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The federal government has been loath to devolve power and resources to the provinces and local bodies, in a clear violation of the spirit of federalism. Of course, the picture is nuanced. Members of the provincial assemblies, for instance, are constantly looking for guidance from the center, as they struggle to settle even petty provincial agendas. But, again, this is to be expected as they don’t feel empowered enough to make crucial decisions like deciding on the name and capital city of their province.

A curious spectacle is now unfolding over the naming of Province 3 and the selection of its capital. The nine-member Nepal Communist Party Secretariat has issued a diktat to its Province 3 assembly members that the province should be named ‘Bagmati’ and its temporary capital of Hetauda should be made permanent. The constitution clearly states that the twin duties fall on the provincial assembly. Yet when members of the NCP parliamentary party in Province 3 could not come to a consensus, they brought the issue before the party secretariat. The assembly members who were all along for Hetauda as the permanent capital supported the secretariat directive, while those pitching for alternative places decried the ‘interference’.

As the NCP has 80 seats in the 110-member Province 3 Assembly, the parliamentary party had enough votes to push through its recommendations. And yet they were bitterly divided. In this situation of a deadlock, it may seem natural for them to look up to their political masters for guidance. Yet the NCP secretariat offered not so much its guidance as settle the matter altogether. Federalism works only when the provinces and local bodies feel adequately empowered to take important decisions and settle differences on their own.

If top party leaders were serious about federalism, they would have better trained representatives of the provincial and local governments to expect and handle such problems on their own. There would have been greater debate on the suitability of certain provincial names and capitals. The kind of administrative federalism that the central-level leaders seem keen on, with decision-making still centralized in Kathmandu, is token federalism. Some friction was to be expected in the implementation of federalism. Our political leaders’ fecklessness has greatly increased that friction.

If foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics, our diplomacy is unsurprisingly messy. The government claims ‘diversification’ is at the heart of its foreign policy and has therefore tried to engage countries from around the world. This engagement’s most notable feature has been the many high-level foreign visits of top government officials, nearly everyone from the prime minister down. PM Oli even went to such exotic locations as Costa Rica and Cambodia, besides his more routine trips to India and China. What has come from these visits is unclear.

What is clear though is that the ruling Nepal Communist Party feels an ideological affinity for the Communist Party of China, and so Nepal has gotten progressively closer to its northern neighbor in the past two years. Part of it was warranted. Diversification in the Nepali context makes little sense without closer ties with China. But the chumminess between the establishments of the two countries could argu­ably hurt the diversification policy. For one, the closer Nepal gets to China, the greater will be the unease in New Delhi and Washington DC.

Fans of King Mahendra point out how the absolute mon­arch kept the country on track in its international dealings, even if his domestic policies were problematic. When the king charted a course, everyone followed, leading to con­sistency in dealings with the outside world. As he did not have to pander to any power center, the argument goes, his foreign policy was solely based on national interest. Another way of putting it is that authoritarian governments are better in some ways than democratic ones.

The picture is more nuanced. China has charted a clear foreign policy course under Xi Jinping. But its initiatives abroad generate great controversy just because China is not a democracy. While poorer countries readily open up to Beijing, they get warier as they get richer. On the other hand, even while big democracies like the US and India often betray their values, there is also this default goodwill toward them, at least in other democratic states. (Whether this goodwill is at all warranted is another matter.)

As many observers of Nepali diplomacy advocate, Nepal should emulate certain aspects of China (its meritocracy, its technological edge) while shunning its politics. Theoret­ically, this is possible. Yet the Chinese rulers also demand a guarantee for the huge investments they make in Nepal. What better way to ensure that than by supporting a strong power center—former monarchs before 2006, and the NCP now? But such a prospect spooks other democratic forces in Nepal, as well as its friends abroad.

Economic diplomacy has been getting plenty of hype of late, as Trump pushes for a pure mercantilist world. In this world, it is possible to diversify your economic ties while safeguarding your ‘traditional beliefs and values’. Contrary to popular belief, I have always held that nation-states are unique entities that have different priorities at home and abroad. For instance, while an abiding faith in human rights may be a country’s core national value, that too can be open to negotiation while conducting diplomacy. For both democracies and non-democracies the pursuit of the vaguely defined ‘national interests’ abroad is often cruelly undemocratic.

A defining characteristic of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP)-led government is its intolerance of criticism. Those in the federal government, which enjoys a near two-thirds majority in the parliament, apparently believe all their critics are enemies who need to be silenced. This comes from a deep-seated fear of having to confront and deal with their many shortcomings. So it is intent on stifling dissent and getting the media to strictly adhere to its ad hoc limits.

A twin set of bills now in the federal legislature would make it a crime to post any content critical of the federal government on social media. Just for expressing their opinion online, a person may be fined between 0.5-1.5 million rupees or be jailed for 5-15 years. Given the vague incriminating terminologies like ‘defamation’ and ‘bullying’, just about any critical post online could be deemed problematic. As troubling are the provisions that allow the National Investigation Department, the state intelligence agency, to snoop on a person or organization under its investigation, including by looking at their phone and online conversations.

There has been no justifiable explanation for why more of such draconian laws are needed, when existing laws are enough to monitor and investigate suspected activities online. As controversially, another bill aimed at curtailing press freedom had been introduced earlier in the year.

So are we headed toward a totalitarian state? We cannot draw that conclusion yet. In India, despite the BJP regime’s best efforts to buy influence and cow the media, dissenting voices are still strong and continue to make the government jittery. These days, even one-party China struggles to keep its citizens away from ‘unwanted’ online content. Besides, Nepal’s democratic space has been continuously expanding since the 1990 political change, and even an all-powerful communist government will struggle to take the country back to the days of the Panchayat surveillance state. Nor is a communist dictatorship possible here.

But if recent measures are not enough to completely reverse Nepal’s democratic gains, they could act as roadblocks in the country’s progress toward a fully democratic state. If, tomorrow, the Nepali Congress gets to lead the government, it would also have every incentive to continue these troublesome laws to stifle criticism against it and mute opposition voices. The NCP is taking the country down a dangerous path. A vigorous defense of free speech from across the social and political spectra is the need of the hour.

Ever since KP Oli’s blockade-time ascendency to the prime min­ister’s post in October 2015, Nepal’s foreign policy has been all about diversifying away from India and cultivating closer links with China. There is now little doubt that the mighty Nepal Communist Party (NCP) under Messrs Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal is looking to emulate the even mightier Communist Party of China (CPC): both its organization and development path for China. The clearest indications of this came in 2019, a year which will be remem­bered as a watershed in Nepal-China ties. A year many Nepalis felt their country’s palpable tilt to China.

Back in April, President Bidya Bhandari visited China and signed the protocol to the bilateral trade and transit treaty that Oli had con­cluded in 2016. This opened up new routes of international trade for Nepal via China, in what the govern­ment touted as Nepal’s first major step toward changing itself from a ‘land-locked’ to a ‘land-linked’ country. During that visit, Bhandari formally invited her Chinese coun­terpart, Xi Jinping, to visit Nepal. For most of the next six months, there were constant rumors about Xi coming to Kathmandu—and all its geopolitical ramifications. Xi came, in October, to a rousing reception, breaking a 23-year hiatus since the last Nepal visit of a Chinese presi­dent.

In terms of agreements, the Xi visit under-delivered. Yet there were still some crucial ones, like the 50-km Kathmandu-Keyrung tunnel road and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters. The much-discussed cross-border rail­way line still seems some way off. By stepping on the legal assistance treaty, hundreds of Chinese accused of involvement in criminal activities are now being deported to China. In an extraordinary event, members of the Chinese intelligence and police were in Nepal to help Nepal Police with the arrests.

The Oli government can be seen as reaching out to countries big and small around the world to enhance Nepal’s diplomatic clout. Yet make no mistake. For better or worse, there has never been a more Chi­na-friendly government in Nepal. Perhaps few other countries have embraced the BRI as enthusiastical­ly. In 2019 the communist govern­ment gave the clearest signal yet of its readiness to forge the strongest possible ties with China. A year of unprecedented increase in Chinese business and political interests in Nepal—not least because of growing US activism under the IPS—2019 will long be remembered as the year when Sino-Nepal ties for the first time overshadowed Indo-Nepal relations in popular imagination.

 Is the Millennium Challenge Cooperation compact a part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy? American officials say it certainly is. Our government says it definitely is not. One of them has to be wrong—and it is our government. The grant giver gets to decide how to classify its money. The taker then has the choice of either accepting or rejecting the offer. The Nepal government has adopted a strange position. It cannot say it will accept the MCC, despite it being a part of the IPS, as the electricity and road projects under it are vital for our development.

It is instead saying that the grant givers them­selves don’t know what they are talking about.It is also interesting how the MCC debate has been framed. Even the most ardent opponents of the MCC in the ruling party have no problem with the compact if the Americans clarify that it is not part of the IPS. What is wrong in this prin­cipled position? Isn’t it the Americans who have added to the confusion about the MCC by trying to retrospectively lump it under the IPS? The Nepal government says it will accept the MCC but not the IPS. But what if you can’t separate them?

Again, I am not qualified enough to work out the proj­ect’s economic benefits for Nepal. In fact, the cross-bor­der transmission lines the $500m grant will help build might be in Nepal’s inter­est. All I want is for our government to stop fooling us. The NCP leaders in the government must be under tremendous US pressure to ratify the compact. Those of them outside the government are under less pressure and can voice their concerns—as they rightly have.

The American ambassador says if Nepal rejects the grant, it will go to some other country, and Nepal will lose out. If so, why is the US so insistent that Nepal accept the grant? Why not give it to another needy country and teach Nepal a lesson? But, no, the Americans are putting all kinds of pressure on the government to accept it. This only adds to the suspicion that the MCC, just like the IPS, has an ulterior motive. Yes, there is no mention of any IPS stuff in the MCC documents. But what if the Americans argue tomorrow that the MCC was approved by the Nepali parliament after it was declared a part of the IPS, and hence Nepal ipso facto accepts the IPS?

Either our government is so naïve that it has started believ­ing in free lunches in international relations. Or it has been put under so much pressure it has become impossible to put off the MCC any longer. Whenever we get any assistance in cash or kind from abroad, be it from India, China, or the US, the first question to be asked is: Is it in our national interest? If the MCC is in our interest, why so blatantly lie to get it approved? If it is not, the near two-third Oli government, I am afraid, is a bit of a paper tiger unsuited to dealing with the new geopolitical challenges facing Nepal.

The writing had long been on the wall for the Samajbadi Party, the 17-seat outfit in the federal lower house that helped KP Oli secure a resounding two-thirds ruling majority. Ever since Upendra Yadav’s Federal Socialist Forum, Nepal united with Baburam Bhattarai-led Naya Shakti back in May, Bhattarai had been pestering Yadav, who was then a deputy prime minister and minister of health, to quit the government and hit the streets. Bhattarai reckoned the Oli government had no intent of amending the constitution and the Samajbadi Party would only squander its political capital in Tarai-Madhes by hanging on.

But with the next set of elections nearly four years away, Yadav calculated, he had more to lose than gain by quitting the government. Elections are expensive and there could be no better way to boost the Samajbadi’s electoral war chest than by sticking with Oli. Yet it increasingly appeared as if Oli was fed up with the insubordinate Yadav and wanted him out. The clearest hint of this was the change last month of Yadav’s ministerial portfolio from health to law without his knowledge. This was ignominy, and yet the veteran Madhesi politician swallowed it.

But it got all too much when the ruling NCP forged an alliance with the 16-seat Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN), the Samajbadi’s arch-rival in Madhes, for seat distribution in the National Assembly, the federal upper house. The sudden alliance spooked Yadav, for not only could it clear the way for RJPN’s entry into the federal government, but also potentially destabilize the Samajbadi-RJPN ruling coalition in Province 2. There was no way a politician as astute as Yadav could have missed the symbolism of a red carpet welcome of his rival party into the federal government.

Perhaps there is already a secret deal between the NCP and the RJPN to facilitate the latter’s entry into the federal government. Otherwise, it would have been risky for the NCP to lose Samajbadi’s support just when rumors swirled about the likely merger of two rival Madhesi parties. With Madhesi parties consolidating, the NCP could have had to pay electorally in Province 2. But with elections still three years away, you wouldn’t bet against the RJPN joining the federal government. What about constitutional amendment then? No one seriously believes it will happen any time soon, whoever is or is not in the government

DIPLOMATIC LICENSE
I may be wrong

When I broke the news about the impending arrival of Chinese President Xi Jinping a few months before his Kathmandu touchdown, the ‘revelation’ was mostly greeted with skepticism. Where were the preparations to welcome one of the world’s strongest leaders? How was it that only I knew? For me, it was a simple case of a trusted source in Beijing passing the information. But did I really ‘know’ Xi was coming? Of course not. There could have been legions of reasons why his trip would have been postponed or even cancelled—in which case, many would have greeted my prognosis with derision.

Then I wrote of how, if he could somehow excuse himself from Donald Trump’s impeachment inquiry, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo could also come to Nepal. Of late the strategic salience of Nepal for the Americans has increased by leaps and bounds. Given how active the Chinese have been here, an acquaintance from foreign ministry recently quipped, “I wouldn’t be surprised if Trump himself makes the trip.” Then I said Narendra Modi could travel to Kath­mandu, hot on the heels of Xi, for predictable reasons. I could be wrong on both counts.

It’s hard to forecast how even your closest friend or family member will behave tomorrow. In international relations, we are talking about the behavior of entire states, if the concept of ‘state behavior’ makes sense at all. Francis Fukuyama famously predicted the ‘end of history’ and the global dom­ination of liberal democracies. Nearly three decades on, Fukuyama maintains he was not entirely wrong: it will just take a little longer for the total triumph of the liberal order to be apparent.

But in a recent Freakonomics podcast, he confessed to being wrong about something else: the Iraq war. Fukuyama had initially supported the 2003 invasion, but when no weap­ons of mass destruction turned up, and Fukuyama learned that the US had no exit plan, he withdrew his support. For admitting he was wrong, the ‘neo-conservative’ Fukuyama was lambasted by friends (who accused him of selling out to the left) and foes (who charged him with feigning repentance with blood on his hands) alike.

Again, it’s hard to predict or even make educated guesses about the future trajectory of a country, much less the world, as Fukuyama was trying with his ‘end of history’ thesis. With so many competing actors and interests involved, you won­der how anyone can ever get things right in diplomacy. Or if all those commentaries and essays and books on Interna­tional Relations are any worthy. Professor of political science and the foremost authority on forecasting, Philip Tetlock, famously found that in soft sciences like economics and political science, the prognostications of experts are as good as those of dart-throwing monkeys.

He advises humility and reliance on multiple, preferably contradictory, sources to improve the precision of your analysis. And, like Fukuyama, the readiness to admit you were wrong. Easier said in a world full of Facebook and Twitter silos

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to be in the mood for a fight, even at great human and material costs. He has just pushed through a divisive citizenship amendment that allows into India members of all persecuted religious minorities in South Asia—except Muslims. This legislation has had predictable results. Muslims around the country have revolted. For a different reason, so have the residents of Northeast India, who fear being inundated by citizens of neighboring countries. Earlier this year, the BJP government in the Northeastern state of Assam started updating its citizenship register, in what has been decried as an attempt to drive out all undocumented residents, even if they have lived in India for several generations. This could result in statelessness of nearly two million people, including around 500,000 Nepali speakers.

The Hindu nationalist government in India is pandering to Indian Hindus’ basest instincts. As the Indian economy cools off and the party’s popularity dips, Modi and his BJP realize that only by stoking sectarianism can they remain electorally competitive. This is unfortunate. Modi got a resounding mandate to govern India, twice, due to his technocratic image—someone capable of getting things done. He promised a breath of fresh air after the staid days of Manmohan Singh.

Yet PM Modi is fast squandering that mandate through a series of ill-advised economic interventions and sectarian policies. A vibrant secular state is now being reduced to a stagnant Hindu theocracy. The new legislation will also affect Nepal. Security types here are already talking about the potential influx of countless Muslims, as India tightens the noose around them. Nepal will face pressure to accept them on humanitarian grounds.

As worryingly, the open promoters of Nepal as a Hindu state, both here and in India, will get a boost, especially if Nepali political parties adopt an electoral logic of emulating Modi’s Hindutwa. For a small country sandwiched between two big powers, it may be unwise to formally speak on the developments in India. But this is the perfect time for sober reflection on the recent violence in India and its implications on Nepal’s national security. For our political parties, the message should be that religion is not something to be trifled with. Even the mighty Modi seems to have bitten off more than he can chew this time. Nepal is not India. An openly sectarian party will have a still tougher time here.