Nepal’s political jostling always manages to keep everyone on the edge of their seats—ranging from possible communist reunification to sporadic pro-monarchical protests. However, one constant has kept looming around the mainstream ever since the current constitution’s ratification—a directly elected executive. Apart from the two major parties, this seems to be on every party’s manifesto—from CPN (Maoist Center) to the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). There are, of course, variations to the concept—most of which I’ll touch upon very basically below.
The appeal of a directly elected executive is clear, especially in Nepal’s polity. It brings democracy front and center, appealing to voters eager to sideline political disarray and usher in leadership to provide “effective” governance. The latter is also the reason why this change is championed by parties whilst in opposition but eschewed once in government. This might be why this concept seems irrefutable, as governments struggle to last meaningfully and public perception of governance has consistently been poor. A peaceful transition to a new form of governance—“effective” and “long-lasting”—would appear to be the way out. The issue is, this runs away from its flaws, which are consistently shunned as “details to be worked out”. The details, however, aren’t as bright as political jingoism would have you believe.
The current constitution could be amended to account for two forms of a direct executive—through the President or the Prime Minister. The first option of a directly elected President is heavily favored by the Maoist Center and its close allies. This would mean a single head of state and the government, appealing to those against “political extravagance”. This system would also include a legislature—whether it is directly elected or PR representation as some have suggested. This would include two cases—wherein the directly-elected President holds a majority in legislature, and wherein they don’t. In case they don’t, governance wouldn’t get “effective” and would instead deteriorate as the legislature will likely look to stamp its authority when it perceives an overbearing executive. There’s a strong chance where key legislation like the budget is stalled leading to government paralysis or even shutdown—as evidenced consistently in the United States.
However, let’s assume they do—the President’s party has a commanding legislative majority. There will, of course, be a fundamental question of checks and balances but contextualizing it to Nepal’s polity shows its dangers. A presidential majority might seem like former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s political endgame, given the circumstances surrounding his resignation during his first term. Although it seems long gone now, it wasn’t too soon ago when former President Ram Baran Yadav had to step-in to prevent Dahal’s overreach. Even if one were to disregard that event, a simple look into Nepal’s history with majoritarian governance backed by the military, be it in 2005 or prior to 1990, should inform one of the possible prospects ahead.
However, there’s another noble option to executive governance—one preferred by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and the RPP—through a directly elected Prime Minister. This appeals to ensure “effective” governance whilst shielding themselves from abovementioned critiques. It must be noted that the only modern example of such a system was in Israel, from 1996 to 2001, when they abandoned it. This system maintains the current structure of government, wherein every voter would likely just have an additional ballot for a prime ministerial candidate. This system would similarly have a legislative majority or minority Prime Minister. Although proponents of this governance structure might assume outright majorities to deliver “effectiveness”, this system is likely to render further political clutter than we currently have. Voters are likely to split ballots—more so than a direct presidential election—where legislators represent local concerns and the Prime Minister is to deliver broad governance mandates. There is empirical evidence to support this, and this was also the primary reason Israel abandoned it in the first place. A minority Prime Minister is fundamentally inept to deliver “effective” governance as proponents promise, whereas the presence of a head of state further raises questions on stability in the face of government deadlock—compromising when the head of state needs to interject to possibly replace the Prime Minister.
However, as in the presidential case—let’s assume the Prime Minister commands a legislative majority for their entire term. The Prime Minister is stable for the entirety of their term and can work “effectively”. However, even in this quixotic scenario—a head of state, whomever it might be, will co-exist alongside the Prime Minister as it does now. A majoritarian Prime Minister forces the head of state to reevaluate their boundaries of accountability, as shown by the French fourth Republic or the recent Israeli judicial reform crisis. The head of state must walk an extremely thin line—they can’t enable authoritarianism like Ahmed during the Indian emergency, nor can they impede governance like Mattarella during the 2018 Italian government crisis.
Nepal’s history of Prime Ministers with legislative majorities and a supposedly symbolic head of state, going back to BP Koirala to KP Oli’s parliamentary dissolution, should stress how thin of a line it is for the head of state. This is of course under an “ideal” scenario, where the legislative majority lasts throughout the parliamentary term.
My critique of these respective systems isn’t meant to invite gloom—but rather encourage honest discourse instead of political jingoism. It is completely fair to propagate for either of these systems, but political parties have been given far too much leeway to preach “effectiveness” and direct democracy without a framework of how it would actually work in practice. Nepal needs democratic stability and instead of contributing toward parliamentary maturity, every time a party is in opposition, their campaign is to upend parliamentary democracy altogether.
Parliamentary democracy might appear messy and unstable—but the alternative cannot be to open another Pandora’s box of experimentation. There might be multiple Prime Ministers in a parliamentary term, divergent coalitions and displeasure over governance but diverting to systems unable to stand such basic scrutiny like above isn’t the solution. Political parties need to get into the nitty-gritty constitutional legalese of alternative systems or stop selling this direct election dreamland once and for all.
The author is a graduate student in economics at the University of South Florida
