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In today’s world, technology has become an essential part of criminal investigations. What once depended largely on eyewitnesses, confessions, and manual police work has now evolved into a system supported by data, machines, and scientific tools. Modern digital technologies are helping law enforcement agencies solve complex cases more quickly, more efficiently, and often more fairly.

Artificial intelligence (AI), data analysis, digital forensics, and biometric identification have significantly transformed traditional methods of investigation. These tools allow investigators to process large volumes of information in a short time, identify patterns, and draw connections that would otherwise remain hidden. As a result, investigations are not only faster but also more accurate and reliable.

Digital evidence has now become a routine part of criminal cases. Electronic records, mobile phone data, emails, and even blockchain-based systems for tracking evidence are increasingly used in courts. Unlike traditional forms of evidence, digital records often leave a trace that is difficult to erase, making them particularly valuable in proving or disproving claims.

Technologies such as CCTV cameras, drones, and body-worn cameras have also changed the way crimes are detected and investigated. Surveillance systems help monitor public spaces and record events as they unfold.

Facial recognition and location-tracking technologies have further strengthened investigations. In many cases, they have helped law enforcement agencies solve crimes that would have otherwise remained unsolved.

DNA analysis

Another major development has been in the field of genetic science. DNA analysis has advanced far beyond its early forms. DNA evidence can link a suspect to a crime scene or help identify unknown individuals, making it one of the most powerful tools in modern investigations.

However, it is important to remember that even scientific evidence has its limits. Courts have emphasized that DNA reports, while important, are not absolute proof.

In Ram Shahi and Others v Prem Kumari Shahi and Others (NKP 2079, Decision No. 10854), the Supreme Court (SC) held that DNA evidence must be examined in the context of social realities and surrounding circumstances. This highlights a jurisprudential principle: technology should assist justice, not replace judicial reasoning.

Cross-border crimes

Technology is also playing a crucial role in addressing crimes in border areas. Nepal faces challenges such as cross-border trafficking, illegal trade, narcotics smuggling, and the circulation of counterfeit currency.

Crimes like human trafficking, especially involving women and girls, remain a serious concern.

In Chandra Kant Gyanwali v Government of Nepal (NKP 2080, Decision No. 11037), the SC stressed the need for stronger border management, including the use of CCTV and other surveillance technologies at checkpoints and transit points. Effective use of technology can significantly improve monitoring and control in these sensitive areas.

From a constitutional perspective, Nepal has recognized the importance of technology in governance and development. The Constitution encourages the expansion of information technology to meet national needs.

At the same time, it protects fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, communication, and consumer rights in digital spaces. These provisions show that while technology is encouraged, it must operate within the framework of rights and freedoms.

AG’s recommendation

In terms of legal provisions, the Electronic Transactions Act, 2063 plays a key role in dealing with cyber offences. It provides that such offences are prosecuted in the name of the Government of Nepal and allows investigators to seek assistance from technical experts.

The growing complexity of cybercrime, however, has exposed the limitations of existing laws. As cyber offences become more sophisticated, there is an increasing demand for updated and comprehensive cyber legislation, recommending the study of Impact Assessment of Cyber Crime–Related Laws in Nepal (Investigative Study Report, 2081), conducted by Office of Attorney General (AG).

Institutionally, Nepal has taken steps to strengthen cybercrime investigations. The report of the Attorney General further reveals that the Central Cyber Bureau at Police Headquarters handles cyber-related offences across the country, supported by cyber cells in all seven provinces.

The Central Investigation Bureau and the Metropolitan Police Crime Division play important roles in different regions. However, studies have suggested that more specialized training is needed for investigators dealing with high-tech crimes, organized crime, and terrorism, recommends the 2081 AG report.

Criminal adjudication 

The Criminal Procedure Code also reflects the growing role of technology in the justice system. It allows the filing of FIR through electronic means and provides for digital archiving of such reports.

Statements of witnesses and accused persons can be recorded through video conferencing, especially in cases involving illness, old age, or security risks. Courts can also record evidence and conduct proceedings digitally, making the justice system more accessible and efficient.

The Evidence Act, 2031 has provisions that allow the use of digital evidence. Facts expressed through emails, messages, or other digital forms can be considered in court. The Act also recognizes expert opinions in areas such as science and technology, provided that the expert appears before the court as a witness. Documentary evidence is not limited to paper documents, which means that digital records are admissible.

The law requires that proper procedures be followed before accessing personal data. For example, investigators must obtain permission from the court and submit relevant documents, such as FIRs, when seeking access to call detail records (CDRs) or other digital information.

In Advocate Baburam Aryal v Government of Nepal (NKP 2074, Decision No. 9740), the SC emphasized that while CDRs can be useful in investigations, they must be obtained strictly in accordance with the law.

This balance between technology and rights is crucial. Surveillance systems, if not properly regulated, can lead to violations of privacy and civil liberties. Strong legal safeguards and judicial oversight are essential.

Way forward

Technology has undoubtedly transformed criminal investigations in Nepal. It has made the process faster, more efficient, and more scientific. The need of the hour is not just more technology, but better regulation, updated laws, and trained personnel who can use these tools responsibly.

The Fifth Strategic Plan of the SC also endeavors to promote the use of technology and AI across the entire judicial system. The need of the hour is to ensure effective compliance with these strategic plans, and the government must provide adequate budgetary support and necessary manpower. A high-tech, technology-friendly justice system cannot be realized unless the government actively supports and motivates court officials and ensures the proper implementation of these strategic plans.

Technology should serve justice, not dominate it. The ultimate goal must remain the same: to ensure fairness, protect rights, and uphold the rule of law in an increasingly digital world.

When Balendra Shah was sworn in as Nepal’s prime minister on March 27, the image was almost impossibly cinematic. A 36-year-old structural engineer and former rapper, standing where four-time prime ministers and Maoist commanders had stood before him, promising to do things differently. His Rastriya Swatantra Party had just won 182 of 275 parliamentary seats—something Nepal had not seen since 1959. The message from the Nepali public was unmistakable: we are done with the old order.

The RSP has since worked hard to project a single, coherent image—a technocratic, performance-driven government that has broken decisively with Nepal's culture of corruption and cronyism. The 100-point governance reform agenda, the youth-heavy cabinet, the swift sacking of a minister who appointed his own wife to a public board—all of it feeds a narrative of competence and accountability.

But beneath that united front, something more complicated is happening. The RSP is not one political project. It is three—held together, for now, by the shared euphoria of a landslide victory and the mutual convenience of power. And to understand why this matters, it helps to reach for a framework that political scientists have spent the last two decades developing: the study of populism itself.

The meaning of populism

Populism has become one of the most overused and misunderstood words in political commentary. Used loosely, it is little more than an insult—a way of calling a politician reckless or demagogic. But scholars define it more precisely, and their definitions are useful here.

The most influential academic framework, developed by political theorists Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser, describes populism as a ‘thin ideology’—a set of ideas that divides the world into two camps: a pure, virtuous ‘people’ and a corrupt ‘elite’. The populist leader claims to speak for the former against the latter. What makes populism ‘thin’ is that it can attach to almost any substantive political program. A left-wing party can be populist. So can a right-wing one. So can a technocrat. The ideology fills in the details; populism provides the structure.

Beyond this core definition, scholars have identified distinct varieties of populism that operate through different channels and appeal to different publics. Understanding Nepal's new government requires distinguishing between three of them—because Balen Shah, Rabi Lamichhane, and Sudan Gurung each embody one.

Balen Shah: The techno-populist

Political scientist Benjamin Moffitt, in his work on populism's global rise, identifies a variant he calls techno-populism—leaders who claim that the system's problem is not structural injustice but simple incompetence, and who position themselves as the capable outsider who can fix what the corrupt insiders broke. The appeal is neither left nor right. It is managerial. Think of it as: the people deserve better—and I know how to deliver it.

Balen Shah is the closest contemporary embodiment of this type in South Asia. A structural engineer by training, a rapper by creative instinct, he built his political reputation as Kathmandu's mayor by setting measurable targets for waste management and traffic, posting updates directly to 4m Facebook followers, and projecting an image of relentless competence unbendable to any party or patron. His 100-point governance agenda—with performance indicators for every ministry—is essentially techno-populism institutionalised.

His populism is also unusually broad in its geographic and ethnic reach. Unlike most Nepali politicians who build their base within a caste or regional bloc, he launched his national campaign from Janakpur, presenting himself as a ‘son of Madhes’, a symbolically charged move for a Kathmandu-born politician of Hill origin. He won support across communities—urban youth, women, diaspora Nepalis—in a way that consciously resists identity-based outbidding.

The risk embedded in this model is one that scholars have documented repeatedly. Moffitt and others note that techno-populist leaders, confident their mandate represents the direct will of the people, tend to grow impatient with the slow, contentious machinery of democratic institutions. Within weeks of taking office, Balen announced the abolition of party-affiliated trade unions in government bodies and the removal of political student unions from campuses, replacing them with non-partisan councils. Both are defended as anti-corruption reforms. 

Critics counter that dismantling workers’ organisations and depoliticising student life weakens the intermediary structures that democracies depend on—a familiar early warning sign in the literature on democratic backsliding.

Rabi Lamichhane: The performative populist

Lamichhane fits a different and older archetype in the scholarly literature—what Moffitt calls spectacle populism and what Latin American political scientists have analysed as the caudillo variant: the charismatic outsider who channels public fury through theatrical confrontation, making the exposure and punishment of the corrupt elite the central act of his politics.

Lamichhane built his career on precisely this. As a television host, he made a name for himself by cornering officials on camera. He founded the RSP in 2022 as a vehicle for anti-corruption outrage and won 21 seats on his first attempt. His style is combative, moralistic, and deeply personalised—politics as a crusade with him as its protagonist.

The profound irony, of course, is that Lamichhane arrived at power trailing active embezzlement charges, multiple stints in pre-trial custody, and a documented record of using an earlier stint as Home Minister to pursue journalists who criticised him. 

A leaked commission report on last September’s protest violence was conspicuously silent on episodes connected to his controversial prison break and the burning of media offices belonging to a publisher he had previously had arrested. As scholars of populism from Jan-Werner Müller to Nadia Urbinati have long observed, performative populism carries within it an authoritarian temptation: once the leader is the embodiment of the people’s will, scrutiny of the leader becomes, by definition, an attack on the people.

Lamichhane remains RSP chair and controls the party’s organisational machinery. He was widely expected to claim the Home Ministry—giving him oversight of Nepal’s police, intelligence services, and the very investigative institutions that might scrutinise his own legal exposure. In the event, the portfolio went to Sudan Gurung, reportedly over Lamichhane’s resistance. 

Sudan Gurung: The movement populist

Sudan Gurung belongs to a third scholarly category—what researchers of the Global South, from Ernesto Laclau onwards, have analysed as movement populism or mobilisation populism: leaders who emerge not from established parties or media platforms but from the streets, whose authority derives from their claimed role as the authentic voice of an uprising rather than any formal mandate.

Gurung rose to national prominence by distributing water to protesters in September 2025, before becoming a central negotiator in the crisis—reportedly engaging directly with the army leadership in the days leading to Sushila Karki’s appointment as interim prime minister. His biography is one of civic mobilisation: earthquake relief volunteer, pandemic aid organiser, youth NGO founder. His populism speaks in the language of sacrifice and solidarity rather than competence or outrage.

But his conduct since taking the Home Ministry—one of Nepal’s most powerful portfolios—has generated immediate concern. Within hours of taking oath, Gurung personally went to police headquarters and, according to reports, effectively pressured the inspector general to arrest former prime minister KP Sharma Oli that same night. 

The arrests may well be legally justified. But a senior commentator put the problem precisely in an op-ed: “The home minister himself releasing arrest warrants and posting updates on social media suggests political leadership stepping into police work.” This, the piece observed, risks casting doubt on the impartiality of investigations—and fits a pattern the scholar Mudde identifies as ‘democratic illiberalism’: popular legitimacy used to bypass institutional process.

Gurung’s own past contains unresolved ambiguities, newspapers have noted: questions about his proximity to the coordination of the September protests, his role in the violence that followed on the second day, and allegations about the opacity of relief funds managed through his NGO. None of these establishes wrongdoing. What they establish, as one commentator noted drily, are “ambiguities that have neither been publicly resolved nor institutionally interrogated before the conferral of one of the most sensitive offices in the state.”

Three populisms, one roof

These are not abstract typological differences. They translate directly into competing instincts on the most important governance questions Nepal now faces.

Accountability: Balen’s techno-populist agenda promises to investigate political figures going back to 1991. Lamichhane's legal exposure creates a structural incentive for the accountability drive to stop well short of RSP’s own leadership. The battle over the Home Ministry was the first visible expression of this tension—and it was resolved in Balen’s favor, for now, by installing Gurung rather than a Lamichhane loyalist. But Lamichhane retains the party chair and is not going anywhere.

Institutional process versus decisive action: Gurung’s movement-populist instincts—arrest warrants announced on Facebook, sleeping on a ministry sofa for public effect, personally dictating police operations—represent a governing style that deliberately prioritises visible decisiveness over procedural integrity. Balen’s agenda, by contrast, is built on systematic institutional reform. These two impulses, sharing a cabinet, will eventually collide.

The federalism question: The snap elections of March 2026 covered only the federal parliament; provincial assembly elections were deferred. For the Janajati and Madhesi communities whose political voice is most directly exercised at the provincial level, this is not a procedural footnote. It is an early signal about whether the RSP's promised ‘new Nepal’ actually includes the communities that Nepal's 2015 constitution was supposed to empower.

The paradox of the majority

Nepal’s previous governments were undone by coalition fragility. The RSP’s extraordinary majority was supposed to solve that. But here is the paradox: that majority removes the external pressure that might otherwise have forced internal coherence. When you must manage a five-party coalition, you are compelled to articulate shared ground in explicit terms. When you hold 66 percent of parliament yourself, you can defer internal contradictions indefinitely—until they detonate.

Three types of populism can, in theory, complement each other. A government that delivers results, holds corrupt elites accountable, and genuinely includes the previously marginalised would be a formidable and legitimate political force. But that outcome requires more than a seven-point power-sharing agreement and a 100-point to-do list. It requires a shared theory of the state—an agreed answer to who governs, for whom, through what institutions, and constrained by what rules.

That the RSP does not yet have. What the next twelve months reveal about whether Lamichhane’s cases are quietly buried, whether Gurung’s decisiveness respects institutional boundaries, and whether Balen’s reform agenda survives contact with his own party will tell us whether Nepal has produced a genuine rupture—or simply replaced one set of elites with another, newer, and for the moment more popular set.

The author is a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a life member of the Delhi-based International Centre for Peace Studies

Nepal and India share one of the world’s most deeply rooted bilateral relationships—built on civilizational ties, open borders, cultural affinity, and economic interdependence. As the Prime Minister of Nepal prepares for an official visit to India, both countries stand at a defining moment: to transform traditional goodwill into structured economic integration driven by connectivity, trade facilitation, and shared prosperity.

Beyond diplomacy

Nepal–India relations extend far beyond formal diplomacy. They exist in the everyday lives of people—families, pilgrims, traders, students, and workers who move across an open and historically fluid border. This unique relationship is anchored in shared culture, religion, linguistic proximity, and deep social familiarity. Unlike most bilateral relationships, it operates at both state and societal levels simultaneously.
Yet while the foundation remains strong, the evolving global economy demands a shift in focus—from sentiment-driven engagement to system-driven cooperation. The challenge today is not trust, but transformation.

Proximity to prosperity

The next phase of Nepal–India relations can be captured in a simple yet powerful vision that rests on four key pillars:

• Trusted neighbours, transforming together:  A commitment to modernize relations based on mutual trust, cultural closeness, and respect, transforming historical ties into a results-oriented partnership.
• Co-creating growth across borders: Promotion of cross-border investment, industrial cooperation, and integrated value chains to drive sustainable economic development.
• Connecting economies, empowering people: Improving transport, logistics, and trade systems to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and directly benefit citizens.
• Shared heritage, shared future: Leveraging deep cultural and civilizational ties to ensure long-term regional stability and prosperity.

The engine of change

Connectivity remains the most critical pillar of Nepal–India economic relations. The efficient movement of goods, services, and people will determine the competitiveness of both economies.

Key priorities include the expansion of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs), dry ports, and cross-border rail networks. Equally important is the adoption of digital solutions—such as electronic cargo tracking and pre-arrival customs processing—to reduce delays and uncertainty.

For Nepal, where logistics costs remain relatively high, even incremental efficiency gains can significantly enhance export competitiveness and investment attractiveness.

Trade, industry and value chains

Beyond connectivity, the next frontier lies in industrial cooperation and regional value chain development. Nepal and India have strong potential to build cross-border industrial ecosystems, particularly in border regions.

Sectors such as agro-processing, light manufacturing, and high-value agricultural exports, including tea, cardamom, ginger, and honey, offer compelling opportunities for collaboration.

A transformative production model can be envisioned: ‘Produce in Nepal–Scale with India–Export Globally.’

This approach integrates Nepal into regional and global value chains while leveraging India’s scale and market access.

Regional integration: The BBIN opportunity

The BBIN (Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal) framework provides a broader platform for regional connectivity and trade expansion.

Full implementation of the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement would enable seamless cross-border transport, significantly reducing trade costs and transit times. Improved access to Bangladeshi ports via Indian corridors would further strengthen Nepal's external trade connectivity, positioning Nepal not as a landlocked country, but as a land-linked economy embedded in a wider regional network.

Quality infrastructure and global market access

To compete globally, Nepal must strengthen its quality infrastructure—upgrading laboratories, improving accreditation systems, and establishing joint certification facilities at key border points.

Alignment with international standards such as Codex, ISO, and SPS frameworks is essential for export credibility. Mutual recognition agreements can further reduce duplication and streamline trade compliance.

Institutional coordination and private sector role

Effective implementation requires strong coordination across government agencies, including those responsible for foreign affairs, commerce, customs, and regulation.

A joint Nepal–India trade facilitation task force, supported by regular review mechanisms, can help resolve operational bottlenecks. The private sector also plays a central role—institutions such as the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Confederation of Nepalese Industries, and the Nepal India Chamber must lead efforts in exporter readiness, compliance awareness, and investment facilitation.

Partnership for the future

The upcoming Prime Ministerial visit represents more than a diplomatic engagement—it is a strategic opportunity to redefine Nepal–India relations for the next generation. With connectivity, competitiveness, and coordination strengthened, Nepal can position itself as a bridge economy in South Asia, linking markets, enabling production networks, and contributing to regional prosperity.

Ultimately, the future of this partnership will depend on moving beyond sentiment toward structured economic cooperation built on trust, transparency, and shared ambition.

Nepal and India are not just neighbours—they are partners in transformation, shaping a shared future in a rapidly changing global economy.

The author is the General Secretary of Nepal-India Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Iran and Israel are both located in the Middle East. Iran lies on the coast of the Persian Gulf, while Israel is situated on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Iran shares borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey. Israel shares borders with Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The distance between the two countries is at least a thousand kilometers. Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel is a democratic country with an executive Prime Minister, whereas Iran is a limited democracy with a religious Supreme Leader and an elected President. In terms of area, population, and defense spending, Iran has its larger shares. Israel possesses atomic weapons, while Iran, supposedly, is on the same path.  

Israel is the only Jewish-majority country in the world, and Iran is a Shia-majority Islamic country. Iran is a major producer of petroleum products. Strategically important in the Middle East and rest of the world, these two nations have been enemies since 1979.

Following an Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, which led to the death of Iran's Supreme Leader, Defense Minister, and other high-ranking officials, both countries have been attacking each other using missiles and drones and it continues to these days. Neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have suffered directly. Iran has attacked them using missiles targeting airports and oil refineries. The United States is supporting Israel, while Russia is helping Iran.

Due to this war, Iran has blocked a major maritime pathway, the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a limited supply of major petroleum products and causing price hikes in the global market. 

Iranian regime and Israel

Iran has two heads of state: an elected president and a Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is the highest authority, selected by a body of clerics for eight years, while the president is elected directly by citizens for a four-year term. However, the Guardian Council, headed by the Supreme Leader, supervises the qualifications of candidates for president and parliament. The Supreme Leader, who is the actual head of the country, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He controls the judiciary and appoints the heads of key state bodies, including the Guardian Council, a hardline-dominated watchdog that vets all candidates for public office.

Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was the Shah (King). During that period, Iranian society was open to the world and had close ties with the US and Western countries based on mutual trust and cooperation. At that time, Western countries had huge influence and investment in Iranian petroleum and other sectors. A law passed in 1950 protected and encouraged foreign investors, leading to massive growth. However, many Iranians felt foreign companies exploited Iran’s resources. Economic inequality and foreign influence contributed to public anger, which led to the Islamic Revolution.

After the revolution, Iran moved toward an autocratic regime under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Relations with the United States and Western countries deteriorated, many foreign companies left, and industries were nationalized. As a result, Iran became isolated and suffered economic blockade from Western powers that continues to this day.After the revolution, Iran has adopted conservative policies and values. There has been mass suppression of opponents and the general public after the revolution, and women’s position in society has been undermined.

Israel was established in 1948 after World War II. The USA and the UK played important roles in its formation. At the time, Israel faced war from Arab countries but succeeded in protecting its sovereignty. Iran has been attacking Israel either directly or indirectly. Hamas is a proxy organization funded by Iran and active in Palestine, and another proxy militia organization is active in Lebanon. Iran uses these proxies for indirect attacks on Israel. Iran sees Israel as its enemy and calls it the ‘Little Satan’.

The Israel lobby in the US

The diplomatic ties between the USA and Israel are strong. Jewish society holds strong positions in politics, science and technology and economic development like banking, trade, and industry. Scientists from Albert Einstein to Oppenheimer were Jewish. The Israeli diaspora in the US also exerts strong weight on the US government to act in Israel’s favor. The formation of Israel was carried out tactically with the help of the US and the UK after World War II. Many congressmen in the US also lobby in favor of Israel. The US is a Christian-majority country, and Jerusalem is the birthplace of Jesus Christ, making Israel a holy place for US citizens. All of this indicates that the US has a strong relationship with Israel, and the US government has always supported Israel. The American-Israeli relationship finds a special bond based on shared strategic interests and diplomatic relations also provide advanced military technology, and security aid for defense.

Iran-Israel crisis

The Iranian Islamic Revolution brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his revolutionaries in power. Iran scrapped all previous agreements with Israel. Khomeini began fierce criticism of Israel for its occupation of Palestinian territories. Gradually, Iran adopted increasingly harsh rhetoric toward Israel, aiming to win the favor of regional Arab states and their citizens or at least to expand its regional influences.

When Israel sent troops into South Lebanon in 1982 to intervene in the country’s civil war, Khomeini also dispatched Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Beirut to support local Shia militias. Khomeini and the entire Iranian leadership have repeatedly questioned and denied the Holocaust.

Before the 1979 revolution, Iran and Israel had close diplomatic relations, and there were daily flights from Tehran to Tel Aviv. It is believed that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had connections with various anti-Shah opposition groups before 1979 and Iranian revolutionary militias trained in PLO camps in places like Lebanon. After the revolution, Khomeini became a strong supporter of Palestine and ‘handed over’ the Israeli embassy in Tehran to the PLO. Over time, Iran’s support shifted more toward Islamist Palestinian groups like Hamas rather than the largely secular PLO leadership. Indeed, as an Islamic Republic, Iran officially rejects Israel’s existence and has completely broken diplomatic ties. Iran backs proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, providing them with resources and these groups have attacked Israeli territory.

Iran wants to expand its influence in the Middle East, while Israel tries to halt that. It reflects that both countries are competing for regional power. Israel is attacking to destroy Iran’s nuclear programs and plants. After Feb 28, Iran has attacked countries in West Asia such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. However, these countries have not provided their territories to the US and Israel against Iran. Iran has blocked and halted the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway for West Asia to supply petroleum products. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s supply passes through this chokepoint located between Iran and Oman. 

Consequences of a war

Due to Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and the drone and missile attacks on the chain of petroleum product and supply by both countries, the supply of petroleum products has been adversely affected. As a result, the prices of petroleum products are skyrocketing. The price linkage with other commodities is also gradually increasing. South and East Asian countries are facing an energy crisis.

Another impact of this war has been massive humanitarian damage and destruction of physical infrastructure and development. There has been intense aerial bombardment, damaging nuclear facilities, power plants, fuel refineries, and sanitation systems.

Iranian proxies such as the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah are likely engaging directly, drawing neighboring countries into the conflict, and the region is becoming highly unstable. West Asia is a region of employment for South and East Asian people; due to this war, many people face the threat of losing their jobs and security situation. Iran’s Supreme Leader, high-level leaders, and security officials have been killed in this war. Innocent school students and people in Iran, Israel, and other countries have also been killed. The conflict is accompanied or preceded by massive cyberattacks and government-imposed internet blackouts to control information.

Due to the impact of this war, a weakened Iran could lead to a shift in regional power dynamics in favor of Israel and its neighbors, which may lead to the collapse of the current Iranian regime.

Nepal is also facing several impacts from this war. Around two million people working in the Gulf region and Israel are facing threats of losing jobs and security. Nepal has suspended work permits for countries like Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Nepal’s economy is based on tourism, but due to this war, the number of tourists coming to Nepal is declining, and direct flights to West Asia are disrupted. The price of petroleum products is rising, leading to higher levels of inflation in every economic sector. Foreign employment is the main source of remittances, so the inflow of remittances has also been adversely affected. If the situation in West Asia deteriorates continuously, we may have to rescue our citizens, which would be a major challenge for us. All of this shows that Nepal and the Nepali people are facing huge challenges.

Conclusion

Israel and Iran became enemies after the Islamic Revolution. Iran officially denies the existence of Israel. Iran supports proxy organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah by providing financial and other resources. The counter attack by Hamas in 2022 in Israel, and Israel’s reactive attack, were disastrous resulting in the loss of huge numbers of human lives, including Nepali students, and massive destruction of physical infrastructure.

Nepal was the first country in South Asia to officially recognize Israel in 1960. The Israeli government has been providing scholarships to Nepali students for higher education. Israel is a decent employer for Nepali citizens. 

Iran has isolated itself from the rest of the region and the world. Due to a decades-long economic blockade, Iran’s economy is suffering from inflation, unemployment, and mass dissatisfaction. Israel is at a turning point in its history; this war is seen as a war of existence. Therefore, due to its adverse internal situation, Israel started this war and wants it to reach a logical end.

A protracted war comes with huge economic, physical and humanitarian costs attached. So, countries like India, China, Egypt, Turkey, Germany, and France must take the initiative to stop the war and call for an immediate ceasefire. Iran must also compromise and come to the dialogue table with the United States and Israel, either indirectly or directly. Only multilateral and bilateral dialogue can solve these problems peacefully. Iran must change its stance of non-recognition of Israel, a country located far from Iran and also review its regime. Only an elected civilian government can solve the country’s problems. Iran must be ready to correct its wrong policies and stances, including stopping funding to proxy organizations.