Winds of a new cold war

The winds of a new cold war between the US and China have started blowing even in Kath­mandu. The latest example of it is the forewarning by an American official about Chinese investment in Nepal and the counter-remark by the Chinese Ambassador in Kathmandu. On Monday, Joseph Felter, US Dep­uty Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, had remarked that Chinese investments should be transparent, that they should serve Nepal’s interests and that Nepal should avoid falling into a debt trap. Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi countered Felter’s remarks the following day, saying that the US was propagating false and irresponsible information. Although western diplomats had been whispering about the growing collaboration between Nepal and China, we hadn’t yet heard the kind of official expression Felter made this week. Now that the Americans have legitimized the China-targeted Indo-Pacific Strategy, they have started talking freely.

 

It was also from Felter that we heard for the first time that the American grant of $500 million to Nepal under the Millennium Chal­lenge Corporation (MCC) is part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. It’s been quite a while since the Nepal Army has been conducting a joint military exercise named Balance Nail with the US Indo-Pacific Com­mand. Regardless of how we inter­pret the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it seems the US has started viewing, placing and dealing with Nepal under this scheme.

 

Such American intimation was also reflected during the bilateral meeting between Foreign Minis­ter Pradeep Gyawali and his US counterpart in Washington DC in December. The statement issued by the US State Department soon after hinted that “Nepal’s central role in a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pa­cific” had been a topic of discussion in the meeting.

 The Indo-Pacific Strategy hasn’t yet assumed the shape of a military alliance like NATO or a regional organization like SAARC

The Indo-Pacific Strategy hasn’t yet assumed the shape of a mili­tary alliance like NATO or a regional organization like SAARC. So it’s not clear how much a country needs to cooperate to be considered a part of the strategy. In fact, this strategy seems to have been advanced in a clever manner to serve long-term interests. A country doesn’t need to announce that it is a part of it, but now it seems the partnerships America strikes will mostly be under this strategy.

 

The strategy is similar to the Chi­nese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in that China has started placing all its partnerships under the BRI umbrella. But the difference is that China has begun giving the BRI a definite shape. And member coun­tries have to sign on to it and take part in its summits. For instance, President Bidya Bhandari is going to Beijing in April to participate in the second BRI summit.

 

By contrast, the US hasn’t given an organizational shape to the Indo-Pa­cific Strategy. But the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Strategy have emerged as weapons with which America and China are competing for world dom­ination in the 21st century.

 

As Foreign Minister Gyawali was conversing with US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, the US Sen­ate was finalizing a bill that has significance for Nepal as well. US President Donald Trump signed the bill into law a few days later. That law, called the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), is the one that directs the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

 

ARIA defines the Indo-Pacific as the region that houses half the world’s population, has the most vibrant economy and poses a chal­lenge to American security strat­egy. It says the US-dominated world order is being challenged in differ­ent ways by China, North Korea and terrorist outfits like ISIS. The US goal is to overcome all such challenges and maintain its world domination.

 

Although ARIA’s purported goals are to enhance American security and financial interests and spread its values, its core concern is a ris­ing China. Growing US interest in Nepal—which shares a border with China’s Achilles heel Tibet and which has a direct stake in Tibetan issues—is therefore natural.

 

Nepal is mentioned twice in ARIA. Under the heading ‘Promoting US Security Interests in the Indo-Pa­cific Region’, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are labelled ‘Democratic partners’ with which the US is going to increase collaboration. (India has been called a ‘defense partner’ and given distinct importance.) As Chinese investment in Nepal’s infrastructure grows, the US is also showing an eagerness to follow suit. That donors are finally channeling investment away from seminars and toward infrastructure is good for Nepal, even though they might be doing it to compete with each other.

 

The second time Nepal is men­tioned in ARIA is under the head­ing ‘Promoting democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region’, which says the US is going to provide aid of over $210 million a year between 2019 and 2023 in order to ‘bring democ­racy to China’ and ‘protect Tibetan tradition, culture, environment, etc.’ It says this amount is going to be invested in NGOs working with the ‘Tibetan community’ in Tibet and ‘other Tibetan communities’ in Nepal and India. That it says ‘Tibetan communities’ instead of ‘Tibetan refugees’ raises questions as to who the definition covers and how the policy will be implemented in Nepal. Managing Chinese responses to it might well be another source of a headache.

 

In December, US President Trump also signed a separate law concern­ing Tibet. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act has a provision of denying a US visa to Chinese officials who deny American citizens a visa to visit Tibet. Considering all these recent happenings, it seems the US wants to revive the Tibet issue from a new angle. How will that affect Nepal? Will Nepal be made ‘a listen­ing post’ to keep an eye on Tibet? Or will it be made ‘a launching pad’? We need to think about it before it’s too late.

 

The foundation of ARIA is the National Security Strategy that Trump made public in December 2017. The strategy considers China a military rival and suggests ways to counter Chinese economic aggres­sion. In the cold war between the US and China, countries like Nepal have little role to play except being a spec­tator. The third actor in this rivalry among the two giants is India, which has its own expectations. Nepal has to collaborate with all three of these powerhouses; it also has to dodge their military objectives. Until recently, all we needed to under­stand was India. But now China and America have become active geopo­litical players in Nepal. If Nepal can skillfully handle the new dynamics in diplomacy, it presents an oppor­tunity. Else, it spells disaster.

 

As Professor Shreedhar Kha­tri said recently, Nepal needs to learn how to deal with great powers. We can neither escape from India, nor stop the arrival of China and America. We have no choice but to learn to maintain parallel relations with them.