoral practices and systems was thus put on the back burner.

The EOM report’s reverberations are in some ways reminiscent of a time not long ago, the last time KP Oli was the prime minister: the 2015 Indian blockade. Here we find the same nationalist fer­vor that engulfed not just the political class, but the majority of people who played sheepishly to the tune. That is not to say that the EOM report is not worth criticizing or that its intentions are apolitical—there clearly was some political intent. However, in retrospect, what it has done is fuel the populism of the government.

If the statement from the foreign ministry focused on the ‘mal-in­tent’ of the EU EOM report, the prime minister’s statements which came a couple of days later went so far as to lump all donors into one pool and even suggested the report was payback for Nepal having sent back some ‘religious conversion’ missions a while ago. No one both­ered to check that the report clearly states that the EOM is an entity entirely independent of the EU, let alone of other donors working in Nepal. It clearly states that all opin­ions in the report are of the authors and do not represent those of any EU countries and diplomatic mis­sions in Nepal or outside.

As such, it was pitiful to have to watch one interview and statement after another talk about the EU as a grave enemy to Nepal as though its offices should be shut down and its diplomats sent home immediately.

Having said that, it is important to be vigilant about the kinds of activities that donors, including the EU, promote in Nepal. On the burning issue of the ‘Khas-Arya’, the suggestion that this group should be removed from the PR system stems from an understanding that the group is an ‘elite social group by birth’. That is 31 percent of the population and the EU should know better than to make such controver­sial statements, especially with this particular government in place and the wide public support it enjoys. It should have been clear to the EU a controversy was in the making when it drafted those recommendations.

All these controversies are only working to make this prime minister stronger. The nationalist wave that was created during the Indian block­ade is boosted by factors like the EOM’s report and KP Oli continues to ride that wave and the populist sentiment behind it. In the eyes of the PM, the opposition is weak, and the civil society is discredited, disorganized and politicized. The media is focused on other things. If the international community and the donors can be discredited, in Oli’s eyes, that’s one more threat he has subdued. Using populist and nationalist rhetoric to discredit the international community could give Oli even more of a free hand than he already has.

The process of forming a new govern­ment is almost complete. Prime Minis­ter KP Sharma Oli has come across as someone very thoughtful about selecting his ministers. Newly-appointed ministers like Pradeep Gyawali, Yubaraj Khatiwada, Rabin­dra Adhikari, Lalbabu Pandit and Gokarna Bista are promising entrants to the cabinet. There are many reasons to be hopeful, albeit cautiously, about this government. But we citizens must not forget that it is also our responsibility to ensure that the government keeps moving in the right direction.Reasons for hope

A stable and all-powerful government has been the dream of the last three generations of Nepalis. Now we are as close to that dream as we have ever been. The likely participation of Madhes-based political parties in the Oli government has further fortified the dream of stability. With three quarters of the parliament in support of Oli, he has become the most powerful prime minister in Nepal’s democratic history. This provides Oli and his government an unprecedented opportunity to deliver on past promises.

In many ways, we can say this government is more powerful than the constitution. It can rectify constitutional weaknesses and work towards safeguarding and institutionalizing the statute. While this government has the ability to revise the constitution, this is not necessarily a cause for alarm, just a matter requiring greater vigilance. Rather than dis­mantling the constitution, it could well be the case that this government will work to imple­ment and strengthen it. For the time being, we have to give this government the benefit of the doubt.

Reminder to the left

Nepal’s left alliance has secured the political authority that it could never have achieved violently. The political capital, which was impossible to garner during the decade-long Maoist conflict and the two CA terms, has the potential to be finally unleashed through the alliance of the UML and CPN MC formed in the run up to the general and provincial elections last year. In a sense, it feels like the coun­try wasted many years. If after a decade of violent war and another decade of transition, the Maoists were going to merge with the UML, it makes sense to question the very purpose of the past two decades. But perhaps such a painful process was necessary to get to where we are today. And now both the UML and the Maoists have an opportunity to deliver on their decades-long dreams of prosperity and equity.

Price of impunity

Impunity is becoming institutionalized in Nepal in large part due to the concessions that were made in the name of the transition. The justice system is biased, selective and politically influenced, and little has been done to curb the rot. After the peace process started, the cases of impunity during the pre- and post-conflict eras were also completely sidelined in the fear that addressing them may derail the process. There was a strong argument that raising the issue of impunity will cost the peace process high. Because of the fear of fresh conflict, civil society groups and the international community maintained studied silence on the topic of impunity. In a way, the earlier governments bought peace with impunity. With the official end of the ‘transition’, it is now time for Nepal to get back on the path of due process and the rule of law.

While the benefit of the doubt must be given to this government, there is still the danger that it may push the argument of development in exchange for continued and perhaps great­er impunity than before. This is the greatest challenge facing us now. The Nepali people’s desperation for ‘development’ is at its peak and so the challenge lies in not allowing the development discourse to subvert due pro­cess. And this is why a strong, vibrant, regen­erated and largely new civil space is necessary and must be created.

With the end of the Maoist insurgency and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, most civil society leaders probably thought their job was done. What was then considered a near-im­possible task had been completed, and Nepal became a federal republic. Political order was restored and peace, by and large, prevailed. With the announcement of the first constit­uent assembly elections, some civil society activists even joined active politics while oth­ers chose to retire, in line with the idea that civil society’s major role had ended. The major responsibility of institutionalizing the political gains of Jana Andolan II (People’s Movement of 2006) was left to the political parties and their leaders.

Furthermore, because of the mingling of prominent civil society activists with political parties in the lead up to Jana Andolan II and thereafter, civil society leaders slowly began to lose their credibility. A fissure among the prominent names laid the foundation of what was to come: a fractured, fragmented and highly polarized civil society space with little credibility.

Erosion of respect

In the past three decades, the same network of civil society that worked closely in the 1990s and leading up to 2006 on larger issues of national interest slowly crumbled with no concerted effort to pick up the pieces or recon­cile. Instead, leaders began to see the political change and ‘transition’ as opportunities to pursue personal interests.

As a result, in the public eye, civil society was no longer meaningful and was mired in competing interests. Respect was lost with the loss of neutrality. People started viewing civil society leaders as representatives of petty interests. Civil society was divided along the lines of geography, race, ethnicity, gender, political parties, donors and what not. And when respect is lost, so is the capacity to mobi­lize the masses in times of need.

Greater vigilance

From 2006 to 2018, the political parties failed to meet basic public expectations. In the absence of a vibrant civil society, the political parties’ performance went unchecked. They acted recklessly. They institutionalized the politics of spoils-sharing (bhagbandako rajn­iti). Corruption was rampant and impunity received political license. On such vital issues, civil society remained largely ineffective.

Although 2006 was a major turning point for the country in terms of political gains, it was the beginning of a political process that needed the vigilance of a vocal and active civil society. It took 12 years to push through a con­stitution and hold a set of elections, a process that went largely unchecked and in which the erosion of the state was palpable. Nonetheless, that is water under the bridge and the year 2018 has heralded yet another milestone in Nepali politics. This time, civil society must rise up to the challenges that the forthcoming years will bring.

Left domination

There is a left majority in all three tiers of government and the ruling coalition seems poised to garner a two-thirds majority in the federal parliament. There is also a leftist inclination in the Supreme Court (which will be more pronounced once the current CJ leaves). And historically, the majority of civil society leaders and NGOs have leaned left. The president, the vice president and the attorney general also lean that way.

This means all the major state organs and non-state actors are currently dominated by the left. While this could well be a sign of bet­ter days to come in the form of development and prosperity, the situation also calls for an unprecedented role of civil society leaders to demand accountability and integrity from all state institutions.

The civil society space needs to grow and efforts to shrink it must be fought, regardless of one’s political inclinations. In the past decade, the media in many ways played the role of civil society: it continuously exposed cases of corruption, impunity and political misdeeds, but there was no strong civil society movement to act upon them.

And it isn’t easy for the media either. The ongoing “contempt of court” case against Kantipur publication is an example of how the judiciary may be used in the coming days to silence the media. At which point, the responsibility falls on all of our shoulders to speak up in favor of what is just. No majority government or political stability can deliver growth without accountability. That is where our civil society must focus.

Finally, we have found an old new prime minister in the form of KP Sharma Oli, who has risen to pow­er on a platform of delivering stability and prosperity. Oli is arguably the most admired living politician in Nepal right now, thanks to his nationalist rhetoric the last time he was prime minister in 2015-16, and more recently with the formation of the Left Alliance and its promise of stability and development. The last time Oli was prime minister, the country was reeling from the devas­tation wrought by the earthquake and strangled by the Indian blockade. Oli took a strong stand against the blockade, for which his party, the CPN-UML, has been rewarded with a solid majority across the three tiers of gov­ernment—local, provincial and central.

As such, the public has great expecta­tions from Oli. He has repeatedly made big promises to transform the country. Now he has been given a chance.

So the question is whether Oli will be able to keep any of his big promises. Whether it be bringing Chinese railway or developing hydropower or increasing ordinary Nepalis’ per capita income, Oli will need to find some ways if he intends to maintain his popularity.

But if we look at his record, Oli has not delivered much. Although he stoked nationalist sentiments, he could not go beyond rhetoric. He signed some bilat­eral deals with China during his tenure as prime minister, which was the back­bone of his ‘development’ agenda on the campaign trail. But infrastructure deals are not new for Nepal-China relations; it is their implementation that is novel.

The rise of Oli in Nepali politics is quite mysterious. What we do know for certain is his ties with various goons and mafia figures and his assertive words and body language. In recent years, Oli grew to be the most powerful man in UML.Under Oli’s protection, a new group of oligarchs has emerged in Nepal. These people do not hold formal government positions; they are in the private sector, but control much of what is going on in the public sector. These oligarchs care little about who is in the government, but work to ensure that major political actors across the spectrum have been won over.

Oli was one of the strongest support­ers of this group of criminal business­men, and now that their power is no longer under the control of the political class, Oli will have to negotiate with them at every step while he leads the government. How Oli will manage to deliver on his development dreams in the face of powerful resistance by the goons he once groomed and sheltered will be interesting to watch.

In essence, Oli projects two images of himself—the protector of oligarchs and the messiah of development. For instance, one day he speaks publicly in favor of the likes of Ajaya Sumargi, a nouveau riche oligarch who, it is sus­pected, became an overnight billionaire with the blessings of the Maoists and plenty of money laundering. The next day, Oli is back to feeding the masses the promise of increased income and high speed transit.

Interestingly, in Sumargi’s case, even the Supreme Court seemed to side with Oli and allowed the scandalous man to access funds frozen by the central bank. The popular understanding is that with the shift in power, Sumargi’s loyalties have also shifted to Oli.

Likewise, a recent picture of Oli and Prachanda having lunch with the owner of the proposed B and C Medical Col­lege went viral on social media. Nepal’s political future is being mediated by such middlemen. And as long as these middlemen meddle in our statecraft, the promise of development will likely remain just a promise.

As for Oli, two conflicting images of one man cannot coexist forever. He will have to choose one and reveal that choice based on the decisions he makes in the coming weeks. KP Oli’s public trial begins now.

Despite so much skepticism and uncertainty, in 2017, what was almost-impossible suddenly became the rather easily possible. Nepal successfully held three tiers of elections: local, provincial and federal—a feat most Nepalis and anyone else who cared to watch were perplexed by. In a real sense, successfully conducting three elections in a year would have been a giant pat-on-your-back accomplishment for even the most developed of democ­racies. For this reason, in the eyes of history, 2017 will go down in the books as one that opened up a chapter that no one was confident was even written until we turned the page to find it was.

Perhaps what drove these elections more than anything else was an elu­sive promise of stability. The past two decades were defined by the contrary ‘political instability’, a buzzword inter­nalized by most, often as an excuse for larger state incapacity, incompe­tency, rampant corruption and poor governance. Political instability was unanimously blamed for everything by everyone. As such the dream of a state of ‘political stability’ was one that, in our collective psyche, we considered a precondition to overcome all social, economic and political evils.

The announcement of the Left Alli­ance in the run up to elections, in tan­dem with their message of stability and prosperity, really thrust the public into a mindset that saw for the first time in a good long while, a glimmer of hope. You have two major political forces, i.e. the UML and Maoist Center, put aside their differences to ‘unite in favor of stability and prosperity’. Nothing could sound better for the ravaged and beat Nepali psyche. It seemed that all at once, Nepali politics had changed in an unprecedent­ed way and wiggled in a tiny space for positive governance.

However, there are no clear signs that things are indeed changing. In fact, the forecast shows more of the same. For example, the Nepali Congress and its democratic alliance, who badly lost the elections, are still running the gov­ernment. Instead of making way, step­ping back and going through a process of introspection, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba is happily steadfast in passing one populist (under-researched and unbudgeted) decision after the next. Albeit a caretaker government, Deuba has so far done little to bring his reign to a close and continues to act as though he has just walked into office with a fresh and popular mandate.

Meanwhile, the victors in this elec­tion are spending the majority of their time squabbling over power sharing compromises instead of focusing on a real plan to deliver on their promised ‘prosperity’. So far, no concrete plans or agendas have been set on how ‘devel­opment’ would be achieved, how these promised railways and industries will be built and sustained and how the income of average Nepalis will be three-fold over 10 years, as promised in the election manifesto. The reality is so dire that two months after already having won on the promise of stability and pros­perity, the leaders are now discussing drafting ‘plans for development’. One can only guess that most of us will have entered old age by the time the discus­sions are finalized, the plans drafted and approved and finally implemented!

Deep down there is an understanding that the promise of stability was just a coy to coax the public to relent in favor of the Left Alliance and that Leftist merg­ers are most often simple temporary opportunistic endeavors. As for the promise of prosperity, a cursory look at the UML and Maoist Center ‘plans’ or lack thereof speak volumes about the superficial and illusive nature of the idea of prosperity. Yet, the promise of both stability and prosperity will undoubted­ly be best tested in the months to come, after which that tiny glimmer of hope which was seen through the year of elections will likely be little more than a memory.

Despite so much skepticism and uncertainty, in 2017, what was almost-impossible suddenly became the rather easily possible. Nepal successfully held three tiers of elections: local, provincial and federal—a feat most Nepalis and anyone else who cared to watch were perplexed by. In a real sense, successfully conducting three elections in a year would have been a giant pat-on-your-back accomplishment for even the most developed of democ­racies. For this reason, in the eyes of history, 2017 will go down in the books as one that opened up a chapter that no one was confident was even written until we turned the page to find it was.

Perhaps what drove these elections more than anything else was an elu­sive promise of stability. The past two decades were defined by the contrary ‘political instability’, a buzzword inter­nalized by most, often as an excuse for larger state incapacity, incompe­tency, rampant corruption and poor governance. Political instability was unanimously blamed for everything by everyone. As such the dream of a state of ‘political stability’ was one that, in our collective psyche, we considered a precondition to overcome all social, economic and political evils.

The announcement of the Left Alli­ance in the run up to elections, in tan­dem with their message of stability and prosperity, really thrust the public into a mindset that saw for the first time in a good long while, a glimmer of hope. You have two major political forces, i.e. the UML and Maoist Center, put aside their differences to ‘unite in favor of stability and prosperity’. Nothing could sound better for the ravaged and beat Nepali psyche. It seemed that all at once, Nepali politics had changed in an unprecedent­ed way and wiggled in a tiny space for positive governance.

However, there are no clear signs that things are indeed changing. In fact, the forecast shows more of the same. For example, the Nepali Congress and its democratic alliance, who badly lost the elections, are still running the gov­ernment. Instead of making way, step­ping back and going through a process of introspection, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba is happily steadfast in passing one populist (under-researched and unbudgeted) decision after the next. Albeit a caretaker government, Deuba has so far done little to bring his reign to a close and continues to act as though he has just walked into office with a fresh and popular mandate.

Meanwhile, the victors in this elec­tion are spending the majority of their time squabbling over power sharing compromises instead of focusing on a real plan to deliver on their promised ‘prosperity’. So far, no concrete plans or agendas have been set on how ‘devel­opment’ would be achieved, how these promised railways and industries will be built and sustained and how the income of average Nepalis will be three-fold over 10 years, as promised in the election manifesto. The reality is so dire that two months after already having won on the promise of stability and pros­perity, the leaders are now discussing drafting ‘plans for development’. One can only guess that most of us will have entered old age by the time the discus­sions are finalized, the plans drafted and approved and finally implemented!

Deep down there is an understanding that the promise of stability was just a coy to coax the public to relent in favor of the Left Alliance and that Leftist merg­ers are most often simple temporary opportunistic endeavors. As for the promise of prosperity, a cursory look at the UML and Maoist Center ‘plans’ or lack thereof speak volumes about the superficial and illusive nature of the idea of prosperity. Yet, the promise of both stability and prosperity will undoubted­ly be best tested in the months to come, after which that tiny glimmer of hope which was seen through the year of elections will likely be little more than a memory.