The absence of the United States, China and Russia from recent G20 leaders’ meetings has often been treated as a sign that the forum has outlived its usefulness. That reading misses what is actually changing. The G20 has not disappeared from global economic diplomacy, nor has it been formally sidelined. What has shifted is the kind of work it is expected to do. Where it once functioned as a space for high-level coordination among the largest economies, it now operates more clearly as a forum sustained by those states that continue to depend on institutional stability.
This change reflects the erosion of the conditions that made the G20 indispensable in the first place. The forum took shape at a moment when financial instability moved quickly across borders and reduced the effectiveness of national responses. During that period, coordination was not a matter of preference, it was imposed by circumstance. That sense of mutual exposure no longer carries the same force. Economic policy is now shaped far more openly by strategic rivalry, domestic politics and security concerns. Subsidies, sanctions and trade restrictions are increasingly deployed without serious expectation of collective restraint. Under these conditions, broad consensus-based settings offer limited influence while imposing visible constraints.
The consequences of this shift were visible well before Johannesburg. The New Delhi summit showed that agreement was still possible, but only by narrowing the range of issues treated as appropriate for collective engagement. Disruptions linked to geopolitical conflict were acknowledged indirectly, if at all. This allowed the meeting to remain orderly, but it also reduced the forum’s capacity to engage with the sources of economic instability rather than its symptoms. Once this approach became routine, leader-level participation lost some of its urgency. Johannesburg made that clear.
The effects of selective disengagement have not been evenly distributed. For countries such as India, the European Union and Brazil, participation in multilateral institutions remains closely tied to economic and political strategy. Their economies are deeply embedded in global markets, and their policy objectives rely on predictable regulatory and financial environments. Institutional credibility matters more to these states than unilateral leverage. Unlike the great powers, they cannot easily replace multilateral engagement with bilateral or bloc-based arrangements without incurring costs.
This dependence has also increased their visibility within the G20. India, the EU and Brazil have become central to maintaining continuity in the forum not because they exercise coercive power, but because they retain a material interest in its operation. Their economic weight gives substance to this role. India’s expanding domestic market and manufacturing ambitions place it at the center of debates on development and technology. The European Union brings regulatory capacity and financial depth that influence global standards regardless of geopolitical fragmentation. Brazil’s position in commodity, energy and agricultural markets connects development concerns with climate and food security in ways few other actors can.
India’s recent engagement illustrates how an emerging great-power leadership now tends to function. Its emphasis on digital public infrastructure and development finance draws directly on policies already deployed domestically. Rather than relying exclusively on aspirational commitments, India has used practical experience to structure discussion. This does not compensate for the absence of great-power coordination, but it keeps multilateral engagement connected to implementation rather than rhetoric alone. The European Union operates through a different channel. Its influence rests less on mediation and more on scale. Through trade regimes, climate regulation, and digital standards, the EU shapes economic behavior well beyond its immediate membership. Within the G20, it provides a degree of policy continuity at a time when economic governance is increasingly shaped by short-term strategic considerations. Brazil’s contribution lies largely in its diplomatic positioning. Its engagement with institutional negotiation, the size of its economy, and South–South cooperation allows it to frame issues such as debt relief, food security and climate adaptation as shared economic challenges. In a polarized environment, this ability to keep discussions from sliding into distributive conflict has practical value.
Together, these states help prevent strategic rivalry from overwhelming multilateral settings altogether. They cannot resolve competition between the largest powers, nor can they substitute for the resources those powers control. Major initiatives in areas such as debt restructuring or climate finance still depend on actors with greater influence over capital and markets. Middle powers can align positions and sustain discussion, but compulsion remains beyond their reach.
What has happened to the G20 cannot be separated from what has happened to the political order that made it possible. The United States has already moved away from the model of leadership that sustained this forum in its early years. It still participates selectively, but its priorities now lie elsewhere: domestic industrial policy, security-driven trade decisions and tightly-managed alliances. The assumption that global economic stability requires sustained engagement in universal forums no longer shapes American behaviour in any consistent way.
China’s trajectory is different, but no less consequential. Beijing has not withdrawn from multilateralism. Instead, it has become increasingly selective about the kinds of institutions it is willing to invest in. Where rules, agendas and hierarchies are inherited from an earlier order, China engages cautiously. Where institutions can be designed, expanded or reshaped, its commitment is far more visible. This does not amount to abandonment, but it does reflect an effort to reconfigure the institutional landscape around Chinese preferences rather than adapt to existing constraints. Russia’s position is shaped by yet another set of pressures. Prolonged sanctions and political isolation have reduced any incentive to preserve institutions associated with Western economic dominance. Its alignment with China is less about shared economic vision than about mutual dissatisfaction with the current system. For Moscow, weakening the authority of existing frameworks has become a strategy in itself, particularly where those frameworks are seen as enforcing exclusion.
Taken together, these trajectories point to an uncomfortable reality. There is no major power waiting in the wings to restore the conditions under which the G20 once functioned. The idea that a hegemonic actor will step in to stabilize multilateral economic governance now belongs to an earlier period. That world has already passed. This is why the role of countries and entities such as India, the European Union, Brazil, and others matters more than is often acknowledged. These actors continue to benefit directly from stable, predictable economic frameworks. Their growth strategies, regulatory environments and external engagements depend on institutions that manage friction rather than amplify it. For them, the erosion of multilateral forums is not an abstract concern but a practical problem.
Sustaining the G20, then, is not about nostalgia for an earlier order or faith in institutional idealism. It is about interest. In the absence of great-power custodianship, responsibility shifts to those who still gain from continuity. Whether this responsibility can be translated into real influence remains uncertain. What seems clear is that multilateralism will no longer be upheld by those with the greatest power, but by those with the greatest stake in keeping the system from fragmenting further.
The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of Delhi based International Centre for Peace Studies
