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President Vladimir Putin’s ninth visit to India starting from 2000—his first after 2021—has arrived at a moment of extraordinary strategic recalibration. Only two days before the visit began (Dec 4), Washington released its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), a document that signals the United States’ shift from expansive values-based foreign policy to a sharper, interest-driven approach rooted in economic security and technological primacy.

The simultaneity is not accidental; it symbolizes a transforming global order in which India, Russia, and the US are pursuing overlapping but divergent strategic goals, and South Asia sits at the fulcrum of this new geopolitical geometry.

The Putin-Modi meeting carries implications not only for Eurasian stability but also for how the US interprets India’s strategic autonomy and recalibrates its own Indo-Pacific playbook.

India at the center

The NSS 2025 acknowledges bluntly that the US cannot “secure every geography nor stabilize every region”; instead, it will prioritize critical partners capable of shaping the global economy, technology ecosystems and regional balance. India stands at the top of this list, described as a “system-shaping middle power” whose partnership is essential for US economic resilience, defence innovation and Indo-Pacific balancing.

Yet Putin’s visit demonstrates that India’s ascent is anchored in multi-alignment, not alignment. India has neither abandoned Russian defense ties nor restricted Eurasian dialogue despite Western pressure. Instead, New Delhi has widened all channels—deepening defense co-production with the US, sustaining energy ties with Moscow, and managing a complex relationship with China across competition, deterrence and cooperation. This can be accounted precisely for the behavior Washington anticipated, but perhaps underestimated in intensity.

Why Putin’s visit matters 

To the US, the optics of a confident, sanctions-resistant Russian leader receiving a warm Delhi welcome carry three strategic messages: one, that Russia retains influence where the West expected decline. India continues to leverage Russian defense support—particularly spare parts, legacy system maintenance and co-development initiatives that Washington cannot fully replace in the short term. Energy cooperation remains robust, and discounted Russian oil has been crucial to India’s inflation management.

Two, India will pursue autonomy even when US pressure peaks. Despite the growing US–India defense technology partnership—jet engine co-production, UAV collaboration, semiconductor cooperation—New Delhi refuses to limit strategic options. Putin’s visit reinforces India’s unwillingness to become a pillar of a US-led bloc.

Third, Eurasian consolidation remains a live possibility. Moscow’s outreach to India is not merely bilateral. It connects to broader projects—International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) dialogue, Arctic shipping and Asian energy integration—areas Washington must now monitor with renewed seriousness. India and Russia interact through UN and G20 in the global forums, regional groups such as Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), East Asian Summit (EAS), financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and extensive bilateral mechanisms (annual summits, Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC), 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue  and Strategic Economic Dialogue. In addition, in the sector-specific cooperation platforms like the Nuclear Energy, Defense Working Group, Space cooperation, energy and Education and cultural exchanges. 

These messages have direct consequences for how the US implements the NSS 2025. The US will respond by deepening India’s economic incentives. While NSS 2025 downplays ideological diplomacy, it elevates economic security and supply-chain diversification as central pillars. Putin’s visit will accelerate US efforts to firstly to expand critical mineral cooperation with India, secondly to attract Indian companies into US industrial ecosystems, thirdly to increase joint research platforms under QUAD and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for prosperity (IPEF), and lastly to fast-track bilateral trade negotiations previously stalled.

Washington will double down on offering India economic and technological leverage that Russia cannot match.

 Stricter defense technology protocols 

The US understands that India operates Russian-origin systems and engages in sensitive defense exchanges with Moscow. To prevent potential technology leakage, Washington is likely to introduce a more robust end-use monitoring, tighter controls on dual-use technology, and clearer segregation between US-led and Russia-linked Indian projects. 

This will not stall US–India defence cooperation, but it will make technology firewalls more prominent.

Acceptance of India’s strategic autonomy 

The NSS 2025 subtly accepts that India will not become a formal ally. Putin’s visit reinforces that assumption. Washington’s emerging approach is pragmatic: work with India where interests converge, avoid friction where they don’t. This opens space for a more mature, less expectation-heavy partnership.

A more fluid strategic landscape 

Putin’s India outreach reshapes the region in ways Washington will study closely.

Pakistan’s strategic relevance to Washington continues to decline. With India strengthening ties with both the US and Russia, there is little incentive for the US to return to older patterns of Pakistan-centric engagement. Islamabad’s utility becomes more functional—counter-terrorism, nuclear risk management—not geopolitical. 

A more competitive Eurasian environment gives these states greater bargaining power. The US, following its new NSS, will adopt: project-based engagement, maritime capacity-building, debt sustainability support, and supply-chain diversification with Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

These states will increasingly play China, India, Russia and the US against one another to secure economic benefits.

Quiet leverage in a multipolar moment

Nepal stands to gain more subtly than other South Asian states. 

A triangular pattern—India maintaining Russian ties, strengthening US partnership and managing China rivalry—creates strategic breathing room for Kathmandu. For the US, Nepal becomes valuable not as a geopolitical frontline but as a functional partner in sectors aligned with American priorities under NSS 2025: green energy and cross-border power trade, digital governance, cyber security, critical mineral mapping, private-sector investment in hydropower, and disaster response and counter-crime cooperation. 

Engagement will neither surge nor decline—but it will deepen sectoral, with fewer political expectations and more performance-based cooperation. This aligns with Washington’s new doctrine: selective, focused, outcome-oriented. 

For Nepal, the key is to maintain balanced diplomacy while leveraging its position within the India-US-China triangle and the emerging India–Russia connectivity frameworks.

A triangular future

Putin’s visit does not derail US-India cooperation. Instead, it forces Washington to adjust expectations, respect India’s independence and compete more intelligently. The NSS 2025 already anticipates this; the visit accelerates it. 

India emerges not as a camp follower but as a sovereign pole—the only major power capable of engaging Washington, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously without aligning with any. 

For South Asia, this means greater flexibility. For Russia, it preserves Eurasian influence. For the US, it demands strategic patience and economic creativity. 

And for the emerging world order, it signals a future defined less by blocs and more by fluid alignment, selective partnerships and overlapping spheres of cooperation.

The author, a Maj Gen (Retd) and strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu, writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy and stability

Before digging into alkaline foods, understanding how pH balance impacts common health concerns like fatigue or skin health can help you relate to your own well-being. The pH level influences metabolism, enzyme activity, and overall health, making it crucial for maintaining a healthy body. This knowledge empowers you to take control of your health by actively supporting your body’s optimal functioning.

The scientific measure of pH levels works on a scale of 0-14:

• A pH of 0-6 is acidic
• A pH of 7 is neutral
• A pH of 8 or higher is basic (alkaline)

Human life requires a meticulously maintained serum pH level of about 7.4 (a slightly alkaline range of 7.35 to 7.45) to function correctly or, in other words, to survive. 

Understanding the concept of pH and its impact on our health can be challenging, especially with misconceptions about alkaline diets. Clarifying how the body’s buffering systems work and what scientific evidence supports or questions these claims can help you make informed decisions about your diet and health strategies.

Choosing alkaline foods can help prevent inflammation and reduce disease risk, give you a sense of control over your health, and motivate positive dietary choices.

Maintaining a balance between acidic and alkaline foods can help reduce acidity and support your body’s optimal function, providing reassurance about your health and choices. 

Some instances of alkaline foods are:

• Fruits like apples, cherries, avocados, pineapple, bananas, apricots, and cantaloupe
• Non-starchy vegetables include broccoli, beets, asparagus, cabbage, carrots, leafy greens, and garlic
• Fruit juices (unsweetened)
• Nuts such as chestnuts or pumpkin seeds
• And legumes like kidney or white beans

Conversely, acidic foods, such as meat, cheese, eggs, sugar, and other sweetened beverages, can pose serious health risks. Overconsumption of these acid-forming foods can leave a residual ‘acid ash’, a term used to describe the acidic residue left in the body after digestion. This acid ash can cause your blood pH to become too acidic (acidosis), rendering your metabolism vulnerable to various diseases and disorders, including osteoporosis and kidney stones. 

Your body’s metabolism thrives on a balanced pH level, ideally between 7.35 and 7.45. Alkaline foods, with their pH-balancing properties, have a clear advantage over acidic foods in maintaining this balance. This knowledge should motivate you to know that you can actively contribute to your body’s optimal functioning by choosing the right foods. Let’s explore the specific health benefits of alkaline foods, emphasizing the importance of maintaining this balance for your health.

Bone health

An acid-rich diet, such as one high in processed meat and refined grains, stimulates osteoclast activity, increasing the risk of osteoporosis.   An alkaline diet maintains the pH level in your body to help lower the risk of osteoporosis, bone mineral density loss, and erosion. Consuming adequate amounts of fruits and vegetables, rich in alkaline compounds and nutrients such as beta-carotene, lycopene, lutein, and zeaxanthin, helps prevent osteoporosis.

Additionally, foods rich in essential minerals, such as calcium, magnesium, and potassium, found in foods like almonds and tofu, help maintain bone density and strength.    

Cancer prevention

Experts maintain that cancer cells thrive in an acidic environment (low pH) but cannot survive in an alkaline environment (high pH). An ‘alkalizing diet’ may help prevent the development and growth of cancer cells. A 2019 study published in the International Journal of Cancer suggested that alkaline diets could offer protection against hormone receptor-negative breast cancer. Clinical research indicates that increasing fruit and vegetable intake while reducing consumption of acidic meats can lower breast cancer risk. 

Heart health

Science backs up the idea that eating more alkaline foods, such as fruits and vegetables, may help lower the risk of hypertension and stroke. Since alkaline diets are low in fat and calories, eliminating acidic foods like red meat, processed foods, and sugar (a significant contributor to heart disease) naturally promotes a healthy body weight and lowers heart disease risk factors. This information should inspire you to add more alkaline foods to your diet for a healthier heart.

Additionally, alkaline foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables are rich in potassium and low in sodium, which can help lower blood pressure levels.

Kidney-friendly

The kidneys help regulate blood pH levels and perform the delicate task of excreting excess substances, including acids and bases. The mainstay of an alkaline diet is fruits and vegetables, which are indeed dietary alkalis and can help alleviate kidney disease and chronic renal illness. Excessive protein intake overburdens the kidneys. 

The alkaline diet supports the kidneys by slowing down the decline of their blood-filtering mechanisms and helps kidney patients balance their pH to safer levels.

Better digestion

Alkaline foods, with their high fiber content, promote healthy digestion and help alleviate the bothersome issue of constipation. Cruciferous vegetables, such as broccoli, Brussels sprouts, cabbage, cauliflower, collard greens, kale, and turnips, as well as fruits like apples and berries, are excellent sources of dietary fiber. 

That said, alkaline fruits and vegetables help regulate bowel movements and promote the growth of gut microbiomes that break down food into beneficial nutrients, thereby reducing the risk of gastrointestinal disorders such as diverticulosis and colorectal cancer. 

Boosts immune function

A robust immune system is pivotal in defending your body against infections and diseases. Alkaline foods are rich in immune-boosting nutrients, including vitamins A, C, and E, as well as antioxidants. These nutrients help fortify your immune response, neutralize harmful free radicals, and curb chronic inflammation, which may also lower the risk of developing cancer. By incorporating more alkaline foods into your diet, you can significantly boost your immune function and improve your overall health.

Supports weight management

Introducing alkaline foods into your diet regimen is more manageable than it may seem. It can be a delicious and enjoyable journey. Doing so can maintain a healthy weight and support overall metabolic function. Because they are low-calorie and nutrient-dense, high-fiber alkaline foods make you feel fuller after your staple meals. As such, they discourage the habit of snacking in between meals. Given this, they help maintain a healthy weight and overall metabolic function, encouraging and motivating you to make these dietary changes.  

Improves skin health

Alkaline foods, such as fruits and vegetables, are rich sources of vitamins, including C, E, and A, as well as antioxidants like beta-carotene. These factors all contribute to maintaining healthy, glowing skin and preventing issues like acne, eczema, psoriasis, and wrinkles. 

Boosts energy level

A regular diet of alkaline-dense vegetables like kale, broccoli, and watercress, and fruits like berries, avocado, apples, and cherries, to name some, provides unfailing increased energy levels and mental agility, not caffeine-rich drinks and sugary treats. 

Prevents arthritis

When your body is too acidic, it deteriorates your metabolism and makes you more prone to degenerative problems like arthritis. By reducing acidic foods and incorporating alkaline-rich fruits and vegetables, you're not just preventing but also alleviating inflammation and increasing growth hormone production. Following this nutritious switch can bring relief and comfort, knowing you're actively managing your health and potentially improving your condition.   

The bottom line: Incorporating alkaline-rich foods is instrumental to achieving optimal health and preventing diseases. Even naturopaths prescribe it and argue that an excessively acidic diet leads to “a breeding ground for disease.”

However, only alkaline foods do not meet the essential requirement of the human body: “a complex, highly organized structure made up of unique cells that work together to accomplish the specific functions necessary for sustaining life.”

At the end of the day, to get the most from your food, adopt a more pH-friendly diet with an 80/20 ratio of alkaline to acidic foods. Eat right. Stay healthy.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in the above text are solely research-based and intended for informative and educational purposes only; the author solicits the reader’s discretion and cross-references or consults a healthcare practitioner for further verification.

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The absence of the United States, China and Russia from recent G20 leaders’ meetings has often been treated as a sign that the forum has outlived its usefulness. That reading misses what is actually changing. The G20 has not disappeared from global economic diplomacy, nor has it been formally sidelined. What has shifted is the kind of work it is expected to do. Where it once functioned as a space for high-level coordination among the largest economies, it now operates more clearly as a forum sustained by those states that continue to depend on institutional stability.

This change reflects the erosion of the conditions that made the G20 indispensable in the first place. The forum took shape at a moment when financial instability moved quickly across borders and reduced the effectiveness of national responses. During that period, coordination was not a matter of preference, it was imposed by circumstance. That sense of mutual exposure no longer carries the same force. Economic policy is now shaped far more openly by strategic rivalry, domestic politics and security concerns. Subsidies, sanctions and trade restrictions are increasingly deployed without serious expectation of collective restraint. Under these conditions, broad consensus-based settings offer limited influence while imposing visible constraints.

The consequences of this shift were visible well before Johannesburg. The New Delhi summit showed that agreement was still possible, but only by narrowing the range of issues treated as appropriate for collective engagement. Disruptions linked to geopolitical conflict were acknowledged indirectly, if at all. This allowed the meeting to remain orderly, but it also reduced the forum’s capacity to engage with the sources of economic instability rather than its symptoms. Once this approach became routine, leader-level participation lost some of its urgency. Johannesburg made that clear.

The effects of selective disengagement have not been evenly distributed. For countries such as India, the European Union and Brazil, participation in multilateral institutions remains closely tied to economic and political strategy. Their economies are deeply embedded in global markets, and their policy objectives rely on predictable regulatory and financial environments. Institutional credibility matters more to these states than unilateral leverage. Unlike the great powers, they cannot easily replace multilateral engagement with bilateral or bloc-based arrangements without incurring costs.

This dependence has also increased their visibility within the G20. India, the EU and Brazil have become central to maintaining continuity in the forum not because they exercise coercive power, but because they retain a material interest in its operation. Their economic weight gives substance to this role. India’s expanding domestic market and manufacturing ambitions place it at the center of debates on development and technology. The European Union brings regulatory capacity and financial depth that influence global standards regardless of geopolitical fragmentation. Brazil’s position in commodity, energy and agricultural markets connects development concerns with climate and food security in ways few other actors can.

India’s recent engagement illustrates how an emerging great-power leadership now tends to function. Its emphasis on digital public infrastructure and development finance draws directly on policies already deployed domestically. Rather than relying exclusively on aspirational commitments, India has used practical experience to structure discussion. This does not compensate for the absence of great-power coordination, but it keeps multilateral engagement connected to implementation rather than rhetoric alone. The European Union operates through a different channel. Its influence rests less on mediation and more on scale. Through trade regimes, climate regulation, and digital standards, the EU shapes economic behavior well beyond its immediate membership. Within the G20, it provides a degree of policy continuity at a time when economic governance is increasingly shaped by short-term strategic considerations. Brazil’s contribution lies largely in its diplomatic positioning. Its engagement with institutional negotiation, the size of its economy, and South–South cooperation allows it to frame issues such as debt relief, food security and climate adaptation as shared economic challenges. In a polarized environment, this ability to keep discussions from sliding into distributive conflict has practical value.

Together, these states help prevent strategic rivalry from overwhelming multilateral settings altogether. They cannot resolve competition between the largest powers, nor can they substitute for the resources those powers control. Major initiatives in areas such as debt restructuring or climate finance still depend on actors with greater influence over capital and markets. Middle powers can align positions and sustain discussion, but compulsion remains beyond their reach.

What has happened to the G20 cannot be separated from what has happened to the political order that made it possible. The United States has already moved away from the model of leadership that sustained this forum in its early years. It still participates selectively, but its priorities now lie elsewhere: domestic industrial policy, security-driven trade decisions and tightly-managed alliances. The assumption that global economic stability requires sustained engagement in universal forums no longer shapes American behaviour in any consistent way.

China’s trajectory is different, but no less consequential. Beijing has not withdrawn from multilateralism. Instead, it has become increasingly selective about the kinds of institutions it is willing to invest in. Where rules, agendas and hierarchies are inherited from an earlier order, China engages cautiously. Where institutions can be designed, expanded or reshaped, its commitment is far more visible. This does not amount to abandonment, but it does reflect an effort to reconfigure the institutional landscape around Chinese preferences rather than adapt to existing constraints. Russia’s position is shaped by yet another set of pressures. Prolonged sanctions and political isolation have reduced any incentive to preserve institutions associated with Western economic dominance. Its alignment with China is less about shared economic vision than about mutual dissatisfaction with the current system. For Moscow, weakening the authority of existing frameworks has become a strategy in itself, particularly where those frameworks are seen as enforcing exclusion.

Taken together, these trajectories point to an uncomfortable reality. There is no major power waiting in the wings to restore the conditions under which the G20 once functioned. The idea that a hegemonic actor will step in to stabilize multilateral economic governance now belongs to an earlier period. That world has already passed. This is why the role of countries and entities such as India, the European Union, Brazil, and others matters more than is often acknowledged. These actors continue to benefit directly from stable, predictable economic frameworks. Their growth strategies, regulatory environments and external engagements depend on institutions that manage friction rather than amplify it. For them, the erosion of multilateral forums is not an abstract concern but a practical problem.

Sustaining the G20, then, is not about nostalgia for an earlier order or faith in institutional idealism. It is about interest. In the absence of great-power custodianship, responsibility shifts to those who still gain from continuity. Whether this responsibility can be translated into real influence remains uncertain. What seems clear is that multilateralism will no longer be upheld by those with the greatest power, but by those with the greatest stake in keeping the system from fragmenting further.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of Delhi based International Centre for Peace Studies

Forty-six thousand and twenty new voters have been registered in Sudurpaschim Province. 

Prem Raj Bhatta, Head of the Sudurpaschim Province Election Office, said that there has been an increase in young voters for the House of Representatives elections to be held on March 5.

"Election material management and voter list updating works are going on. A deadline until Friday has been given for registering objections on the voter list and correction of any errors," Bhatta added.

He said the highest number of new voters was added in Kailali with 18,213 and the lowest in Bajura with 1,517 from September 26  to November 21, during the period opened for registering for the voter list.