What do we know about the new BRI deal?

On Dec 5, Nepal and China signed the Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation (FBRC) during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China. While both sides have refrained from disclosing the agreement’s full details, the government has repeatedly emphasized that Nepal is not obligated to take loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, this assurance has not fully dispelled concerns, as the exact modalities of financing remain unclear.

Under the agreement, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s National Development and Reform Commission will act as the implementing agencies. It has been clarified that the BRI is not a bilateral treaty; rather, it will be governed by the laws of each participating country. Additionally, Nepal retains the option to collaborate with third countries in implementing the projects listed under the BRI.

The agreement refers to “aid financing,” a term that has sparked diverse interpretations. The ruling coalition insists that loans are not part of the arrangement, but the absence of concrete definitions leaves room for ambiguity. It is also unclear how this framework differs from the 2017 BRI agreement. Officials have revealed that 10 projects have been shortlisted under the BRI, ending years of speculation about its implementation in Nepal.

Chinese state news agency Xinhua offered some insights, citing the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). According to Xinhua, the agreement emphasizes the principles of planning together, building together, and benefiting together. It seeks to enhance cooperation in critical areas, including the economy, transportation, trade, and industrial development. The NDRC hailed the agreement as a step toward deepening political trust between Nepal and China and fostering high-quality Belt and Road collaboration.

In an interview with CGTN, Prime Minister Oli described the FBRC as a comprehensive umbrella agreement that encompasses diverse sectors such as infrastructure, culture, health, and education. He highlighted its potential to align Nepal’s development strategy with China’s, calling the agreement a significant milestone in bilateral cooperation.

Officials involved in the negotiations stated that the FBRC reflects Nepal’s proposals, with minimal changes from China. A previous draft implementation plan sent by China in 2020 had stalled due to Nepal’s indecision. In 2023, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government came close to signing the plan, but the effort was abandoned at the last moment. Ahead of Oli’s visit, the Nepalese government formed a task force to revise the document, which ultimately produced the FBRC.

Semanta Dahal, a task force member, explained in an Onlinekhabar article that the Chinese draft resembled a broad agreement rather than a focused implementation plan. The FBRC, on the other hand, prioritizes economic and project development cooperation, retaining only the already-listed projects under the BRI. Dahal noted that a dedicated mechanism for future BRI discussions would be established soon.

The FBRC identifies 10 projects, providing clarity after years of uncertainty surrounding BRI’s implementation in Nepal. These projects include the Tokha-Chhare tunnel, the Hilsa-Simikot road, the Kimathanka-Khandbari road and bridge, the Keyrung-Kathmandu trans-border railway, Amargadhi City Hall, a 220kV transmission line, Madan Bhandari University, Kathmandu Scientific Center and Science Museum, the China-Nepal Industrial Park in Damak, and the Jhapa Sports and Athletics Complex.

Of these, the railway and tunnel projects are long-term endeavors requiring at least a decade to commence. Feasibility studies for these projects are underway with Chinese assistance. Negotiations for road projects are in progress, while the construction of the transmission line depends on a power trade agreement between the two countries. The remaining projects are relatively small, reinforcing Nepal’s cautious approach to avoid taking on large-scale loans under the BRI.

China has established mechanisms like the Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to support BRI initiatives. By mid-2023, the SRF had committed $22bn across 75 projects, while the AIIB, with 106 members, had approved $43.6bn for 227 projects globally. These initiatives span transport, energy, public health, and other sectors, promoting connectivity and sustainable development.

In recent years, China has shifted its focus toward smaller development projects that promise immediate returns. This approach reflects a growing reluctance to fund large infrastructure projects that lack financial viability. Consequently, Nepal and China have avoided selecting major projects under the BRI, except for the railway and tunnel.

The FBRC represents a cautious yet significant step in Nepal-China relations. While it marks progress in operationalizing the BRI, questions remain about financing and execution. The agreement signals Nepal’s intent to address its development needs without over-relying on debt. With ten projects identified and mechanisms for future negotiations in place, the FBRC lays the groundwork for collaboration, even as it underscores the challenges of aligning development ambitions with financial realities.