Reluctant federalists

 

 Two days after summoning the first ever meeting of the Inter-province Council, a constitutional mechanism to resolve disputes between the provinces and the center, in early September, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli decided to abrupt­ly cancel it. He was reportedly furious at the nine-point declara­tion made by the chief ministers following their conclave held in Pokhara—right before the meet­ing—that squarely blamed the fed­eral government for withholding authority and resources required for the smooth functioning of the provincial structures.The prime minister’s anger may be understandable from a party functionary point of view given that six out of seven chief ministers are his subordinates in the party, but not acceptable for the head of a federal gov­ernment. Regardless of party affiliations, chief ministers are heads of autonomous subnational governments elected by people of the province.

Beyond the fire and fury of the news headlines, the nine-point declaration offers a clear road­map for ending the gridlock at the provincial level. The provinces have three interrelated problems: absence of laws, lack of person­nel and meager resources. The provincial government by now ought to have most laws enabling to maintain law and order, deliver services and implement develop­ment projects within the provinc­es, but they don’t. The onus lies with the federal parliament to pass most of these laws, clearly delegating the authority as pro­vided in the Constitution.

The center has been sitting on the provincial civil and local civ­il service bills that would have enabled them to do their own hiring. Provincial governments have no control over the exist­ing officials deputed by the center, as an interim measure; moreover, they are transferred frequently without consulting the provincial authorities. It makes sense for them to demand that the center allow them to do temporary hiring while they wait for the laws to be passed in the federal parliament.

The provincial governments also have no control over the law and order apparatus in the province. Even on this front, Kathmandu is sitting on a law to create provincial police force—while meddling in the affairs of the subnational governments through the Chief District Officers (CDOs) who continue to defy the provincial governments by virtue of being under the federal govern­ment. The chief ministers have merely requested that CDOs also report to the provincial govern­ment alongside the federal gov­ernment until a provincial police force is created.

Resource distribution is anoth­er issue that is creating friction between the two tiers of govern­ment. The Natural Resource and Fiscal Commission, as stipulat­ed in the Constitution, is long overdue. Without it, distribution of natural and other financial resources have been left to the mercy of federal government. This has also prevented clarity on local and provincial taxations—prolonging an uncertain fiscal environment for citizens and busi­nesses. Among other things, the declaration made by the chief ministers also demands an apex body under the prime minister’s leadership to implement federal­ism, besides calling for establish­ment of a permanent secretariat for Inter-Province Council. Noth­ing in their demands appears to be out of line.

Perhaps the problem lies else­where. The prime minister and much of his party were reluc­tant federalists prior to the uni­fication, more so in the case of province two. But one had hoped that the reality of governing a nascent federal system, along­side the obligation of deliver­ing prosperity, would force them to appreciate the impor­tance of delegating authority to subnational structures. As one of Oli’s party subordinates and Chief Minister of Gandaki prov­ince Prithivi Subba Gurung cor­rectly pointed out recently, the fear of province two is being used as a justification to deprive all the provinces of autonomy enshrined in the constitution.

Federalism will fail if the center continues to employ half-measures that only seem to increase financial burden on the taxpayers without attendant ben­efits of the system O