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Nepal has completed candidate nominations under its First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system, marking a critical step toward the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for March 5. The process concluded largely peacefully, easing concerns about political instability.

Nepal’s federal parliament consists of 275 members, with 165 elected through the FPTP system and the remaining 110 through proportional representation (PR). With nominations now finalized, the Election Commission is moving ahead with the election calendar. Below are ten developments emerging from the nomination process that merit attention.

1. Candidate numbers exceed 3,000

According to Nepal’s Election Commission, more than 3,000 candidates have filed nominations under the FPTP system. This figure is expected to decline slightly as parties negotiate withdrawals. Separately, 3,293 candidates from 63 political parties have registered under the proportional representation system.

2. An influx of new faces

Political parties have introduced a notable number of first-time candidates, reflecting growing public pressure for political renewal. Analysts link this trend partly to youth-led protests in September that called for accountability and generational change. The Nepali Congress, one of the country’s largest parties, has nominated 106 new candidates out of its 165 FPTP slots. The CPN-UML, CPN (Maoist Centre), and the newly formed Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) have also fielded a large number of new contenders, though comprehensive data is still pending.

3. Absence of pre-election alliances

In contrast to the 2017 and 2022 elections—when major parties formed electoral alliances—no formal pre-poll coalitions have been announced this time. Major parties, including the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, RSP, and the Nepali Communist Party, have fielded candidates in most constituencies. While limited seat adjustments may still occur, parties appear to be testing their individual electoral strength.

4. Limited progress on inclusion

Despite constitutional commitments to inclusivity, candidate representation under the FPTP system remains uneven. Women, Indigenous communities, and other marginalized groups are underrepresented. While proportional representation lists are legally required to ensure diversity, no such obligation exists under FPTP, resulting in only about 400 female candidates nationwide.

5. High-profile contest draws attention

One of the most closely watched races is in Jhapa-5, where former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is facing former Kathmandu mayor Balendra Shah, a popular independent figure known for his anti-establishment appeal. The constituency drew nationwide attention during nominations, with competing demonstrations of political strength and minor clashes reported.

6. Prominent political figures shift constituencies

Several senior leaders are contesting from strategically significant constituencies. Nepali Congress President Gagan Kumar Thapa has moved from his traditional stronghold in Kathmandu to Sarlahi-4 in the southern Madhes region. Former Prime Minister and Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal is contesting from Rukum (East), a historic center of the Maoist insurgency. Former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai has reversed an earlier decision not to contest and is running from Gorkha-2. RSP chair Rabi Lamichhane is contesting from Chitwan-2, while former top bureaucrat Kul Man Ghising is running from Kathmandu-3. Veteran leader Sher Bahadur Deuba, a dominant political figure since the 1990s, has opted not to contest this election.

7. Journalists enter electoral politics

A growing number of journalists have entered the electoral race, underscoring public distrust in traditional political elites and the media’s expanding role in politics. Prominent television host Rishi Dhamala and several other journalists are contesting from various constituencies. Nepal’s state-run news agency reports that more than a dozen journalists are running for office—more than in previous elections.

8. RSP expands nationwide presence

The Rastriya Swatantra Party, which emerged as a major political force in the 2022 elections, has fielded candidates in 164 of Nepal’s 165 constituencies, excluding the remote Himalayan district of Manang. This positions the party alongside long-established parties and reflects its rapid organizational growth. The monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party has also fielded candidates nationwide.

9. Legal hurdles cleared

Nepal’s Supreme Court declined to intervene in internal disputes within the Nepali Congress, refusing to issue a stay order that could have delayed the election process. The decision has removed a major legal obstacle and allowed the Election Commission to proceed as scheduled.

10. Cabinet ministers resign to contest

Four cabinet ministers resigned to contest the elections, drawing criticism from civil society groups and opposition figures. Critics argue that ministers should prioritize ensuring free and fair elections rather than seeking electoral office, while supporters defend the resignations as consistent with democratic norms.

The political document presented by Gagan Kumar Thapa at the Nepali Congress Special General Convention proposes a far-reaching transformation of the country’s political landscape and national politics. It reviews the prevailing political situation and introduces new ideas to address existing challenges. The document is likely to trigger a nationwide debate on several key issues.

View on the GenZ movement

The document has taken ownership of the Sept 8–9 GenZ movement. It states: “The youth-led movement has brought Nepali politics to a distinct and challenging turning point. From the perspective of our party, the political situation before and after the GenZ movement is entirely different.” The rebellion is described as an outburst of public frustration against repeatedly failed leadership, the erosion of credibility in public institutions, and systemic problems such as misgovernance and corruption.

The document further states: “We were the largest party in the parliament that was dissolved by this movement, and we were also a stakeholder in the deposed government. When the rebellion erupted addressing public grievances, we must acknowledge the reality—while repeatedly assuring the general public—that, in one way or another, we were involved in these issues and failed to intervene in time to prevent these anomalies.” According to the document, the GenZ rebellion should be understood as a movement for fundamental transformation, demanding economic development, meaningful opportunities for youth, good governance, and government accountability.

At its core, the document argues, the GenZ rebellion was about change: changes in policies, methods and practices, thinking and mindset, and certain leadership roles. As the largest party in Parliament and part of the government targeted by the movement, the need for internal reform within the Nepali Congress became evident.

The document notes: “Recognizing this, party members at all levels raised their voices for transformation. As calls for change grew stronger at the grassroots level, there was concern at the center that we had reached a point where decisive action had become difficult.” Previously, following the GenZ movement, the party leadership had not fully taken ownership of the uprising.

The document reaffirms the party’s commitment to political reform, good governance, and youth participation in the wake of the GenZ movement, which it describes as a historic political awakening. It expresses deep sorrow over the tragic incidents during the protests and pays tribute to those who lost their lives. Thapa has pledged that acts of repression and violence during the protests, along with serious human rights violations, will be independently and impartially investigated. A government commission is currently conducting an inquiry.

The document emphasizes that truth and justice must be established and legal action taken against those responsible. Recognizing the political awakening of the youth as a vital societal force, it commits to institutionalizing meaningful youth participation at all levels of party organization and state governance. “The call for fundamental transformation expressed by the youth is the living political capital of our society,” the document states, adding that policy-level and structural arrangements will be implemented to ensure decisive youth representation. The NC establishment and other parties, particularly the CPN-UML, do not agree with Thapa’s position on the GenZ movement.

Good governance and anti-corruption

The document highlights that the core demands of the rebellion are closely linked to corruption control, transparency, and good governance. It calls for a multiparty national dialogue to address these demands and institutionalize reforms reflecting citizens’ aspirations. The party pledges to:

• Engage all stakeholders to build consensus on good governance without violating constitutional principles
• Lead multiparty dialogue to create a shared national understanding and ensure result-oriented reforms
• Strengthen the independence of constitutional bodies, regulatory authorities, and public institutions
• Depoliticize universities, public agencies, and service delivery organizations while ensuring merit-based functioning and inclusive representation
• Simplify administrative procedures, strengthen institutional capacity, and enforce financial discipline
• Promote transparency, accountability, and citizen-responsive governance

Reclaiming NC’s leadership

The document emphasizes reclaiming the Nepali Congress’s leadership in national politics. At critical moments in history, it states, the party has taken decisive decisions and forged a distinct identity. At its founding, the party voiced public aspirations for freedom, civic supremacy, human rights, liberation from the Rana regime, and democracy. In 1990, restoring people’s rights and establishing a multiparty system were its core objectives. Following the 2006 movement, the party played a decisive role in resolving issues of democracy, republicanism, federalism, and inclusiveness through a democratic constitution. The document acknowledges all major political documents since 1950, including the recent GenZ movement.

Politics grounded in principles

Ahead of upcoming elections, the document reiterates its commitment to politics based on core values: integrity, democracy, and public service. It stresses that principles will take precedence over power and rejects pre-election alliances that compromise its ideals. Over the past three decades, the party has endured setbacks, exile, and violent challenges while upholding its principles. Even when electoral outcomes were manipulated, it accepted results without compromising integrity.

The party acknowledges recent challenges in maintaining its commitment in a polarized and populist political climate but reaffirms that it will never compromise democratic values, national integrity, sovereignty, or the rule of law.

Reform of state mechanisms

The document acknowledges long-standing criticism of state institutions over the past three decades, particularly excessive political influence that has weakened their functioning. It calls for an overhaul of state mechanisms and proposes reforms, including to the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA).

Corruption is identified as the root cause of Nepal’s political, administrative, and economic challenges. The party pledges to strengthen the rule of law, ensure accountability, and reinforce anti-corruption mechanisms through measures such as:

• Ensuring independence of constitutional bodies, including the CIAA and the Auditor General
• Appointing officials based on competence, integrity, and proportional representation
• Mandating asset declarations by ministers, parliamentarians, and senior officials
• Protecting state institutions, universities, and public offices from partisan interference

Improving public service delivery

The party proposes reforms to make public service delivery citizen-centered, transparent, and result-oriented. These include fixed service timelines, accountability for delays, reduced red tape, and expanded e-governance.

Rejecting office-centered administrative thinking, the document emphasizes citizen-focused services. Integrated service centers will replace fragmented systems, allowing citizens to access multiple services—such as registration, licensing, taxation, social security, and health—through single physical or digital platforms. Digital connectivity will be expanded to enable home-based service delivery.

Public servants’ competence and integrity are highlighted as essential. Salaries will reflect market value, and training will focus on efficiency, communication, and modern administrative practices. The number of ministries at federal and provincial levels will be reviewed and rationalized, and an umbrella law will strengthen federalism and clarify intergovernmental authority.

Democratic reforms within political parties

The document acknowledges persistent problems such as weak intra-party democracy and leadership stagnation. It argues that democracy requires continuous participation, accountability, and inclusiveness, not just periodic elections. Proposed measures include:

• Electing all leaders—from ward level to central leadership—through democratic processes
• Conducting timely and transparent internal elections in all party-affiliated bodies
• Ensuring representation of women, Madhesis, minorities, persons with disabilities, youth, and marginalized communities
• Institutionalizing internal democracy through competitive elections and gender-balanced candidacies
• Introducing digital, transparent candidate evaluation systems based on competence and integrity

The document also proposes tenure limits for executive positions and a one-time proportional representation rule to broaden leadership opportunities.

Reform of the electoral system

The document supports reforms to make Nepal’s electoral system more inclusive, stable, and accountable. It proposes reviewing constitutional provisions, introducing reserved constituencies and “Single Rotation Reserved Constituencies,” guaranteeing voting rights for Nepalis abroad, and institutionalizing “Right to Reject (No Vote).” Primary elections, state funding based on vote weight, and strict financial accountability are also proposed.

Limiting the term of the Prime Minister

Reflecting public sentiment, especially among youth, the document proposes a two-term limit for the Prime Minister. Currently, neither party statutes nor the Constitution impose such limits. The Nepali Congress pledges to lead efforts to incorporate this provision, noting that the same leaders have dominated the premiership since 1990.

Political influence on constitutional bodies and public institutions

The document criticizes excessive politicization of constitutional bodies and public institutions, which it says has undermined credibility and institutional integrity. It proposes policy- and law-based appointments, open applications, public oversight, and transparent selection processes.

A “cooling-off period” is proposed to prevent immediate post-retirement appointments to constitutional bodies. Legal protections will also be introduced to shield officials from political pressure and penalize partisan interference.

Foreign policy

On foreign policy, Thapa reaffirms commitment to national interest, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and balanced diplomacy. Nepal will strengthen ties with India and China based on equality and mutual benefit while diversifying global partnerships to support development and economic growth.

Ahead of the crucial March 5 elections, Nepal’s largest political party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has plunged into a deep internal crisis following a formal split. The rupture has thrown the electoral process into uncertainty and exposed a widening generational divide within the party. Two rival factions—one led by party president Sher Bahadur Deuba and the other by General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa—are now locked in a legal and constitutional battle for legitimacy. Gagan Thapa is 49 years old, while the current party president, Sher Bahadur Deuba, is nearing 80.

The establishment faction has expelled  Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma, accusing them of organizing a special convention in violation of the party statute. In response, the Thapa-led faction has claimed overwhelming support within the party, asserting that it commands the backing of nearly 67 percent of the General Convention representatives. The faction has already elected a new Central Working Committee (CWC) through the convention and submitted its updated documentation to the Election Commission (EC), seeking official recognition.

The immediate authority to decide the party’s legitimacy lies with the Election Commission, which will examine the submitted documents and consult both factions. However, any party dissatisfied with the EC’s decision is almost certain to challenge it at the Supreme Court (SC), making the judiciary the ultimate arbiter. This legal uncertainty has placed the party—and the broader electoral process—in a precarious position.

At the heart of the split lies a generational conflict sharpened by the GenZ–led youth movement of Sept 8–9. Young leaders had demanded swift leadership change, greater internal democracy, and ownership of the reform agenda raised by youth activists. Instead of accommodating these demands, senior leaders who are above 70 years consolidated control, rejecting calls for a special convention despite provisions in the party statute. The refusal ultimately triggered the breakaway led by Thapa, symbolizing a broader struggle between reformist youth leaders and the party’s old guard.

The timing of the split is very meaningful. Candidate nominations under the Proportional Representation (PR) system have already been finalized and cannot be altered unless the entire electoral process is cancelled. Meanwhile, the deadline for nominations under the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system is just six days away, leaving the NC with only a narrow window to resolve its internal dispute and finalize candidates. Given the legal and constitutional complexities involved, it appears highly unlikely that the matter can be settled within the next four to five days.

If the dispute remains unresolved, both factions are expected to proceed independently, each claiming to be the legitimate Nepali Congress. This raises serious questions: Which faction will the EC recognize for electoral purposes? Can the EC and the government proceed with elections without the participation of the country’s largest party? Or will the election calendar have to be revised?

The EC is constrained by time. With less than 50 days remaining before the scheduled polls, extending deadlines or granting additional time may not be feasible. While elections could theoretically be postponed to April or May, such a move could invite constitutional challenges, as the current government is mandated to hold elections within six months of its formation.

If elections proceed as scheduled amid this chaos, the Nepali Congress is likely to suffer significant electoral damage. 

Nepali Congress (NC), Nepal’s oldest democratic party, is witnessing one of its most consequential internal challenges. Youth leaders Gagan Kumar Thapa and Bishwo Prakash Sharma have launched an open revolt against the party’s entrenched leadership by calling a special general convention—a move that could fundamentally reshape the party’s future.

The convention, scheduled for January 11–12 in Kathmandu, comes at a politically sensitive moment, when the country is immersed in election preparations. For decades, the party’s senior leadership—many of whom have alternated between power and opposition since 1990—has dominated decision-making and is often accused of organizational inertia, factionalism, and resistance to reform. Thapa and Sharma argue that without urgent structural and leadership change, the Nepali Congress risks irrelevance, particularly among young voters.

The immediate trigger for this assertive move lies in the September 8–9 Gen Z–led protests, which exposed a deepening generational disconnect between political parties and Nepal’s youth. Since those protests, Thapa has consistently argued that contesting elections under the same leadership and organizational framework would amount to political self-sabotage. According to him, symbolic gestures are no longer sufficient; only radical internal reform can restore public confidence.

Unsurprisingly, the party establishment—led by Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba—has strongly opposed the convention, even though he has already stated that he will not contest the party leadership again. Deuba appears to have forgotten that, as a youth leader, he himself had revolted against the party leadership two decades ago. Deuba and his allies, who have steered the party through multiple governments and internal power struggles, view the move as destabilizing and ill-timed, arguing that this is a moment to focus on election preparations rather than internal conventions.

However, the youth faction remains defiant, framing the convention as a legitimate intra-party democratic exercise rather than a futile gathering. Whether the convention will immediately displace Deuba and other senior office-bearers remains uncertain. Leaders close to Thapa suggest that if the establishment faction engages constructively, the youth leaders may defer leadership change until the party’s regular general convention after the elections. If resistance continues, however, the special convention could be empowered to take decisions even on leadership restructuring.

Crucially, the youth faction holds a strong legal footing. According to the Nepali Congress statute, a special general convention must be convened if 40 percent of elected general convention representatives demand it. Thapa’s camp has already secured the signatures of 54 percent of representatives—a figure expected to rise further before January 11—making the convention difficult to block without risking internal rupture.

If the convention proceeds and the party remains united, the Nepali Congress could experience its most significant generational shift in decades. Such a transformation could also help the party reconnect with Gen Z voters, many of whom are openly demanding leadership change across major political parties. Party insiders say the convention could mark the birth of a “new Nepali Congress”—more responsive, inclusive, and future-oriented.

Interestingly, cracks are already appearing within the establishment camp. Several senior leaders aligned with Deuba have begun expressing support for the special general convention, sensing the changing political mood. However, Shekhar Koirala, another senior leader and a declared contender for the party presidency, finds himself in an awkward position. While positioning himself as an alternative to Deuba, Koirala has yet to clarify his stance on the special general convention—an ambiguity that could weaken his claim to lead a reformist charge. As Nepal heads toward elections, the unfolding struggle within the Nepali Congress is no longer merely an internal power contest. It has become a broader test of whether one of the country’s most influential parties can reinvent itself—or remain captive to its past.

While the nation remains preoccupied with election-related politics, troubling developments are unfolding in the Tarai-Madhes region. Tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities have intensified in recent days, pushing the situation on the ground toward a fragile and vulnerable state.

Several parts of the southern plains have witnessed clashes and rising hostility, forcing local administrations to impose extended prohibitory orders and curfews to prevent further escalation. Although the situation has temporarily calmed following a five-point agreement signed by political parties and key stakeholders, past patterns suggest that the risk of renewed unrest remains high.

Under the agreement, religious protests and movements have been banned in Birgunj. In a welcome step, a Harmony Committee comprising representatives from both Hindu and Muslim communities has been formed to foster dialogue and prevent misunderstandings. 

While inter-community tensions in the Madhes are not new, the worrying factor today is their growing intensity and frequency—raising fears of wider and more dangerous confrontations. Over the years, disputes linked to religious processions, provocative social media content, and political mobilization have repeatedly triggered clashes, particularly in urban centers such as Birgunj. These incidents increasingly threaten the region’s long-standing tradition of social coexistence and communal harmony.

For a long time, the Nepali Army has cautioned successive governments and political parties about the deteriorating security situation in the region. Yet these warnings have largely gone unheeded. Compounding the problem, misinformation and disinformation circulating on social media continue to inflame emotions and provoke both communities.

Amid the recent unrest, Vice-president Ramsahya Prasad Yadav issued a public appeal urging citizens to refrain from spreading rumors, engaging in provocation, or resorting to violence. He warned that the misunderstandings, hostility, and conflicts witnessed in recent days have seriously challenged Nepal’s social harmony and pose a grave concern for the nation as a whole. Observers say  governments should carve out a multi-prong strategy to deal with the unfolding situation in Madhes.

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah, popularly known as Balen, continues to enjoy significant support among young voters, though his popularity has shown signs of decline following the GenZ protests. Critics argue that his inability to respond effectively to incidents of vandalism and arson during the Sept 8–9 protests dented his image as a mayor.

As a result, it remains uncertain whether Shah commands the same level of public support he did during the 2022 local elections. Despite this uncertainty, Shah remains a key political figure among emerging and alternative political forces, at least in perception. 

Several newly-formed parties appear eager to secure his backing ahead of upcoming elections. A few weeks ago, Kulman Ghising, who recently launched the Ujyalo Nepal Party, met Shah seeking his support whereas on Dec 22, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chair Rabi Lamichhane held discussions with Shah, fueling speculation about possible political collaboration.

Balen has given a clear signal that he supports emerging political forces challenging traditional parties, but it remains uncertain whether he will publicly endorse or align himself with any of them. So far, his message suggests support for new political parties but it is unclear whether he would engage in active politics like Rabi. 

A case in point: After the GenZ protests, the Nepali Army reportedly offered him the premiership, but he declined it. Although it is unclear whether these new political forces will unite, there is a growing sentiment among them that electoral cooperation is essential to challenge the dominance of traditional parties—namely the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML. This view has also come from several self-proclaimed GenZ leaders, who are pressing alternative political groups to form a united front. Among the new parties, the Rabi Lamichhane-led Rastriya Swatantra Party remains the most influential. Emerging as the fourth-largest party in the House of Representatives in the 2022 elections, the RSP disrupted Nepal’s conventional political landscape.

To unite emerging political forces, Balen has initiated consultations with political leaders, GenZ representatives, artists, media professionals, and members of civil society. Over the past few years, he has remained in continuous dialogue with people from all walks of life, including the political leaders from major political parties. Senior political leaders, including former prime minister Baburam Bhattarai, have met Balen Shah. 

Although the party faced internal setbacks after the GenZ movement, including the departure of some key leaders, it partially recovered through unification with the Bibeksheel Party. After his recent release from jail, Lamichhane has intensified political consultations. He met Prime Minister Sushila Karki to pledge the RSP’s support to the government. However, his meeting with Mayor Shah attracted wider attention and triggered renewed debate over the possible consolidation of new political forces ahead of the March 5 elections. Such an alliance, if it materializes, could pose a serious challenge to Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML.

Despite facing multiple charges related to cooperative fraud, Lamichhane continues to enjoy personal popularity. A strong communicator, he has a distinct ability to dominate headlines and connect directly with the public. He is skilled in the art of communication as he can share his ideas, feelings and information clearly and effectively, while also listening to and responding to his supporters. Unlike leaders of traditional parties, Lamichhane’s appeal is largely personality-driven rather than party-based. Many supporters voted for him as an individual rather than for the RSP as a political party. Therefore, whether the RSP can sustain its growth in Lamichhane’s absence is a moot question.

In contrast, Balen does not directly communicate with the masses. Since becoming the mayor of Kathmandu, he has rarely engaged with the public or faced the media. Instead, he often uses social media platforms to vent his anger and criticize mainstream political parties. Like Lamichhane, Balen also stokes anti–mainstream party sentiment. At the same time, he has not shown any clear ideological inclination.

But Lamichhane and Balen both are non-ideological. Their stance on key constitutional issues—including federalism and full commitment to the 2015 Constitution—remains ambiguous. Notably, during last year’s pro-monarchy protests, the RSP maintained silence. 

Nevertheless, Lamichhane avoids conventional political jargon and focuses instead on governance failures and everyday problems facing the people—a strategy that resonates with frustrated voters. Lamichhane was widely popular until two years ago; however, allegations related to cooperative fraud have affected his public standing.

This populist appeal gives Lamichhane the potential to draw voters away from the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, particularly in urban constituencies. If the RSP, the Ujyalo Nepal Party, Balendra Shah and other alternative forces form an electoral alliance, it could significantly erode the traditional voter base of mainstream parties, at least in urban areas.

However, these new political forces face structural limitations. Their organizational presence in rural areas remains weak, and they lack strong networks in the Tarai region. While they managed notable urban victories in 2022 despite a limited organization base, sustaining and expanding such success will be more challenging without strong grassroots foundations.

Since the 2022 elections, the RSP has expanded its organizational reach, but its rural penetration remains limited. Still, rising anti-establishment sentiment and public frustration with traditional parties may push alternative forces toward unity. If these parties manage to coordinate effectively, they could emerge as a serious electoral threat—if not by winning outright, then by decisively weakening the dominance of Nepal’s long-established political parties.

Leaders argue that if there is an electoral alliance among the new political forces, with open backing from figures like Balen, it could force the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML into an electoral alliance of their own. The two key developments—Rabi Lamichhane’s release from jail and his meeting with Shah—have alarmed mainstream political parties. At the same time, major political parties are holding regular meetings to chart their strategies.

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah, popularly known as Balen, continues to enjoy significant support among young voters, though his popularity has shown signs of decline following the Gen Z protests. Critics argue that his inability to respond effectively to incidents of vandalism and arson during the September 8–9 protests dented his image as a mayor.

As a result, it remains uncertain whether Shah command the same level of public support he did during the 2022 local elections. Despite this uncertainty, Shah remains a key political figure among emerging and alternative political forces, at least in perception. 

Several newly formed parties appear eager to secure his backing ahead of upcoming elections. A few weeks ago, Kul Man Ghising, who recently launched the Ujyalo Nepal Party, met Shah seeking his support. Similarly, on December 22, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chair Rabi Lamichhane held discussions with Shah, fueling speculation about possible political collaboration.

Balen has given a clear signal that he supports emerging political forces challenging traditional parties, but it remains uncertain whether he will publicly endorse or align himself with any specific party. So far, his message suggests support for the emergence of new political parties. However, it is unclear whether he would engage in active politics like Rabi. After the Gen Z protests, the Nepal Army reportedly offered him the premiership, but he declined it.

Although it is unclear whether these new political forces will unite, there is a growing sentiment among them that electoral cooperation is essential to challenge the dominance of traditional parties—namely the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML. This view is also echoed by several self-proclaimed Gen Z leaders, who are pressing alternative political groups to form a united front. Among the new parties, Rabi Lamichhane-led Rastriya Swatantra Party remains the most influential. Emerging as the fourth-largest party in the House of Representatives in the 2022 elections, the RSP disrupted Nepal’s conventional political landscape.

Although the party faced internal setbacks after the Gen Z movement, including the departure of some key leaders, it partially recovered through unification with the Bibeksheel Party. After his recent release from jail, Lamichhane has intensified political consultations. He met Prime Minister Sushila Karki to pledge the RSP’s support to the government. However, his meeting with Mayor Shah attracted wider attention and triggered renewed debate about the possible consolidation of new political forces ahead of the March 5 elections. Such an alliance, if realized, could pose a serious challenge to Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML.

Despite facing multiple charges related to cooperative fraud, Lamichhane continues to enjoy personal popularity. A strong communicator, he has a distinct ability to dominate headlines and connect directly with the public. He is skilled in the art of communication, as he can express his ideas, feelings, and information clearly and effectively, while also listening to and responding to his supporters. Unlike leaders of traditional parties, Lamichhane’s appeal is largely personality-driven rather than party-based. Many supporters vote for him as an individual rather than for the RSP as an institution. Consequently, there are concerns about whether the RSP can sustain its growth in Lamichhane’s absence.

In contrast, Balen does not directly communicate with the masses. Since becoming mayor of Kathmandu, he has rarely engaged with the public or faced the media. Instead, he often uses social media platforms to vent his anger and criticize mainstream political parties. Like Lamichhane, Balen also stokes anti–mainstream party sentiment. At the same time, he has not shown any clear ideological inclination.

But Lamichhane and Balen both are non-ideological.  Their stance on key constitutional issues—including federalism and full commitment to the 2015 Constitution—remains ambiguous. Notably, during last year’s pro-monarchy protests, the RSP maintained silence. 

Nevertheless, Lamichhane avoids conventional political jargon and instead focuses on governance failures and everyday problems faced by ordinary citizens—a strategy that resonates with frustrated voters. Lamichhane was widely popular until two years ago; however, allegations related to cooperative fraud have affected his public standing.

This populist appeal gives Lamichhane the potential to draw voters away from the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, particularly in urban constituencies. If the RSP, the Ujyalo Nepal Party, Balendra Shah, and other alternative forces form an electoral alliance, it could significantly erode the traditional voter base of mainstream parties, at least in urban areas.

However, these new political forces face structural limitations. Their organizational presence in rural areas remains weak, and they lack strong networks in the Tarai region. While they managed notable urban victories in 2022 despite limited organization, sustaining and expanding such success will be more challenging without strong grassroots foundations.

Since the 2022 elections, the RSP has expanded its organizational reach, but its rural penetration remains limited. Still, rising anti-establishment sentiment and public frustration with traditional parties may push alternative forces toward unity. If these parties manage to coordinate effectively, they could emerge as a serious electoral threat—if not by winning outright, then by decisively weakening the dominance of Nepal’s long-established political parties.

Leaders argue that if there is an electoral alliance among the new political forces, with open backing from figures like Balen, it could force the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML into an electoral alliance of their own. The two key developments—Rabi Lamichhane’s release from jail and his meeting with Shah—have alarmed mainstream political parties. At the same time, major political parties are holding regular meetings to chart their strategies.

Much has changed in South Asia since the 18th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit held in 2014. India-Pakistan tensions, a persistent stumbling block for the regional grouping, have further deteriorated over the years. In May 2025, the two nuclear-armed neighbors even engaged in a brief conflict, further threatening the region’s fragile security and stability. Their relationship is unlikely to improve in the immediate future.

Similarly, India-China relations reached a historic low after the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020. Although there have been some improvements in recent months, the relationship remains fragile. Nepal-India ties have also experienced fluctuations over the past decade. India imposed a blockade on Nepal in 2015, and another dispute erupted in 2020 over the publication of new political maps. Only in recent years has a semblance of normalcy returned.

India-Bangladesh relations too have seen instability. Ties deteriorated after Bangladesh’s long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India in the wake of the student-led movement of 2024, which later evolved into a broader political uprising. India is now facing pressure from Bangladesh’s new ruling forces to repatriate Hasina. Meanwhile, the rise of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami has altered regional dynamics, improving Dhaka’s relationship with Pakistan. The two countries are now working to establish direct sea links between Karachi and Chittagong to boost bilateral trade, raising New Delhi’s eyebrows.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has further complicated the regional landscape. No South Asian country has formally recognized the regime. As India cautiously improves its contacts with the Taliban, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have grown more hostile. 

Meanwhile, internal political transformations across SAARC member states have weakened earlier commitments to regional cooperation. The GenZ-led political wave in Nepal has, at least temporarily, sidelined traditional parties that had long championed the SAARC process. In Bangladesh, Hasina’s exit has removed one of the region’s strongest advocates of SAARC, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan shows little interest in it. Sri Lanka, still recovering from its recent economic crisis, is slowly returning to normalcy.

A generation of leaders who were once deeply invested in SAARC is now out of power and losing influence. Their successors, with limited grounding in SAARC’s history and purpose, are less inclined to prioritize regional integration.

India remains the central pillar of SAARC. Without India’s willingness and leadership, revival appears unlikely. Over the past decade, India’s global stature has grown significantly, and it is poised to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030. As SAARC has stagnated, India has increasingly promoted BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) as an alternative platform. Although other SAARC members do not view BIMSTEC as a true replacement, they are not in a position to revive SAARC without India’s consent. Yet India continues to fund SAARC institutions even as it publicly blames “one particular country” for obstructing progress.

During this period, China’s influence across South Asia, long considered India’s strategic backyard, has grown considerably. Except for Bhutan, all South Asian countries have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China, an observer in SAARC, has deepened its engagement amid intensifying US-China rivalry. Both global powers are now vying for influence over smaller South Asian states.

It remains unclear how the US and China view SAARC’s relevance in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Historically, India has viewed SAARC with suspicion, wary that smaller neighbors might unite to pressure New Delhi or use the platform as a collective bargaining bloc. In the current climate, such concerns may be even stronger. At the same time, South Asian countries increasingly prioritize sub-regional or bilateral cooperation over SAARC-level initiatives. Filling the vacuum created by SAARC’s inactivity, China has been exploring alternative cooperation mechanisms for South Asian states, excluding India. It has already established the China-South Asian Countries Poverty Reduction and Cooperative Development Center in Chongqing. Recently, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar suggested that a trilateral initiative involving Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan could be expanded to include other regional nations.

Despite SAARC’s stagnation, the need for regional cooperation has become more evident than ever. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the region’s vulnerabilities. Political instability has increased fragility across several member states. The US-initiated tariff wars further weakened regional economies. According to the World Bank, intra-regional trade in South Asia accounts for barely five percent of total trade—far below ASEAN’s 25 percent. Greater regional integration might have helped member countries better withstand recent economic shocks.

In Oct 2025, seven prominent economists issued a statement lamenting the absence of serious bilateral or regional trade dialogues in South Asia, despite being the world’s fastest-growing region. They noted that the gap between actual and potential trade continues to widen. More regional trade, they argued, could provide much-needed stability amid global trade volatility and help South Asian economies deepen their integration into global value chains.

Climate change is inflicting catastrophic damage across the region. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India have all experienced an alarming rise in floods and landslides in recent years. Sri Lanka’s devastating floods this year caused significant loss of life and property—yet SAARC remained inactive throughout the crisis.

During the early months of Covid-19, there were signs of revived regional engagement. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held talks with SAARC leaders and proposed collective health initiatives. But these efforts soon fizzled out. As the US under Donald Trump cut funding for key priorities such as health, climate, and development, SAARC could have stepped in by creating its own fund, but no substantial action followed.

Today, SAARC continues to fade from relevance, despite limited activities still being carried out by the Secretariat in Kathmandu. Most regional leaders no longer prioritize SAARC, and many have even stopped issuing messages on SAARC Day.

In the years immediately following the 2016 summit postponement, reviving SAARC was still raised in bilateral meetings, particularly by Nepal and Bangladesh. Leaders such as KP Sharma Oli and Sheikh Hasina often urged India to move forward with the summit process. But in recent years, the SAARC agenda has effectively disappeared from bilateral discussions. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan only deepened uncertainty since no South Asian country recognizes the Kabul regime, raising questions about its participation in future summits.

The SAARC Summit is supposed to convene every two years on a rotational basis. The last, the 18th Summit, was held in Kathmandu in Nov 2014. The 19th Summit was scheduled for Pakistan in 2016 but was cancelled after India announced a boycott. As chair, Nepal made several diplomatic attempts to revive the process, but all proved futile. It has now been a full decade since heads of state last gathered under the SAARC banner.

Other SAARC mechanisms have also stalled. The Council of Ministers, the second-highest body, last met formally in Pokhara in 2016. Informal sessions held annually in New York since 1997 have not taken place in recent years due to India-Pakistan tensions and uncertainties around Taliban representation. The Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries last met in March 2016. Only the Programming Committee, led by joint secretaries, continues to meet virtually.

For now, the future of SAARC remains deeply uncertain. The regional environment is not conducive for hosting a summit anytime soon. India’s changing relationships with its neighbors, shifting geopolitical dynamics, and growing political instability across several member states all point to a bleak outlook.