The recent India-China rapprochement has been intrigu­ing to observe from here in India. Open a random news­paper or flip through the TV news channels, and there is bound to be a news story on how India and China have decided to ‘cooperate’ rather than ‘compete’. Most recently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum in Singapore, made it clear that India pursues an independent foreign pol­icy and does not believe in joining any (read: pro-US) bloc. But in the next breath, he added that India is firmly in favor of unhindered and open navigation in South China Sea. This was in reference to what India and the West see as China’s ‘militarization’ of this vital global trade route.

 

Interestingly, the very next day, He Lei, a top Chinese general who was heading the Chinese delegation at the forum, termed Modi’s rather blunt statement on South China Sea ‘positive’. There clearly are renewed efforts to defuse old Indo-China tensions, even if the leaders of the two countries sometimes have to say provocative things to please their domestic constituencies. These efforts stem largely from the realization that only if the two Asian powers work together can they effectively counter Donald Trump’s protectionist tendencies.

 

As Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is set to embark on his official trip to the northern neighbor, what does this thaw­ing of Indo-China ties entail for Nepal? If there is a level of understanding between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on how to deal with other smaller countries in the neighborhood, it could mean India would have fewer qualms about Nepal reaching out to China.

 

But therein lies the danger. As happened with the 2015 Indo-China bilateral agreement on the Lipulekh tri-junction, vital issues of Nepal’s interest may increasingly be decided in Beijing and New Delhi. In the dealings between big powers, the interests of smaller players can often be ignored. This is why the Nepali foreign policy apparatus as well as PM Oli will have to be proactive in maintaining open and extensive channels of communication with both India and China.

 

In his second term as prime minister, Oli has been largely successful in performing the delicate balancing act between India and China. But unless our foreign ministry apparatus is also strengthened to quickly respond to emerging foreign policy challenges, and to come up with long-term strategies to back the prime minister’s international outlook, his efforts alone may prove inadequate o