Talks are ongoing for the disengagement in the Line of Actual Control (LAC), but China has continued with the development of critical infrastructure close to the LAC. This suggests that Beijing lacks the capacity to follow through with an agreement.
China has repeatedly gone against a series of bilateral agreements and confidence-building measures. The words of Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar resonated quite profoundly when he said, something to the effect of, the state of the border will determine the state of India-China relations. Until both states do not substantially improve their relationship, the future of Asia’s security architecture remains in peril. How do you evaluate South Asian countries’ engagement with China, particularly on BRI? China’s ability to sustain a robust military presence in the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, in particular, is still constrained. To build its image as a major development and economic partner in the region, China began engaging with various South Asian countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Sri Lanka, for example, received billions of dollars worth of Chinese investments. But as the economic crisis unfolded in Sri Lanka, it became clear how deeply the country is indebted to China. Some estimates suggest China accounts for 10 percent of Sri Lanka’s total debt, others say it could be as large as 20 percent. Despite this, China remained reluctant to restructure Sri Lanka’s loans in the face of Colombo’s repeated requests. The Sri Lanka crisis has shown that Beijing is not only an insufficient provider of economic growth and development but, with its hesitant response, also an unreliable comrade in case of economic distress. Does this mean China’s influence is waning in the region? The situation like in Sri Lanka is a challenge for China’s long-time efforts to cultivate the image of a responsible power, given its desire to incorporate as many states as possible into the BRI. Two other major recipients of Chinese loans in the region, Pakistan and Nepal, may also be treading a similar path. If that happens, China’s plan could backfire. Then again, without a robust and practical alternative to the BRI, despite a series of pushbacks, smaller states in the region will have no choice but to continue engaging with the available option, which is China. What is your view on the US-China contest in the Indo-Pacific region? The power competition between the US and China is much more than material power. It is a combination of both material power and perception. While shifts in the distribution of power is a normal phenomenon in international affairs, the divergences in perceptions between established and rising great powers make all the difference. Being the chief architect of the established international rules-based order, the US continues to seek its preservation. China, meanwhile, is rising with the desire to alter and reshape the rules of engagement in the Eastern Hemisphere. With concepts such as the Global Security Initiative, China seeks to exclude extra-regional powers and the traditional US-led alliance network. And with Washington's material decline and diminishing influence in the Indo-Pacific, it has to bank on other like-minded major powers like Japan and India to maintain the status-quo. However, the role of geography and asymmetric economic interdependence continue to complicate the security environment at the peril of developing states. As China continues to grow, more turbulence can be expected in the context of the brewing power competition. South Asian countries are feeling the heat of deepening US-China rivalry. What are your suggestions for smaller countries in the conduct of their foreing policy ? Smaller countries play a pivotal role in the strategic equation of major powers. However, instead of reacting to the structural shifts, they must leverage on their strategic positions by maintaining their centrality rather than being dragged deeper into major power competition. Small states must be able to provide major powers with a less ambiguous roadmap of engagement without fearing the loss of support from either state. This does not mean that small states should seek to disturb the balance. Rather, they should aim to maintain the status quo without further exacerbating the balance of power. This will provide them with a more conducive environment for growth, development, and security.
