The Chinese hate foreign meddling in their domestic politics. Hence their reluctance to butt into the internal politics of other countries. That, at least, was traditionally the case. But as it gains economic and military heft, and under a leader determined to establish China as the preeminent world power, China’s diplomatic instruments are getting blunt. There was no gainsaying its recent message to Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli: maintain the Nepal Communist Party unity at all costs, even if it entails him giving up the post of prime minister or party co-chairperson. Oli, unsurprisingly, has rebuffed Chinese envoy Hou Yanqi’s many recent meeting requests.
Unhappy with the pressure from the north, Oli has looked to cultivate the southern neighbor. He has sent to Delhi ‘informal’ envoys to resurrect his old contacts. Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali is himself slated to visit the Indian capital at December-end. India has reciprocated Oli’s gesture, espying no other way to cut the ‘pro-China’ NCP down to size: witness the recent flurry of high-level Indian visits to the Nepali capital. But, one may ask, didn’t Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe also come calling at the same time?
He did, but of his own accord. Oli didn’t seem to be listening to the Chinese envoy in Kathmandu or to China’s other emissaries. Wei came to force Oli to listen. Interestingly, during his brief Kathmandu stay, Wei spent hours chatting up the Nepal Army top brass, not in pow-wows with top political leaders. The Oli government appearing shaky, China is hedging its bets and has intensified efforts to establish the mighty Nepal Army as its new ‘permanent friend’ in Kathmandu, much like it relied disproportionately on the monarchy before 2006.
Revealingly, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, during his own two-day Kathmandu trip, met leaders from across the political spectrum—but not Prachanda. This was done at Oli’s special request, say insiders. These are not the only signs of thawing ties between the Indian and Nepali establishments.
It’s an open secret within the NCP that the current pro-monarch and Hindu state protests have Oli’s tacit support. Otherwise, pandemic-time protests with thousands of attendees would have been impossible, when much smaller gatherings were nipped in the bud. (The prohibitory orders against pro-monarchy protests later came from the Maoist home minister.) Oli wants to reciprocate India’s support by keeping the BJP in good humor. This bolsters the speculation of otherwise more conspiracy-minded strategic analysts who reckon the BJP would like to see Nepal reinstated as a Hindu state ahead of the 2022 Uttar Pradesh state elections, to further strengthen Aditya Yoginath’s grip on the heart of the Hindi belt.
Oli ascended to power on the back of the 2015-16 Indian blockade. He is minded to jump ship again, back into the arms of his old Indian patrons. He wants to kiss and make up. In return, he will not needle India on border (left out of agenda during Shringla’s visit) nor speak too loudly in favor of the EPG (again not discussed).
The fast-changing power equations in Kathmandu are ripe for geopolitical maneuverings too. If the NCP splits, will the Chinese openly back the Prachanda faction? Or do they look to further cultivate the army? How does India balance its old support for Nepali Congress and Madhesi parties with its new penchant for Oli? And what will be the American role in all this?
On cue, international publications have started describing Nepal as “a frontline state in the new cold war”.
