Analysis on Bangladesh’s UN Water Convention accession and water challenges

Bangladesh’s decision to join the United Nations Water Convention on June 20 is a seminal turn of events given its struggle with transboundary water management, especially in the shared river systems with India. It became a 56th party and the first South Asian country to sign to the framework, and hopes to improve cooperation and fairness in water sharing, which is important to its water security, because it depends on 57 shared rivers, major among like the Ganges and Teesta River, but this decision comes with challenges such as the expiry of the 1996 Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty in 2026 and the pending resolution of the Teesta River dispute, in the midst of political instability domestically in Bangladesh.

The UN Water Convention, known officially as the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, was established in 1992 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and became open to global accession in 2016. It espouses ideals like fair use, do no significant harm, and sustainably manage, as well as requiring cooperation and monitoring regulations and dispute resolution.

This step is in line with Bangladesh’s requirement for an organized tool to control its water resources, since it is highly deltaic by topography and the majority of its river waters are derived from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) system.

The 1996 Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty, which is in effect until 2026, had been the keystone of India-Bangladesh water cooperation, dividing water at the Farakka Barrage to guarantee 35,000 cusecs during the lean season to Bangladesh, but opponents, including Bangladeshi water experts, say it does not come with such a minimum flow guarantee and does not take account of climate-induced variability. So, It’s time of the essence to renegotiate an accord that rivers the treaty, and the principles of the UN Water Convention could help steer a new, more flexible and equitable accord, which might take into account environmental flows and climate resilience.

The Teesta River dispute, which has simmered since an almost-agreement in 2011 was derailed by the political opposition in West Bengal, remains a flash point. The Teesta is crucial for Bangladesh’s north, providing water for farming and other occupations there, but Indian activities upstream and local priorities in the state of West Bengal make sharing difficult. The focus of the convention on the involvement of different stakeholders may also help to foster a discussion involving, for example sub-national governments and communities, as a way out of the impasse.

The convention also provides a legal and institutional structure that would work in Bangladesh’s favor in negotiations. The proposed mechanisms of joint monitoring and data sharing could mitigate hydrological information asymmetry and improve the performance of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), formed in 1972. According to UNECE, the JRC, although a leading body for water negotiations, is not provided with the necessary enforcement capacity, and the convention's modalities for dispute settlement may offer a model. Nevertheless, as India is not party to the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention or the 1992 UN Water Convention, the strength of direct enforcement is limited and Bangladesh must rely on diplomatic persuasion or international attention.

The convention has been gaining global acceptance, with recent accessions by African and Middle Eastern nations such as Chad, Senegal and Iraq, which illustrates its usefulness in promoting cooperation on shared waters, according to UNECE. Bangladesh is free to learn as to how to go about creating joint water commissions in Africa and they may be able to provide an example that could be inaugurated in South Asia with the participation of Nepal and Bhutan for instance.

Domestic Politics Bangladesh’s internal situation has had recent turmoil such as the removal of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the rule of the interim government under Muhammad Yunus as referred to in the user’s question, which could affect its ability to be a capable actor. An unstable political environment can result in ambivalence in foreign policy, thereby reducing its negotiation capability, facilitated with the diplomatic bargaining that is expected to accompany the renegotiation of contracts. Recent reports, including UNEP, call attention to Bangladesh’s cooperation with the UN over the environment, although political obstacles may impede action. West Bengal plays a significant role within India’s federal structure which adds another dimension since local politics often takes precedence over national interests and that further complicates Teesta talks.

Geopolitics are playing out as well with China’s commitment of a $1bn loan for Teesta management last year, as mentioned in the user query, also worrying India. It indicated a mounting trend of preferring to focus on national developmental needs and could push India to a harder line in negotiations over the Ganges treaty.

Bangladesh’s decision to accede to the UN Water Convention is a tactical step to improve transboundary water governance, providing tools for negotiation and cooperation. However, its ability to resolve the Ganges treaty expiration and Teesta dispute will hinge on the ability to overcome political instability, mobilize India, and use third party support. The principles of the convention could provide a spur towards progress, but the outcomes are not a given and will need the active involvement of both countries and the international community. As Bangladesh charts these waters, its regional leadership could in fact become a model for cooperation over water in the region, and lead not to upholding global norms, but rather to their outright adoption.