Prime Minister KP Sharma’s India visit, for all intents and purposes, was heavy on symbolism. Both sides were keen on resetting bilateral ties that fell to historic lows after the 2015 blockade.In Nepal the fear of a Nepali Prime Minister compromising on ‘national interest’ during an India visit is ever present. There is a perception that Indians try to extract their pound of flesh from the occupant of Baluwatar in exchange for their support. Since the 1990s, virtually all Nepali leaders have looked to the South to get into Baluwatar. As soon as a new prime minister is elected, visiting Delhi to shore up support becomes one of the first acts of duty. Since New Delhi extends the customary invitation along with its congratulatory call, one can argue that New Delhi demands this homage. With the exception of Puspha Kamal Dahal’s first tenure, no other Nepali prime minister has deviated from Delhi’s strict political choreography.
What’s different this time?
Well Oli, despite his team’s rhetoric to instead bring the Indian PM to Nepal first, did stick to tradition. But unlike in the past, the Nepali PM was able to deal with his Indian counterpart from a position of strength. The Joint Statement and the joint press conference have telltale signs of Oli successfully resetting India-Nepal ties on a more equal footing. Of course, at this stage, all we can see is the form, not the substance.
During the joint press conference, Modi made subtle suggestions to accommodate all sections of society in Nepal’s development—perhaps an indirect reference to the Madhesi demand for constitutional amendment. PM Oli, on the other hand, stressed the ‘principle of equality, justice and mutual respect’—indirectly telling New Delhi to stay out of Nepal’s internal politics. Oli also took a swipe at India’s cross-border power purchase guidelines that he said wasn’t consistent with free market principles and the PTA signed between the two countries. The fact that both prime ministers agreed to disagree openly, albeit politely, points to a more mature relationship. This clearly shows, at least for now, that New Delhi has become a bit more accepting of its declining influence and limits in Nepal.
But the biggest acceptance on New Delhi’s part appears to be the expanded role of the ‘big elephant in the room’—China, as SD Muni puts it. That was reflected in the agreement to expand Indian connectivity with Nepal through Inland Waterways and a rail line to Kathmandu.
What this agreement on connectivity allowed Modi was to control the narrative on China’s increasing engagement in Nepal.New Delhi appears to have accepted that Oli would inevitably sign a railway agreement in Beijing soon after his Delhi visit. By preempting Beijing, New Delhi hopes to counter any narrative about it losing its traditional sphere of influence. Domestically, this helps the BJP to frame its messages as it faces general elections next year.
As Oli ran on a nationalist plank and secured a substantial majority for his coalition, the political leadership in New Delhi appears to be willing to do the dance for now. But it may not stay that way if Kathmandu fails to maintain high-level political communication and Nepal affair gets delegated to the bureaucratic and intelligence levels in India.
Rajapaksa’s playbook
Perhaps not the best person to emulate, but there certainly were things in former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s diplomatic playbook that the Oli administration would do well to learn from. As Rajapaksa’s government began the campaign of a final push against the LTTE in 2008, Colombo needed a lot of arms and ammunition. The Chinese and the Pakistanis came in with an open offer. But Rajapaksa initially sent his two brothers to New Delhi with a shopping list, which India declined to offer. Still he kept sending his brother Basil and his foreign minister to New Delhi at regular intervals. Rajapaksa is said to have conveyed to Mahmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee in 2008 that his government would readily accept a deal with India if New Delhi offered equally favorable terms as Beijing. India wouldn’t or couldn’t match the Chinese offer. As a result, India was forced to accept, if not tacitly support, the campaign against the LTTE.
As Nepal’s engagement with China grows, the onus of reaching out regularly to New Delhi at the political level falls on both the incoming National Security Advisor and Foreign Minister. Only such an approach can sustain the current symbolic resetting of ties and a degree of strategic autonomy Nepal seems to have gained—and ensure another disagreement does not lead to a recurrence of blockade-like hostility.
twitter@johnparajuli
