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Contrary to claims that the Gauri Bahadur Karki-led probe commission report ignored the second day of the GenZ movement, the 898-page document provides a forensic account of a state in collapse, a security vacuum that invited chaos, and a ‘criminal hijacking’ of a peaceful protest that has now led to criminal charges against the highest levels of the former government.

The Karki Commission report draws a clear distinction between the ‘peaceful’ protests of Sept 8 and the ‘criminal’ activities of Sept 9. 

The Karki Commission draws a sharp, definitive line between the two days of the uprising. Sept 8 was characterized as a ‘reform-oriented and anti-corruption’ movement that was largely peaceful until it reached the gates of Federal Parliament. However, the report characterizes Sept 9 as a day when the movement was ‘hijacked’ by what it calls ‘criminal elements’.

According to the report, the crowd on Sept 9 was no longer just the frustrated GenZ youths who had mobilized over a social media ban and systemic corruption. Instead, the riots were joined by street vendors, garage workers, transport drivers, construction workers, and even individuals who had just escaped from police custody or prisons. This shift transformed a political protest into a nationwide spree of arson, looting, and targeted destruction.

The report provides a chilling inventory of the damage inflicted on Sept 9. The violence was not random; it followed a tactical pattern across 18 districts, from east to west.

In Kathmandu Valley, ‘criminal elements’ targeted the very heart of the Nepali state. Beyond the Federal Parliament, mobs attacked Singha Durbar and its various ministries, Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General, Sheetal Niwas (President’s Residence), Official Residence of Prime Minister in Baluwatar, and the Minister’s Quarter in Bhaisepati.

The commission’s field visits revealed a calculated method of operation. In almost every instance, attackers first destroyed CCTV cameras and government Data Centres to erase evidence before proceeding with the destruction. They emptied water tanks to ensure fire-fighting efforts would fail, then used ‘Molotov Cocktails’ and other highly flammable chemicals to torch buildings.

Private property was not spared. The report details the looting and burning of star hotels (including the Hilton and Hyatt), political party offices, shopping malls (notably Bhatbhateni stores), and the private residences of politicians and civil servants. In some instances, the looting was so frenzied that individuals were trapped inside burning buildings and died while attempting to steal goods.

Perhaps the most damning section of the report is the analysis of the ‘security vacuum’ that emerged on Sept 9. By 10:00 am that day, police presence across the country had essentially vanished from the streets, withdrawing into their stations.

The commission found that top police leadership had issued orders to use ‘minimum force’ and, if the situation worsened, for personnel to strategically withdraw to save their own lives and protect their weapons. While this may have limited casualties, it created a psychological victory for the mobs. “The crowd felt that they had won, that they could do anything, and that no one was coming to stop them,” the report notes.

This vacuum led to the collapse of police infrastructure. In the Kathmandu Valley alone, 39 police units, including circles, divisions, and posts, were looted, burned, or vandalised. Large quantities of state weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment were seized by ‘non-state actors’. The report highlights the brutal murder of three police officers, two at the Maharajgunj Circle and one at the Koteshwor Division, who were beaten to death by the mob.

The commission specifically critiques the lack of a ‘unified command’. While the Nepali Army was eventually deployed, it did not happen nationwide until 10:00 pm on Sept 9, long after the nation’s most vital installations had been torched.

The chaos of Sept 9 culminated in what the report calls a ‘grave security challenge’: the mass escape of prisoners. Across the country, mobs attacked jails, overwhelming staff and forcing gates open.

The most high-profile incident occurred at Nakkhu Jail, where protesters demanded the release of Rabi Lamichhane, the chairperson of Rastriya Swatantra Party. The jailer’s statement to the commission describes a scene of intense pressure where, fearing a total massacre, administration officials eventually allowed the crowd to take Lamichhane. Lamichhane himself claimed he was ‘pushed out’ by the crowd against his will.

The scale of the escape was staggering. A total of 12,440 prisoners and detainees fled their cells on Sept 9. As of March 30, the government has managed to return 8,225 to custody, but 4,215 remain at large, continuing to pose a significant threat to public safety. 

Contrary to claims that the state has halted its pursuit of the Sept 9 rioters, data from Police Headquarters reveals an extensive and ongoing nationwide crackdown. To date, law enforcement has taken 951 individuals into custody and registered 801 cases, of which 690 have already been resolved. The judicial system remains actively engaged in these proceedings, with 210 individuals currently held in jail pending trial.

Kathmandu Valley has emerged as the primary focal point for these legal efforts, accounting for 259 cases and 409 arrests, including those tied to the murder of three police officers. Notably, the police revealed that 48 of the individuals arrested in the capital had prior criminal records for serious offenses such as attempted murder and drug trafficking. This finding lends significant weight to the commission’s theory that the movement was systematically infiltrated by criminal elements rather than being a purely spontaneous protest.

The arrest of former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak on March 28 is the direct result of the commission’s recommendation for criminal investigation into their ‘negligent conduct’. The commission argues that in a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister holds the ultimate responsibility as the ‘guardian’ of the citizens.

The report is particularly scathing regarding Oli’s testimony. It notes that even as gunfire continued for four hours outside Parliament on Sept 8 and riots consumed the city on Sept 9, no effective efforts were made to prevent human loss. The commission termed Oli’s responses during questioning as ‘irresponsible’.

For Lekhak, the commission recommended action for negligence that led to the loss of life. While Lekhak argued that he provided ‘policy guidance’ and that the protests were ‘infiltrated’, the commission concluded that the failure to coordinate a unified response and the subsequent ‘security vacuum’ constituted a criminal lapse in duty.

The report also identifies the government’s own actions as the primary catalyst for the explosion of anger. The ban on 26 social media platforms was the ‘triggering factor’ that drove the youth onto the streets. 

However, the commission also criticizes the government for its handling of the ban’s lifting on Sept 9. It argues the government lifted the restrictions without studying how misinformation and ‘negativity’ would spread. This allowed false reports—such as the claim that 32 bodies of protesters were hidden inside the Parliament building—to go viral, further inciting the mobs to attack government structures.

The commission identifies a critical turning point on Sept 8 when a peaceful protest transitioned into a violent siege. According to the report, at approximately 12:00 pm, a group of about 100 motorcyclists arrived from various corridors, including Chabahil and Gaushala. Many members of this group were wearing black T-shirts with ‘TOB’ written on them.

These individuals—believed to be the members of the gang that goes by Tibetan Original Blood— acted as provocateurs, revving their motorcycle engines to create loud noise and aggressively inciting the crowd. Following their arrival, the protesters became significantly more violent, attacking police lines with water bottles, stones, rods, bricks, and slingshots in a concerted effort to breach the Federal Parliament.

For the TOB group and other individuals involved in vandalism, arson, and looting, the commission has made several specific recommendations aimed at ensuring systematic prosecution.

To address the widespread destruction of state and private property on Sept 9, the commission has outlined a series of rigorous recommendations targeting general vandals and criminal elements. Central to this strategy is the formation of a high-level Special Investigation Team under the Ministry of Home Affairs, composed of forensic and technical experts. This team should be tasked with utilizing primary evidence already collected, specifically Base Transceiver Station (BTS) data from Nepal Telecom and NCell, to identify telephone numbers present at vital riot sites like Singha Durbar and the Supreme Court. 

Meanwhile, the government of Balen Shah, in its first cabinet decision, has said that it would form a probe committee regarding Sept 9.

To ensure accuracy, the report directs investigators to cross-verify this digital data with CCTV footage, social media videos, and victim-provided clips to confirm the identities of those involved in arson and looting.

Furthermore, the commission emphasizes the need for specialized focus on the systematic tactics used by rioters, such as the strategic destruction of Data Centers and CCTV cameras intended to erase evidence. 

The report recommends severe criminal prosecution for individuals who utilized Molotov cocktails or targeted sensitive government documents. Accountability also extends to the security breach, with a specific probe recommended to identify both the ‘non-state actors’ and negligent police involved in the theft of state weaponry.

Despite its nearly 900-page length and extensive evidence, the Karki Commission report explicitly acknowledges several critical areas where it lacks data or definitive findings. 

The most significant admission in the report is that the commission failed to collect enough solid evidence to recommend formal prosecution for most individuals involved in the Sept 9 violence. The commission cited its ‘short mandate’ and a severe ‘lack of time and human resource’ as reasons it could not conduct a detailed investigation into every incident nationwide. Instead of identifying all perpetrators, it recommends that the government form a special investigation team to finish the work.

The commission reports a lack of cooperation regarding security data. Specifically, it states that police and the Armed Police Force (APF) did not provide detailed logs regarding which officers used what ammunition or the specific circumstances under which weapons were looted. The report notes that despite repeated requests, these agencies provided ‘reports citing arson’ rather than the forensic details required to determine if ammunition was used responsibly or negligently.

The report highlights a gap regarding the movement’s origins. While the commission mentioned suspicions that foreign funding may have been directed to certain NGOs to fuel the unrest, it explicitly states that it found no ‘concrete evidence’ or ‘solid proof’ to support these claims. It notes that while the geographic location of Nepal makes such influence a ‘natural suspicion’, the state’s regulatory mechanisms currently lack the transparency to confirm these financial trails.

In a damning critique of the state’s internal systems, the commission reveals that it did not receive a single intelligence report from any government or non-governmental agency to assist in its investigation. This left the commission to rely almost entirely on testimonies and raw BTS (cell tower) data, which only proves physical presence at a scene rather than specific criminal actions.

The first session of the House of Representatives following the March 5 elections commenced on Thursday at the Federal Parliament Building in Singhadurbar. The session was summoned by President Ramchandra Paudel on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the Constitution of Nepal. The meeting was presided over by the senior-most member of the House, Arjun Narsingha KC.

Despite the formal opening, the session was immediately disrupted by protests from the CPN-UML. As soon as proceedings began, UML lawmaker Guru Baral rose to obstruct the House, prompting the Speaker to grant him time to speak. The opposition expressed strong objections to the recent arrests of CPN-UML Chairperson and former prime minister KP Sharma Oli, as well as Nepali Congress leader and former home minister Ramesh Lekhak.

Baral alleged that both leaders had been detained by misusing Sections 181 and 182 of the Civil Code, calling it a matter of “grave concern.” He claimed that protests were taking place nationwide and accused the government of suppressing them, demanding their immediate release.

In a powerful address to the first session, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chairperson Rabi Lamichhane asserted that his party carries a historic mandate to transform the country’s administrative core, Singhadurbar, rather than simply occupying it. Lamichhane emphasized that the RSP has already begun the process of reform and pledged that his party would repay the voters’ trust through responsible governance.

He issued a rare challenge to the opposition, inviting them to maintain a strict, 24-hour watch over his party’s actions to ensure total accountability. He reminded his fellow lawmakers that while their physical seats in Parliament have changed, their moral obligation to answer the public’s questions remains the same. He warned that failing this “massive mandate” would leave them permanently stigmatized by history. 

Regarding the arrests of Oli and Lekhak, Lamichhane firmly rejected claims of political vendetta. Citing the GenZ protests of September last year, he asserted that the first right to justice belongs to the mothers of martyrs and urged the opposition to respect the rule of law rather than blaming “foreign interference” for their political setbacks.

In a notable moment, Lamichhane issued a public apology from the parliamentary rostrum to the Dalit community for centuries of systemic injustice, describing it as “organized crime.” He pledged that no citizen would face discrimination based on caste under the current leadership and committed to ending political retaliation through the misuse of laws and ordinances.

He also assured a fair parliamentary environment, stating that dissenting voices would not be silenced and that a majority would not be used to harass the opposition. He reiterated his commitment to transparent governance and a foreign policy guided by national interest, while assuring investors of a secure and predictable environment.

Main opposition Nepali Congress lawmaker Bhishma Raj Angdembe extended his best wishes to Prime Minister Balendra Shah for completing a full five-year term, noting that no prime minister in the past 75 years has done so. At the same time, he cautioned against unconstitutional practices.

While expressing support for national progress, Angdembe rejected claims that the past 35 years had yielded no achievements, urging the government to acknowledge past progress while addressing remaining challenges. He also questioned the government’s transparency regarding the GenZ protests, asking whether the investigative commission’s report would be made public.

Raising concerns about the Gauri Bahadur Karki Commission, Angdembe accused it of bias, saying it focused on state suppression on Sept 8 but did not adequately investigate the arson and destruction of key government buildings, including Singhadurbar, on Sept 9. He stressed the need for a comprehensive and impartial investigation into both incidents.

Meanwhile, CPN-UML Parliamentary Party leader Ram Bahadur Thapa delivered a scathing critique of the current political transition, alleging that the GenZ movement on Sept 8 and 9 was an unannounced ‘Color Revolution’ orchestrated by the RSP. While formally congratulating Prime Minister Shah on his historic appointment and the RSP on the success in the March 5 election, Thapa claimed that this ‘magical victory’ was bolstered by decisive internal support from the Nepali Army, the bureaucracy, the Sushila Karki cabinet, the Barbara Foundation, and various NGOs. He further alleged that external ‘invisible powers’ used AI, algorithms, and Goebbels-style propaganda to frame champions of democracy as villains and murderers while elevating those seeking to ‘burn the country’ to the status of heroes.

In a series of pointed questions directed at the state, the UML leader demanded to know the true objectives behind the arson attacks on key state institutions like Singhadurbar, Shital Niwas, Baluwatar, and the Supreme Court, as well as the mysterious appearance of armed groups during the protests. He fiercely condemned the ‘illegal arrest’ of Oli and Lekhak, labeling it a conspiracy to dismantle established political leadership through a ‘cycle of state terror’ and ‘media trial’.

While acknowledging the temporary defeat of the traditional parties, Thapa warned that the CPN-UML would use its full strength in Parliament to demand answers, concluding that this loss is only a temporary setback and that a defeated army always possesses the potential to turn the tide toward victory.

Nepali Communist Party (NCP) Vice-chair and lawmaker Barshaman Pun delivered a reflective speech, admitting that his party failed to capitalize on the historic mandates it received in the past. Drawing a parallel between the current rise of the RSP and the success of the then-CPN (Maoist) in the 2008 elections, Pun acknowledged that the Maoists held a similar level of overwhelming public trust but were unable to utilize it effectively for the country’s benefit. 

He noted that the 2017 electoral alliance and subsequent party unity were also opportunities that the leadership “did not know how to handle” or sustain. Offering a word of caution to the newly dominant RSP, Pun urged them to learn from these past mistakes to ensure that this mandate translates into meaningful progress for the nation, promising that the NCP would provide the necessary cooperation to move the country forward.

Harka Sampang, chair of the Shram Sanskriti Party, launched a poignant critique of the perceived ‘internal discrimination’ within the parliament itself. Responding to earlier remarks by RSP Chair Lamichhane regarding systemic inequality, Sampang argued that a double standard exists where major ruling parties are allotted 30 to 40 minutes to speak while smaller parties are restricted to just a few minutes, asserting that all lawmakers are equally elected by the people and deserve an equal platform.

Beyond parliamentary conduct, Sampang took a hardline nationalist stance by demanding the immediate cancellation of the “unequal and treasonous” MCC compact, which he claimed undermines Nepal’s non-aligned foreign policy and serves a hidden military strategic purpose.

Outlining his party’s expectations for the new government, he urged Prime Minister Shah to adopt a policy of ‘management over displacement’ regarding landless squatters, calling for an end to the use of dozers against citizens’ homes and demanding the distribution of land ownership certificates instead. He also cautioned the government against making hasty, unstudied decisions on sensitive social issues, specifically urging a reconsideration of recent moves involving elderly allowances, student organizations, and bridge course regulations. 

Sampang advised the administration to consult thoroughly with the opposition and all stakeholders before implementing major changes, warning that failing to do so would lead to a cycle of making decisions only to be forced into embarrassing retreats later.

Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) leader Gyanendra Shahi offered support for constitutional amendments to abolish the provincial system, arguing that it imposes a heavy financial burden. He also reiterated his party’s position in favor of restoring a constitutional monarchy, while cautioning the government against ignoring public sentiment.

Independent lawmaker Mahabir Pun described himself as a non-partisan figure committed to reform. He said he entered politics following the GenZ movement and briefly served as education minister, during which he initiated reform measures in the education sector. Pun said he had handed over draft reforms to the prime minister’s team and pledged to continue working for systemic change from within Parliament.

In the 275-member House of Representatives, the RSP holds 182 seats, followed by 38 seats for the Nepali Congress, 25 for the UML, 17 for the NCP, seven for the Shram Sanskriti Party, five for the RPP, and one independent member.

The meeting was adjourned and will reconvene on Sunday.

Nepal’s first general election in 1959 was conducted without any international assistance or foreign observers. The country managed the polls independently, relying solely on domestic institutions for logistics, administration and oversight.

International involvement in Nepal’s elections began to take shape four decades later. A significant turning point came during the 1999 House of Representatives election, when around 100 international observers from the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States monitored the voting process. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) also deployed observers, marking one of the earliest instances of structured international monitoring in Nepal.

During the same period, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) supported voter education initiatives. Voter awareness booklets and election information materials were prepared and distributed through District Election Offices, and Radio Nepal aired 20 short voter education dramas. A British-supported organization, Election Awareness Campaign, printed 250,000 posters carrying voter awareness messages for the House of Representatives election scheduled for 1999, which was later postponed.

Following the People’s Movement of 2006 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists, Nepal formally sought United Nations assistance for the peace process and the planned Constituent Assembly elections. In 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, United Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) set up an election office. UNMIN supported the drafting of election-related laws, preparation of election management plans, voter registration, voter education, political party registration, media and campaign regulation, and training. Initially, 12 advisers were deployed; the mission later expanded to include up to 230 national and international personnel to assist with preparations for the election.

Nepal also received approximately Rs 1.9bn worth of election materials and equipment from various countries and donor agencies. Assistance included heavy printers, laptops, desktop computers, servers, mobile phones, vehicles, digital and video cameras, generators, solar systems, plastic ballot boxes and security seals. Major contributors included China, India, Australia, Denmark and Japan. Support also came from international organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and National Democratic Institute. 

The Constituent Assembly, however, failed to draft a new constitution and was dissolved in 2012.

In 2013,  a second Constituent Assembly election was held and this time too, international assistance continued. A Media Center was established within the Election Commission with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under its Electoral Support Project (ESP). Japan provided election materials worth approximately JPY 14.9m through a project focused on capacity development and technical assistance. China supplied stationery and polling materials, including pens, markers, staplers, scissors, calculators and stamp pads. India provided 48 vehicles, including Mahindra double-cab pickups, Mahindra Scorpio jeeps and Tata mini trucks, to support logistics.

International monitoring also remained active. Organizations such as The Carter Center and ANFREL observed the polls. Assistance and observation support were also provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Asia Foundation.

The 2017 federal and provincial elections—the first held under the 2015 Constitution—also saw extensive international observation. The Carter Center, ANFREL and the European Union Election Observation Mission deployed observers across the country. UNDP’s Electoral Support Project, funded by the European Union, UKAID, Norway and Denmark, continued to strengthen the Election Commission’s institutional capacity, voter registration systems and operational planning.

In 2022, during the local, provincial and federal elections, international and domestic observation missions again monitored the process. ANFREL observed the polls, while domestic civil society groups such as Democracy Resource Center Nepal—supported by the Asia Foundation—conducted technical observation of electoral preparations, polling and counting. The UNDP’s Electoral Support Project continued providing technical assistance, including support for voter roll management, training and election planning.

International assistance has continued in the lead-up to the 2026 House of Representatives general election. The government of Japan allocated Rs 397.5m from counterpart funds under its Food Assistance Projects to support election management software updates, training of officials and voter education. China provided a grant of $4m to assist with election preparations but there are reports that China has imposed strict conditions for the expenditure of the money.

India has delivered election-related assistance in three tranches in early 2026. The third tranche included more than 270 vehicles, including 50 trucks for the Nepali Army, along with other supplies. The first two tranches, handed over in January 2026, included over 310 vehicles and additional materials. The assistance was formally handed over by the Indian Ambassador to Nepal’s Home Minister in Kathmandu. For the March 5 elections, the Carter Center, Asian Network for Free Elections, International Republican Institute and Multidisciplinary Institute of Training and Learning are observing the elections.

Nearly seven decades on, Nepal’s elections have evolved from a purely domestic exercise to a process regularly supported and monitored by international partners. While the 1959 election was conducted without foreign involvement, international logistical, technical, financial and monitoring support has become a consistent feature of Nepal’s electoral landscape since the late 1990s, particularly following the 2006 peace process and the country’s transition to a federal democratic republic.

The latest electoral data from Nepal reveals a profound demographic shift that is reshaping the nation’s political landscape. While the country has historically been governed by a ‘senior guard’, a new wave of political representation is emerging, characterized by a sharp divide between the voting and candidacy patterns of the youth and the elderly. This generational disconnect suggests that while established parties like the Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML, and Nepali Communist Party (NCP) maintain institutional loyalty among seniors, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has effectively monopolized the aspirations of the younger generation.

For the first time in recent history, the ‘under 30’ demographic has found a singular political home. The RSP has positioned itself as the primary vehicle for youth participation, fielding 17 individuals. In a surprising show of grassroots youth engagement, the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party follows with 14 individuals under 30. 

This stands in stark contrast to the UML, which has managed to field only three, and the Nepali Congress, which remarkably has zero representation in this youngest category. Other parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (seven individuals), CPN (Maoist) (four individuals) and NCP (one individual) show minor engagement. Smaller entities like the Shram Sanskriti Party (seven), Ujyalo Nepal Party (nine) round out the group, but the data suggests that for the GenZ demographic, the RSP is the primary attraction.

As we move into the 31 to 40-year-old demographic, the RSP reaches its peak influence with a massive 53 individuals. This is the highest concentration of talent for the party and signals a strong grip on the young-adult workforce. This age group also sees a significant surge from the Ujyalo Nepal Party with 33 individuals, the CPN (Maoist) with 36, and the Shram Sanskriti Party with 31. Interestingly, even in this energetic age bracket, the traditional ‘big two’ remain largely absent, with the UML fielding only 10 and the NC only nine. The NCP shows a slightly higher involvement here with 18 candidates, while the RPP fields 26 and the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party maintains 19.

The 41 to 50 age bracket serves as the ultimate competitive melting pot, where almost all parties show their most balanced numbers. The NCP holds the highest number here with 61 candidates, followed closely by the RSP with 51 individuals. They are joined at the top by the CPN (Maoist) and the Shram Sanskriti Party, both of which have exactly 50 individuals. The RPP also shows its strength here with 44 individuals. It is only at this stage—the mid-40s—that the NC (39) and UML (36) begin to see their numbers rise, suggesting that their recruitment pipelines favor those who have ‘paid their dues’ over several decades. Other notable presences in this middle bracket include the Ujyalo Nepal (29), and Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (38).

The power dynamic shifts entirely once we cross the 50-year threshold. In the 51 to 60 age group, the CPN-UML records the single highest number in the entire dataset with 71 individuals, followed closely by the Nepali Congress with 67 and the RPP with 51. The NCP remains a significant force with 47 candidates. Meanwhile, the RSP begins to dip with 41 individuals, and the CPN (Maoist) drops to 28. In this bracket, the Ujyalo Nepal (25) and Nepal Majdur Kishan Party (38) maintain steady numbers, but this group clearly represents the ‘power center’ of the established parties, where organizational experience is most highly valued.

Finally, the 61 and above category cements the divide. The Nepali Congress leads the seniors with 50 individuals, followed by the CPN-UML with 44, NCP with 37, and the RPP with 35. In a sharp reversal of the youth trend, the newer parties are almost non-existent among the elderly. The CPN (Maoist) has 12, the Ujyalo Nepal has eight, and the Shram Sanskriti Party has six. Most notably, the RSP has a mere two individuals in this senior group. 

This data paints a final picture of a nation split by time: a youth-led movement is rising from the bottom, while the traditional guard continues to hold the fort from the top.

The March 5 parliamentary election is not merely a battle for seats, but for the ideological essence and the mode of governance of the nation. The newly formed Nepali Communist Party (NCP), created by the merger of ten unique communist groups, aims to reclaim the hegemony of the left. The Nepali Congress (NC), revitalized and fragmented with Gagan Thapa at the helm, marks a new generation of leadership that is moving away from the Sher Bahadur Deuba era. CPN-UML is trying to revive under the same KP Sharma Oli despite the backlash from the people.

However, these forces are just ‘old’ contenders for the election. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), along with its strategic allies, has chosen former Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balen Shah as their prime ministerial candidate, hoping to capture the anti-incumbency sentiment of almost 19m voters and bring a technocratic revolution in the nation.

The election is marked by the presence of a number of ‘heavyweight’ contests where senior leaders face existential risks from each other or from emerging challengers. Based on the 2022 electoral baseline and the strategic realities of the 2026 race, here are the 11 most important constituencies that could determine the future balance of power in Nepal’s politics.

Jhapa-5

Jhapa-5 has come to occupy the center-stage in the election of 2026, with a direct confrontation between the Chairperson of the UML and former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and RSP’s Prime Ministerial Candidate Balen Shah. The constituency has traditionally been a stronghold of the UML, and it is interesting that Shah has chosen to fight this election in an attempt to take on the ‘titan’ in his own den.

Oli won this seat in the election of 2022 with relative ease, garnering 52,319 votes, more than twice the number of votes garnered by his closest contender from Nepali Congress, who managed only 23,743 votes. Shah has a considerable pull among the youths and new migrants in semi-rural districts like Jhapa. Although Oli still enjoys considerable support through the organizational strength of the UML and the traditional voter base of the party, especially among the elderly populations, the election here will now be a direct contest between ‘political longevity’ and ‘youths’. Even a slight loss of vote share by Oli will make this election a neck-and-neck contest.

Sarlahi-4

The newly elected President of the Nepali Congress, Gagan Kumar Thapa, is making a unique move by giving up a secure seat in Kathmandu-4 and opting for a contest from Sarlahi-4 in Madhes. Thapa is pitted against Amresh Kumar Singh, who emerged victorious as an independent candidate in 2022 and joined RSP recently. Singh polled 20,017 votes, while Nagendra Kumar Yadav of Nepali Congress secured 18,252 votes to finish second in the electoral race. Singh, who had won from the same constituency as a NC candidate in the 2017 polls, chose to contest as an independent after he was denied a party ticket.

Thapa is a national figure with minimal roots in Sarlahi-4, while Singh enjoys a strong support base because of his image as an anti-establishment leader. Also in the race are UML, NCP, JSP, and a number of independent candidates. In this contest, it remains to be seen whether Thapa’s image as a national figure will be able to overcome the issue of identity-based voting in Madhes. Thapa’s failure will be a disaster for his prime ministerial ambition, while Singh’s win will establish him as a giant-killer.

Rukum East

NCP Coordinator and former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal is contesting from Rukum East, a district he calls the ‘new headquarters’ of the party. He is challenged by a symbolic but very powerful contender in Sandeep Pun of the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, who is the son of a leading martyr of the Maoist insurgency.

Dahal’s decision to contest from Rukum East is his return to the revolutionary stronghold to ensure a smooth entry into the new parliament with waning support in the urban areas. However, Pun represents a section of the ‘Maoist base’ who feels betrayed by the leadership’s merger politics and corruption. Most importantly, there are reports that the UML has agreed to extend its tacit support to the candidates of Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party in this region to clip the wings of Dahal’s power.

Chitwan-3

Chitwan-3 features a high-stakes encounter between Renu Dahal, the former Mayor of Bharatpur Metropolitan City and daughter of NCP Coordinator Pushpa Kamal Dahal, and Sobita Gautam of the RSP. In 2022, Rastriya Prajatantra Party’s Bikram Pandey had won from here defeating then CPN (Maoist Center)’s Bhojraj Adhikari by 9,747 vote margins.

Dahal aims to reclaim her father’s legacy seat by showcasing her developmental achievements as Bharatpur Mayor. Meanwhile, Gautam, a rising star of the 2022 RSP wave, has moved constituencies to challenge the ‘first family’ of the NCP. This contest is a referendum on whether the ‘service delivery’ model of the Dahal family can withstand the RSP’s ‘new force’ narrative.

Kathmandu-4

Kathmandu-4 has become an open battlefield following Gagan Thapa’s departure. In 2022, Thapa won comfortably with 21,302 votes, while UML finished second with 13,855 votes. The 2022 results highlight why the seat is volatile. Although RSP did not field a direct candidate, it secured 9,412 proportional representation votes, indicating a strong appetite for change. NC received only 11,808 PR votes, suggesting much of its support was tied to Thapa’s personal appeal rather than party loyalty. The UML showed a similar gap, with 13,855 direct votes against 10,560 PR votes, while RPP posted a notable 6,881 PR votes.

Starting from a base of nearly 10,000 votes without an FPTP candidate last time, RSP sees a clear opening and has fielded Pukar Bam in the race. Congress candidate Sachin Timalsina is a new face, making a smooth transfer of Thapa’s vote bank uncertain. UML’s Rajan Bhattarai, contesting for the third time, faces an equally tough challenge as urban and GenZ voters increasingly question traditional party dominance. Bam, who has made his name for his civic activism, makes him a credible contender, positioning Kathmandu-4 as one of the clearest indicators of whether urban political change will translate into electoral victory.

Kathmandu-5

The constituency of Kathmandu-5 is witnessing a hot and crowded contest between NC General Secretary Pradeep Paudel, UML’s senior leader Ishwar Pokharel, RPP leader Kamal Thapa, and RSP’s Sashmit Pokharel. The constituency is a symbol of the larger struggle between reformism, communism, and royalism.

Pokharel seeks to reclaim the seat he lost in 2022, emphasizing his seniority and past ministerial record. Paudel, now a key figure in the Thapa-led NC, relies on his reputation as a clean, reformist leader. The entry of Thapa and Sashmit creates a four-way contest that makes the outcome highly unpredictable. This race will determine if the ‘youth wave’ that favored Paudel in 2022 has matured into a stable constituency or if the fragmented vote will allow the UML to return or the RSP’s Sashmit, who has worked with Balen Shah’s team in Kathmandu Metropolitan City.

Saptari-2

CK Raut, the chairperson of the Janamat Party, seeks to retain Saptari-2 after his historic defeat of Upendra Yadav in 2022. Raut secured 35,042 votes, while Yadav managed only 16,979. The landslide victory marked the arrival of Janamat as a serious political force. This constituency remains the focal point of the Madhes, where regional identity clashes with the Janamat Party’s ‘alternative’ development narrative. Raut faces a re-energized field as national parties like the UML and NC have prioritized this seat to curb the Janamat Party’s expansion. While Raut’s 2022 margin was massive, the 2026 contest involved a more fragmented Madhesi vote, with several ‘new forces’ attempting to slice into his youth base. Also, Raut’s Janamat Party in recent months has experienced a split. This time, he is facing JSP’s Umesh Kumar Yadav. The result will indicate whether Janamat’s success was a one-time wave or a lasting realignment.

Chitwan-2

Chitwan-2 is noteworthy as the least competitive and most politically significant seat. In 2022, the seat was won by Rabi Lamichhane with a landslide victory of 49,300 votes, leaving behind the candidates of the Nepali Congress and the UML. The same was repeated by Lamichhane in the by-elections of 2023, securing an even higher number of votes. In 2026, Lamichhane is up against relatively low-profile candidates of the traditional political parties. Unless there is a major swing in voter preference, Chitwan-2 is likely to be with the RSP party.

Sunsari-1

Sunsari-1 is turning out to be one of the most unpredictable contests in the eastern part of Nepal. In the 2022 election, JSP’s Ashok Rai won the seat with a narrow margin of only 453 votes, defeating RSP’s Goma Tamang, who received 16,606 votes. The same unpredictability has been witnessed in the 2026 election, but with a twist.

Harka Sampang, the former Mayor of Dharan Sub-metropolitan City who resigned to contest the general election, has formed the Shram Shakti Party. Contesting on the symbol of ‘two hands holding soil’, Sampang brings a unique, labor-oriented populism to Sunsari-1. Sampang’s campaign is characterized by its grassroots activism, including door-to-door cleaning drives and a focus on ‘soil and sweat’. He faces Samir Tamang of the RSP and candidates from the JSP, NC and UML, who are struggling to match his ‘stubborn’ local visibility. This battle will signal whether local, issue-based movements can transcend to the national legislative level.   

Tanahun–1

Tanahun-1 has turned out to be one of the most revealing constituencies in the country. In 2022, Nepali Congress leader Ram Chandra Paudel won this seat by securing 25,361 votes. The second position was taken by the UML party with 19,981 votes, and RSP was nowhere in the picture. However, in the 2023 by-election, it was RSP’s Swarnim Wagle who won by an overwhelming margin. This shows that there has been a tremendous shift in voters’ behavior. In 2026, Wagle will face Nepali Congress candidate Govinda Bhattarai, UML’s Bhagwati Neupane, and NCP candidate among others.

Gulmi-1

Gulmi-1 has emerged as one of the most unpredictable electoral arenas in the Lumbini province, as the traditional bipolar struggle between the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML is shattered by the entry of formidable new challengers.

In 2022, Chandra Bhandari secured a hard-fought victory against the UML’s Pradeep Gyawali. The 2026 battle is defined as a ‘four-way contest’. Gyawali seeks to reclaim his former seat by relying on a strong UML organizational base, while Bhandari faces the challenge of maintaining his vote. The dynamic is fundamentally altered by Sagar Dhakal (RSP), who previously gained national prominence for challenging Sher Bahadur Deuba in Dadheldhura, and Sudarshan Baral (NCP), a senior leader and former provincial minister representing the unified leftist front. This multi-cornered fight is a critical test of whether the ‘new wave’ can dismantle established strongholds in rural heartlands.

The socio-political genesis of the 2026 election

This catalyzing event for an early election was the widespread civil unrest that gripped Nepal in 8-9 Sept 2025. While this unrest was tipped by a government crackdown on social media platforms, there were simmering frustrations with corruption, economic stagnation, and the perceived arrogance of the ruling parties. Ultimately, this unrest resulted in a minimum of 76 deaths. The GenZ movement, with its decentralized and digital nature, effectively delegitimized the government of KP Sharma Oli and forced a constitutional reset. 

The appointment of Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister was a stabilizing force that allowed for elections to be conducted while the traditional parties purged and merged themselves. The period between this uprising and the scheduled March 5 elections has been one of unprecedented political machinations. The Election Commission (EC) has finally verified a voter list of 18,903,689 voters for this 2026 cycle. While this represents a 5.09 percent increase from 2022, 1.1m voters represent a new voter turnout, primarily from the youth who spearheaded this GenZ movement.

Nepal has declared its first natural fish sanctuary in the lower Karnali river, marking a significant step toward freshwater biodiversity conservation and sustainable fisheries management. The sanctuary was jointly declared by Rajapur Municipality of Bardiya and Tikapur Municipality of Kailali during a formal public event held on the banks of the Karnali River on Thursday.

The newly declared sanctuary covers a 4.8-kilometer stretch of the river with a total area of approximately 3.9 square kilometres, spanning the territorial jurisdictions of both municipalities across Lumbini and Sudurpaschim provinces. Local authorities said this is the first time a river section in Nepal has been formally designated as a natural fish sanctuary.

According to officials, the protected river stretch serves as a critical breeding, spawning and nursery habitat for several indigenous fish species. It also provides important habitat for nationally and globally significant aquatic fauna and birds, including the river dolphin, gharial and smooth-coated otter. 

With the declaration, fishing activities in the sanctuary area will be regulated. Fishing will be prohibited during breeding seasons, and permits will be required for fishing at other times, local governments said. The sanctuary has been established under the Aquatic Animal and Biodiversity Conservation Act of the local governments, following decisions endorsed by the municipal executives of both Rajapur and Tikapur municipalities and public consultations at the ward level.

Officials described the initiative as historic, noting that it is largely community-driven in a region where indigenous communities, particularly the Sonaha and Tharu, rely on fishing for their livelihoods and cultural practices. Local representatives said reaching the decision required extensive consultations to ensure community consent and understanding of the long-term benefits of fish conservation and sustainable resource use.

The sanctuary will be managed under a co-management framework involving the two municipalities, river-dependent communities and relevant government line agencies. Community River Stretch Management Groups have been formed to support monitoring, management and awareness activities in coordination with the Division Forest Office and security agencies.

Officials and conservation partners said the lower Karnali fish sanctuary is expected to serve as a model for community-led freshwater ecosystem conservation in Nepal, contributing to biodiversity protection, sustainable livelihoods and long-term stewardship of river ecosystems.

“This sanctuary is a decision jointly initiated, endorsed and fully owned by Rajapur and Tikapur municipalities. It reflects our responsibility to lead conservation from the ground up, guided by the voices of our river-dependent communities. This is a decision taken by the people of Rajapur and Tikapur for our own future,” said Tikapur Mayor Ram Lal Dangaura Tharu.

He also said the community should not rely solely on fishing for their livelihood, but should explore alternative income opportunities, adding that the municipality is always open to supporting capacity-building initiatives for local people.

“By taking full municipal ownership of this declaration, we affirm that protecting the lower Karnali is our shared duty. This marks the beginning of long-term stewardship driven by local governments, communities and coordinated action,” said Rajapur Mayor Dipesh Tharu. “This is an exemplary initiative, and other local governments should follow suit in conservation efforts.”

Ghana Shyam Gurung, country representative of WWF Nepal, said local municipalities had demonstrated bold leadership by declaring the Sakhi Fish Sanctuary with the aim of conserving, promoting and sustainably using natural resources. “In this region, fish are not only central to local livelihoods but are also interwoven with cultural and religious life. This initiative also has the potential to strengthen nature-based regenerative tourism by protecting the river ecosystem that sustains iconic wildlife such as gharials, otters and dolphins. When we protect fish, we protect water; when we protect water, we protect life; and when we protect life, we secure our future,” he said.

According to fish expert Suresh Wagle, the Karnali River is home to 197 fish species, of which 136 are found in the lower Karnali. He said the number of species has been declining, making the establishment of a fish sanctuary in the Karnali particularly important.

A local resident of Rajapur, Binod Chaudhary, said the community is positive about fish conservation as people now understand that sustainable practices are vital for future generations. “Fish is an important part of our livelihood, but fishing without proper methods ultimately harms the community,” he said. “Fishing during the breeding season reduces fish stocks in the river and disrupts the ecosystem. Ultimately, if fish numbers decline, we will be left with nothing.”

With just two and a half months remaining before the March 5 parliamentary elections, political activities across the country have intensified. Prime Minister Sushila Karki has held meetings with leaders of major political parties, including KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Meanwhile, Minister for Communication and Information Technology, Jagadish Kharel, has been visiting party offices and holding discussions with party officials.

In a major political development, Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balen Shah and Kulman Ghising have joined the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and signed a triparty agreement with party Chair Rabi Lamichhane and Ghising as Vice-chair. The agreement names Shah as the party’s prime ministerial candidate.

Other political parties, including the CPN-UML, Nepali Congress, Nepal Communist Party, and newly formed parties such as Janadesh Party, Gatisheel Loktantrik Party, and Bibeksheel Loktantrik Party, are also engaged in internal preparations. They have begun allocating candidates for the election and have already submitted closed lists of proportional representation candidates to the Election Commission.

As political parties mobilize their resources and gear up for the March 5 polls, attention has also turned to the Election Commission, the constitutional body responsible for conducting elections in Nepal.

Over the past week, the Election Commission has taken several key steps, including initiating the printing of ballot papers, collecting the closed lists of proportional representation candidates from political parties, determining candidate expenditure limits, establishing the Election Information Dissemination and Coordination Center (EIDC), publishing the voter list, approving a temporary voter list collection program, and issuing the Election Code of Conduct 2025.

The commission has also begun correcting errors in the proportional representation lists submitted by political parties. According to the Election Commission, a closed list of proportional representation candidates has been submitted from 64 political parties to contest the election under 58 election symbols. The closed lists submitted by the political parties between Dec 28 and 29 will be examined until Jan 4.

Following the examination, political parties will be asked to reconcile their lists between Jan 5 and 11. The commission will then verify the revised lists from Jan 12 to 17. The closed lists are scheduled to be published on Jan 18, while the final list will be published on Feb 3.

Meanwhile, the commission has begun printing ballot papers. Proportional representation ballot papers will be printed first, followed by direct ballot papers. Printing is being carried out at the Janak Education Materials Center Limited in Sanothimi, Bhaktapur, with the process having started on Dec 31. The commission plans to print 10 percent additional ballot papers for proportional representation elections, and the process is expected to take 20 to 30 days.

Printing of direct ballot papers will begin after the proportional ballot papers are completed and the final list of candidates is published. As direct ballot papers vary by constituency, they will be printed accordingly.

The final voter list includes citizens who will have reached the age of 18 by March 4. According to the Commission, the list comprises 18,903,689 voters—9,663,358 males, 9,240,131 females, and 200 others. In comparison, the 2022 parliamentary elections had 17,988,570 registered voters. This marks an increase of 915,119 voters, including 522,552 males, 392,552 females, and 15 others.

For the March 5 elections, the Commission has designated 23,112 polling stations across 10,967 polling centers nationwide. This represents an increase of 885 polling stations and 75 polling centers compared to the 2022 elections.

The Election Information Dissemination and Coordination Center has been established at the Commission’s office to strengthen communication with voters, candidates, political parties, and other stakeholders, and to enhance coordination with the media. The aim is to ensure that the House of Representatives elections are conducted in a free, fair, transparent, and credible manner.

The EIDC consists of three coordinated units: the Election Information and Communication Centre (Press Office), the Information Integrity Promotion Unit, and the Digital Voter Education Unit.

Acting Chief Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari said that effective dissemination of factual and official information is essential to ensuring credible elections. He expressed confidence that the EIDC would help counter misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, and hate speech on social media during the election period. He also urged the media to uphold principles of self-regulation and responsible reporting.

Bhandari said the Commission has made necessary preparations to promptly remove misleading, rumor-based, and false information, including AI-generated deepfake content, circulating on social and digital media. He added that coordination has been established with social media platforms such as Meta, TikTok, and X to address such content and take action against individuals or organizations violating the law.

The Commission will also conduct a content analysis through an expert group to assess media coverage of election-related information, representation of political parties and candidates, portrayal of gender and geographic issues, and dissemination of voter education materials. The findings will be used to inform the Commission’s decision-making process.

Meanwhile, the Election Commission has approved a temporary voter list collection program covering government employees, security personnel stationed in barracks, detainees and prisoners, residents of government-run old-age homes, and office-bearers of constitutional bodies whose names are included in the final voter list.

The Election Code of Conduct 2025 has also been approved, expanding provisions related to social media use, introducing measures for green elections, and incorporating new topics such as party manifestos. The code prohibits the dissemination of false or misleading information, operation of fake accounts or websites, and publication of defamatory or personally insulting content. While political parties and candidates may promote their agendas through official or personal social media accounts, the Commission has urged them to do so in a dignified and systematic manner.

The code further prohibits the wearing or carrying of election-related symbols, logos, or clothing during campaign activities. Political parties, candidates, and their affiliated organizations have been urged to conduct rallies, meetings, and campaign events in a disciplined and civilized manner, using only approved party flags and symbols in permitted sizes and numbers.

In cases of code violations, the Commission has stated it will take action based on the nature and severity of the offense, ranging from public warnings and fines to legal penalties, including the cancellation of candidacies. Monitoring mechanisms will be active from the central to district levels to ensure compliance.

Furthermore, the Election Commission has published the maximum spending limits for candidates contesting under the first-past-the-post system and for political parties contesting under the proportional representation system. The commission has directed candidates to open a separate account at a bank or financial institution for election-related expenses and to conduct all spending through that account. Candidates are also required to designate a responsible person to incur expenses on their behalf and to inform the Election Officer’s Office and the relevant Provincial or District Election Office of the designated person’s details.

The commission has further directed that candidates must remain within the prescribed spending limits and submit detailed statements of election-related income and expenditure—either personally or through an authorised representative—to the concerned Provincial or District Election Office within 35 days of the declaration of election results. Political parties and candidates are also required to make public the details of income and expenditure incurred during election campaigning for the information of all concerned.

The maximum spending limit has been set at Rs 2.5m for five constituencies, Rs 2.7m for 17 constituencies, Rs 2.9m for 65 constituencies, Rs 3.1m for 52 constituencies, and Rs 3.3m for 26 constituencies.

Emphasizing that credible elections require strict adherence to the code of conduct, the Commission has called for collective commitment from political parties, candidates, media, and stakeholders to ensure a clean, free, impartial, fear-free, and economical election, contributing to democratic strengthening and good governance in the country.

Three months after the GenZ movement, at least 49 GenZ-affiliated groups have been registered at the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. These groups are largely led by prominent faces of the protest, including those involved in negotiations and the formation of the interim government.

Following the appointment of Sushila Karki as prime minister, the House of Representatives was dissolved, and fresh elections were announced for 5 March 2026. With electoral politics now firmly on the horizon, the question dominating public discourse is simple: Where are the faces of the GenZ movement headed?

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah was a central figure during the movement, openly calling for the dissolution of Parliament and backing an interim government under Karki—both of which ultimately materialized.

Despite widespread expectations that Shah would take a frontline role in post-protest politics, he has so far remained publicly restrained. However, sources close to ApEx say Shah is quietly working to bring together the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Ujyalo Nepal Party backed by Kulman Ghising, and leaders such as Sudan Gurung under a broader electoral alliance.

If plans proceed as expected, Shah, on Martyrs’ Day (30 Jan 2026), is likely to announce his affiliation with the Desh Bikash Party. Previously the Hamro Nepali Party registered at the Election Commission with the election symbol ‘Stick’ has changed its name to Desh Bikash Party as per Shah’s direction, sources say. Ghising recently fuelled speculation by posting a photograph of his meeting with Shah.

Sudan Gurung, another breakout figure of the movement, has registered Nepal Janasewa Party as a contingency option for the upcoming polls, sources say. The party is chaired by Prakash Khadka and carries the election symbol ‘black-and-white shoe’.

Several GenZ leaders—including Ojas Thapa, James Karki, Pradeep Pandey, and Bhawana Raut—are aligned with this camp. Still, Gurung is believed to be closely coordinating with Shah and remains keen on contesting the elections together rather than separately.

Meanwhile, Rakshya Bam has taken a different route. Her group, Nepal GenZ Front, is currently running a nationwide political awareness campaign called ‘Janajagaran’. The core team includes Yatish Ojha, Yujan Rajbhandari, Manish Khanal, Pradeep Gyawali, Amy Amrutha, and Ritu Khadka.

Sources say the group is also exploring the possibility of reviving Nepal Bibeksheel Dal, given many members’ previous association with the party.

Similarly, Tanuja Pandey, known for her strong advocacy of democratic values and the 2015 Constitution, is focusing on public political education rather than direct party politics.

Within the GenZ Movement Alliance, Ojaswee Bhattarai has already taken a formal political step, becoming chair of the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, associated with leaders such as Baburam Bhattarai, Janardan Sharma, Sudan Kirati, and Santosh Pariyar. Alliance members Rijan Rana and Manzil Rana are also inclined towards the party, though they have yet to formally join.

In contrast, Miraj Dhungana and Prabesh Dahal are pursuing a markedly different agenda. According to ApEx sources, they are lobbying for the revival of the 1990 Constitution and advocating for Prime Minister Karki’s resignation in favour of an all-party government led by former Chief Justice Kalyan Shrestha.

The Council of GenZ, which has coordinators across all seven provinces, illustrates the ideological diversity and political fluidity within the broader GenZ movement. In Koshi Province, coordinator Uparjan Chamling, a former Bibeksheel Party associate with leftist leanings, is now involved in Rakshya Bam’s Janajagaran campaign. Shiva Yadav of Madhes Province, who serves as a secretariat member to Youth and Sports Minister Bablu Gupta, has announced his intention to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections but has yet to declare a party affiliation; sources say he is in talks with both the Ujyalo Nepal Party and the RSP. Another GenZ face, Purushottam Yadav, maintaining close ties with Gupta, is in the preliminary proportional list of RSP.

In Bagmati Province, coordinator Afsana Banu is closely associated with Sudan Gurung and the Nepal Janasewa Party, while Pradeep Pandey, the Gandaki coordinator, remains aligned with Gurung but is also exploring a possible move to the Ujyalo Nepal Party. In Lumbini, Aaditya Acharya, 21, is legally ineligible to contest elections due to the age requirement; after unsuccessful attempts to amend the rule, he is now lobbying for a position in RSP’s central committee, drawing on his close relationship with party leader Ganesh Paudel. 

Meanwhile, in Karnali Province, coordinator Anil Shahi is close to newly appointed minister Madhav Chaulagain and is widely seen as sympathetic to RSP, whereas Khemraj Saud, the coordinator for Sudurpaschim Province, is aligned with the Ujyalo Nepal Party.

Some GenZ figures remain unaffiliated. Aakriti Ghimire, initiator of ‘howtodesh-bikas’—a platform simplifying politics for youths—and former Personal Branch Officer to PM Karki’s secretariat, has not aligned with any party. She previously served as chief of staff to Sumana Shrestha’s secretariat. Monika Niraula and Saken Rai, who work closely with Ghimire, are inclined towards the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party but have not formally joined.

On the other end of the spectrum, JB Chand, Madan Buda, and Hemraj Thapa—who also identify as GenZ leaders—are aligned with controversial businessperson Durga Prasai and support the monarchy. Prasai’s group is registered as Nagarik Bachau Dal, Nepal.

Meanwhile, Jasmine Ojha and Biplabi Neupane have officially joined Janadesh Party Nepal, backed by media personality Rishi Dhamala, while Pawan Thapa has joined Gatisheel Loktantrik Party led by Birendra Basnet, owner of Buddha Air.

What began as a youth uprising demanding systemic change has now evolved into a fragmented political landscape, with GenZ leaders spreading across new parties, old ideologies, and competing power centers.

As Nepal heads towards the March 2026 elections, the GenZ movement’s greatest test may no longer be mobilization—but whether its leaders can translate protest energy into coherent political influence.