Prime Minister KP Oli’s China visit has stirred the pot, with some experts terming it as a diplomatic maneuver aimed at counterbalancing India and fueling speculations that India was not too keen on extending an official invitation to him. Additionally, the two major ruling coalition parties, the CPN-UML and the NC, have differing interpretations of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as viewing it as grants versus aid. These differences, along with their political and ideological leanings toward either China or India, have sent out mixed signals regarding Nepal’s relationships with its neighbors. Many Indian politicians, media outlets and think tanks view the BRI as China’s key foreign policy tool aimed at influencing the signatory countries' domestic and foreign policies. For instance, a recent heated debate in the Indian Parliament focused on the perceived shift of India’s neighbors toward China and India’s failure to build trust with them. India’s Member of Parliament Manish Tewari questioned the efficacy of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Neighborhood First’ policy even as Nepal and China signed on the BRI cooperation framework during Prime Minister Oli’s recent visit to China, triggering considerable debate in India’s nationalistic media. India’s relationship with Bangladesh and other neighbours is on a rough patch. Bangladesh’s popular movement, which toppled the regime of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August this year, has created friction between the two countries, with Bangladesh asking India to extradite the former PM. Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal have tried to strengthen their relations with China often creating friction with India. In South Asia, critics also argue that the appeal of BRI funding and other assistance to India’s neighbours is less about China’s efforts to contain India, which accounts for almost 80 percent of the region’s economy, and more about these countries’ desire to counterbalance or challenge India’s Monroe Doctrine-style regional dominance. Global politics also plays a significant role in South Asian geopolitics. Military conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war and trade tensions, such as the US chip embargo and reciprocal tariffs coming from the US and China, underscore the renewed great power competition involving the US, a rising China, and a revisionism ambition of Russia. India’s fast economic growth, coupled with rising global influence, is also reshaping alliances and the world’s political and economic orders.  In this context, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) comprising India, Australia, Japan and the US seeks to counter China’s growing military and political influence in the Indo-Pacific. Recently, the global economic landscape is shifting in India’s favour, with 69 percent of companies, up from 55 percent in 2022, planning to leave China, and 39 percent favouring relocation to the Indian subcontinent, according to Fortune Magazine. India’s reservation toward Nepal’s closeness with China through the BRI also emanates from the fact that in global power competition, superpowers and rising powers are likely to use military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and technological tools to influence other states and reshape the world order by leveraging foreign assistance in all forms—military, economic and development. For example, China has invested billions in African infrastructure projects and established a military base in Djibouti, with plans for another in Gabon. A key lesson for Nepal is to carefully assess each form of assistance or alliance, accepting or rejecting them based on national interests. At the technical level, Nepal should be aware of risks and opportunities associated with BRI fundings under which China has provided an estimated $1.34trn to more than 20,000 projects based in 165 countries in the form of grants and loans.  The top three recipients of BRI funding over the past two decades have been Russia, Venezuela and Pakistan. China has provided nearly $170bn in development loans to Russia for multi-sector projects, including industry, mining and construction, budgetary assistance to Venezuela for stabilizing the economy and funding of more than $67bn to Pakistan (almost 20 percent of its GDP) whose economy continues to struggle. Chinese loans have been a major source of sovereign default risk in countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Zambia, prompting some to label it as China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. According to World Bank estimates, in 2022, one-third of debt service payments by the 74 poorest countries in the world were owed to China, with many borrowers unable to repay. This has led Beijing to reduce spending on infrastructure projects under the BRI and focus more on rescuing countries in financial distress to help them repay their loans. China is also increasingly focusing on smaller-scale strategic projects, such as green technologies, political party training and cultural exchanges. The key question is not whether to accept BRI funding, but to assess whether proposed projects are financially and technically viable and offer a high rate of return. Fitch's credit rating recently highlighted Nepal’s strong debt affordability, with more than 40 percent of government debt being external and highly concessional. This suggests that accepting BRI loans is less challenging for Nepal than for countries like Sri Lanka or Pakistan. However, the projects must be transformative for Nepal’s development; otherwise, they risk becoming ‘white elephant’ projects. China has recently been scaling back funding for large-scale projects, making it increasingly difficult to secure substantial grants. The challenge for Nepal now lies in its ability to develop projects with high rates of return and secure adequate fundings. Otherwise, submitting a list of projects without concrete funding agreements would amount to little more than a symbolic gesture aimed at counterbalancing India. Most importantly, Nepal should prioritize what is beneficial for the nation while improving its communication of priorities. Nepal must clearly explain why development assistance from its neighbors, including BRI, is not only crucial for its own economic growth but also contributes to regional and global economic integration. This can be achieved by dispelling common myths, addressing information gaps and building trust with both India and China. Countries like Singapore and Mongolia have successfully crafted foreign policies that serve their national interests by earning the trust and confidence of rival powers.  At the same time, Nepal should adopt a balanced approach, maintaining strong ties with both neighbors to secure financial support for infrastructure and development projects, without becoming overly reliant on large loans from either country. Such a strategy would encourage healthy competition between the two regional powers, enabling Nepal to negotiate more favorable terms for its development. As long as Nepal clearly communicates to both India and China that accepting BRI promotes Nepal’s stability, growth and prosperity, maintaining close economic ties with China may not be as sensitive an issue for India as often perceived. Given a divided national political landscape, Nepal needs a consensus on how to handle foreign development assistance and decide which projects to accept or reject. While the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding sparked political division, it also led to a more open debate. In contrast, discussions on the BRI have been less transparent, with limited public information, making the call for parliamentary debate and oversight both valid and reasonable. Most importantly, a national consensus is crucial on the principles for accepting foreign assistance, including inclusion (with civil society participation), transparency (openness about projects and funding), parliamentary oversight (for broader legitimacy) and honest communication with donors on Nepal’s approach and position. While parliamentary approval for each foreign funded project may not be necessary, it is essential for larger projects like the BRI or the MCC Compact. The author is a member of the board of directors at the Institute of Foreign Affairs,Nepal. Views are personal

Asia has been one of the world’s fastest-growing regions, and energy requirement is expected to increase by more than 50 percent until 2040, mainly driven by factors such as industrialization, urbanization and population growth. The general electricity generation dependency upon coal and thermal power in the region is 70 percent for India, over 80 percent for Bangladesh and 58 percent for Pakistan. Despite being a technologically advanced nation, 70 percent of Japan’s energy demand is fulfilled by fossil fuels whereas the numbers for South Korea and China are 80 percent and 60 percent, respectively. The Asian countries use about 0.5bn metric tons of coal annually, of which more than 1.5bn metric tons of CO2 are emitted from the power sector. This heavy reliance on fossil energy resources bears the social cost of extreme air pollution and greenhouse gas pollution. As industries like steel, cement, ammonia and others that release high levels of CO2 are expected to expand during the current decades, it is imperative to develop nontraditional energy sources in the region. Green hydrogen is a clean, versatile energy carrier generated through water electrolysis using renewable electricity. In contrast to grey or blue hydrogen, which are derivatives of fossil fuels and their production emits greenhouse gases, green hydrogen is carbon-free. Its applications are manifold: from powering industry and transport to energy storage and a clean fuel source for power generation. For Asia whose energy mix is dominated by coal and natural gas, green hydrogen offers a pathway to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors like steel, cement and heavy transport. It also aligns with the region’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to limit global warming. The present energy scenario of Nepal shows a comfortable position with an installed hydropower potential of about 3,157 MW, while the total domestic demand is about 1,870 MW. Nepal’s estimated peak electricity demand looks much less at 10,500 MW by 2040 with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW. This excess renewable energy is a perfect opportunity for Nepal to focus on green hydrogen production since water electrolysis can be powered with surplus electricity. Green hydrogen can act as a carbon-neutral and exportable energy vector for meeting the energy transition needs of neighboring Asian countries. Since coal and thermal energy predominate in the countries within the region, exporting green hydrogen from Nepal could be helpful to countries like China, South Korea, Japan, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan to progress toward less carbon-intensive energy sources and, at the same time, spur regional cooperation and growth of the energy sector.  India's rising demand for green hydrogen is a perfect opportunity for Nepal to become a major exporter of green hydrogen. Nepal, being a country abundant in hydroelectric power, could use the excess clean energy to generate green hydrogen to aid India in its decarbonization drive. Moreover, Nepal has the potential to export green hydrogen and its derivatives, such as ammonia, to India via pipelines, enabling further export to East Asian and South Asian markets. While green hydrogen may not currently be the most economically viable energy source, it stands out as one of the most environmentally-sustainable options, aligning with global decarbonization goals. Besides, the geographical location of Nepal, which is adjacent to India, and the ongoing prospects of energy exchange make the country an ideal supplier of green hydrogen. At the same time, this business may lead to the generation of thousands of employment opportunities in Nepal’s energy transportation and logistics sectors and contribute to diversification. Green hydrogen holds the promise of becoming the foundation of Nepal's new export economy in energy and, therefore, could become a long-term substitute for the two most volatile industries in Nepal—remittances and tourism. A 2023 report by the World Bank estimated that if Nepal utilized 10 percent of its technically feasible hydropower for hydrogen production, it could produce 1.2m metric tons of green hydrogen annually, worth approximately $6bn at current market rates. Exporting hydrogen to India, Bangladesh and potentially China would create thousands of jobs throughout the supply chain of hydrogen production, storage, transport and logistics. For Nepal’s economy, which relies heavily on remittances and tourism, hydrogen could diversify revenue streams and reduce trade deficits. The proximity of Nepal to the two significant energy consumers, India and China, places it at a logistical advantage in terms of green hydrogen exports. India’s National Hydrogen Energy Mission has targeted bringing down the price of green hydrogen to $1 per kilogram by 2030, creating massive demand for cheaper imports. And Nepal could be a key supplier. Also, hydrogen trade could be added to existing bilateral agreements such as the India-Nepal Power Trade Agreement (2014). Developing regional hydrogen corridors with shared infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage facilities, would reduce costs. The government’s support is critical to making Nepal a green hydrogen hub. The Nepal Hydrogen Hub plan foresees the utilization of excess hydropower in the production of green hydrogen that can be utilized in Nepal’s economy in green cement and green steel industries, and the excess hydrogen can be exported as green ammonia or transported through pipelines to the Asian market. Setting up a green hydrogen plant for every hydropower project being developed in Nepal would be very costly. In response, the Nepal government should propose a plan to establish four strategic hydrogen hubs to centralize resources for cost efficiency based on the approximate area of hydropower stations. These hydrogen hubs, depending on their distances from either India or Bangladesh, could be used to export green hydrogen, hence providing Nepal with perfect regional markets.  For that, the policymakers need to formulate a National Hydrogen Roadmap outlining the production target, export strategy and incentive for investment. Offering subsidies or tax breaks for producing green hydrogen and related infrastructures can attract domestic and foreign investments. Incentivizing public-private partnerships is critical for mobilizing large-scale capital and technical expertise. Green hydrogen aligns with Nepal’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to achieve net-zero emissions by 2045. Hydrogen can reduce air pollution, improve public health, and contribute to global climate goals by replacing fossil fuels.  Developing robust export infrastructure, such as pipelines, storage systems and transportation networks, will ensure seamless movement to regional and international markets via shipments. This will not only strengthen the Nepali economy but also make it more self-reliant, rather than being dependent on remittances and taxes, which are unsustainable long-term economic solutions. Becoming a green hydrogen export hub will not only position Nepal as a leader in sustainable energy but also create massive employment opportunities and drive the development of green infrastructure to pave the way for long-term economic growth and environmental resilience. Besides, the export of green hydrogen will lower Nepal’s trade deficit by decreasing reliance on imports while creating new revenue streams. This transformation aligns with global efforts to decarbonize energy systems and presents Nepal with an opportunity to lead the region in renewable energy innovation and sustainability.

Over the past 30 days or so, various mechanisms of the Nepali and Indian military along with their team of aides remained active, vibrant and traveled back and forth pursuing a special mission. The spontaneous multilayered communication, coordination among various military and civilian components, and frequent arrangements of combined engagements marks another milestone in the Nepal-India defense relations. As a result of these meticulous efforts, military chiefs of Nepal and India have been conferred the honorary title of general of each other’s army in separate ceremonies. This has been an epoch of bolstering military-to-military relationships, which contributes significantly to Nepal-India relations as a whole.  At this onset, this article seeks to explore the areas of defense cooperation between Nepal and India through the pursuit of a seven-decade-long practice of conferring the title of honorary general to each other’s army chiefs. Furthermore, it analyzes how this practice has reinforced Nepal’s strategic interests and also argues why it is imperative for longer defense cooperation between the two neighbors.  Tracing the practice The Indian Military Chief General Upendra Dwivedi was honored with the honorary rank of General of the Nepali Army on 21 Nov 2024 by Nepal’s President Ramchandra Poudel during an investiture ceremony held at the president’s office, Sheetal Niwas.  A few weeks later, India’s President Droupadi Murmu conferred the honorary rank of General of the Indian Army to Nepal’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashok Raj Sigdel on 12 Dec 2024 amidst a special investiture ceremony held at the president’s office. General Sigdel is the 16th COAS of the Nepali Army to be conferred with such an honor.  The practice of honoring each other’s Chief of Army Staff by conferring the honorary title of General between Nepal and India dates back to the 1950s. Given the world security situation of the early 1950s—the end of the Second World War and the inception of the Cold War—strong security ties and proper understanding among the regional states was vital. In such a pretext, Nepal and newly decolonized India developed an understanding of defense and security cooperation, which has evolved in multiple dimensions since then. Among myriad practices and provisions, conferring the honorary title of General remains one of the most effective and valued practices.  The practice of conferring the title is not only a ceremony that takes place in a certain period but largely beyond that. It transcends through different dimensions of Nepal-India relations, viz defense cooperation, security affairs, diplomatic, social, cultural and spiritual aspects. It also reflects the historical legacy and comradeship the two armies shared throughout the years despite various episodes of turbulence in bilateral relations.  In the context of the changing world order of the 1940s, India was on the verge of being independent from the British colony, whereas Nepal as an independent kingdom was beginning to open up to the world through an open and multilateral foreign policy. As a result of the foreign policy priorities and farsightedness of the time to establish close relations with neighboring countries and put Nepal on the world stage, the practice of conferring the title of honorary General on each other’s army chiefs between the two countries seems to have started.  In 1950, General KM Kariappa, Chief of hArmy Staff of India, was awarded the Honorary General of the Nepal Army for the first time whereas Chief of the Army Staff General Surendra Bahadur Shah was the first from the Nepali side to be honored with the same honorary rank of General. Since then, 16 COAS of the Nepali Army and 20 Chiefs of the Indian Army have received the title. Nepal and India are two independent neighboring countries that share borders in three directions. Although bilateral diplomatic relations formally began on 13 June 1946, the historical, religious, cultural and geographical proximity between the two countries goes back a long time. Thus, the honorary generalship also signifies this deep-rooted bilateral relationship.  Why this matters This unique military practice fosters abundant opportunities to both armies for defense and security cooperation, benefiting both nations. Besides that, it has ample positive impacts, which are shortly described below.  First, this type of practice is an important exercise in military diplomacy. While some say that security and diplomacy are different and opposite issues, in modern diplomatic practice, security and diplomacy are complementary rather than opposite to each other, where the other cannot succeed in the absence of one. Therefore, each country perceives military force as a source of national power along with its geography, population, economic capacity, diplomacy and intelligence. This seven-decade-old practice has proved to be a milestone in deepening relations between the two countries through cordial defense relations. It is globally seen that the trust gained at the military level makes it easier to discuss, and cooperate at other layers of the state. For this reason, in the realm of international relations study, the democratic peace theory suggests that a country doesn’t feel insecure by the hundreds of nuclear warheads owned by friendly states unlike a single nuclear warhead owned by the adversary.  Secondly, this unique practice is part of an ongoing effort to peacefully resolve mutual misunderstandings, disputes and problems that arise from time to time. There have been plenty of examples of continuous efforts for a concrete exit by the various mechanisms formed by the governments of the two countries through expert provisions and insights. Third, the support of friendly military forces is essential during natural disasters and crises. The assistance rendered by friendly military forces during disasters that Nepal has faced at different times is unforgettable. After the devastating earthquake of 2015, 18 military teams from 34 friendly countries extended their invaluable assistance in the search, rescue and relief operations. Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, friendly military forces provided generous support to Nepali Army personnel and ordinary citizens. These are some of the instances of established relations and diplomatic dimensions at the military level. Surya Kiran, an exercise involving the Indian and Nepali armies, is also an example of a platform that prepares to combat such disasters jointly.  Fourth, since the regional security challenges faced by these two countries with open borders can only be addressed through joint response, a practice of institutional trust and cooperation at the military leadership level is a must, which is reinforced by this practice of honorary generalship.   Fifth, the implementation of Nepal’s foreign policy requires significant contributions from all state agencies, governmental and non-governmental, private and professional sectors. Since the visits of the military leadership are not limited to the equivalent level but also with personalities related to foreign, administrative and national security, it provides a way to augment the overall security situation and mutual relations. During the official visit to India, Nepal’s COAS met with India’s defense minister, and national security advisor, including other key defense portfolios. The Indian military chief had also met top political and defense authorities of Nepal during the context of the investiture ceremony. These are the crucial opportunities where defense priorities and concerns are expressed based on mutual understanding and trust. Sixth, although conferring the title of honorary general is an established practice at the military level, it is also a matter related to the dignity of the nation and foreign relations. Established diplomacy at the military level provides support to the country’s overall diplomatic maneuverings mostly in times of state emergencies and crisis.  Lastly, India has not only been the largest defense exporter for Nepal but also remains as a stable and reliable security partner in the region. As Nepal and India share open borders, both countries bear similar kinds of security threats, viz terrorism, cross-border crimes, money laundering and counterfeiting, communal violence and refugee crisis, along with human security threats such as unemployment, food crisis, environmental hazards and natural disasters, pandemic and health crisis. Thus, it is imperative to have smooth, vibrant and spontaneous cooperation between the spearhead security agencies of the two countries to deal with these common security threats.  To sum up, a strong bond between the two armies may eradicate the possibility of a swerve in bilateral relations regarding various issues and areas that Nepal and India confront. Such a unique practice also paves the way for cordial and trustful relations between Nepal and India in the long term. Realizing this matter, the Nepali Army has perceived this practice as an "emblematic of the close ties" between the national armies of the two countries. This practice not only consolidates an inveterate relationship between Nepal and India but also hones the trust between the two armies, which is essential for peaceful coexistence. All in all, this practice helps to amalgamate bilateral interests, creating a conducive environment to pursue the security equilibrium. The author is a Major in the Nepali Army. The views are personal and do not reflect the Nepali Army’s official position

The concept of Non-Resident Nepali (NRNA) citizenship has sparked mixed reactions in Nepal. Some view it as a significant step toward recognizing the contributions of the Nepali diaspora, while others dismiss it as largely symbolic. Since its inception in Nepal as a concept, there has been confusion and ambiguity surrounding the practical implications of this citizenship. With over 7.5m Nepali nationals living abroad, the diaspora has become an important force in the national economic, cultural and diplomatic landscape. As Nepal’s global presence continues to grow, the idea of NRNA Citizenship is gaining importance, both to strengthen Nepal’s ties with its global community and to acknowledge the vital role of Nepali nationals living overseas. The diaspora contributes in multiple ways to national development—through remittances, investments, trade and cultural exchanges, and international reputation. Many NRNs also act as cultural ambassadors, promoting Nepali values and traditions around the world. The introduction of NRNA citizenship aims to formalize this relationship by ensuring NRNs’ increased and significant involvement in Nepal’s political, diplomatic and economic processes. By offering NRNs the right to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections, the citizenship provision seeks to ensure that the global Nepali community has a direct voice in shaping the country’s future. This, in turn, would help foster a stronger sense of national identity and civic responsibility among Nepalis abroad. Granting NRNs the right to invest and own property in Nepal could have both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, NRNs could contribute significantly to Nepal’s economic development by injecting capital, creating jobs, and facilitating trade, while on the other, wealthier NRNs, particularly those from economically advanced countries, could dominate the real estate and business sectors. This could drive up property prices and create economic imbalances between Nepalis living abroad and those residing in Nepal. The influx of foreign capital could distort local markets and exacerbate wealthy disparities, further entrenching inequality in the country. While remittances remain a crucial source of income for many families in Nepal, there are concerns that an over-reliance on NRNs for investment could limit the country’s economic diversification. Nepal might become increasingly dependent on its diaspora for financial support, making it vulnerable to external economic fluctuations. A downturn in the global economy or a decrease in remittance inflows could negatively impact Nepal’s economic stability, especially if the country has not developed other robust sources of revenue. Moreover, as NRNs gain more economic influence, the gap between the wealthy diaspora and the average Nepali citizen could widen, potentially leading to social tensions. NRNA citizenship could also lead to political manipulation. If NRNs are granted voting rights, there is a risk that political parties in Nepal might attempt to influence the diaspora to secure electoral support. This could distort the democratic process, especially in a country with a history of political instability and external influence. Politicians could try to sway NRNs to vote in ways that benefit their political agendas, which could undermine the integrity of Nepal’s elections. Furthermore, nationalist groups in Nepal may oppose the idea of granting voting rights to NRNs, arguing that individuals who do not live in Nepal should not have a say in the country’s political decisions. This could create tensions between those living abroad and those residing in Nepal, especially if NRNs are perceived as receiving special privileges without contributing equally to the country’s development. NRNA citizenship could also cause diplomatic complications. Many countries, including India, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, do not recognize dual citizenship. For NRNs living in these countries, attempting to hold Nepali citizenship while retaining their foreign nationality could create legal challenges. These NRNs may face difficulties navigating the conflicting requirements of their host countries and Nepal. For example, they could risk losing their legal status in countries that do not permit dual nationality. These diplomatic complexities will require careful negotiation between Nepal and the host countries of its diaspora to ensure that NRNA citizenship does not lead to strained relations or legal complications for NRNs. NRNA citizenship presents a unique opportunity for Nepal to strengthen its relationship with its vast diaspora. By granting legal status, voting rights and business opportunities to NRNs, Nepal could benefit from the resources and expertise of millions of Nepali nationals living abroad. NRNA citizenship could also help enhance Nepal’s international standing, improve foreign relations and stimulate economic development. However, these benefits must be carefully balanced against the risks associated with dual citizenship, national security concerns, economic inequality and political manipulation. To make NRNA citizenship successful, they will need to approach its implementation with thoughtful planning and inclusive dialogue. Constitutional amendments to allow dual citizenship must be pursued, but they must take into account the potential risks of divided loyalties and national security. Additionally, diplomatic discussions with countries that do not recognize dual nationality will be essential to ensure that Nepal does not jeopardize its relations with these nations. Moreover, Nepal must work to mitigate the potential for social and political divisions between NRNs and those living in Nepal, ensuring that NRNA citizenship does not create new sources of tension or resentment. If managed effectively, NRNA citizenship could become a powerful tool for bridging the gap between Nepal and its global community. The focus should be on encouraging the diaspora to align with the expectations of the Nepali state through constitutional provisions, not on purely technical issues. Alongside citizenship, the additional rights that the NRNA community seeks should be addressed through continuous discussion and debate, ensuring that all perspectives are considered collaboratively.

The World Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Awareness Week was celebrated from Nov 18–24, with the theme “Educate. Advocate. Act Now”, had a limited impact on community awareness and behavioral change toward rational antimicrobial use. When bacteria, fungi, viruses, and parasites evolve over time and lose their ability to respond to medications, it’s known as AMR, which makes infections more difficult to treat and increases the risk of disease transmission, severe illness, and death. Designated as a ‘silent pandemic’ AMR has claimed three lives per minute, totaling around 36m deaths since 1990. Without urgent policy interventions, and preventative actions, the current projection indicates an alarming rise to 1.9m deaths annually by 2050.  The economic impact is equally staggering, with the World Bank’s 2017 projection estimating that AMR could cost up to $1trn globally by mid-century and force an additional 28m into extreme poverty by 2050, with 93 percent of them residing in low-income countries. AMR was associated with 23,200 fatalities and attributed to 6,400 additional deaths in Nepal in 2019. The country ranks 52nd globally and 2nd in South Asia for age-standardized AMR mortality rates per 100,000 population. AMR includes not only bacterial infections and antibiotic misuse but also resistance to antifungal medications, crucial for treating life-threatening infections in immunocompromised individuals. Fungal illnesses are prevalent in Nepal, especially among those with chronic conditions like diabetes, HIV, cancer, lung disease, and tuberculosis.  A 2015 study estimated 1.87 percent Nepali population suffers from serious fungal infections annually, with conditions such as invasive aspergillosis and cryptococcal meningitis being prevalent among HIV/AIDS patients. Another 2020 research in Bhaktapur found that one-third diabetic patients had fungal infections, caused by Candida and Aspergillus species, resistance to fluconazole and ketoconazole, both broad-spectrum azole antifungals. This underscores the urgent need for improved diagnosis and treatment strategies to tackle antifungal resistance in Nepal. Antifungal resistance affects both human and animal, with escalating antifungal use in veterinary and agriculture contributing to resistant strains. This dual threat compromises treatments, impacts livestock productivity, undermines food security and economics. Studies highlight widespread fungal contamination in food, feed, and livestock, emphasizing the urgent need for awareness, surveillance, rational use, stewardship and containment strategies to safeguard public health and agricultural productivity. Aflatoxin contamination is a significant concern in Nepal, particularly in maize, rice, and animal feed. A 2005 study by Koirala and team observed high aflatoxin in staple foods, posing health risks like liver damage and immune suppression. Another 2024 research by Agriculture and Forestry University revealed very high levels of aflatoxin contamination in the dairy milk in Kathmandu, presenting a serious public health issue. Resistant fungal infections in livestock have reduced milk production and caused health issues. The aquaculture sector in Nepal is also affected by fungal pathogens, which contribute to fish morbidity and mortality, threatening the livelihoods of small-scale farmers, as highlighted by Shrestha and team in 2020 through research at four fish farms. Similarly, a 2009 study by Aryal and Karki from Nepal Agriculture Research Council found a high prevalence of aflatoxins in poultry feed, further impacting the rural economy. Climate change exacerbates the fungal threat by promoting fungal growth and aflatoxin production through erratic rainfall and seasonal variation. Poor air quality increases airborne fungi, worsening respiratory and skin infections, particularly in immunocompromised individuals. Shifting monsoon patterns and poor storage practices raise contamination risks, especially in crops like rice straw used for animal feed. Droughts enhance spore release from Coccidioides, while flooding spreads spores. Climate change also enables fungi to spread into new areas and adapt to higher temperatures, increasing the prevalence of pathogens like Candida auris. The diagnostic approach to antifungal resistance in Nepal involves several key components. Precise fungal pathogen diagnosis is crucial for effective treatment, with traditional methods like laboratory culture and morphological identification being time-consuming and error-prone. Recent studies emphasize the need for rapid diagnostic tests to identify resistant strains for targeted treatment. Leveraging facilities developed during the Covid-19 pandemic, such as PCR, Next-generation sequencing (NGS) and serological tests, could enable robust, faster, precise diagnoses.  The WHO’s AWaRe framework, which categorizes antifungals into Access for common infections, Watch for broader-spectrum requiring monitoring, and Reserve for last-resort options, can guide prescribing practices to contain resistance. Implementing this framework can optimize antifungal prescribing while reducing resistance. Nepal can adapt this framework to suit local healthcare needs, incorporating more accessible, user-friendly methods.  However, patterns of antifungals use reveal concerning trends, with practitioners relying on broad-spectrum antifungals without proper diagnostics, leading to overuse and resistance. Additionally, antifungals used as growth promoters in livestock fosters resistance in animal pathogens, posing risks to human health via zoonotic transmission. Antifungal resistance in Nepal is driven by several challenges such as limited awareness, inadequate surveillance, poor stewardship and weak healthcare infrastructure. Addressing this, the government must establish robust monitoring systems for antifungal resistance in food and feed, supported by regulatory frameworks to protect public health. Evidence-based education and training programs for healthcare providers, veterinarians, and farmers are essential to promote rational antifungal use and raise community awareness about contamination risks. Integrating fungal infections into livestock insurance and providing essential antifungal medications free of charge can improve accessibility. Strengthening collaboration among the Department of Livestock Services, ‘One Health’ stakeholders and local governments is vital for enhancing prevention, diagnosis, and treatment capabilities. Implementing standard treatment guidelines and rational use policies can help mitigate overuse. Cross-sectoral collaboration among agricultural experts, veterinarians, and public health officials is vital. Paired with community campaigns, it can drive behavioral change toward responsible antifungal practices. Research institutions should prioritize studying local resistance mechanisms and innovating new solutions. Adopting the ‘One Health’ approach provides a framework for integrated interventions across human, animal, agricultural and environmental sectors, essential for effectively combating the escalating threat of antifungal resistance. The authors are researchers at the Nexus Institute of Research and Innovation specializing in AMR

Nepal’s geographic and ecological diversity is as vast as its topography. Within a compact territory between two big neighbors, Nepal features nearly every type of global climate and vegetation. The country is home to the world’s highest peak, Mount Everest, standing at 8,848.86 meters above sea level. At the other extreme, the landscape drops to as low as 200 feet above the sea level in Dhaijan, Jhapa, located in the easternmost part of the country bordering India. This striking contrast highlights the exceptional ecological and geographical variety that Nepal encompasses. The topological variation has been the contributing factor in the cropping of the diversified races of people within the country. One of the squarely predominant races of people of Nepal are the Newars who had and have yet eminently sacrificed generation after generation for the making and growth of Newar heritage worthy to contribute in establishing several world heritage sites in Kathmandu valley alone. The Newars are a community in Nepal, composed of both Mongoloid and Aryan ancestry. It is believed that those who trace their origins to the northern regions of Nepal are of Mongoloid descent, while those from the Indo-Gangetic plains are of Aryan heritage. There is also a prevailing belief that the Jyapus of the Kathmandu Valley and the Dhimals of eastern Tarai share a common origin. The Dhimals hold the belief that a branch of their community migrated from the eastern plains to the Kathmandu Valley, contributing to the formation of the Jyapu community. However, there is also a possibility that a group of Jyapus migrated eastward to the plains. The more widely accepted view, however, aligns with the Dhimal’s belief that the Mongoloid people migrated from the northern belt to the valley, shaping both communities. The Newars, compounded with multiple casts and creeds divided into occupational groups, had established the specific identity with an enormous wealth of cultural heritage both in terms of tangible and intangible culture. The tangible cultural treasures like structural designs encompassing settlements, houses, palatial structures, temples, the stupas monasteries, water spouts, dug wells both deep and shallow ones, Jibus (the platforms for performing arts), color combination in murals, frescos, paintings and Thankas, indigenously traditional skills and craftsmanship used in potteries, stone and wood carvings, metal crafts, remarkable accessories of life used in all different events of life giving moments are being accepted as invaluable human heritage.  Intangible, yet, adhered in all tangible modes of Newar heritage: the philosophy of life, value orientation, normative conceptions, and belief systems which grossly give impetus in all domains of life have remained the basic building blocks of cultural heritage throughout the ages and for all the time to come. And the cultural heritage that has been inherited from generations to generations has turned into cultural heritage. In this sense, culture bears the phenomenon of heritage and the heritage of the culture. Under the domain of cultural heritage, Newar cultural ecstasy could well be sensed through audio instruments, visual performances, oral testing and physical being together as well. Each mode of cultural behavior and conduct bears serious philosophical impact on the Newar lifestyle. In other words, multiple aspects of intangible heritage are profoundly engraved into the tangible norms and values attached to the beings of the Newar heritage. Early in the morning, the juniors would pay regard to the seniors by bowing down to their feet. As the juniors would do so the bride does the same to the grooms. In absence of the know-how of the philosophical values attached to the practice of bowing down, one might consider them the symbols of domestic tyranny or male domination. But the fact of the matter would remain away from truth. Neither bowing down to the feet mean male domination nor submission. The implication that the practice casts upon societal value has a serious meaning. It bears the symbolic implication to the preparedness in extending mental support over the significant steps taken either by the husband in case of wives and/or in case of the juniors to the superiors. Life is a movement needing support of many in several ways. The feet are the organs of the human body to make the body move to a destiny. With the help of the feet, we tend to carry ourselves to a certain destiny we assert ourselves to. The feet are the bodily organic mechanism to make ourselves capable of carrying or moving toward destiny. And it is all but symbolic to pay regard to the seniors by bowing down the feet. Regards and honors are expressed in terms of bowing down to the feet of the seniors and the honorables in the form of cultural practice.  Sincere homage is also paid to the demised souls through offering of the Pinda,  an oval-shaped ball of wheat flour coated in black sesame seeds quite symbolic of the embryo inside the womb of a mother or a pregnant woman. As all Hindus believe in the cyclical process of birth and rebirth, so do the Newars—in incarnation and reincarnation. The values and beliefs rooted in such a philosophy need profound and serious analysis. Cultural heritage is adopted by the practitioners either through a process of thorough understanding of the philosophical concept and symbolic meaning attached to them or without understanding them even. Philosophy without practice and practice without philosophy may not exist in any society, yet it is hard for everybody to keep a neat sense of the concept that one might even be practicing. The need for giving expression to the underlying meaning attached in them, thus, becomes an incredibly immense task. As is the case with most of the cultural concerns, so is with the Newar culture that the symbols play a central role in interpreting the philosophical and conceptual bearing upon them. The philosophies of life and conceptual values have mostly been reflected through the symbols or the symbolic designs. The symbolic designs have mostly remained like an exquisite piece of artifact or even as simple as a log or a stone block. It could be glanced through a symbolic prism wherein one can enjoy a connoisseur's test. In most cases, the Ganesh or the Bhairav have remained in the form of a rock, a boulder or a stone block. The insider participants can without hesitation make sense of them. Thus a boulder would remain the symbolic presentation of the Ganesh or the Bhairav. Cultural image and symbol could thus be created upon an object of nature either through carvings, paintings, crafts or even in abstract form. And cultural objects take turn in a noble piece of craftsmanship popularly accepted and adopted by the cultural participants irrespective of insiders or outsiders. Logically convincing or convincingly logical, proven scientific or scientifically proven interpretation and reinterpretation of the cultural objects or phenomena adds lively flavor on the human heritage of a given culture. Culture changes with time, innovation and interpretations that make sense. Likewise, the ecological impact on the Nepali hat the Topi bears a deep sense of meaning that reflects the mountain ecology. The Nepali black hat, Bhadgaunle Topi which has remained a marvelous piece of Nepali costume, bears a symbolic design after the mountaintop. The hat is designed after the dark rocky mountain top so as to reflect the ecological impact on it. The multi-coloured hat worn by most of the Nepalis has been designed after the summer peaks covered with beautiful wildflowers, projecting a very beautiful image of the country internationally.