The Russia-Ukraine war has evolved into a transnational conflict drawing in thousands of foreign nationals. Available data suggest that approximately 18,000 foreign citizens are serving in the Russian Armed Forces, while more than 130 foreign nationals from over 30 countries have been listed as prisoners of war (POWs) in Ukraine. Among them are Nepali citizens, killed, missing, captured, or still engaged in combat.
The participation of Nepalis in a distant European war is not an isolated anomaly. Rather, it reflects the intersection of global labor migration, economic precarity, militarized recruitment networks, and geopolitical strategy. This article examines the structural drivers behind Nepali enlistment, Russia’s motivations for foreign recruitment, and Nepal’s diplomatic and policy responses.
Foreign recruitment in the Russian war effort
Foreign recruitment into the Russian military must be understood within the broader context of manpower shortages and political constraints. As battlefield losses mounted, Moscow sought to replenish forces without triggering widespread domestic discontent through additional waves of mobilization.
Foreign nationals serve several strategic purposes for Russia in the context of the ongoing war. First, their deployment provides a degree of political insulation, as casualties among foreign fighters are less likely to trigger domestic backlash compared to losses among Russian citizens. Second, recruiting foreigners can be more cost-efficient, often involving fewer long-term welfare obligations, pensions, or social benefits. Third, amid sustained battlefield attrition, foreign enlistment enables rapid operational replenishment of forces without resorting to politically sensitive large-scale mobilization at home. Fourth, the presence of foreign fighters carries propaganda value, allowing Moscow to portray its war effort as enjoying international backing rather than being isolated. Finally, foreign recruits who return to their home countries may function as informal transnational networks of influence, potentially advancing Russian strategic interests beyond the immediate battlefield.
Entities associated with the Wagner Group, a Russian state-aligned private military company (PMC), reportedly played a role in foreign recruitment efforts. Following the failed mutiny led by its commander in 2023, the group was formally dismantled. In the aftermath, the Russian government moved to consolidate control by integrating PMCs into the regular armed forces. As a result, individuals recruited thereafter have been enlisted directly into the military, signing formal contracts with the Ministry of Defense rather than with private entities. Additionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of decrees expediting Russian citizenship for foreign nationals who enlist, thereby institutionalizing recruitment incentives within the state framework.
Motivations of foreign recruits
The motivations of foreign nationals joining the Russian Armed Forces can broadly be categorized into three interrelated drivers: financial incentives, coercion and deception, and ideological affinity. Economic necessity appears to be the most significant factor, as many recruits originate from lower-income countries where domestic wages are far below the compensation packages advertised by Russian recruiters.
Reported monthly salaries of $2,000–$3,000, along with promises of insurance coverage, medical benefits, and pathways to citizenship, create powerful pull factors for economically vulnerable individuals. At the same time, evidence from captured foreign fighters indicates that not all enlistments are entirely voluntary. In certain cases, individuals were allegedly misled with promises of civilian employment, threatened with deportation, or pressured into signing military contracts. There have also been claims that recruitment extended to detainees, with authorities reportedly approaching individuals while they were under arrest, prior to any court sentencing. In such instances, coercive tactics, including intimidation, physical pressure, or blackmail, were allegedly used to secure enlistment.
Additionally, the contracts are typically drafted in Russian, a language many recruits do not fully understand, raising concerns that they may sign binding military agreements without clear comprehension of their terms and obligations. These accounts complicate the narrative of free and informed consent in the recruitment process. A smaller segment may be driven by ideological affinity, particularly individuals from regions historically connected to Soviet or socialist political traditions. Many of these regions remain significantly exposed to Russian influence in their political systems, economic networks, and informational space, which can increase susceptibility to pro-Russian narratives and propaganda, thereby shaping perceptions and motivations. However, in the Nepali context, ideological motivations appear to be secondary to economic considerations.
Nepal’s structural vulnerabilities
The recruitment of Nepalis into the Russian military cannot be divorced from Nepal’s domestic political economy. Nepal’s economy remains heavily dependent on remittances. Youth unemployment hovers near 20 percent, and approximately one in five citizens lives below the poverty line. Per capita income remains under $1,500. Labor migration is deeply embedded in Nepal’s development model; an estimated 1,500–2,000 Nepalis leave the country daily for foreign employment. In 2022–23 alone, roughly 71,000 Nepalis opted for permanent migration. Within this context, Russia emerged as an alternative labor destination, albeit one embedded in a war economy.
Beyond structural poverty lies aspirational transformation. Social media exposure has amplified desires for global mobility, consumer goods, and upward socioeconomic mobility. Russian recruitment advertisements reportedly emphasized high salaries, advanced weaponry, insurance coverage, and immediate citizenship pathways for families. For individuals earning less than $200 per month domestically, the promise of $3,000 represented not only income but social mobility.
Similarly, Nepal’s historical experience with foreign military service, particularly Gurkha service in British and Indian armies, has normalized overseas enlistment as honorable employment. However, unlike treaty-based Gurkha recruitment, current enlistment into Russian forces lacks formal intergovernmental safeguards, transparency, and institutional oversight.
Recruitment mechanisms and trafficking networks
Reports indicate that many Nepalis traveled to Russia on tourist visas, often transiting through the United Arab Emirates. Informal agents and alleged trafficking networks reportedly charged substantial fees, ranging from $1,500 to $9,000 per recruit. In Dec 2023, Nepalese authorities arrested multiple individuals accused of facilitating recruitment into the Russian military. Despite Nepal’s suspension of labor approvals for Russia, anecdotal evidence suggests that recruitment continued, albeit at reduced rates. Russian officials have maintained that foreign nationals joined independently and voluntarily, complicating data verification efforts.
Battlefield realities and human costs
Testimonies from returnees and families describe short training periods, sometimes as brief as 10–14 days, before deployment. Language barriers, extreme climatic conditions, and unfamiliar terrain compounded operational risks. Some accounts allege that foreign recruits were deployed in frontline positions with limited protection. Casualty figures remain contested. Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges dozens of deaths and over one hundred missing persons, while Ukrainian intelligence sources have cited higher involvement numbers.
In March 2024, Ukraine publicly disclosed that it was holding five Nepali prisoners of war (POWs). However, no visible initiatives were taken by the Russian side in response. The families of the POWs have continued to report delays in the dissemination of information and in compensation procedures from the Russians. The lack of clarity surrounding official figures has further contributed to growing public distrust.
Nepal’s diplomatic position
Nepal formally condemned Russia’s invasion and voted in favor of resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly demanding respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. This marked a departure from Nepal’s abstention during the 2014 Crimea vote, reflecting a shift toward a more explicit normative stance aligned with the UN Charter. Simultaneously, Nepal has pursued diplomatic channels to repatriate POWs, recover remains, and seek compensation. However, the state faces structural limitations in monitoring and regulating informal migration routes.
The phenomenon of Nepali participation in Russia’s war highlights several urgent policy challenges for the state. First, it exposes weaknesses in migration governance, underscoring the need for stronger oversight of outbound labor migration and tighter regulation of informal and unauthorized recruitment channels. Second, it calls for more robust anti-trafficking enforcement, including enhanced cross-border cooperation to dismantle networks that exploit vulnerable job seekers. Third, the crisis reflects deeper structural issues within Nepal’s domestic employment strategy, particularly persistent unemployment and heavy dependence on remittance-driven growth, which push youth to seek risky opportunities abroad. Finally, it reveals limitations in consular protection capacity, emphasizing the need to expand diplomatic resources and crisis-response mechanisms to better safeguard Nepali migrant workers caught in conflict zones.
Conclusion
Nepali involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war is neither purely voluntary adventurism nor solely geopolitical manipulation. It is a product of structural economic vulnerability, aspirational pressures, recruitment networks, and wartime labor demand. For Russia, foreign recruitment mitigates domestic political risk and manpower shortages. For Nepali youth, enlistment represents a high-risk strategy for socioeconomic mobility. For Nepal, it exposes systemic weaknesses in migration governance and economic planning. Absent structural reform, similar patterns may re-emerge in future conflicts.
The author is the Research Director at the Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Nepal’s leading think tank
