Chandra Kant (CK) Raut’s sudden entry into main­stream politics was as dra­matic as it gets. It also proved to be a massive public relations vic­tory for a government struggling to control the media narrative on completing its first year in office.

 

But even on substance, this is a solid undertaking and sends a clear message to all dissent­ing groups that the government is keen on resolving differences through dialogue.

 

Bringing a secessionist group into the mainstream fold from the cold requires the appearance of some serious concessions from both sides. In that spirit, the deal is intentionally ambiguous so that both parties can sign up despite continuing differences. Negotiators and diplomats rely on ambiguities all the time to advance negotiations. It is rare to have even a joint communiqué between friendly governments without varying interpretations, let alone peace agreements. All agreements between the Maoists and the State in the past, includ­ing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, are replete with ambi­guities. The 22-point agreement between Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum and the government in August 2007 followed a similar pattern.

 

For the Oli government, this is a first step in a peace process with a secessionist group. This was clear in Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s speech—in which he compared Raut to Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda.’

 

Those within the ruling party and outside who are jumping the gun on the wording of the agree­ment fail to recognize the impor­tance of this development. They also fail to see the agreement in its entirety. The first point clearly confines the agreement within the current constitutional framework. But that Raut has interpreted the agreement as a concession from the government is also logical.

 

Anything short of the text of the agreement—whose ambiguity has allowed Raut to claim victo­ry—would have looked like sur­render. This would have created a legitimacy crisis for Raut himself within his fold. The prospect of some other secessionist leader labeling Raut a sell-out and tak­ing on the helm of his erstwhile outfit would then be a real possi­bility. That would have defeated the whole purpose of the agree­ment: to neutralize the threat of a secessionist movement.

 

Prudent first step

The government needs to be congratulated for recognizing the threat CK Raut’s movement posed to the integrity of the Nepali state in the long run. This agreement is a prudent first step towards neutralizing that risk. For all the hubris the government has shown in other areas, this is one area it has acted wisely. Often, a strong majority in the parliament can delude governments into thinking that that they can bulldoze their way around. History clearly shows that dissent cannot be dealt with force and finding a democratic and constitutional framework to resolve differences is critical to the endurance of a state.

 

However, the success of this peace process with Raut’s outfit hinges on the sincerity of both the sides.

 

Raut could very well use this moratorium on state crackdown and freedom to engage in open politics to further burnish his secessionist credentials. As the Maoists did in the past, this could be a strategic retreat. During the reception gathering for Raut in Janakpur airport on March 10, his supporters carried placards calling for Free Madhes. Many in Kathmandu see this as a sign of Raut reneging on the agreement. I think it is too early to conclude anything at this stage. After taking such huge risks, both the govern­ment and Raut need to be given some breathing space.

 

The government also needs to go easy on its plans, if any, to bring Raut into the government, unless it wants to risk strengthen­ing the hands of hardliners within Raut’s movement. This is assum­ing that he would even accept a government offer. There are speculations that the government intends to nominate Raut to the National Assembly and make him a minister. If true, that would be premature and unwise. It may also encourage other copycats to take a similar route to power.