The global geopolitical stage has been rocked with multiple events, protracted theaters of conflict, and competing interests between different actors. At this time, the rapprochement and de-escalation between the two Asian giants, who have been otherwise seen as competitors and rivals, needs to be studied cautiously. The ties between two of the world’s largest economies went haywire after the clashes along the India-China border during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. It caused loss of lives to both sides, causing fundamental alteration in the ties between the two nations.
After disengagement from the last friction point, namely the Patrolling Point 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in 2022, a hope of fragile calm in that region was expected. It needs to be noted that it is not the return of the pre-2020 status quo ante. But there has been an update since last October as both countries are actively pursuing to deescalate their border tensions and resuming some bilateral ties. There have been visits by the officials of both countries, including the Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and National Security Advisors. There is a resumption of flights after a gap of five years, re-opening of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage and lifting of import ban on fertilizers, rare earth metals, and tunnel machines are all part of this new deal.
Whatever transpires in 2024-25 is a tentative, at most a fragile change. After the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi in August 2025, where he met Prime Minister Modi, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Doval, all agreed on the modalities of patrolling the borders, relaxation of Visa regimes, and possible opening of trade corridors. It is of some significance that this is the first meeting Prime Minister Modi will have had in seven years; his visit to meet Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin.
Nevertheless, all these measures do not indicate the resolution of the inherent conflicts. Border regulation systems are confidence-building measures and not solutions. India continues to raise objections to the CPEC, which passes through Kashmir, and the build-up of Chinese infrastructure along the LAC, among other factors, is bound to keep the mistrust tethered.
In the Chinese view, the major strategic motivation of this rapprochement is the multifaceted and growing rivalry with the United States. China has expressed this through its foreign policy that is highly oriented toward its east coast, especially with the strained relationships with Taiwan and the South China Sea as well as the technology conflict with the United States. A constantly war-like border of hot troops with India, a country of increasing might, is an expensive and risky strategic distraction. The possibility of an accidental escalation might spell out a disastrous two-front scenario to Beijing, requiring it to divert its military and diplomatic resources.
Such a Chinese strategic outlook over time has demonstrated as scholar Yun Sun has described, stabilizing relations on one front to free up resources and attention to a more urgent theater. This renewed thaw with India is a sensible de-risking policy, which will help Beijing in reducing the risk of war toward its western flank and redeploy its resources in the central arena of its standoff with the US and its allies. This is also a tactical thrust toward undermining the already existing Western rhetoric of a lone and threatening China, being surrounded by a complete coalition of democratic nations.
To India, the practical effect is a reprieve and a powerful endorsement of its diplomacy. On a pragmatic level, the military and economic burdens of the standoff have been enormous, and the de-escalation of direct tensions enables the government to concentrate on economic recovery and its long-term program of military modernisation.
On a diplomatic level, the biggest achievement is the endorsement of its valued principle of strategic autonomy. This detente is not an isolated bilateral phenomenon but is directly tied to the changing geopolitical environment, specifically tensions with the United States. It must be noted that the defrosting is occurring against a background of what many consider to be the worst period in Indian relations with the US executive in decades. The imposition of high tariffs on Indian products by the Trump administration in the US has revealed the shortcomings of a relationship that was being marketed as a counterweight to China.
In this regard, China has already expressed its discontent with the tariffs and underscored the importance of collaboration between the two Asian powerhouses against unilateral bullying. This has given a strategic leverage that Beijing has seized upon. Engaging with China, New Delhi plays to its partners in the Quad that the application is not an unconditional commitment against any one nation but a collaboration founded in mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific. This stance empowers India by demonstrating that it can juggle its complicated relationship with China in its own way, making it an independent and dominant power.
Among the strategic questions that the thaw poses and mostly depends upon is whether China would re-evaluate its Pakistan policy. Islamabad is vacillating once again between Beijing and Washington. On the one hand, it has inaugurated CPEC Phase 2, pursuing higher Chinese investment in infrastructure.
On the other, it is renewing contacts with Washington, where Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has overtly solicited US investments and is executing diplomatic overtures to the Trump administration. Pakistan, however, would always be an essential ally to Beijing: a strategic partner, a corridor to the Arabian Sea and a warm client to export arms and finance. China is the major source of Pakistani imports of arms and rollover loans continue to be a major source of fiscal stability in Islamabad. It is due to this factor alone that there can be no likelihood of Beijing weakening its strategic commitment.
Optics may, however, change. Such a cautious rapprochement with India does not imply that China will give up Pakistan. The most plausible is that of policy dualism, where China is to remain good friends with Islamabad and chooses to accept a limited cooperation dimension with New Delhi. This reflects its longstanding capacity to compartmentalize: advancing economic relations with India at the same time as keeping closer defence relations with Pakistan.
With a relative calm on its northern frontier, India will have time for maneuvering the bumpy roads of Trump’s foreign policy. The US’ strategic interest in India beyond Trump is a strong, independent India capable of anchoring regional stability. A stable border allows India to focus its resources and strategic attention on the broader Indo-Pacific, directly aligning with US goals. Crucially, it proves the US-India relationship is non-transactional and not solely defined by the current geopolitical rejig. Prime Minister Modi’s proposed visit to China and its outcomes are likely to define or redefine the limits and potential of this thaw.
The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
