Nepal-China relations: Beware the dragon (Part II)
In the first part of this article, I discussed the different Chinese goals in Nepal and how China has been steadily increasing its foothold. The second part here will deal with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ties with the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), Chinese soft power, the India factor, and dangers of the communist China.
Growing proximity with NCP and increasing strategic space
The Chinese are believed to have come closer to the Nepali Maoists after the latter emerged as the largest political party in the first Constitution Assembly election in April 2008. Prior to that, during the Maoist insurgency, China most did not lend the Nepali Maoists any material or moral support, even as the Maoists claimed to be inspired by Chairman Mao. China rather suspected the Maoists of trying to defame the name of the revered chairman at the instigation of foreign powers. The fact that they provided arms and ammunitions to Nepal Army at the request of then King Gyanendra in 2005, to be used against Maoist rebels, when India, the US and the UK, the traditional suppliers of arms, had stopped the supply citing human rights violations, tells a lot about what the Chinese thought about Nepali Maoists.
The Maoists participated in a joint struggle with then Seven Party Alliance (SPA) against King Gyanedra's direct rule during the Second Popular Movement and came to the peace process after its success. In the election of the first Constitution Assembly in April 2008, they emerged as the largest political party, pushing other two influential parties, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, into distant second and third positions. Only after that did China reach out to the Maoists in the country’s 'state to state' relation module. The 'ideological common ground' could have brought them close as well. Though the Maoist leadership spent most of their insurgency days on Indian soil and held important meetings there, because of their ideological orientation and the way they trained their cadres on anti-Indian sentiment, it was no surprise that the Maoists developed sympathies for China.
During this time, China might have realized that it could have a trustworthy and reliable friend in Nepal's communists. In the first Constitution Assembly elections, the Maoists got about 30 percent votes and CPN-UML about 21 percent. Coming to the second Constitution Assembly elections, the Maoists were pushed to third position with about 17 percent (average of FPTP and proportional) votes, while the largest party Nepali Congress got about 30 percent and the UML about 25 percent (average votes again). In the last parliamentary elections in 2017, where UML and Maoists fought elections by forming an alliance, the former got about 30 percent votes while the latter got about 15 percent. With the alliance, their representation in HoR was far higher, 174 seats, when the main opposition Nepali Congress could have only 63 members even though it got about 33 percent votes. When the votes of all communist parties were combined, it came to around half of total votes in the elections. With this realization, China seems to have reached out to Nepali communists.
China has developed such good relations with Nepali communist leaders that hundreds of Nepali students have been studying in China at their recommendations. Political leaders are also accused of receiving resources for various foundations they run. China in the past maintained good relations with almost all major parties in Nepal but in last decade, relations between the CPC and erstwhile parties that united to form NCP has been so intense that they have even been organizing joint symposiums and meetings; Chinese ambassador uses her 'good offices' to unite communists of Nepal or mediate conflict between them.
Chinese ambassador to Nepal Yu Hong was said to have played a crucial role in the formation of a pre-poll alliance between UML and Maoists before the 2017 elections. At that time, some media wrote of how Yu had spent a lot of time trying to forge an electoral alliance between the two parties. But mainstream media refrained from writing conclusively because of lack of concrete evidence. However, it should be understood that China's role in the merger was secondary.
Later, almost throughout 2020, when the ruling NCP factions were having serious conflicts, China's current ambassador Hou Yanqi played an active and overt role, probably with the intent of giving a loud and clear message that China had arrived as a big player in Nepal. She was thus often criticized by Nepali media, opposition parties and even members of the ruling NCP. Nepali media refrain from criticizing China. News and views about China usually pass serious scrutiny before they are published because Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu tries to make sure that 'detractors with ulterior motives' do not use mainstream media. Responsible mainstream media in Nepal have been respectful of China's sensitivities.
On April 27 Chinese President Xi Jinping talked to his Nepali counterpart Bidhya Devi Bhandari over the phone for about 40 minutes. The talk, according to official statements from the two countries, focused on supporting Nepal in its fight against Covid-19 and other issues of bilateral interests such as the BRI and China's developmental assistance. As this happened when the conflict in the NCP was at its peak, many analysts and media outlets at the time speculated that President Xi had probably conveyed a message of truce between the feuding sides. Pushpa Kamal Dahal faction suddenly backtracked from a dispute with PM Oli after the telephone conversation, making some in Nepal suspect he abided by Xi's suggestion conveyed to him via President Bhandari. Though the constitution of Nepal envisioned the President as a ceremonial figure and a symbol of unity, President Bhandari has not hesitated from playing an active role in the ruling NCP, to either keep it united or for the benefit of the Oli faction with whom she has very good political ties. She has been severely criticized by the media, analysts and political parties, including some within the NCP, but she seems undeterred. Oli and his group in the party were instrumental in the two-time election of Bhandari as Nepal’s President.
Other incidents also indicate growing strategic proximity between the CPC and the NCP. A two-day symposium on 'Xi Jinping Thought' was organized between the two in September 2019 where the Chief of International Liaison Department of CPC Song Tao and other CPC officials imparted training to around 200 NCP leaders. According to news reports, issues of party discipline, strengthening inter-party ties and jointly executing the BRI were discussed. Though this was justified as an attempt to make Xi happy and to make his planned Nepal visit possible (which latter happened on October 12 and 13, 2019), the parties in opposition and sections of media criticized the symposium as ‘undesirable’ because of the differing political systems in Nepal and China.
Similarly, a virtual conference between the CPC and the NPC on 19 June 2020 was criticized for several reasons. First, it was held within days of a violent border clash between India and China in Galwan Valley, resulting in the deaths of over 20 Indian soldiers. Analysts and media worried that it would send a wrong message to India. Second, sections within both the ruling and opposition parties who believe Nepal should remain a multiparty democracy opposed the growing proximity between the CPC and the NCP. They feared that ideological exchanges and indoctrination of NCP leaders and cadres may embolden those in the party who believe Nepal should be a kind of socialist state instead of an 'inherently unstable' multi-party system.
Third, at that virtual meeting, Dahal committed that Nepal would decline assistance considered detrimental to its and its neighbor's security. He was referring to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) pact with the US, which China dislikes and some leftist groups in Nepal are resolutely opposed to. Oli is thought to have opted for dissolution of the House of Representatives after feeling China favored Dahal instead over him as Oli was for accepting the MCC assistance. The $55 million grant to Nepal has been pulled into controversy mainly by Nepal's leftists and especially those who protect China's interests in Nepal. Rumors have been spread about the MCC being a part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy that is aimed at containing China. The propaganda has gone to the extent of portraying the MCC as anti-national and strengthening US presence in Nepal. Even general people have developed negative views about the MCC based on such rumors.
Besides using its influence in the NCP, China has also used its soft power in Nepal rather effectively.
Their kind of soft power
In international discourses on soft power, China is said to have little of it, unlike its economic and military power. According to Western scholars’ definitions of soft power, politics (read: democratic system), culture, economy, movies, language, universities, etc are primary sources of soft power and China, due to its 'lack of democracy' and freedom of expression, does not have a political culture worth emulating. Chinese experts however refute these western standards. They say culture should be the primary source of soft power and take pride in having a culture developed over 5,000 years.
‘Soft Power 30’, an annual publication of the University of Southern Carolina, every year ranks top 30 countries according to their soft power. In its 2019 ranking, China came 27th even behind the likes of Austria, Belgium, Greece and Czech Republic. According to the publication, France, the UK, Germany, Sweden and the US were the Top 5 countries on soft power that year. In previous annual publications too China hardly made it even to the bottom of the list.
International Relations scholars have said that political systems, culture, educational institutions and value systems don’t comprise soft power unless they can influence policy decisions. If the efficacy of soft power is measured in terms of influence on policy decisions and formation of positive public opinion about a particular country, China has been rather effective in using soft power in Nepal for several reasons.
First, China has traditionally cultivated an image of a great power that does not interfere in Nepal's internal affairs but assists the country’s development almost unconditionally. It is viewed as disinterested, benign, benevolent and credible developmental partner. This image of China has been formed over seven decades, and China has benefitted from such public perception.
Second, the India factor continues to bolster China’s positive image in Nepal in an interesting way. Nepal and India, two close neighbors with open borders and interactions at multiple levels, do not always have smooth relations. They have more frictions as they have more interactions. Moreover, Indian highhandedness in Nepal's internal affairs in the past has at times pushed Nepali elites to move closer to China.
Third, after the restoration of democracy in 1990, the number of communist parties and voters in Nepal gradually increased. In past elections of the lower house of Nepali parliament, communists got almost 50 percent popular votes. In the past their popular votes could not translate into parliamentary majority as they were divided. But the pre-poll alliance between the then UML and Maoist Center got over 45 percent votes for these parties and their majorities translated into almost two-thirds of total seats in the lower house. Though almost all these parties are communists only nominally, their indoctrination and socialization with various communist jargons seem to make them always ready to fight 'bourgeoisie and feudal' elements on the domestic front and more sympathetic to China. But they are usually hostile to 'imperialist US' and 'expansionist India'.
Fourth, China has also been successful in influencing Nepali opinion-makers. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, big groups of Nepali journalists visited China every month with the sponsorship of Chinese agencies. Those who got great hospitality in China didn’t dare to write critically about it. Nepali editors rarely prevent journalists from going on sponsored foreign trips or inquire about the sponsors or the impact of such trips on those journalists’ writings and reports. Editors of mainstream Nepali media are also very sensitive about China. This may not be the case in news about liberal democracies, which are freely criticized. But news and views about China pass through great scrutiny before they are published. This gatekeeping is the result of frequent interactions between Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu and editors of mainstream media.
Fifth, our intellectuals, opinion writers and analysts rarely write critically about China. With few exceptions, scholars who get higher education in China, for reasons that are difficult to understand, rarely criticize China, its foreign policy or any aspect of Nepal-China relations. People who got their higher education from democratic countries do not shy from criticizing their earlier host countries though.
China also provides generous funds to scholars working in opinion-making positions. China has been able to use these intellectuals to not only highlight positive aspects of China and Nepal-China relations but also to criticize China's competitors in Nepal. For example, a few months ago, I asked a Nepali writer about why he wrote about China's response to Covid-19 pandemic with such appreciation in the Chinese media. 'Otherwise they do not publish,' pat came his reply. The temptation to get published in Chinese media or academic publications probably bars Nepali scholars from being objective and forces them to self-censor.
China has invested heavily in intellectuals and students in opinion making positions in universities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that call themselves think tanks. China provides scholarships to students on long- and short-term courses and to other professionals on the recommendation of political leaders and close Chinese confidants in Nepal. China offers scholarships not only in medicine, engineering and other science courses but also in humanities and social sciences, law and even media. Lately, China has been providing hundreds of BRI scholarships and fellowships to Nepali students and scholars. This has ensured that positive news and opinions about China are routinely written and published in mainstream Nepali newspapers and other media outlets.
China is not solely to be blamed though. Nepal government does not believe in spending in research and development and engaging intellectuals with expertise in different areas. Limited number of universities, the few research centers in those universities and a handful of government think tanks cannot engage scholars with various expertise, ideologies and inclinations. Therefore, intellectuals in search of greener pastures are forced to work in projects funded by foreign donors. In the long run, most of them end up being loyal to the country that funds their organization, for the security of their jobs and livelihoods. There are dangerous repercussions of this seemingly simple phenomenon. Our government-funded think tanks and universities hardly have a role in shaping discourses. Most are limited to giving jobs to people loyal to political leaders. Vibrant and government funded think tanks, research centers and universities would engage scholars of all ideological inclinations, enriching and enabling the state. But the Nepali state has failed to appreciate this.
There are some intellectuals who speak critically of China. But the problem with many of them is that they speak for their 'donors', not from the standpoint of Nepal's national interest. This too is undesirable and dangerous for the reasons already discussed.
The India factor: Elephant in the room
There are many important considerations in Nepal-China relations and one of the most important is India. For many reasons India occupies a lion's share in Nepal's strategic thinking, whether on Nepal's foreign relations or domestic developments. Many people, especially those who naively believe in idealism or those unaware of the present world-order, find it inappropriate and unnecessary to talk about India when discussing Nepal-China relations.
The multifaceted Nepal-India relations include political, cultural, social, and religious spheres. The two countries had open borders much before countries in the European Union did. Hundreds of thousands of Nepalis and Indians work in each other's countries. For example, according to a commentary by Vikrant Deshpande available on the website of India's Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, around 40,000 Nepali and Indian Gorkhas serve in the Indian Army, and around 90,000 Gorkhas in Nepal receive their pensions from India. Of the 40,000 Gorkhas, about 32,000 are Nepali citizens. Nepal's relation with China or with any other power is not as multilayered. Hundreds of thousands of Nepalis and Indians crossed the borders even during the pandemic, first to go to their homes and to latter to go back to their workplace. There are innumerable links between Nepal and India, which will be difficult to undo even if the hostility between the two countries intensifies.
Nepal's high dependence on India on trade and transit due to its geographical imperatives give India leverages. India has not hesitated to use such leverages and at times without much thought. In my article on Nepal-India relations published in the Annapurna Today weekly around four years ago I had written, 'though India is a middle-power in global power calculations, it is the most powerful country in the world for Nepal'. This reality has not changed.
India considers the Himalayas as its natural and magnificent barrier with China. After China assumed direct control of Tibet in 1950-51, India portrayed Nepal and Bhutan (and then Sikkim) as its buffers with China. Before that, British India and independent India both considered the vast territory of Tibet as a buffer between the two countries. Based on these colonial geo-political perspectives of security, India considers Nepal and Bhutan as lying within its security perimeter and sphere of influence. This view that independent India inherited from British India and its narrow interpretation made India take active interest in Nepal's internal developments.
For these reasons, India has been instrumental in almost all political developments in Nepal. It played an important role in Nepal's struggle for democracy before 1951, then most probably in King Mahendra's takeover from democratically elected government in 1960, then in the restoration of democracy in 1990, and again in the signing of the 2005 agreement between then Seven Party alliance and CPN (Maoist) in New Delhi. India has also been accused of trying to 'micromanage Nepal. Nepali politicians, scholars and general population probably would not have been in favor of balancing India with China had India had displayed such an overbearing attitude time and again.
India's deep engagement in Nepal has been made possible not just because of India's interest. Many endogenous factors have also dragged India into Nepal's internal affairs and widened the space for it to play. Nepali political groups and elites have a tendency of asking for India’s help when necessary, but then resorting to demonizing it to prove their nationalist credentials.
For example, before 1951, King Tribhuvan took refuge in India and the forces struggling against Ranas also took shelter there too. Hence, Nepali Congress, King Tribhuvan and Ranas accepted India's mediation in signing a tripartite agreement that led to the establishment of democracy in Nepal in 1951. From that time, Nepali political actors have been seeking India's support/recognition. India was home to many dissidents in exile including Nepali communists who were fighting for democracy during the Panchayat era. Again, in 1990, those fighting for democracy sought India's support by inviting it into Nepal's internal affairs.
During the 10-year-long Maoist insurgency, most Maoist leaders used India as a shelter and many of their decisive meetings were held there. India's role was also sought during the signing of the 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in November 2005 in New Delhi, in preparation for the second popular movement.
Nepal trying to move uncomfortably close to China should be a lesson for India that too much interest in its internal affairs antagonizes Nepal and pushes it away. India should respect Nepal's sovereignty and assist wholeheartedly in its developmental and democratization efforts. Even if it wants to be reckoned as a regional power, it has to have a cooperative rather than a coercive approach. It is difficult to understand why Independent India has been unable to come up with 'win-win' approaches despite having so many good universities, think tanks and non-governmental research centers.
Nepali elites have welcomed and lauded India's role whenever it has served their purpose but been critical of it when India acted against their personal or group interests. With only a few exceptions, Nepali elites have not only welcomed but also compelled foreign forces into intervening or speaking about Nepal's internal affairs when it benefitted them. Such is also the case with China. Chinese interests alone would not have created such a big space for them so soon. Had Nepali elites, especially in the communist parties, not welcomed China's role, China probably would have limited its presence here.
Dangers of dragging in the dragon
China has emerged as a player with a significant say in Nepal's internal political affairs. It has been trying to create a high profile as Nepal’s biggest FDI source. Chinese corporations, both state-owned and private, have invested heavily in Nepal's high- potential sectors: hydropower, construction and tourism. China has also shown great interest in the development of Lumbini, birthplace of Lord Budhha, in what is an emotional issue for Nepalis. China is trying to win the mind-game in Nepal in many ways.
India and the US, and other powers that have had significant say in Nepal, are uncomfortable with China's rising influence in Nepal at their expense. The more China is drawn into Nepal, the more the probability of disproportionate response from other powers. Though factional NCP rivalry is the main endogenous cause for parliament dissolution, the power-game between the India and the US on one hand and China on the other is widely believed to be the main exogenous one. The zero-sum approach between these great powers can bring great dangers to Nepal.
Nepal and Bhutan may be the last places where India would be willing to give up its influence due to reasons discussed above. Nepal shares an open border with Indian states of Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In a way, Nepal's Tarai and India's 'heartlands' of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are contiguous geographical regions with a lot of interactions between people on either side. Strong Chinese presence in Nepal will hence be unacceptable for India. Besides, India has multiple interests and leverages in Nepal. China's strong presence may invite strong reactions from India too. As India has great strategic penetration in Nepal it might not hesitate to use those leverages.
Even the US, the global superpower, which is actively trying to contain China in the global political theater, would be uncomfortable with the expansion of China's influence in Nepal, at the cost of India, its QUAD partner. The controversy over the MCC might only be the tip of iceberg of the budding geopolitical rivalry in Nepal. The country could thus be turned into a dangerous geopolitical battlefield. Some intellectuals have already started expressing their fear about it.
Political uncertainty after the recent dissolution of parliament has given rise to a grim situation. Foreign experts often call Kathmandu not only the capital of Nepal but also a capital of conspiracies, where conspiracy theories are constantly manufactured and spread. The prospect of Nepal turning into a geopolitical battlefield might sound like just another conspiracy theory but the way great powers of the world are being drawn here does not bode well.
China used to be praised as a good and trustworthy friend until a decade ago. But given China's proactive role in the NCP and in management of Nepal's internal affairs, Nepali mainstream media have started opposing China's highhandedness. Nepali media and intellectuals may end up criticizing China the way they do India's overbearing attitude. Moreover, as discussed above, China can never substitute India in Nepal, at least for a few decades. Though Nepal and China signed the historic Agreement on Transit Transport during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's 2016 China visit, due to lack of infrastructure, great distance of Chinese ports, and geographical and language barriers, China can never be India’s alternative for Nepal. China should exercise restraint as an unstable Nepal will be in the interest of neither China nor India.
China’s proactive role may cause severe instability in Nepal. China will thus have to resist the request of myopic Nepali politicians or friendly intellectuals for its greater role in Nepal. From Mao to Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Chinese politicians advised Nepal to have good relations with India, as they believed China could not be India's substitute for Nepal. They exercised restraint when Nepali politicians asked for greater Chinese role to balance India's. China would do well to keep following that wisdom. In the longer run, Nepal must try to reduce the engagement of India, the US and other powers in its internal affairs. But, immediately, it is China's aggressive posture that has put Nepal into a spot of bother.
Besides the possibility of dangerous geo-political fallouts, there are other undesirable consequences of China's overt role in Nepal's internal affairs. Elements within the NCP believe the communist revolution in Nepal, armed or unarmed, is incomplete. They say Nepal has not reached a stage from where socialism can be achieved, and that multiparty democracy is the root cause of many of Nepal’s problems. The elites of communist parties have comfortable lifestyles and many have developed 'feudal' and 'capitalist' ways and tastes. They have their children educated and settled in the US, the UK, and Australia, the countries they denounce as capitalists, imperialists and neocolonialists. In the past couple of decades, children of some of these leaders have started going to study in China under various scholarship schemes.
Communist leaders are trapped in an irony. Due to Nepal's geopolitical compulsions, the kind of communist regime they want will never materialize. Nor can Nepal be another China. Any such effort will only turn us into geopolitical battlegrounds. Geopolitical battles can be merciless for weak and small states straddling geopolitical fault-lines. We Nepalis and as well as our namesake communists must know our limits.
China's strategic proximity with the NCP has alienated other political parties like Nepali Congress, Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal and other fringe parties. Congress leaders do not say it openly but in private conversations they express dismay at China’s preference for the NCP and its pro-active role in keeping the party intact. They argue that China's backing of the NCP has the chances of emboldening 'anti-democracy' groups. Nepal's struggle for democracy is now over 70-year-long. Though Nepali democracy has been more ritualistic than substantive, any perceived threat to democracy, freedom of expression and mobility may not be taken well by political forces that have repeatedly fought and made sacrifices for the cause of democracy.
Most probably, China realized that the recent Nepal visit of Guo Yezhou's team backfired, as was evidenced in its condemnation in Nepali media outlets. After the team’s return, China in its official statement said that the team only wanted to improve relations with Nepal, while it was clear that the delegation had tried its best to bring truce between rival NCP factions. Let's hope China will have more of such realizations.
Many westerners accuse China of being an 'empire in the making' after its claims on the South China Sea, India’s Arunachal Pradesh and 'other territories of China' lost during China's century of humiliation. (Fortunately, China has not treated Nepal that way after the two countries established diplomatic relations.) They argue communism has been a vehicle for China's revival and rejuvenation and the cultural important of Chinese life has surpassed communist ideology. Hence Chinese rulers including Xi Jinping are often criticized for being 'emperors in new clothes', the new cloth being the communist ideology.
Historically, the dragon has been an important part of China's lifestyle, culture, language, and psyche. Dragon is taken as a symbol of China's imperial power. In international political discourses, China is often called a dragon. A systemic global upheaval has been predicted owing to China’s rise. Is Nepal going to be affected by China's rise and its attempt to change the global status quo? Recent developments in Nepal suggest Nepal may suffer if it cannot handle this geopolitical game wisely.
What Nepal needs to know
Great powers find it difficult or are unwilling to disentangle themselves from strategic spaces for themselves. India for instance finds it hard to keep aloof of internal developments in Nepal. The US refuses to withdraw from not only from North or South Americas but also from Japan, South Korea, Middle East, South China Sea, and major international organizations, and every nook and cranny around the world. China is deeply engaged in the Koreas and the South China Sea and is trying to enhance its influence in other parts of the world as well, even at the cost of other powers. Through the BRI, and other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms China is determined to have its place in the world and China's aggressive posture in Nepal is a part of it.
It is now urgent that Nepal has a knowledge-based foreign policy as well as the instruments to produce that expert knowledge. Nepal should also work towards a clear and transparent China policy. We should always support ‘One China’ in both our words and deeds and we should not at any cost allow our soil to be used against China's security sensitivities. The analysis that Western powers are trying to keep an eye on China or act against its interests from Nepal has some logic. It is our duty not to let that happen.
Tibetan refugees may have their grievances but Tibet has been accepted as an integral part of China by the world’s most powerful nations including the US and our southern neighbor India, the latter of which is home to the largest number of Tibetan refugees. Nepal cannot allow anti-China activities of Tibetan refugees. China's power, our good relations with China and our sensitive geopolitical location do not allow us to go against China’s genuine interests. All political forces, intellectuals, media and other stakeholders agree on so much.
We should also not be a part of China's encirclement by great powers. This should not be limited to policy and rhetoric but should also be translated into our actions so that China starts trusting us. For this we have to develop state capacity to an extent that our neighbors and other powers will have confidence that our soil won’t be used against their security interests. Gradually, powers like India and the US should also be persuaded to disengage from many sectors. It is easier said than done but this must be our goal.
But we should also avoid dancing to China’s tunes. China has come very aggressively in Nepal and it has been vocal about its desire to shape developments here. It wants to do so not only for its advantage but with also the intent of challenging other powers and harming Nepal's relations with its traditional developmental partners. We should draw a red line on China's engagement. To still believe China is disinterested and benevolent would be naive. For example, Nepali media have written that China kept its border with Nepal closed for months due to fear of 'imported Covid cases' reaching China. Because of this some northern mountainous regions of Nepal like Humla could not get vital day-to-day goods. This shows that China puts its national interest above everything else.
Though there have talks of leveling the Himalayas and handshake across Himalayas via a multimodal connectivity network between Nepal and Tibet, the prospect of Nepal using China as a transit is slim. Even if some level of transit via China materializes, Nepal's geography and geopolitical imperatives will continue to make it largely reliant on India for transit.
There are also lessons for Nepali politicians and intellectuals: they should have unanimity in foreign policy. Our giant neighbors are rising powers, both have continent-sized geography and population and both are undergoing rapid economic and military rise. These two countries have made significant contribution to what has been called the shifting of the center of global economy to Asia. They are studied in universities, think tanks and research centers throughout the world. We are right in the middle of these two global powerhouses and yet we have hardly studied them, or their interactions and the likely impact on Nepal of those interactions. We have largely become passive recipients of their agenda.
Compared to them, we are economically and militarily nowhere. It is high time we also have our own government-funded centers to study China and Nepal-China relations comprehensively, through multiple perspectives, and devise our own China policy based on the changing global context and our ground realities. Only institutionalized and knowledge based-approach will save us. Nepal needs think tanks that not only study our foreign policy but domestic issues to enhance our state capacity. A handful of such institutions are not enough; we need many more.
Inviting powers with opposing geopolitical interests in Nepal is unwise. Dragging China to balance India or the US or other powers can have dangerous consequences. Nepali political elites and China both need to understand that hard reality. An unstable neighborhood will never benefit China. Like Nepal has been sensitive about China's security sensitivities for decades, China also should be sensitive about Nepal's geopolitical imperatives.
China most probably will not be able to help us if Nepal plunges into a geopolitical conflict. The fact that China kept its border with Nepal closed for several months after the great earthquake that rattled Nepal in April 2015 and during the recent Covid-19 pandemic indicates China won't be there to help us if we get into serious troubles. If so, China would do well not to be dragged into Nepal's internal affairs at the request of Nepal’s opportunist, rent-seeking and myopic elites. China should also reach out to all groups, rather than limiting itself to dealing exclusively with communists.
In the end, we don’t want to unnecessarily drag the dragon into Nepal. Let the dragon also shed the temptation to be dragged in easily.
Twitter: @shivap566
The author has a Masters in International Relations from South Asian University in New Delhi and is the Managing Editor of Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies
Nepal-China relations: Beware the dragon (Part I)
On Sunday 27 December 2020, a four-member delegation led by Guo Yezhou, Vice-minister of the International Department of Communist Party of China (CPC), arrived in Kathmandu to ‘assess the real situation’ in Nepal. The visit happened amidst the political uncertainty caused by the dissolution of Nepal's lower house of the parliament by President Bidhya Devi Bhandari on December 20 at the recommendation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. The House was dissolved because of irreconcilable differences between the two factions of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), one led by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, and the other by Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Madhav Kumar Nepal. Yezhou was said to be carrying Chinese President Xi Jinping's message to leaders of yet-to-formally-split NCP, urging them to remain united and ensure stable government in Nepal.
The team met President Bhandari, Prime Minister Oli and Chairmen of other NCP faction, Dahal and Nepal, and suggested all of them work to preserve party unity. Though the visiting team could not immediately succeed in bringing together the deeply divided NCP, media reported that it had managed to somewhat pacify the two factions, keeping the hope of a future alliance or unity alive. Due to China's keen interest and effort in bringing together communist groups of Nepal and maintaining their unity, there have been speculations that this will not be China's last attempt to unite Nepali communists. It will probably continue to invest politically, diplomatically, financially and emotionally in this cause, with long-term and larger goals in mind.
The chances of immediate reconciliation between the two NCP groups are slim. Dahal-Nepal faction is vehemently opposed to Oli’s dissolution of parliament and sees it as a blow to the country’s yet-to-be institutionalized constitution, federalism and political stability. This faction has sacked PM Oli from the post of party chairman and leader of parliamentary group. Dahal has taken over as the leader of the now defunct parliamentary group and another influential leader Madhav Kumar Nepal has been declared chairman of this faction.
Oli's faction in the NCP has sacked Dahal, the party’s 'Executive Chairman', and added hundreds of new members to its Central Committee to ensure its majority. Both factions claim to be the true successor of the NCP and each has laid its claim on the party’s old election symbol, the Sun. In a revealing interview with journalist Rupesh Shrestha for Fireside, a popular interview program on Kantipur Television, Dahal admitted to a de facto party split , and awaiting de jure split. This is the current situation in the ruling party. I will be referring to this interview several times in this write up as it offers insights into many things I intend to explain and analyze here from the 'horse's mouth'.
After the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in August 1955, China had perhaps never before shown this level of interest in managing Nepal's internal affairs. And it must also be rare, if not the first time, that China's overt and explicit maneuvers have been roundly criticized by Nepali media which otherwise exercise restraint to the extent of invisible censorship while publishing news and views about China. They have written editorials condemning China's highhandedness in Nepal. China's role has also been criticized by leaders of opposition parties like Nepali Congress and Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal and even by some leaders of the NCP. It seems Oli has of late felt out of China’s favor and it could be one important reason that compelled him to take the extreme step of parliament dissolution. Aware of such negative criticism in Nepal, the Chinese side tried to finesse the purpose of their Nepal visit. They termed the visit an act of reaching out to neighborhood and improve relations with neighbors before the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021. The visiting team tried to diffuse the criticism by meeting Nepali Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba and Janata Samajbadi Party leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai but some details of their secret meetings with Nepali communist leaders had already leaked in Nepali press. There remained no doubt that they were here to keep the NCP united. In the interview with Kantipur Television (mentioned above), Dahal admitted that the Chinese team had tried to persuade him on the same.
As journalist Chandra Shekhar Adhikari wrote in Ekagaj, a Nepali online news portal, the Chinese team that visited Nepal submitted its report directly to China's President Xi Jinping. If this is true, it demonstrates that Nepal's northern neighbor has taken developments in Nepal seriously and has tried to actively shape it.
In spite of knowing about such a deep divide in the ruling NCP why is China so desperate to maintain and preserve the left alliance and unity in Nepal? Why has it been interested in playing a greater role in Nepal's internal politics and creating still bigger strategic space for itself? It is necessary to situate China's present activities in Nepal in the canvas of its long-term objectives and strategies. It is also important to know how China has been able to play a greater role in Nepal and why. Let's try to explore answers to these questions.
Several factors have contributed to China playing a bigger role in Nepal: the overthrow of monarchy, China's trusted institution in Nepal, in May 2008; China's new policy of 'Going Out' to invest abroad and its new approach of being heard and seen on the global stage; China's perception that rivals are trying to encircle it via a policy of 'containment of China', and China's willingness to give a befitting response; and an increase in the number of nationalist communists in Nepal.
From the middle of the 1950s to the first decade of 21st century China maintained 'low profile' in relations with Nepal. It did not interfere in Nepal's internal affairs and aided its developmental efforts by helping build many highways and industries. Though Nepal's monarchy was theoretically incongruent with China's communist rule, China had found a trustworthy friend in that institution. Monarchial Nepal would address China's sensitive security interests mainly originating from dissident Tibetan refugees in Nepal and would always respect and lend support to One China Policy. Nepal also controlled the Tibetan rebellion on Nepali soil. Their shared ambivalence towards India, Nepal's need to balance India's interference, and China's desire to project itself as a power respectful of sovereignty of small nations brought together these two countries with two different political systems. This state of affairs continued until the first decade of the 21st century. After Nepal was declared a republic, China started extending relations with various political and social forces, just like powers like India and the US had been doing.
It started cultivating ties with sub-state actors like political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), security forces, media and intellectuals, but it mainly dealt with whoever was in government. Due to its instable politics and short-term governments during the transition phase, China got closer to various political groups including communist parties of Nepal. China might have felt it easier to be close to Nepali communists rather than Nepali Congress or Madhesh-centered parties that are traditionally inclined towards India on ideological grounds. Relations between the CPC and China's party state on one hand, and the NCP and its government on the other, were consolidated as a result of several conscious efforts from the two sides. In time, it created a kind of acceptance for China's 'positive role' in internal affairs of NCP and hence Nepal.
China was guided by the visions of its paramount leader Deng Xiaoping who not only introduced market economy side-by-side China's socialist economy but also believed in 'maintaining low profile but getting things done.' Deng had once been a victim of Chairman Mao’s purge. But after being reinstated in the party he improved relations with the West and imposed two-term limit on high-ranking Chinese leaders like General Secretary of CPC (the President of Chinese State) and Premiers. China also pursued 'post-ideological foreign policy' mainly under Deng’s leadership so that it would not lend financial or material or even moral support to communist rebellions in other parts of the world. China walked this path until the coming of Xi Jinping to power. He has given continuity to policies of reform and open market and embraced globalization but Xi has also undone many provisions instituted by China's revered paramount leader. The two-term limit for high-rank Chinese politicians has been scrapped. Xi is allowed to go beyond two terms as President and would be able to serve life-long if he so wishes. He has adopted the policy of 'Going out' and decided to be assertive, heard and seen on the global stage.
For this purpose, Xi has come up his ambitious signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the world's largest infrastructure and development project that would contribute to the distribution of largest amount of public goods were it to be successful. The BRI is not limited to infrastructure but includes almost everything—infrastructure, health, education, science, environment, culture and many more—that influence social, economic and hence political life of Asia, Europe, Africa and other continents—all by keeping China at the center of this transformation. Xi seems to be trying to rewrite the world order in China's favor by transforming the existing one that puts the Western powers at the top. He is the only leader after Mao to have his thought included in the Constitution of Chinese State and CPC's Constitution while still in power. Power projection both on domestic as well as foreign fronts is necessary for such a powerful leader to retain his public legitimacy. China's assertive and at times offensive postures worldwide including in Nepal should be seen as obvious manifestations of policies of the present-day Chinese leadership. Though Xi as an individual is thought to be very capable and rational politician, critics worry that the end of two-term limit could make Chinese leadership more authoritarian and have undesired consequences for China and the world.
China is now an important player in global political chessboard and is influential not only in Latin America, Africa and Asia but also in Europe, Australia and North America. The West has come up with a 'China threat theory' because of fears that China would destabilize the liberal political-economic order instituted and sustained by the West. China for its part says the theory is a narrative to obstruct 'China's peaceful rise'. China is now the world’s largest manufacturing center, has the biggest reserve of foreign currency, is the largest global economy on purchasing power parity basis, and has the highest total expenditure by outbound tourists. China is also a formidable military power. Though it is far behind the US in terms of military expenditure and global presence, China is thought of as capable of filling the military capability differential with the US if it so wishes. China already has ability to largely deter the US from initiating any offensive against it.
China alone is not responsible for its enhanced role in Nepal. Factors intrinsic to Nepal have contributed too. China's influence on Nepal’s communist groups and left intellectuals, a real or perceived ideological commonality between the NCP and the CPC, and the desire of nationalist communists in Nepal to balance India's role by inviting China are pull factors that enable China to widen its strategic space in the NCP. Nepali elites, leftists, rightists and centrists, all show a dangerous tendency of inviting or even dragging a foreign power to play a greater role in Nepal's internal affairs for their vested interests. Though this may sound like generalization, it is true with only rare exceptions.
China's new-found proximity with Nepali communists especially ruling the NCP has enabled it to shape Nepal's domestic politics, a big change from its low-profile engagement until the start of the second decade of this century. Before the 2017 elections, China maintained good relations with all political parties of Nepal but preferred state-to-state ties.
China’s desires to keep the ruling NCP intact and to give continuity to Nepal’s communist government have to be seen in the context of China's possible objectives, old and new, vis-à-vis Nepal.
China’s goals in Nepal
Evaluating China's activities in Nepal in the past decade or so, China seems to have the following objectives in Nepal, not necessarily in the order discussed here. First, it wants to maintain unity among major communist factions. It wants to do so as the first step in attainment of its long-term goals. In the past five years China has invested heavily—politically, emotionally, diplomatically and no doubt financially—towards this end. Around 50 percent voters in Nepal lean towards communists, which can easily translate into over two-thirds majority in parliamentary elections if all of them are united.
Nepal has been an exception in that the number of communist parties and voters here have been continuously rising even after Francis Fukuyama’s 1990 declaration of 'End of History' marking the 'defeat of communism' at the hands of the liberal democratic ideology. Most probably, Nepal is the only country in the world where a decade-long communist rebellion was a success (in terms of political outcomes). Though China did not help the communist rebellion at the time, it might after the end of monarchy have found trustworthy friends in Nepali communists.
In an article titled “Nepali Communist Parties in Elections: Participation and Representation” published in Dristikon Journal (Vol.10, no.1), Amrit Kumar Shrestha, Associate Professor of Political Science in Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur, has worked out total votes obtained by Nepali communist parties since Nepal’s first democratic elections in 1959. According to data compiled by Shrestha, the Nepal Communist Party obtained just 7.21 percent of total votes in the historic first parliamentary elections of 1959. In the parliamentary elections held in 1991 following the restoration of democracy in 1990, the communists got 38.51 percent votes. Likewise, their vote-share in 1994 and 1999 elections were 35.52 percent and 41.16 percent respectively.
After the Maoists entered the peace process in 2006, the combined votes of the communist parties in the first Constitution Assembly elections in April 2008 amounted to 57.67 percent (FPTP) and 57.45 percent (proportional representation). In the elections of the second Constitution Assembly in November 2013, their combined votes decreased slightly, to 48.15 percent (FPTP) and 43.25 percent (proportional). In the last parliamentary elections in November/December 2017 they garnered 47.65 percent FPTP and 48.50 percent proportional system votes, respectively. Though these are combined votes of about half a dozen communist parties, the two largest, CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center), together got over 45 percent of the total votes in 2017 elections. This translated into a near two-thirds majority in Nepal's lower house of the parliament, even though the election system was a mix of FPTP and proportional representation.
Nepali communists, because of their ideological indoctrination and socialization, are anti-India and anti-West, and hesitate to accept liberal democracy wholeheartedly. Though Nepali communist leaders have spent a lot time in India, during Panchayat era and later during the armed insurgency, they have been compelled to use anti-India rhetoric in their official documents, trainings and speeches. True, anti-India feelings in Nepal are often made worse by India's overbearing and coercive tactics. But Nepali communists have always been soft towards China because of their 'ideology' and training. China most probably saw this as an opportunity to get closer to them: forge closer ties with communist leaders and intellectuals and create strategic space for itself, to the extent that it could play a mediating role in party conflicts.
China's second objective, built on the first, seems to be a stable government in Nepal. In the abovementioned context, it now means a stable 'communist' government. This, according to statements of Chinese officials, media and scholars, is necessary to protect China's security interests in Nepal—such security threats mainly arising from Tibetan refugees and China’s rivals like India, the US and other Western powers using Nepali soil to keep an eye on and destabilize China or weaken its presence in the neighborhood.
China advocates stable government here for other reasons as well. For instance, Chinese officials and intellectuals have said that Nepal needs 'stable' politics to create conducive environment for Chinese investment including in big BRI projects. China has repeatedly emphasized the need for stable government and politics in Nepal in documents and discussions related to trade, investment and tourism as well. China has started becoming more vocal and active about it.
China's third objective is to ensure that Nepal does not become fertile ground for anti-China activities by Tibetan refugees, some of whom are engaged in naming and shaming China at the provocation of Western forces. With China's unprecedented rise as economic and military power, the country’s containment has started becoming overt and more pronounced. The US has recently asked Nepal to provide documents to Tibetan refugees to ease their travel and make it easier for them to get jobs. Members of US Congress have in the past criticized Nepal of being hostile and not sympathetic to Tibetan refugees. There are visible things. But many things in international power politics transpire beneath the surface. China is aware that Nepal could be used as one location in its 'strategic encirclement'. Hence China is in favor of a stable and friendly government.
Forth, for a great power or an aspiring superpower, it is not unnatural to try to create a friendly and favorable neighborhood. In international power politics influence in neighborhood is taken as an important measure of power projection. Though China says that it does not believe in 'imperial' and colonial perspectives like ‘spheres of influence’ and ‘buffers zone’, its rising power and response to rivals might have 'forced' it to project power in different parts of the globe. China is competing for influence with the US, Japan, India and other Western powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even in Europe. Nepal is just another such place.
China's fifth objective in Nepal might be to be the most powerful player here and directly hurt Indian and American interests. Nepali analysts and journalists often hesitate to discuss this aspect of Chinese behavior. After all, the statement 'offence is the best defense' used in day-to-day life by some egoists often finds its place in international politics and international relations theories. According to offensive realism, an international relations theory, in the uncertain and unpredictable global power games, offence may be the best form of defense. In Nepal, China is usually perceived as disinterested, benign and benevolent power. As China has wielded its soft power in Nepal rather successfully (as will be discussed in this article) a lot of positive information about China flows through media and social sites. In Nepal, being positive or soft on China is almost synonymous with being a nationalist. China might have been willing to cash in this public perception and maintain strong foothold in Nepal as a 'pre-emptive' blow against current and probable 'anti-China' activities here.
China is a rational actor in international politics. The way China has engaged with India's permanent foe Pakistan shows that the 'all-weather friendship' between the two might not have been so deep without India’s involvement in the equation. Many Indian politicians and scholars accuse China of using Pakistan to keep India entangled in regional affairs and preventing its rise as a global power. Spectrum of engagement between China and Pakistan from arms and ammunition, technology transfer, BRI, and other strategic issues clearly indicate the India angle in their joint strategic initiatives.
During the Galwan Valley crisis, the way Chinese scholars, media and officials spoke about the probability of India facing a three-front conflict with China, Pakistan and Nepal suggests they are trying to use Nepal against India. Conflict with small neighbors may be a source of irritation for regional or great powers. And using Nepal to irritate India might have been one of China's goals. Knowing or unknowingly, we usually overlook this aspect of China's behavior in Nepal.
The fact that China wants to create strategic space in Nepal at the cost of other powers is also evident from the way it showed its displeasure at Nepal's readiness to accept grants from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects. China appears to want to stretch the notion of 'stable government in Nepal' to mean a government that draws Nepal closer to China at the expense of Nepal's traditional relations with India, the US and other Western powers. Though China's official rhetoric on the MCC is that Nepal is free to accept or decline it according to its need, Chinese media and scholars have also been saying that the MCC is a part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Nepal should thus reject it. Nepali politicians and scholars, mainly leftists, who usually give voice to China's interests in Nepal, are vehemently opposed to the MCC. They have been spreading all sorts of rumors against it. His willingness to accept MCC projects is thought to be a reason KP Oli fell out of Chinese favor. Dahal, during a joint virtual program of CPC and NCP, committed to not accepting any assistance that would be detrimental to security of Nepal and its neighbors, clearly alluding to the MCC. But PM Oli as well as his foreign minister Pradeep Gyawali and Finance Minister Bishnu Prasad Paudel are clearly in favor of the MCC. Hence, China, which was earlier in favor of continuation of Oli's government leadership, is said to have changed its position. Later, if Nepali scholars and politicians with close ties with China are to be believed, Chinese were of the view that 'NCP should remain intact and should run the government but we do not have problem with who leads it.'
The MCC, the $55 million project, targeting Nepal's energy sector, especially construction of transmission lines, is not a huge project in terms of financial assistance. But its refusal especially at China's provocations may not be taken lightly by the world's only superpower. Rejection of the MCC would not only mean rejection of US 'goodwill gesture' but a clear indication of Nepal moving into China's fold. The US has felt threatened by China's rise and is seeking ways to contain it in various ways in the global political great game. NCP leader Dahal in the same interview with Rupesh Shrestha hinted that the MCC might have been the reason behind the dissolution of House of Representative. He did not elaborate but requested democratic countries like India and the US to speak against House dissolution, a great blow to democracy and constitution. This request was meaningful and probably hinted of a rapprochement with India, the US and other democratic countries. But both India and the US in their official statements have said that recent political developments within Nepal are its internal affair. Their position is thought to favor Oli.
That the MCC might have been an important reason for the NCP split is also indicated by the fact that PM Oli and leader of opposition Sher Bahadur Deuba, both MCC supporters, are also said to have similar views on latest political developments.
The deeper Chinese engagements in Nepal get, other big powers that have major stakes in here are looking to respond. Great powers do not easily give up their prerogatives in the zero sum nature of international politics. But if Nepal cannot manage this game, we may have unforeseen and dangerous consequences. Nepali elites and intellectuals fear Nepal could become next Afghanistan or an altogether different geopolitical battleground. Such fears seem to be gaining strength due to colliding interests of great powers.
Is the CPC's and Chinese state's growing intimacy with NCP an indication of 'ideology' coming back into China's foreign policy? Has it taken a policy of strengthening relations with communist parties or supporting their government? Is it the beginning of a new Cold War based on ideology, with Nepal becoming the first spot where Communists are encouraged to capture state power? Is that another of China's objectives in Nepal? That is probably not the case. China has been trying to establish relations with all sorts of political groups throughout the world irrespective of their ideologies. It might just be that China has found it easier to engage with communist groups of Nepal on ideological grounds. Historically, China has placed national interests above ideology. It has fought border wars with communist Soviet Union and Vietnam. It also supplied arms and ammunition to Nepal Army to fight Maoist rebels at the request of King Gyanendra. So it is probable that China and NCP might have found it easier to use 'ideology' as a pretext to consolidate their ties.
Though India, a regional power, and the US, a global power, were for long engaged in Nepal in line with their interests, China's transformation from apparently a low-profile and benign actor to a player with great impact in Nepal has been rather speedy and dramatic.
From low- to high-profile engagement
Nepal's powerful northern neighbor China assumed low profile in its relations with Nepal after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between on 1 August 1955. Five principles of peaceful co-existence (Panchasheela) that included mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and co-existence were mentioned in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between Nepal and China on April 1960, as well as in other bilateral agreements, most probably at Nepal's insistence. For example, principles of Panchasheela were either mentioned or the commitment to abide by them were categorically mentioned in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations signed in Kathmandu on 1 August 1955, the Joint Communiqué on Talks for the Maintenance of Friendly Relations signed in Kathmandu in September 1956, the Agreement to Maintain Friendly Relations and on Trade and Intercourse signed in Kathmandu in September 1956, the Sino Nepali Boundary Agreement signed in Peking, the Boundary Treaty signed in 5 October 1961 in Peking, the Boundary Protocol signed in Peking on 20 January 1963, and even the Agreement signed between Tibet Autonomous Region of China and Nepal on 2 May 1966.
These five principles of Panchasheela were emphatically mentioned most probably to allay Nepal's concerns vis-à-vis certain claims by China's successive regimes, from its erstwhile emperors to Mao Zedong. In the 1791-92 Nepal-Tibet war, China sent its army in support of Tibet to fight and defeat Nepal. As a result the 'Treaty of Kerung' was signed in 1792, compelling Nepal to send quinquennial (five yearly) gift missions to Chinese emperors in Peking. These missions would travel all the way from Kathmandu to Peking via Tibet and they continued till 1906. Though they were called five-yearly missions they were irregular.
Nepali side saw the gifts as Mamuli Saugat (ordinary gifts), but Chinese emperors interpreted them as tributes from their 'tributary or dependent or feudatory' Gorkha Kingdom. In other words, Chinese interpreted the agreement to send gifts to Peking as Nepal’s acceptance of tributary status. Historians like Baburam Acharya, Tri Ratna Manandhar, Vijay Kumar Manandhar, Gyan Mani Nepal among others have written in great details about Nepal's gift missions to China and differing interpretations of the two sides. Chinese interpretations were not limited to Gorkhalis, but all kingdoms sending gifts to powerful Chinese emperors with the aim of keeping them happy or at least not inviting their displeasure.
Chinese emperors used to consider themselves 'Sons of Heaven' and those who sent gifts as barbarians and their tributaries. Books and journal articles on China's history unanimously agree on this point. Henry Kissinger's popular book 'On China' that is widely read in Nepal also discusses such interpretations of powerful Chinese emperors. These emperors sent return gifts to Nepali rulers and conferred titles on Nepali kings and later on Rana Prime Ministers through those missions. Nepali rulers accepted those titles with pride, without understanding that acceptance of the title meant acceptance of Nepal as tributary state of China in the eyes of Chinese emperors. When Rana Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher learned of this interpretation in 1910 from a British minister in Peking, he discontinued the gift-sending missions. Nepal could do so as the British India had guaranteed its security due to various appeasing tactics of the Ranas. China too had become weak due of internal conflicts during what Chinese like to call 'the century of humiliation'.
Chinese emperors in Peking were to be replaced by the Republicans led by Sun Yat-sen. In the course of China's internally turbulent times that were also marked by foreign interventions, it was ruled by the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and by communists led by Mao Zedong. But Chinese narrative with respect to 'tributary states' including Nepal continued to survive. China applied such a narrative not only to Nepal but also Korea, Tibet, Mongolia and others. Even Mao is said to have listed territories like Hong Kong, Macau, Korea, Burma and even Nepal as China's lost territories during China's century of humiliation and emphasized the need to get them back.
Nepali leaders were apprehensive about China's intent on Nepal even after the establishment of democracy in February 1951. China's formal occupation of Tibet in 1950-51 enhanced the fears of Nepali rulers. A sequence of events after the occupation such as Western powers’ attempts to exclude communist China and accept Chiang Kai-shek-led Republic of China in Taiwan, necessitated China taking measures to be accepted as a responsible member of the international community. China accepted sovereign equality of small countries like Nepal and Burma (now Myanmar) and Chinese communists started assuring Third World countries that they did not have imperial desires. Nor did they believe in colonial-era doctrines of spheres of influence. Nepal was still hesitant to establish formal bilateral relations. But Nepal's heavy dependence on India and India's apparent highhandedness made a section of Nepali elites contemplate formal relations with China. China's reassurances about respecting independence, integrity and sovereign equality of states big or small, rich or poor, in international platforms such as meetings of Non-Aligned Movement and bilateral dealings had persuaded Nepal. In addition, being in good terms with a powerful neighbor is a good approach in its own right.
It was in this backdrop that the Principles of Panchasheela were mentioned in many treaties and agreements between Nepal and China. From that time until the end of monarchy in May 2008, China remained respectful of Nepal's sovereignty, assisted generously in Nepal's developmental and did not take much interest in its internal affairs. Though monarchy was conceptually and philosophically incongruent to communism, China found a trustworthy friend in that 'stable' institution. During the time of active monarchy until 1990, China relied on it to address its security interests, which were mainly limited to Tibetan refugees and their use by foreign powers. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1990 and onset of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, kings in Nepal retained significant powers. China had good relations with these kings, even though the Chinese now also had good relations with the government of the day.
Only after monarchy was overthrown did China start to cultivate relations with various other social and political forces in Nepal. In an interview for my master's level thesis, Nepal's senior journalist Yubaraj Ghimire had told me that China started reaching out to many sub-state actors mainly because Nepal's central authority had been diffused. In the process of exploration, they probably came to realize that Nepali communists could be reliable partners as they could easily secure majority in elections if they united. They were closer to China ideologically and most probably would support China's other goals.
China's gestures were reciprocated by Nepali communists, and it was given a role in the unification of two big Nepali communist parties. China's ability to use soft power mainly among leftist politicians and intellectuals will be discussed somewhere else in this write-up. China all of a sudden emerged as a great player in Nepal and started shaping Nepal's internal politics after the party it had helped come into being got almost two-thirds majority in the federal lower house and thumping majorities in National Assembly and provincial assemblies. But China was not the only factor responsible for the unification of then CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—it’s role was rather active but secondary.
After NCP formed the government, the proximity between CPC and Chinese party state on one hand, and NCP and NCP government in Nepal on the other, intensified. The CPC appeared more and more confident in having a say in NCP's internal matters. China also tried to help the government improve its image in various ways. President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal in October 2019, the agreement on the Trans-Himalayan Connectivity Network, big Chinese investment, mentioning of Nepal as an important BRI country, China's promotion of tourism in Nepal are some ways in which China tried to bring credit to NCP government. Evaluating some recent interactions between the CPC and the NCP helps us understand how China rapidly built its position in Nepal by wielding 'soft power' over Nepal's political elites, especially in NCP and opinion makers close to the party.
The second part of this article dealing with the CPC’s ties with the NCP, Chinese soft power, the India factor, and dangers of communist China will be published next Monday, Jan 25
Twitter: @shivap566
The author has a Masters in International Relations from South Asian University in New Delhi and is the Managing Editor of Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies
