Nilanthi Samaranayake: Russia remains an important actor for Smaller South Asian countries

Nilanthi Samaranayake is a visiting expert at the US Institute of Peace and an adjunct fellow at the East-West Center in Washington. She has 25 years of experience in the nonprofit research sector. Most recently, she served as director of the strategy and policy analysis program at CNA, where she led a team conducting multidisciplinary research and analysis for civilian and military leaders. Before joining CNA, Samaranayake analyzed public opinion at the Pew Research Center and completed a fellowship at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Her work focuses on regional security in the Indian Ocean, smaller South Asian countries, non-traditional security issues, and US alliances and partnerships. Kamal Dev Bhattarai  of ApEx spoke with her on China-US contestation and implications for the South Asian Countries like Nepal. The views expressed are solely hers and not of any organization that she is affiliated with.

How do you see the US-China contest in South Asia?

Smaller South Asian countries are increasingly expressing concerns about maintaining their sovereignty and independence amid strategic tensions between large powers. Nepal, for example, was caught in this situation as a smaller state during the debate over the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). What should be a straight-forward effort to help meet development needs can quickly become politicized due to the backdrop of strategic competition. This pattern was seen in Sri Lanka with the MCC as well, but with a different outcome. The US withdrew its $480m offer.

It has been more than one year since the Biden administration came up with an Indo-pacific strategy, how are South Asian countries responding to it?

To understand how Smaller South Asian countries are responding to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, I recommend reading a recent East-West Center series with experts from Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka directly commenting on their own country’s responses. I served as a guest editor for the series.

The United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies India as a major defense partner and discusses how the US will support India’s regional leadership. The strategy, however, does not mention any of the Smaller South Asian countries. This is an oversight that US officials may want to address in a future update because it represents a disconnect between US strategy and policy. In fact, a review of US policy in the region shows that Washington has clear interests and engagements with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives along multiple lines, such as economics, development, security, and democratic governance. It even has common interests with Bhutan despite their lack of formal diplomatic relations.

How do you see India’s engagement with South Asian countries in the backdrop of growing US-China competition?

Regarding US-China competition, India is a major actor on its own terms due to its border conflict with China, which has included fatalities. As a result, India has sought to strengthen its relationships with the Smaller South Asian countries as tensions with China have increased in the past few years and as China has developed more active ties with these countries. 

India has conceptual frameworks for organizing its regional engagements such as Neighbourhood First and SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) in the Indian Ocean. As the US and India are deepening their relationship, underscored by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US, we also see the US supporting India’s security concerns about China in the Smaller South Asian countries. For example, US officials reportedly met with Sri Lankan leaders after India expressed its objections to Sri Lanka permitting a Chinese ship to visit the controversial Hambantota port last summer.

How do you see the position of South Asian countries in the Russia-Ukraine War?

This is a good question because Russia remains an important actor for Smaller South Asian countries, despite all the attention given to China’s role in South Asia. In March 2022, the UN General Assembly resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka abstained along with India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, in particular, has found itself caught up in the debate over sanctions as it tries to pursue a power plant project with Russia. 

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka tried to enforce the sanctions, but had to back down after Russia suspended passenger flights for four months and affected tourism earnings during the worst of the country’s economic crisis. However, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives have voted at the UN in Ukraine’s favor. This is a strong stance for smaller states to take.

What are your suggestions for a country like Nepal in the conduct of foreign policy in the shifting geopolitical environment?

Nepal is navigating major power rivalry in ways that are similar to other Smaller South Asian countries. Yet its relationship with India is unique in terms of trade, people-to-people ties, and military cooperation. Nepal has arguably the most considerations to make as it manages its foreign policy with large powers.

I think the challenge for Nepal and other Smaller South Asian countries will be to maintain their focus on meeting national-level economic development needs and hitting targets like graduating from least developed country (LDC) status, while minimizing partisan and personality-based infighting in domestic politics to the extent possible.