With authority tightly held in one man’s hands, it’s easy to forget the remaining 2,295 delegates attending the conclave in Beijing. But it is among these jockeying cadres that experts in Chinese politics search for clues about just how much power Xi has — and how long he is liable to hold it.
The primary focus will be on the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the seven-member body at the pinnacle of decision-making power. If Xi is able to stack the committee with loyalists, then there will be few signs of checks on his personal control.
Turnover at the top of the party had previously been encouraged by an informal age limit known as “seven up, eight down” whereby officials who are 67 years of age or younger take on new positions, while those 68 years old and above retire. Sticking to this rule-of-thumb would create two new slots for Xi to fill with allies.
But that norm may no longer hold. Xi, who is 69, is at minimum set to ignore the purported rule for himself — and may also do so to promote allies to the Politburo. “It’s not about age any more. It’s about whether you are on Xi’s side,” said Yang Zhang, a sociologist at American University’s School of International Service.
One key indicator of Xi’s power will be if extra members of the current committee are pushed into early retirement, with most attention being on Premier Li Keqiang, who at 67 has not reached the informal age limit.
The other big question is whether a successor will emerge from the reshuffle. Before Xi, a pathway for future leaders had begun to form, where an heir-apparent took on a Standing Committee position and the vice presidency five years before they were appointed to the top job. Both Xi and his predecessor, Hu Jintao, ascended in this manner, according to the Washington Post.
But that precedent, too, was broken when no officials young enough to serve three terms made the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017. Analysts tracking Chinese politics warn against expecting an anointed successor this year either, arguing that Xi’s extended rule could bypass entirely the generation that will dominate the 370-odd full and alternate members of the Central Committee (the body below the Politburo) over the next 10 years. “It’s in everyone’s interests not to mention the issue of succession,” said Zhang.
“Even if politicians born in the 1960s make it to the Politburo Standing Committee, they will merely be Xi’s technocrats.” It’s more likely that the eventual successor will be from the 1970s generation, but that crop of leaders is currently too young and inexperienced for a clear favorite to be selected at this juncture, Zhang said.
Even if none of them will head the party, officials born in the late 1950s and 1960s are the ones who will implement, interpret and, perhaps occasionally, challenge Xi’s policy agenda as he forges ahead with ambitious plans to tackle inequality and social ills while simultaneously securing the country’s position as a military, economic and technology power, The Washington Post reported.
