In September 1986 Deng Xiaop­ing proudly told Mike Wallace, an American journalist, “We permit some people and some regions to become prosperous first. Our policy will not lead to… a situation where the rich get richer while the poor get poorer.” But a young singer had a different view altogether. Four months before the interview, Cui Jian had played the song “Nothing to my name” in a TV song competition and immediately became the talk of the whole country. The song has been analyzed from various angles by various scholars, but most agree that it symbolized the yearnings and frustrations of the youth in the immediate aftermath of the 1978 reforms. China in the 1980s was going through monumental changes. Some wanted more freedom and western-style democracy. Some were confused with ris­ing inflation. Some were angry with the state doing away with the lifelong employment/benefits (‘iron rice bowl’), and with ram­pant corruption. The top ech­elons of the party had political reformers and hardliners engage in ideological and power strug­gles. Young students nationwide were debating the future of Chi­na. The Triangle (sanjiaodi) at Peking University became the hub of student activism where student leaders, influenced by dissident intellectuals, delivered passion­ate speeches and put up posters demanding political freedom and end to corruption.

There’s absolutely no reason to believe that the new Chinese model will be replaced by something imported anytime soon

Student activism led to protests in January 1987 but they achieved nothing. Instead these protests strengthened the hardliners in the party. The reform-minded Hu Yaobang was forced to step down. In 1989, Hu died and the students thought it was the right time to push for political reforms. They were joined by the workers who had lost their jobs or those who feared losing their jobs due to privatization, and others who felt that the reforms had done nothing to change their lives.

Much has been written about the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crack­down. There’s no denying that the state was wrong to use force and live ammunition to empty the square. But the students weren’t in the right either. Their ‘here and now’ attitude yet again weakened the liberals and strengthened the hardliners in the party.

The students were confused and didn’t know what they actu­ally wanted. There were faction­al rivalries in the square. Each student leader wanted to come out as the bravest and most rev­olutionary, and these students share the responsibility for what happened there and elsewhere in China then.

With the protests over, the state started addressing some of the grievances. Leaders were told to keep an eye on their off-springs’ business activities and Deng Xia­oping ordered ending the privi­leges accorded to his son’s China Kanghua corporation that was accused of engaging in illegal practices. The pace of economic reform was slowed to address the employment and economic con­cerns of the people and to cleanse the system of ‘evils’.

The state understood that it needed an ideological replace­ment for socialism. But first it had to strengthen the Communist Par­ty rule. Thus a multifaceted cam­paign was launched to remind the Chinese of the national humil­iation and the party’s fight for national liberation and pride.

Economic development con­tinued in a more systematic way, which led to employment opportunities, and people felt less dependent on the state. People now literally tended to their own business. Confusion and helpless­ness were replaced by a sense of direction and determination.

The majority came to accept that economic reform and strong leadership were necessary to become rich and strong and the state was doing all it could to reassert China’s rightful place in the world, along with the view that the western countries were using democracy to destabilize China and stall its growth. The fate of post-1990 democracies made the majority disillusioned with the western model. More­over, the West’s criticism of China on human rights and lectures on democracy irked many Chinese.

With people getting richer and taking pride in their system and heritage, the state found Confu­cianism more suited to govern China. And it was accepted by the public as well. It is a homegrown ideology that focuses on meritoc­racy, rule of law and social justice. The old sage who for the most of the 20th century was criticized for China’s problems of 2,000 years was suddenly wanted again. He is now China’s answer to democra­cy and his ideas have given more to China than the chaos democra­cy has unleashed in many parts of the world.

Hence there are no more large-scale protests for political reforms. The people and the state are now in harmony, with each following its own way (dao). The Chinese model borne out of shame, pride and quest for power has brought the people and state together. And there’s no reason to believe that this model will be replaced by anything imported anytime soon.

Heaven and a billion-plus peo­ple can’t be wrong.

(This is the concluding article of a three-part series on the motivators behind China’s current growth trajectory)

Stories by Trailokya Raj Aryal

China avenging national shame

Over to Deng