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The ruling Nepal Communist Party Co-chairman and ex-Maoist party leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Pra­chanda’ must have been aware of the risks of travelling to the United States, if only to treat his wife this time. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US was among the first countries to designate the warring Maoists in Nepal ‘terrorists’. Only in 2012, six years after the Maoists had joined mainstream politics, were the former insurgents removed from the infa­mous list.

Before leaving for the US on March 17, Dahal had appar­ently secured an iron-clad pledge of ‘immunity’ from the Americans. Yet an unpleasant surprise awaited him when he landed on US soil. Officials from Nepali Embassy in Washing­ton DC surrounded him and tried to whisk him away, “almost as if I was still underground,” Dahal later recounted. Only later did he learn that one Dr Tilak Shrestha of the Nepali Congress PR wing in the US had ‘informed’ the FBI that a ‘ter­rorist’ responsible for the death of ‘17,000 innocent Nepali people’ was on American soil.

Even though Dahal had gotten a ‘no-investigation’ assur­ance from the US prior to his trip, he must have known that the American judiciary works independently from the US government. Had someone gone to a US court by invoking the UN’s ‘universal jurisdiction’—whereby someone impli­cated in ‘flagrant violation of international humanitarian law’ can be prosecuted for their crimes anywhere in the world— Dahal might have been in trouble. In 2016, Dahal had had to cancel a trip to Australia after a case was lodged against him with the New South Wales government. Before that, in 2013, a Nepal Army colonel had been arrested in the UK under universal jurisdiction.

Dahal knows that no future trip to western countries will be without risk, especially if transitional justice in Nepal is not settled to the satisfaction of the international community. But even if it is, Dahal or any of the former Maoist leaders will never be completely out of the woods. The Americans felt the need to humor the co-leader of the ruling party at a time they are looking to increase their footprint in Nepal under their new Indo-Pacific Strategy. Should the American priorities change tomorrow, Nepali communists, and especially the for­mer Maoists, could once again find themselves under Amer­ican scrutiny. Unfortunately for them, the American sway in the western world extends far beyond the US borders.

In ‘Essays on Nepal: Past and Pres­ent,’ Sam Cowan brings to the analysis of contemporary Nepali history and society a rare incisive­ness and depth. Most of 19 essays in this volume have already been published in various outlets, and an avid follower of Nepali history and politics would have relished them. Even so, in bringing them together in one volume, Cowan helps us form a useful mosaic of the evolution of modern Nepal and Nepali nation­alism, and better understand the country’s recent journey from war to peace.

Travelling to Nepal regularly after his 1994 appointment as Colonel Commandant of the Brigade of Gur­khas, the titular head of Gurkhas in the British Army, and being in reg­ular touch with the reigning Nepali monarchs of the time, Cowan had over the years gathered an acute understanding of the functioning of the modern Nepali state, most notably the post-1990 leg of its long and painful transition from absolute monarchy to full democracy.

This gives Cowan remarkable fore­sight. As a battle-hardened ex-sol­dier, Cowan was able to predict how the government-Maoist conflict would have no clear winner and was headed for a stalemate—this, in 2005-06, when many were forecast­ing a decisive victory for the state fol­lowing the full engagement of Royal Nepalese Army in the war.

While the Maoists were ill-equipped for an all-out war, Cowan argues, the RNA was fast losing ‘hearts and minds’

While the Maoists were ill-equipped for an all-out war, Cow­an argues, the RNA was fast losing ‘hearts and minds’ with its brutal anti-insurgency tactics. Another path-breaking essay in the volume explores Maoist military tactics during the insurgency: for instance, how they prepared for, and learned from, each raid.

Another set of fascinating chap­ters juxtaposes Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher’s 1906 visit to Great Britain with King Mahen­dra’s 1960 visit. Chandra Shumsh­er was successful in finagling an honorary doctorate from the Uni­versity of Oxford from his obliging British hosts. But King Mahendra was unable to do so, much to his visible chagrin.

Cowen digs into rare Bodle­ian Library records and National Archives in Kew, London, to give new backgrounds to these two vis­its, including the doctorate debate. The subtle differences in the treat­ment of the two Nepali rulers in the UK was, for one, reflective of chang­ing British interests in the pre- and post-colonial worlds.

Other chapters deal with the upshots of old geopolitical rivalries in this ‘cockpit’ of Asia—encompass­ing topics like Kalapani, Khampas, border firing, infiltration, etc.

Whether Cowan is writing about the Anglo-Nepal war, the civil-mil­itary relations, the systemic cor­ruption in government agencies in Nepal, or about one of his countless treks through his beloved country, he brings great insights as an astute outside observer. Again, there is mili­tary precision in the writing, the writ­er’s ability to separate noise from the essential evident in each essay. Now living a retired life, Nepali watch­ers will be waiting for more from Cowan-the-writer.

Essays on Nepal: Past and Pres­ent

Sam Cowan

Genre: Non-fiction

Publisher: Himal Books

Price: Rs 990, Pages: 362

With under a fortnight left for the start of the general elections, India is in full election mode. Newspapers and TV news channels are filled with endless specu­lations on seat projections and electoral alliances. Leaders of both the ruling BJP and the main opposition Indian National Congress are endlessly canvassing the length and breadth of India, trying to drum up support. One issue dominates the national discourse at this crucial time: Pakistan.

The common thinking here seems to be that before India’s ‘preemptive’ air strikes inside Pakistan—that followed the terror attacks in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 Indian paramilitary personnel—the two main parties were running neck and neck. After all, in recent state elections, Congress under Rahul Gandhi had made crucial gains in former BJP strongholds like Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Gandhi was finally getting into his element, riding high on the back of Modi’s disastrous ‘demonitization’ and BJP’s seeming ignorance of local and state level issues. Yet Pulwama has changed everything.

Recent opinion polls show public support for Modi rising following what is widely seen as a muscular anti-Pakistan policy post-Pulwama: for the first time since the 1971 war, an Indian prime minster dared to send Indian warplanes into Pakistani territory. It has now emerged that India was on the verge of using missiles against Pakistan after the latter’s cap­ture of its airman Abhinandan Vartaman in an aerial combat following Pulwama. (Pakistan was readying for a retaliatory missile attack of its own.)

In the face of his party’s narrowing lead over the INC, Pulwama, as tragic as it was, was also a big boost for Modi’s popularity. India is readying itself for four more years of the former chaiwala-turned-chowkidar, albeit with a less over­whelming mandate than he got in 2015.

For Nepal, whether Modi or Gandhi comes to power makes little difference. The landlocked country has faced crippling blockades during the reign of both their parties. There is also greater institutional memory of India’s neighborhood policy, particularly in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Bureau­crats and spooks will continue to have a disproportionate say in how India’s relations with its smaller neighbors will (or won’t) progress.

 Meanwhile, Modi’s face is ubiquitous in pre-election Delhi, as are posters expressing support for Pulwama victims. The two phenomena seem inextricably linked. Nepal should start planning for another stint of Modi, which is perhaps a good thing in light of the recent rapprochement between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

 Earlier in the week, a video of motorists in Kathmandu protesting and violating the ‘no vehicle’ restriction imposed to allow President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s motorcade to pass went viral. Being made to wait out in a cold night for 40 minutes, with no sign of Her Excellency, would have tested the patience of the most jaded commuter. A day later, newspapers carried the story of President Bhan­dari’s upcoming trip to New York where she will take part in the 63rd session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women and be a part of the ‘High-Level Roundtable: How Women Leaders Change the World’.

A ceremonial head of state, Bhandari has a knack of get­ting into controversy in her country. She apparently wants the most lavish of motorcades, a more opulent President’s Office—even if the adjacent police academy has to be razed for the purpose—a spanking new chopper to crisscross the country, and she likes the high and mighty bowing and scraping before her. In comparison, her foreign trips have drawn a more balanced response. Widely criticized for ‘inviting herself’ to Qatar, Bhandari was also lauded for her measured speech highlighting Nepal’s pre­carious climatic position at the UN climate meet in Poland.

 So long as the bird is killed, what does it matter who throws the stone?

On April 24, she will fly to Beijing to attend the second BRI conference. Foreign Ministry sources say the visit will be meaningful as Bhandari will discuss important BRI projects with her Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping; and the long-stuck BRI projects in Nepal could finally get some momentum. Moreover, she will formally invite President Xi to Nepal. The communist government, in this light, seems intent on using the good offices of the president to secure its diplomatic goals. This is more astute than may appear on the surface.

As Nepal is pulled even deeper into the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and with Prime Minister KP Oli seen in New Delhi as an old China sympathizer, the communist government is looking to get closer to China via the president: So long as the bird is killed, what does it matter who throws the stone? Bhandari, who seems in total comfort in the patriarchal world she inhabits back home, may struggle to assert herself as a ‘woman leader who can change the world’. But while she is in the Big Apple, the communist government will be happy if she can carry out a less demanding responsibility: Can she do some legwork to expand Nepal’s diplomatic relations beyond the existing 163 countries and add a feather to the Oli government’s diplomatic cap, for instance?

The Americans seldom fail to remind the world of the perils of falling into China’s ‘debt trap’, as embodied in President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia Joe Felter did the same during his brief stay in Nepal earlier this week. As reported in The Kathmandu Post, and speaking like a spokesperson for the Nepal government, Felter said: “We welcome a constructive relation with China, we welcome the investment by China, but as long as that investment is designed to serve the interest of Nepal and not just China.”

The Chinese were not amused. A day later, Chinese Ambas­sador to Nepal, Hou Yanqi, told the Global Times, “The sup­port and assistance China has offered have no political strings attached and [China] does not interfere in [Nepal’s] domestic affairs.” It is “very ridiculous” for someone to try to interfere in friendly relations between China and Nepal, she added.

Those fearful of ‘autocratic’ China’s influence have long invoked the dangers of getting close to the dragon

Those fearful of the rise of ‘autocratic’ China’s influence in Nepal have long invoked the dangers of getting too close to the fire-breathing dragon. “Look at what happened in Hambantota!” is their most common refrain. But as Ameet Dhakal recently reported in Setopati, there is an alternative narrative to Hambantota. Accord­ing to the prominent Sri Lankan economist Nis­han de Mel he quotes, the Lankans also offered the US and India a chance to operate the port. Both declined. This correspondent has himself heard more than one Sri Lankan intellectual say there should be a more nuanced reading of the monolithic ‘BRI is evil’ narrative.

It is also interesting that the US is reminding Nepal of the dangers of the BRI when the Chinese are themselves skeptical of the big infrastructure projects Nepal wants them to build under the initiative. For instance, they have in recent times told Nepali officials that a costly cross-border rail may not be in Nepal’s economic interest. “Even if China builds the rail line, who will ensure its upkeep in Nepal? Does Nepal have enough railway engineers, for instance?” one Kathman­du-based Chinese official recently asked this correspondent. Instead, “why not focus on more economically feasible and bilaterally beneficial projects?”

Far from looking to trap Nepal in debt it cannot repay, the Chinese approach in Nepal has been more business-minded in recent times, which is perhaps how it should be. And who says good business decisions don’t make geostrategic sense?

No foreign policy expert from either India or Nepal that this correspondent talked to believed India and Pakistan would go to a full-blown war, even as tensions have considerably risen following the terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir last week. “No doubt things are going to escalate. We do not know how India will retaliate,” says Brookings India’s Constantino Xavier (See interview this week). But “I do not see a possibility of war.”

Nepali analysts like Nishchalnath Pandey of the Center for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu, a private think-tank, and Indra Adhikari of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, a government one, also doubt there will be a large-scale war. What is interesting though is that all three analysts believe recent developments will further weaken SAARC, an organization that was already stuck in limbo after India refused to take part in the 2016 summit slated for Islamabad.

In Xavier’s reckoning, the mounting Indo-Pak tensions will naturally make India pursue alternative regional connectivity projects like BIMSTEC and BBIN that do not include Pakistan and downplay the utility of an organization like SAARC, which includes Pakistan, as “Pakistan has consistently blocked the way” to regional cooperation via SAARC. Xavier believes SAARC is not the only game in town.

Pandey has a slightly different take. “Yes, SAARC is already dysfunctional,” he says. “However, it has at least provided a platform for leaders of member countries to meet and have free and frank discussion.” Not just that. As Nepal is the current chair of SAARC, “it’s our responsibility to ensure that even at a time like this regional cooperation endeavors aren’t left in the doldrums”.   

Adhikari of the IFA also rules out an all-out war. But she says pressure could mount on Nepal to pick sides. “Forced to make a choice, the sentiment will naturally be in favor of India,” she adds. “Nepal and India are treaty allies, our soldiers serve in the Indian army and we depend on India for so much.”

Yet she is confident that even in the event of a war, Nepal won’t be coerced to choose sides. “India never consulted us during its previous wars with Pakistan. There is no reason things should be different this time,” Adhikari says.

Unlike in India, there is still a huge constituency in Nepal that believes SAARC is still the best platform to deal with regional issues. As its current chair as well as the permanent host of its secretariat, Nepal will continue to fly the SAARC flag.

Both the sides are trying to dial it down. The Oli gov­ernment has asked the US to differentiate between the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) and the coalition govern­ment the party leads. By calling on Prime Minister KP Oli on Feb 5, the US Ambassador to Nepal Randy Berry also gave a clear signal: while his country is still mightily displeased with the turn of events in Nepal around Venezuela, it is not in a mood to let this single issue spoil overall bilateral relations either. The ‘centrality’ of Nepal in the Indo-Pacific Strategy adds to the urgency of a quick dispute resolution.NCP co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s strong statement on the unfolding crisis in Venezuela came only a day after the UN and nine foreign embassies in Kathmandu came out with a strong statement of their own on transitional justice. In their Jan 24 statement the international com­munity had called on Nepal’s government to ensure that conflict victims get timely justice, in line with the Supreme Court verdict. Four years ago, the apex court had ruled out a transitional justice mechanism that provided near ‘blanket amnesty’ in conflict-era rights violations.

Dahal and top lead­ers of the former Maoist party have always sus­pected what they see as the ‘needless interven­tion’ of western powers in Nepal’s transitional justice process. Perhaps their biggest fear is that they could be apprehended and jailed abroad under international juris­diction. Dahal has already had to cancel some of his foreign engagements in fear of arrest. Interestingly, neither India nor China had signed the joint statement on transitional justice. With these two missing, the former Maoist leaders felt the initiative had to come from the US, the third most important foreign actor in Nepal.

On what many top Maoist leaders see a life-and-death issue, PM Oli is also in no position to backtrack from Dahal’s statement issued on the NCP letter-pad. This is also why Dahal has refused to back down either. As noted in this space last week, there were other reasons behind the communist government’s strong stand in favor of Venezuela, chiefly China (a big investor in Venezuela), Nepal’s perceived ‘cen­trality’ in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Oli’s yearning to assert himself on the global stage.

The whole episode was also a potent reminder of the risks of lingering on transitional justice, the third vital leg of the peace process after the management of the Maoist arms and army and constitution-writing.

The storm Nepal Communist Party Co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal kicked up by commenting on the internal politics of Venezuela refuses to die down. On Jan 23, the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president of his country claiming that the incumbent President Nicolas Maduro had lost public faith. On the same day, US President Donald Trump recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president. Follow­ing this, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said time had come “for every other nation to pick a side… Either you stand with the forces of freedom or you’re in league with Maduro and his mayhem.”

On Jan 25, speaking on behalf of his party—when Prime Minister and NCP co-chairman KP Sharma Oli was in Davos—Dahal issued a strong statement on Venezuela. He termed Guaidó’s elevation as president and the prompt US recognition as “the grand design against the legitimately elected President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro and the Venezuelan people.” The statement also accused the US of “trying to create chaos and violence” in Venezuela, urging it instead to respect the UN principles of “non-interference, national sovereignty and peaceful coexistence”.

American officials in Kathmandu were nonplused. Was this the position of the NCP-led government of Nepal, the US Embassy wanted to know? Following this reaction, and endless speculations in popular media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jan 29 issued an ‘official state­ment’ saying “Nepal believes that internal political problems of a country need to be resolved within its constitutional parameters in a democratic manner, free from external inter­ferences”. In other words, the government position is not much different to Dahal’s statement; the underlying message being that the ‘external interference’ of the US in Venezuela is unacceptable.

There are a few explanations for this. One, following the withering criticism of the Oli government for ‘agreeing’ to be a part of the US-led (and arguably anti-China) Indo-Pacific Strategy, the communist government felt the need to assert its independent status. Two, Nepal being pulled into the US strategic grouping would not have gone down well in Beijing, and the Oli government wanted to show it is far from an ‘American stooge’. It is also not a coincidence that Beijing is lending support to Maduro. The Chinese depend on him to protect their investments (now upward of $82 billion) in the Bolivarian republic.

Many have labelled Nepal government’s handling of the whole affair ‘immature’. ‘Calculated’ may be a better word.