Much has been written about Nepal’s last-minute withdrawal from the BIM­STEC military exercises held in India from Sept 10 to 16. Some see this as a mark of Nepal’s asser­tiveness and advice India to get used to dealing with a confident Nepal. Others are praising the government for upholding the principles of non-aligned move­ment as they saw the exercises as being targeted against China. Meanwhile, the Indian side, which was clearly dismayed by Nepal’s “snub”, attributes the cancella­tion to Nepal’s “internal political dynamics”, a vague interpretation that can mean many things. All of these are politically cor­rect interpretations, which, like all politically correct interpreta­tions, are cryptic, bend the truth, do not tell the whole truth or con­tain no truth at all.

Here’s what the withdrawal means, plain and simple. The decision does not in any way prove that we are becoming more independent or assertive in con­ducting our foreign policy. All it means is that we are becoming overly sensitive of China and we don’t want to do anything that we imagine as against Chinese interests. When foreign policy is guided by others’ imagined inter­ests and with the sole intent of appeasing others than promoting our own interests, can we call that being assertive and independent?

China has made it clear time and again that it doesn’t want Nepal to jeopardize its relations with India, but we don’t seem to get it. The Chinese foreign minis­ter, Wang Yi, talked about trilat­eral cooperation with our foreign minister Pradip Gyawali in Beijing for a reason.

Therefore, it makes little sense to believe that the pressure to withdraw from the exercises came from Beijing. As Nepal was beaming with pride for upholding the ideals of non-aligned move­ment and preserving its neutral­ity, China was participating in a 27-country naval exercises that also included the US, Japan and India, among others, in Darwin, Australia, from August 30 to Sept 15. The leaders and scholars who opposed Nepal’s participation in the BIMSTEC military exercises thinking that it won them some brownie points with China, are clearly in for disappointment.

Then, what actually led us to commit a major diplomatic blun­der that certainly angered one neighbor but made no difference whatsoever to another neighbor?

PM KP Oli wants to prove that he is a nationalist and is quite good at standing up to India. As the government is losing its pop­ularity, he seems to have realized that being “assertive” vis-à-vis India would do his image no harm at all.

Nepali Congress probably cal­culated that opposing the mffffffili­tary exercises would help shed its pro-India image and make it appear as nationalist as the rul­ing NCP and it too could be seen favorably by China. The govern­ment thus pulled out of the mili­tary drills, fearing that the NC was stealing its nationalist thunder.

It could also be that some intellectuals and lawmakers who opposed the military exercises were made to believe that China wasn’t happy with them, by a junior diplomat or somebody act­ing on his or her own capacity in Kathmandu. And the government was easily swayed byf the orches­trated “public outcry” against the military exercises.

A recent report by the Wilson Center on Chinese influence in American academia contains many examples of Chinese dip­lomats in consulates across the US going beyond their mandate to encourage Chinese students associations to protest “anti-Chi­na” views in academia. Rather than serving their country these diplomats wanted to boost their own careers and perks. Some­thing of the sort has happened here as well.

In September 2013 the Min­istry of Defense sent a letter to the Nepal Army asking it not to enroll foreign students in its high altitude and mountain warfare school in Mustang. The military, realizing that it was just someone in Kathmandu trying to raise his/her profile, ignored it altogether. There has been no pressure from Beijing, at least publicly, on the issue so far. Just like the south­ern diplomats in Kathmandu, the northern diplomats too at times go beyond their mandate and our gullible leaders and analysts read­ily swallow it.

India probably knows that the decision has to do with the gov­ernment being overly and unnec­essarily sensitive to Chinese inter­ests in Nepal. But it cannot say so openly given the recent thaw in its relations with China. Hence the vague “internal political dynam­ics” interpretation is what they have to be satisfied with.

Again, just like the others, I could be way off as well.