There could hardly be a more compelling time to write and reflect on the world order, as nations remain deeply engaged in an ongoing contest of power and influence. Writing this feels more of a relatable environment of world order rather than a distant view and it also shapes the way we comprehend our own outlook of the world and human nature. If there’s one thing that’s unchanging attributes of humans, it’s their consciousness for power that drives them restless and impulsive. For power takes the shape of their desires, molding ambitions, igniting conflicts and competitions. This isn’t the end here, as it rather scales up in a larger frame from individuals to states; and then the urge to gain power grows as a continuum; it manifests. Regardless of whether one believes it or not, there’s a significant reality difference between being in actual power to being in proximity to that power.
In light of this idea comes Jo Inge Bekkevold’s article “No, the World Is Not Multipolar” that provides a striking rebuttal and yet convincing critique to the increasingly popular narrative to one of the widely spread beliefs that the International system is an emerging multipolar. The term ‘multipolar’ has been repeatedly invoked in academic debates, by diplomats, policy analysts and media commentators. Global leaders like Antonio Guterres, Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron, Lula da Silva, and Vladimir Putin present multipolarity as an imminent reality every now and then. Bakkevild argues that the narrative rests falsely on the concept of what an actual multipolarity is all about. In response, Bekkevold presents a carefully assembled series of empirical evidence that unfolds how great-power capabilities are distributed clarifying, what truly constitutes the great-power standing
Bekkevold’s idea of multipolar means having at least three state variables as an imperative element such as enough military capacity, economic weight and global influence to shape international outcomes. In this scenario, according to him, only two countries at present fulfills this criteria: The United States and China. At its baseline, this essay roots with Neorealism theory where the diffusion of power is prominently present. Reviewing the commonly contested countries such as Russia, Brazil and India, he claims that each one of them does not meet the criteria. India, for instance, has been an emerging power in the last few years but possesses only a fraction of its economic budget in comparison to China’s economic budget. Similarly, the European Union too, cannot function as a single unified pole because other European countries have very different national interests and their own approaches to foreign policy.
Japan and Germany might be wealthy but they still lack the global reach. Russia has nuclear weapons but its economy too, falls short. In that sense, the conclusion he draws in true sense, is that none of these countries can become as close as the United States and China are. His explanations are backed by concrete measurable data as he refers to SIPRI defense statistics, IMF GDP rankings, and naval deployment figures. These data gives an empirical weight to his argument which is based on political aspiration rather than a structural set of realities. The fact that the United States and China together account for half of global military expenditure, and that China’s GDP counters the combined economies of countries in the world marks a significant scale of unmatched domination.
The most interesting part of the essay is when he mentions three reasons that challenge the popular beliefs of the multipolar world. The first reason being the idea of multipolarity as widely accepted because it is a normative concept which invites a fair international system where the fear of one power gaining momentum and outweighing the other do not exist. The second reason being, that the sense of multipolarity serves as a way of intellectual avoidance as it hints on the intention of such people who want to avoid the new form of Cold war. The third reason is that these things used in common, so as not to leave out the space for the USA to place their leverage.
Part of why these reasons come out is from the influence of political desire rather than an empirical reality. In such a scenario, the author’s explanation showcases a gap between people’s perspective and the functioning of the world order. While the author claims the fact confidently, he bases it around the idea of failed global power distribution and making policies rests around it, which can create serious strategic mistakes. The author’s key point to be noted is around how countries’ failed attempts to understand multipolarity in real sense leads to failed strategic mistakes.
Strategic systems motivate policymaking and when policies are made according to multipolarity, and it leads to policy failures. For instance, his example of Macron claiming Europe as a “third superpower” demonstrates how simple rhetoric confuses allies and creates unrealistic expectations, including Beijing. Similarly, investors who misread the global system risk making costly strategic errors.
In that sense, the author’s perspective fits perfectly with a neo-realistic theory offering explanations about material power like military strength and economic size where every other 4 country goes competitive to gain power. And nowhere does the author mention explicitly about soft power which makes it even more clearer as to the significance of struggle for power gain. The treatment of global power therefore, is relatively static, however the arguments put forward are persuasive enough to improvise the misled narratives. Illustrating the position of the USA and China and the world as a Bipolarity, the author’s motivation holds truth about struggle for power.
The analysis in a nutshell, mirrors the persistent enduring human impulse for power as highlighted earlier, where proximity to power dictates false perceptions, false narratives and false strategic led behavior. Therefore, whether or not the world order is multipolar or bipolar becomes secondary when the desire for power becomes a full fledged influencing factor in the International System. So, in arguing that the world is bipolar is Author’s own conformity that power gravitates towards the strongest–that today’s world order is constantly shaped not by aspirational rhetoric alone but by the hard realities of material capabilities, demanding strategic clarity rather than comforting imaginations.
