As the so-called wave of revolutions has swept across South Asia, it is now set to culminate in elections in Bangladesh and Nepal. In Nepal, the interim government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki has proceeded without delay in conducting elections. The country’s politics have remained in flux since the last polls, marked by shifting coalitions and Gen Z–led anti-corruption protests that culminated in the dissolution of Parliament in September 2025. As Nepal’s 30 million citizens prepare to vote amid a fragmented field of 125 parties and more than 2,500 candidates, neighbouring India is watching closely. The outcome carries significant implications for India’s interests—from the reliability of governance and Kathmandu’s foreign policy orientation to regional stability and the future of bilateral cooperation.
While Nepal’s traditional parties retain strong cadre bases, a powerful youth wave has emerged, one that every party is now trying to capture. This churn has produced internal upheavals across the three major parties: the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). Within the Nepali Congress, General Secretaries Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma led a high-profile revolt against the ageing leadership of Sher Bahadur Deuba. This culminated in a January 2026 “Special General Convention,” where Thapa was elected party president, effectively ending Deuba’s decades-long tenure after the Election Commission recognized Thapa’s reformist faction as the legitimate party leadership.
In the CPN-UML, Senior Vice-Chair Ishwar Pokharel, backed significantly by former President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, mounted a direct challenge to KP Sharma Oli during the party’s December 2025 general convention. Pokharel and his supporters criticized Oli’s handling of the GenZ protests and his refusal to step down as prime minister until forced by the uprising. Despite this, Oli retained the party chairmanship by a wide margin.
Meanwhile, the CPN (Maoist Centre) faced a similar crisis. Deputy General Secretary Janardan Sharma openly demanded that Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ resign and take responsibility for the party’s declining credibility and its growing disconnect from youth aspirations. Although Sharma eventually quit to launch his own Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, his dissent accelerated the Maoists’ merger into the broader Nepali Communist Party (NCP) in November 2025. Formally established on 5 Nov 2025, the NCP is a broad alliance of ten leftist factions seeking to consolidate influence ahead of the March 2026 elections. Its core comprises the Maoist Centre and the CPN (Unified Socialist), with Prachanda remaining a dominant—though increasingly scrutinized—figure.
The youth-led movement itself is now split between high-stakes party politics and independent activism. The most prominent “alternative” force has emerged in the alliance between Balen Shah and the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP). In a bold attempt to break with the old political order, Shah resigned as mayor of Kathmandu to contest a parliamentary seat in Jhapa-5, directly challenging UML’s Oli on his home turf. The alliance has positioned Shah as its prime ministerial candidate, betting that the momentum of the protests can unseat the country’s most entrenched leaders.
At the same time, many original GenZ organizers, such as Rakshya Bam, have chosen to stay away from large party structures altogether. Running as independents or under smaller banners like the “GenZ Front,” they argue that joining any major party, even newer ones, inevitably leads to the same compromises. Their focus remains accountability: demanding justice for those killed during the September protests and acting as a “moral watchdog” to ensure the movement’s anti-corruption message is not diluted by electoral politics.
From India’s perspective, New Delhi has historically supported a democratic and stable Nepal, a position reaffirmed after the GenZ protests, when the Indian establishment swiftly recognized the interim government and began working with it. That said, no state welcomes unpredictability in its foreign relations, and predictability is built through continuity, trust, and sustained engagement. From this standpoint, India would prefer that the current political churn ultimately leads to a measure of stability.
India would first and foremost hope that these elections serve as a stabilising force in Nepal’s fractured politics, preventing a relapse into chaos that could raise security concerns along the open border. Elections are also moments when populist and nationalist rhetoric tends to peak, sometimes straining bilateral ties. While such rhetoric deserves attention, it is ultimately the post-election government that matters. Given the current geopolitical climate, a reset grounded in pragmatism and mutual interest will be essential. For now, it is time to let democracy, and the people of Nepal, do their work, while others watch and wait.
The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life member of Delhi Based the Delhi-based International Centre for Peace Studies
