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When former President Bidya Devi Bhandari attempted to re-enter active politics through the CPN-UML—the very party she helped build—she was blocked by a decision that hides behind constitutional dignity while exposing a deeper problem in Nepal’s political culture. The move to sideline her isn’t just a power play—it is an act of political exclusion steeped in patriarchy, internal insecurity and disregard for constitutional freedoms.

The CPN-UML’s Central Committee, led by KP Sharma Oli, denied Bhandari’s return, arguing that a former president must remain above party politics to preserve the sanctity of the office. Yet this rationale collapses under scrutiny—legally, politically and morally. This is not simply about Bhandari’s personal ambitions. This is about how we define democracy in Nepal. Are we a system that allows experienced leaders—regardless of gender—to remain engaged in shaping the country’s future? Or do we selectively retire people when their political presence becomes inconvenient?

Both Dev Gurung of the CPN (Maoist Center) and Tank Karki of the UML itself have forcefully challenged the party’s decision, calling it unconstitutional and unjustified. Gurung points out that the move violates Article 17 of Nepal’s Constitution, which guarantees political freedom and fundamental rights to all citizens, including former officeholders. Once a president steps down, they are no longer bound by the symbolic or ceremonial obligations of that office. The Constitution does not categorize former presidents as non-citizens. Any restriction on their political participation would require strong legal justification—such as actions threatening national sovereignty—which clearly does not apply in Bhandari’s case.

What is more surprising is Gurung warns that political parties registered under the constitution cannot make internal rules or take decisions that override or undermine constitutionally-protected individual rights. In this case, the UML’s action amounts to a political overreach with no constitutional basis.

Tank Karki echoes these concerns from within the party. He questions how any political organization can assume the authority to limit a citizen’s right to participate in politics, especially when no such restriction is mandated by the Constitution. Karki invokes multiple precedents to dismantle the UML leadership’s justification: Ramchandra Paudel returned to Nepali Congress after serving as Speaker, Subash Nembang resumed active roles within UML post-speakership, Khilaraj Regmi became Prime Minister while serving as Chief Justice and Nanda Bahadur Pun held a senior Maoist position while serving as Vice-president. These examples make it abundantly clear that returning to politics after holding high office is not new, nor is it constitutionally inappropriate. Karki rightly asks: “Are we truly democratic if we restrict political participation for someone who is no longer in office?” His question reveals the core contradiction of the UML’s decision—it is less about constitutional dignity and more about political control.

Indeed, Bhandari’s assertiveness and her public hint at contesting leadership within the party were likely perceived as a direct threat by Oli, who has ruled UML unchallenged for years. But attempting to eliminate opposition through procedural justifications is not leadership—it’s suppression. And suppressing a leader like Bhandari, especially after her decades-long contribution to Nepal’s democratic movement, is not just unfair—it’s self-defeating for a party that claims to represent democratic ideals.

What’s more troubling is the gendered nature of this exclusion. When men return to active politics after high office, they are often hailed for their experience. When a woman does the same, she is told it undermines her dignity. This is a classic patriarchal double standard. It elevates women only when they are silent, symbolic and submissive—but excludes them when they seek actual power.

The logic used to bar Bhandari, wrapped in notions of “respect,” “republican values,” and “national unity,” is in fact a tool of silencing. It offers ceremonial honor in exchange for political irrelevance. But true dignity for women in politics lies in allowing them to lead, compete and challenge—just as their male counterparts do.

This sends a deeply discouraging message to Nepal’s women: that the presidency is not a platform for further leadership but a dead-end. That political achievements are valid only until they challenge existing male authority. That even after reaching the highest office, women must gracefully disappear from the political stage.

Nepal’s democracy cannot afford to send such a message.

Bhandari is not asking for favors. She is asserting a right she has earned through decades of political struggle—from student activism in the late 1970s to her contributions in constitutional processes and women’s representation. She remains one of the few women in Nepal with both national recognition and grassroots political experience. Silencing her does not protect democracy—it weakens it.

At a time when Nepal’s political environment is marked by fragmentation, volatility and declining public trust, the exclusion of a credible and experienced leader like Bhandari is a strategic blunder. Her return could help stabilize internal party conflicts, promote left unity and offer a counterbalance to male-dominated power blocs. Her leadership represents continuity, not disruption. Moreover, allowing her back into politics could rejuvenate faith among Nepal’s younger generation—especially women—that political space is open to all, not just a privileged male few.

Let’s also set the legal record straight: there is no constitutional clause that prevents a former president from joining a political party. The arguments being made in UML’s decision—the so-called “spirit” of Article 61—are interpretive at best. The same “spirit” was never invoked for male figures returning from constitutional positions. Why now?

Some claim that Bhandari’s political re-entry might damage the symbolic sanctity of the presidential office. But symbols don’t build nations—leaders do. And leaders must be allowed to evolve, contribute and contest. The presidency was a chapter in Bhandari’s political journey—not the conclusion. Letting her rejoin politics is not an attack on the republic—it is a celebration of its openness. Her participation will not break the system. In fact, excluding her weakens the very democratic spirit the UML claims to be protecting.

Democracies do not function by freezing capable leaders into statues of respect. They thrive when voices—especially those of women—are free to speak, challenge and lead. Nepal cannot claim to support women's empowerment while pushing its most experienced female politician into a corner. Ultimately, this is not just about Bidya Devi Bhandari. This is about what kind of republic we want to be. One that fears women’s power or one that embraces it?

Let her lead again—not as a symbol, but as a politician, a woman, and a citizen. Because the strength of Nepal’s democracy will be measured not by how well it confines women, but by how freely it lets them rise.

The author is a political observer and advocate for inclusive democratic processes

Nepal’s economy in the fiscal year 2024/25 exhibited signs of a guarded but meaningful rebound, marked by notable shifts in trade patterns, rising consumption of key commodities, and strong export performance. While criticisms continue to mount regarding the government’s inability to roll out bold economic initiatives, market behavior and trade data present a story that hints at renewed momentum.

One of the most significant indicators of this evolving economic landscape is the overall expansion of Nepal’s international trade. The total trade volume grew by 19.24 percent compared to the previous year, a strong indicator of increased commercial activity despite political and administrative inertia. Imports during this period reached Rs 1.804trn, a 13.25 percent rise from the previous fiscal year’s figure of Rs 1.592trn. Although a double-digit increase in imports would generally raise alarms in an economy known for chronic trade deficits, this year’s data must be read in the context of a simultaneous and historic rise in exports.

Exports for the fiscal year hit a record Rs 277bn, an impressive 81.8 percent surge from Rs 152bn in 2023/24. This steep rise in export volume represents the strongest performance on record and suggests that Nepal’s export capacity is beginning to respond to global market opportunities, logistical improvements, or perhaps increased value-added activity in key sectors. Interestingly, a substantial portion of this export growth is attributable to processed soybean oil, which Nepalese traders import in crude form from third countries and refine for export, primarily to India. This particular trade mechanism, while increasing both import and export volumes, has had the net effect of raising overall trade engagement and foreign exchange earnings.

Petroleum products continue to play an outsized role in Nepal’s import basket, both as a necessity and a source of government revenue. Total petroleum imports in 2024/25 amounted to Rs 274.27bn. Diesel led the chart with 1.47m kiloliters imported, valued at Rs 128bn, an increase of nearly 55,000 kiloliters from the previous year. Petrol followed closely at 746,420 kiloliters worth Rs 64.12bn, and aviation fuel imports rose to 210,012 kiloliters, valued at Rs 18.79bn. LPG gas consumption, another critical indicator of household energy demand, hit 5.55bn kilograms, translating to an import value of Rs 62.58bn.

What makes these figures particularly noteworthy is the inverse relationship between global petroleum prices and domestic consumption. Despite falling prices on the international market, Nepal’s import volume increased substantially, suggesting robust domestic demand. This reliance, while generating significant revenue of Rs 120.57bn in petroleum-related taxes, also underscores the country’s vulnerability to global price fluctuations and its continued dependence on fossil fuel imports.

The import composition further reveals evolving consumption patterns. While diesel remained dominant, an unusual and noteworthy rise was observed in the import of crude soybean oil, which surpassed petrol in value at Rs 108.95bn. These two commodities were the only ones with imports exceeding Rs 100bn, emphasizing their critical role in the current trade structure. Meanwhile, imports of smartphones, now ranked sixth in value, reflect a growing appetite for tech consumption among Nepali consumers.

Month-wise import trends revealed fluctuating demand, with peak imports recorded in the middle of the fiscal year and a decline toward the end. For instance, imports stood at Rs 170bn in mid-May to mid-June but dropped to Rs 160bn in mid-June to mid-July. Part of this decline is attributed to the closure of the Rasuwa customs point, a vital trade gateway with China, due to flooding.

A similar pattern emerges in the automotive sector, which appears to be undergoing a modest but clear revival. The import of electric passenger vehicles increased by 14 percent, reaching 13,578 units valued at Rs 31.76bn. From this, the government collected Rs 19.7bn in revenue. The commercial EV segment witnessed even stronger growth, rising by 73 percent year-over-year with 3,813 units imported. These developments reflect both shifting consumer preferences and the likely impact of government incentives and global supply trends favoring electric mobility.

In the two-wheeler market, long regarded as a bellwether for middle-class consumption, the story is equally optimistic. Imports of motorbikes and scooters rose by 34 percent, with 201,000 units entering the country. The government earned nearly an equivalent amount of Rs 24.73bn in revenue from these imports alone. The rise in two/three-wheeled electric vehicles was also notable, with 29,437 units imported compared to 20,704 units the year before. Even fuel-based passenger cars showed a rise in demand, with 4,978 units imported in 2024/25, up from 4,246 the previous year.

These numbers offer a nuanced understanding of post-pandemic consumer behavior. Rather than a broad-based economic boom, Nepal appears to be experiencing targeted recoveries in segments such as transportation, technology, and household energy, with more modest gains in other sectors. Interestingly, this uneven recovery seems to be occurring largely independent of proactive government economic management. While critics have accused the administration of failing to implement impactful reforms or development programs, the market appears to be finding its footing nonetheless.

Beyond trade and consumption, the real estate market offers another dimension of economic recovery, particularly in high-value segments. Government data shows a spike in transactions involving premium properties in urban centers. Although the total number of property registrations slightly dipped in Asar compared to Jestha (55,524 compared to. 56,010), revenue collection told a different story. The government collected Rs 6.55bn in property transaction taxes in Asar, up by Rs 1.82bn from the Rs 4.72bn collected in Jestha. Compared to last year’s Asar, which generated only Rs 4.61bn from 46,179 transactions, this year’s data clearly indicates growth in the sale of higher-value properties.

This surge in property deals reflects rising investor confidence, likely driven by factors such as stable remittance inflows, limited alternative investment avenues, and increasing urban migration. It also highlights the potential of the real estate sector to act as a stabilizing force in Nepal’s economy, particularly in the absence of sustained industrial output or manufacturing-led growth.

All this growth occurred in a context where policy intervention was largely missing and government initiatives failed to inspire widespread confidence. The resilience of the market and the adaptability of consumers and businesses, rather than institutional action, have been the primary drivers of this recovery phase.

However, this growth comes with caveats. The rising dependency on petroleum imports, the fragile export base reliant on limited product categories, and infrastructure bottlenecks highlight the structural limitations that remain. To truly achieve sustained economic momentum, Nepal’s policymakers must move beyond passive observation and engage in strategic planning that strengthens domestic production, diversifies the export base, and builds climate-resilient trade infrastructure.

Nepal’s financial system has disbursed loans totaling Rs 5.55trn to approximately 1.94m borrowers. Governor Biswo Poudel recently highlighted this trend while presenting new data on small borrowers—defined as those with loans under Rs 10m. On that occasion, the chief of the central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), raised concerns about the concentration of large loans among a small group of individuals and whether such lending practices are contributing meaningfully to economic productivity.

Around 1.94m Nepali people have accessed loans from commercial banks, development banks and finance companies. Of these, approximately 1.869m small borrowers have taken loans totaling
Rs 1.99trn.

These small borrowers include lower-middle-class individuals who often borrow to start small businesses, send family members abroad for work or fund vocational training. Many also take loans to purchase land or vehicles, or to build homes. However, this group is financially vulnerable. According to NRB data, 28.8 percent—equivalent to Rs 549.85bn—of their loans have become non-performing, accounting for 4.34 percent of total lending.

Mid-level borrowers, defined as those with loans between Rs 10m and Rs 100m, are also under financial stress. This segment includes approximately 6,793 borrowers, holding Rs 1.254trn in loans. Roughly 11 percent of this amount is non-performing, indicating severe repayment challenges, especially post-covid, as many small and medium enterprises failed to recover.

At the other end of the spectrum are large borrowers—those with loans exceeding Rs 100m. This group consists of just 7,763 borrowers, who collectively hold Rs 2.39trn. Even more concentrated, 1,552 individuals manage over Rs 1.34trn in loans, highlighting a stark imbalance in credit distribution. Despite handling large sums, the rate of non-performing loans in this group is significantly lower.

The data indicate that the larger the loan, the lower the likelihood of it being classified as non-performing. Borrowers in the higher brackets often have the advantage of restructuring loans, accessing new credit to service old debt and leveraging networks within the banking system. This circular lending practice, often facilitated by banks themselves, poses systemic risks and raises ethical questions.

Loans in the Rs 10–500m range account for 95 percent of Rs 1.048trn in outstanding loans, with a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 22.14 percent (Rs 232bn). Notably, NPL ratios decrease as loan sizes increase. For loans between Rs 50–100m, the NPL rate drops to 4.83 percent, and for
Rs 100–200m, it falls to 3.01 percent, with the highest loan brackets seeing NPLs as low as 0.04 percent.

There is a stark contrast in Nepal’s loan distribution and associated credit risks across borrower categories. While small and mid-level borrowers (with loans below Rs 100m) collectively hold significant portions of the total loan portfolio—Rs 1.99trn and Rs 1.254trn, respectively—they also exhibit alarmingly high non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of 28.8 percent and 11 percent, indicating financial vulnerability and limited resilience. In contrast, large and very large borrowers (with loans above Rs 100m), though few in number, control disproportionately high volumes of credit—up to
Rs 2.39trn—with remarkably low NPL ratios (3.01 percent and 0.04 percent). This inverse relationship between loan size and credit risk reveals a systemic concentration of financial resources among a limited elite, raising concerns about financial equity and governance. The findings underscore the need for regulatory reforms to rebalance credit flows, safeguard small borrowers, and address emerging issues of financial inequality and systemic risk.

This disparity raises concerns over the governance and equitable distribution of financial resources. NRB data reveal that out of 1.94m borrowers, just 194 individuals—0.01 percent—have accessed loans exceeding Rs 2.25trn, or 3.9 percent of the total loan volume. On an average, each of these individuals has taken loans of over Rs 1.11bn. These statistics underscore a critical issue: a limited number of individuals control a disproportionate share of banking sector credit.

This concentration of financial power has drawn attention in parliamentary discussions. In a recent meeting of the Finance Committee of the House of Representatives, clause-by-clause deliberations on the amendment of the Banks and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA), 2073, are underway. The proposed amendments aim to address conflicts of interest, ensure fair loan distribution and introduce stricter governance measures to prevent the undue concentration of credit.

The ongoing legislative review seeks to establish clearer guidelines on eligibility for loans and address the structural weaknesses that allow such imbalances. Key concerns include whether bank directors and affiliated individuals are receiving favorable treatment and whether existing legal frameworks are sufficient to prevent misuse of financial resources.

As the debate continues, it has become evident that financial inequality is deepening. There is a pressing need for reforms to ensure that credit distribution contributes to inclusive growth, supports small and medium enterprises, and reflects principles of transparency and social justice.

The author is a senior fellow and program executive at SNG Solution