The progress of Nepal’s peace process has been patchy since its formal beginning in 2006. The faltering transitional justice pro­cess, an integral part of the peace process as well as the Comprehen­sive Peace Accord (CPA), does not augur well. But two other major components of the peace process—management of arms and army of the then Maoist rebels and consti­tution-drafting—have been success­fully completed. Every conflict and peace process is unique. But Nepal’s peace process is still distinct and cannot be compared with that of any other post-conflict country. Peace, constitution-drafting and transitional justice processes are always risky. But Nepal not only concluded the management of arms and army, but in the process also established a unique Nepali model while following international norms and standards.

 

Positive messages

First, Nepal’s peace process is led by domestic actors; polit­ical parties initiated and led the entire process. There was no third party involvement, as happens in most post-conflict countries. It is worth noting that in a highly polarized society and fractured pol­ity like ours, a cross-party mecha­nism with no experience in a peace process not only took all decisions based on consensus, but also estab­lished a Nepali model of arms and army management.

Second, Nepal’s armed con­flict ended on the back of sus­tained dialogue among political parties. The CPN (Maoist) renounced violence and embraced a peaceful democratic process. The Maoists joined the political mainstream and transformed into a civilian party by dissolving their army and handing their arms over to the government.

Third, despite disagreements on various issues, major politi­cal parties kept talks alive. They shared their views and debated issues to understand one another. Keeping the negotiation process alive ultimately paid off. The political parties followed the prin­ciple of ‘consensus through dia­logue’ which is a unique lesson from Nepal’s political transition.

Forth, Nepal learned from other post-conflict countries but did not import or replicate their model. Instead, it developed its own model of constitution drafting and management of arms and army. Nepal did not follow the technical process of disarmament, demobi­lization and reintegration (DDR) adopted by many post-conflict coun­tries. Rather ex-combatants were demobilized and disarmed. Nepal also did not use the loaded phrase ‘security sector reform’ (SSR), but still followed its principles during the peace process.

Fifth, according to the prevalent international practice, there are two options for ex-combatants: integration into security agen­cies or reintegration into soci­ety. But Nepal introduced a new concept of voluntary retirement. Out of 19,602 ex-combatants, 15,624 chose voluntary retirement rather than integration or rehabilitation. Likewise, 1,422 ex-combatants were integrated into the Nepal Army (NA). Only six opted for rehabilitation. Voluntary retirement was a new and highly risky experiment but it worked in Nepal. It is a Nepali con­cept that can be applied to other conflict-ridden countries.

Sixth, the NA played an exem­plary and instrumental role while integrating its former enemy. Even when political parties had con­tradictory stands, the NA agreed to take in ex-combatants. On this issue, the NA at times seemed more flexible and liberal than the opposition parties. The NA also adeptly carried out all its responsibilities during the inte­gration and training of integrated combatants. Had the NA been hes­itant, integration would have been more difficult. No national army has played such a constructive role in similar contexts abroad.

 Had Nepal also been able to complete transitional justice, the country would have won greater kudos

 

Negative messages

First, the management of the arms and army is now complete and the constitution has been promulgated. But the process was lengthy and expensive. There is no official data on the expenses of the entire peace process including constitution draft­ing, but everyone agrees that it has been a costly endeavor. However, we shouldn’t forget that peace is less expensive than war.

Second, Nepal’s peace process is heavily focused on integration and rehabilitation. But the govern­ment and political parties did not pay attention to conflict victims. The whereabouts of 1,452 ‘disap­peared’ people remain unknown 12 years after the peace process started. But the government did nothing save distribute some cash relief to the victims, and even then most of the cash ended up with political party cadres. Therefore, the victims are still fighting for truth, justice and reparation.

It took almost eight years to pro­mulgate a controversial transitional justice act, one that is not accept­able to the victims, civil society, and human rights community. The act came into existence because of a marriage of convenience among political parties. The gov­ernment constituted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for Investi­gation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) after 9 years of the signing of the CPA. But for four years those toothless transitional justice bodies could do nothing except reg­ister complaints. Those who com­mitted serious crimes during the conflict should have been brought to justice. But no government has been serious about transitional justice and ending impunity.

Third, the government offered attractive cash packages to verified Maoist combatants. But what about the 4,008 disqualified combatants? The government did offer them a small package, which they declined because it came too little too late and because the ‘disqualified’ tag still hung over them. Female com­batants and their children were also badly neglected.

 

Conclusion

Despite the faulty transitional jus­tice process, Nepal will always be credited for working out a unique model of constitution-drafting and management of arms and army. Had Nepal also been able to complete the transitional justice process, Nepal would have won greater kudos. Still, that does not detract from its remarkable achievements in the peace process thus far.

Geja Sharma Wagle played an active part in the integration and rehabilitation process of former Maoist guerillas and is still involved in the transitional justice process