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On 8 Sept 2025, thousands of youths descended onto the streets of Kathmandu to protest years of systemic corruption, widening inequality between the political class and ordinary citizens, limited opportunities, and the growing distance between young people and state authority. The controversial decision by the KP Oli-led coalition government to ban 26 social media platforms served as the immediate trigger, but the protests reflected much deeper and long-standing dissatisfaction with the state. Shortly after the ban, hashtags such as #NepoKids and #NepoBaby began trending on TikTok and called for street protests. The movement had no single leader, no party flag, no formal guidelines, and was expected to remain peaceful and non-violent, as most protesters were teenagers and many of them in school uniforms. However, the demonstration did not unfold as anticipated. Protesters breached the first police barricades near Everest Hotel in New Baneshwor and advanced toward the main gate of the Federal Parliament, where some attempted to climb the gate. The government failed to control the protest and responded with extreme brutality, killing 19 individuals that day. In the evening, Oli convened a cabinet meeting. Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak resigned, and the government announced the withdrawal of the social media ban, but it failed to anticipate or manage the consequences for the following day. Despite the curfew, the situation worsened dramatically the next day. From early morning, angry protesters moved with a different intensity than the previous day. Government buildings and state institutions were vandalized and set on fire. Politicians and their properties were targeted, and amid the chaos, thousands of prisoners escaped from prisons. By the afternoon, Oli submitted his resignation to the President, but by then the situation was already out of control, with massive national losses. Following his resignation, Oli was evacuated by the Nepal Army to a safe location amid ongoing attacks and threats against political figures. From that night onward, the Army took control of security across Kathmandu and other areas to restore law and order, enforce the curfew, and stabilize the country during the power vacuum. This continued until an interim government was formed under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki on Sept 12, with the mandate to hold elections on March 5. The movement ended with a heavy human toll, massive economic losses, and several days of national crisis. Despite these costs, it opened space for intense intra-party debate, especially among younger members of major traditional parties who began demanding immediate leadership change and grassroots-level reform. Nepali Congress: Revolt to reform Nepali Congress (NC), the country’s oldest democratic party and a key player in the pre-protest coalition government with CPN-UML, faced immediate backlash. Its headquarters and leaders were attacked, and internal conflicts between the establishment faction led by Sher Bahadur Deuba and the reformist faction led by Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma intensified. Soon after the uprising, Thapa and Sharma issued a joint statement and video message acknowledging the GenZ movement, admitting their party’s repeated failures to understand citizens’ demands despite being in power multiple times. Reformist leaders feared not only for the party’s future but also for their own political relevance. They strongly demanded party reform, generational handover, and serious reflection on past mistakes to build a “New Congress.” The party faced two main options: proceed to elections under the existing leadership, as favored by the establishment faction, or pursue reform through a regular or special convention, the core demand of the reformists. As internal tussles continued, the reformist faction began collecting petitions from party representatives nationwide under Article 17(2) of the party statute, which mandates a Special General Convention if at least 40 percent of delegates submit a written request citing specific reasons. Meanwhile, the establishment faction pushed for the restoration of the dissolved House of Representatives. Deep disagreements gradually pushed the party into prolonged internal turmoil. On Oct 14, Sher Bahadur Deuba appeared at a Central Committee meeting after recovering from injuries sustained during a mob attack on the second day of the protests. He called for party unity amid national unrest, condemned organized violence, and acknowledged GenZ demands for good governance. He pledged to hand over party leadership after the 15th General Convention and temporarily stepped aside as party president, appointing Vice-president Purna Bahadur Khadka as acting president. Despite expectations that Deuba’s move would ease tensions, divisions only deepened. The establishment faction opposed holding a convention before the March 5 elections, arguing it would disrupt preparations, while reformists insisted that pre-election change was essential to address youth demands. The Thapa–Sharma faction strengthened its position by securing support from more than 50 percent of convention delegates for a special convention, while establishment leaders focused on restoring the dissolved House. On Dec 1, after two months of heated debate, the Central Working Committee announced the 15th General Convention for Jan 10–12 in Kathmandu, a move widely seen as an attempt to sideline the demand for a special convention. Reformists warned that if the regular convention failed to proceed, a special convention would be unavoidable. On Jan 2, the convention was postponed until after the elections, citing logistical challenges and campaign priorities. In response, the reformist faction rejected the delay and began preparations for a special convention. On Jan 8, the Thapa-Sharma faction officially announced a Special Convention for Jan 11-12 at Bhrikutimandap, despite strong opposition from the establishment. The convention opened with enthusiasm and hopes for a “New Congress.” Thapa and Sharma presented political and organizational proposals outlining their vision for party transformation. Meanwhile, fears of a party split grew as candidate selection, which was scheduled for Jan 20, remained stalled. Organizers claimed 56 percent delegate participation, though the official list was never released. The establishment faction dismissed the convention as illegitimate and unconstitutional. On Jan 14, the Deuba faction expelled Thapa, Sharma, and Farmullah Mansoor for five years, removing their general membership. This marked the third major split in Nepali Congress’s history since 1950. In response, representatives at Bhrikutimandap formed a new Central Working Committee under Thapa’s leadership until the next regular convention. Both factions approached the Election Commission (EC) seeking official recognition. The Thapa-Sharma faction argued that their convention followed party statutes and enjoyed majority support, while the Deuba faction insisted it was illegitimate and threatened nationwide protests if rejected. The EC later recognized Thapa’s faction as the legitimate Nepali Congress based on majority delegate support. The Deuba faction rejected the decision, alleging external interference. The matter is now before the Supreme Court, and NC is heading into the elections under Thapa’s leadership, while the establishment faction remains largely silent. UML’s radical stance CPN-UML adopted an antagonistic stance toward the GenZ uprising from the outset, choosing confrontation over introspection. Amid widespread turmoil and party leaders under the army protection, Shankar Pokharel called for dialogue to safeguard constitutional democracy while strongly condemning the Sept 9 vandalism. The party appeared divided. Leaders such as Ishwar Pokhrel, Surendra Pandey, and Yogesh Bhattarai acknowledged past mistakes and called for reform, while Shankar Pokharel and Mahesh Basnet remained firm supporters of Oli. Unlike Nepali Congress, these divisions were not strictly generational. Following Oli’s return from army protection, reformist voices gradually faded. The Oli camp’s framing of the movement as anarchic and disastrous became the official party line, accompanied by conspiracy narratives and harsh criticism of the Karki-led interim government. UML strongly pushed for parliamentary restoration. At the Oct 15–18 Central Committee meeting, reformists urged Oli to step down. When he refused, they shifted focus to demanding a general convention to restore legitimacy. The party’s 11th General Convention was held Dec 14–16 in Bhaktapur. Despite public expectations for leadership change, Oli was re-elected for a third term, effectively closing the chapter on internal reform. Maoist’s cosmetic adjustment As an opposition party, CPN (Maoist Center) expressed solidarity with the Sept 8 protests and demanded the prime minister’s resignation. Despite suffering losses during the unrest, Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal acknowledged the youth movement and sought to position himself as adaptable and open to generational change. He accepted the interim government and focused on the upcoming elections. On Sept 26, Dahal dissolved the party’s central and standing committees, forming a convention organizing committee with himself as coordinator. While framed as reform, internal tensions persisted. Leaders like Janardan Sharma openly criticized Dahal’s top-down approach but failed to generate substantive change. Sharma later joined Baburam Bhattarai’s Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party. Unlike in NC, there was no strong generational push for leadership change. On Nov 5, Dahal initiated a unification of nine leftist parties, forming the Nepali Communist Party with himself as coordinator. While framed as consolidation, the move appeared more like rebranding, retaining the same leadership and political culture under a new name. RSP: From early blunder to alternative force The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), founded in 2022 with anti-establishment rhetoric, emerged as the fourth-largest parliamentary force. While it initially supported the GenZ movement and demanded the prime minister’s resignation, its political immaturity became evident. On the second day of unrest, senior leaders focused on mobilizing pressure for Rabi Lamichhane’s release from prison, even as the country burned. That same day, more than 13,000 prisoners, including Lamichhane, escaped, triggering a national security crisis. RSP faced widespread criticism, and leaders such as Sumana Shrestha left the party citing internal democracy concerns. Nevertheless, RSP continued to support the interim government and opposed parliamentary restoration. Seeking to position itself as a credible alternative, RSP unified with Bibekshil Sajha on Nov 30. After Lamichhane’s release on bail on Dec 19, the party endorsed Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah as a prime ministerial candidate, despite controversies surrounding his role during the unrest. An agreement with the Ujjyalo Nepali Party briefly followed but later collapsed. As elections approach, parties are contesting independently, without coalitions. While many claim to be “new” or “reformed,” the fundamental nature of Nepali politics remains largely unchanged.