Dahal’s game plan to regain power

CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal has been making provocative statements these days. While his rhetoric lacks a clear roadmap, it hints at potential shifts in Nepal’s political landscape. Recently, Dahal admitted he had made a mistake by forming alliances with the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML, alliances he has benefited from for over a decade. Despite this, he vowed that his party would contest the upcoming elections independently.

Inconsistent statements characterize Dahal’s political narrative. He has repeatedly claimed he has no intention of becoming prime minister during the current Parliament's term, set to expire in 2027. Yet, on November 16, he unveiled a potential strategy for reclaiming power. He declared that his party’s “magic number of 32” in the House of Representatives could topple the existing coalition. This assertion underscores his urgency to reassert dominance, as Maoist leaders acknowledge that failure to break the NC-UML coalition before the 2027 elections could spell trouble for their party's survival. A senior Maoist leader candidly remarked, “To maintain at least our current strength, we must either ally with the NC or UML, which necessitates dismantling the coalition.”

Maoist leaders believe the current government faces two primary vulnerabilities. First, while Nepal’s bilateral relations are progressing, New Delhi appears hesitant to fully back the UML-led government under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. According to a senior Maoist leader, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian policymakers have shown greater engagement with the NC than with Oli, raising doubts about the coalition’s stability.

Secon, disagreements over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could exacerbate tensions. The UML, led by Oli, is eager to finalize a BRI implementation plan to demonstrate tangible progress. However, this push might create rifts within the coalition, as the NC remains wary of BRI commitments. Oli’s cautious handling of the issue reflects these internal dynamics, providing Dahal an opportunity to capitalize on the discord.

Dahal’s recent interactions with New Delhi reveal his strategic pivot. His interview with The Hindu showcased his criticism of Oli for allegedly playing the ‘China card’, signaling Dahal’s intent to align with India’s geopolitical priorities. Over the past six to seven years, Dahal has cultivated stronger ties with New Delhi, aligning mutual interests during his premiership. Notably, his government signed a long-term energy trade deal with India, facilitating Nepal’s electricity export to Bangladesh through the Indian grid. This agreement not only bolstered Dahal’s domestic image by stabilizing the energy sector but also endeared him to New Delhi.

In contrast, Dahal refrained from signing any major agreements with Beijing, including a proposed BRI implementation plan in 2023. His reluctance to engage with China, a departure from Oli’s precedent, has likely pleased New Delhi. Furthermore, Dahal avoided contentious issues such as the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report and Nepal’s border disputes with India, which UML leaders like Oli have persistently raised. His softer stance on these matters aligns with India’s preference to keep them off the bilateral agenda.

Dahal’s rapport with BJP leaders has also grown, allowing him to leverage India’s influence on Nepal’s political landscape. On contentious issues like secularism, Dahal has conveyed his flexibility, indicating no objection to removing secularism if major parties agree—a stance likely to resonate with the BJP’s ideological agenda.

Aware of shifting international dynamics, Oli recently acknowledged in a party meeting that external conditions may not favor his government. While the UML leadership claims improved relations with India, Dahal’s positioning suggests he might still be New Delhi’s preferred candidate for prime minister. His track record of aligning with India on strategic issues strengthens this perception.

Even if Dahal fails to secure the premiership, he appears open to supporting Sher Bahadur Deuba of the NC until the elections, contingent on an electoral alliance. However, this proposal faces resistance within the NC. While Deuba’s faction fears losing to the UML without Maoist support, a significant section of the NC remains opposed to collaborating with the Maoists, citing ideological and policy differences.

Adding to the coalition’s challenges are disputes over governance issues. The NC and UML have clashed over topics such as the removal of Kul Man Ghising as the head of the Nepal Electricity Authority and the issuance of ordinances to facilitate party splits. These disagreements further expose the fragility of their partnership, creating an opening for Dahal to exploit.

Dahal’s political maneuvers reflect his ambition to return to power by navigating Nepal’s complex internal and external dynamics. By aligning with New Delhi’s strategic interests and exploiting fissures within the NC-UML coalition, he positions himself as a key player in shaping the country’s political future. However, whether he can convert these efforts into a tangible political comeback remains uncertain. The coming months will reveal if Dahal’s strategy of leveraging alliances and external support will succeed or if the Maoists will face an uphill battle to remain relevant in Nepal’s shifting political landscape.