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On April 22, the tranquil Baisaran meadow near Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir was converted into a site of extraordinary catastrophe. Militants reportedly associated with The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), executed a violent assault on the group of tourists, leading to the deaths of at least 26 (25 Indian nationals and one Nepali citizen) victims and injuries to more than 20.

This assault is among the most lethal strikes on civilians in the area since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In the last 35 years of the Kashmir conflict, tourists were spared even in the height of militancy. This has changed now, it has been visible from the attack in Raesi, Jammu, last year, which took the lives of nine Hindu pilgrims. And so many other things have also changed in the course of the previous 24 hours in the South Asian geopolitical landscape. The attack coincided with four main events that happened recently. 

On the day of the attack, US Vice-president JD Vance was visiting India, interestingly on the same day Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi was in Jeddah meeting with the Saudi Prince and officials. Two other incidents that happened earlier but have a significant impact on the nature, psyche and politics of the attacks, extradition of Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian citizen who served in the Pakistani military for some time, from the USA to India. 

It reignited the old scars of the terrible 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were a paradigm shift in the global approach to fighting terrorism from South Asia. After a lengthy legal battle, Rana was extradited to India. The last but most significant event which had a colossal impact on the Pahalgam attack was Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen Asim Munir’s remarks on the ethnic two-nation theory between India and Pakistan, which is true for Pakistan but not for India because it is a civic democratic nation. He also referred to Kashmir as their ‘jugular vein’, provoking a load of religious sentiments just weeks before the attack, the clips of which are making rounds on social media. 

The preliminary intelligence findings from India suggest that five culprits, three from across the border and two locals, were involved in this heinous attack. India, in response, took a slew of diplomatic decisions, the most important of which is the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which survived three full-scale wars and many terror attacks perpetrated by Pakistan on Indian soil. 

Other than that, India has declared the defence attaches of Pakistan’s High Commission in New Delhi as persona non grata and given them a week to leave the country. Along with this, the newer development or any escalation from the Pakistani side may result in military retaliation. 

Consider this: in Feb 2025, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif showed a desire to pursue dialogue with India as it is the only ‘way forward’. Even before that, Pakistan’s ruling party’s patron, Nawaz Sharif, has called for normalizing ties with India. India, meanwhile, has been firm in its approach of not indulging Pakistan unless it dismantles the terror apparatus of the country. India has also been successful in de-hyphenating its relations with Pakistan vis-à-vis global powers, as India and Pakistan are not seen through one lens. 

For India, in the current geostrategic setting, the only rival is China, which is mainly accurate. It has also been successful in creating new ties with Pakistan’s traditional Gulf partners. 

Comparatively, Pakistan’s situation is in the doldrums. Its economy is growing at a meagre 2-3 percent, one of the lowest in South Asia, with a volatile inflation, which went as high as 39 percent in 2023. It also has a very high debt-to-GDP ratio, which is why there needs to be multiple bailout packages from the IMF. Politically, Pakistan has always been in turmoil, where its most popular leader has won an election engineered by the Army, which has installed Shahbaz Sharif as Prime Minister of Pakistan. Still, the driving seat of power is, as usual, with the Army. 

For the longest time in Pakistan, the Army has maintained one of the most venerated positions and a symbol of national unity. It started slowly eroding when the failure of the state became apparent in the last two decades, the tenure of ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was also the Army’s favourite at one point, was in the tussle. His removal prompted protests that echoed to many cantonments in Pakistan, where protesters attacked the army’s establishments. It was the most visible frustration of Pakistanis toward the venerated institution. Pakistan is also grappling with autonomy and secessionist movements in Balochistan, which has also caused forced disappearances of many ethnic Baloch who allege that the state has a direct involvement in these incidents. Islamabad has been rocked with protests by Baloch people.  

In addition to that, in March 2025, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an ethnonationalist militant organization, attacked the Jaffar Express, which runs from Quetta to Peshawar and hijacked it. The attacks caused the loss of 31 lives, including 18 soldiers who were travelling on that train. Other than that, after the Taliban came to power, Pakistan’s relations with its northern neighbour have been sour. There has been a condition of low-intensity conflict on the Durand line. Last year, the usually quiet western border of Pakistan with Iran also rocked when Iran launched a series of missile strikes on Pakistan. Paradoxically, for the previous few years, leaving few incidents, Pakistan’s border with India has been relatively peaceful, which has changed with sudden developments. 

It is in this context that General Asim Munir’s remarks and subsequent attack in Kashmir need to be read. Pakistan’s deep state knows that these attacks will have strong retaliation from India, which will help in fuelling nationalist fervor. Nevertheless, it also needs to be clarified that Pakistan’s reason to exist, the “two-nation theory”, which General Munir put so much emphasis on failing more than 50 years ago after the creation of Bangladesh.

It also needs to be noted that Gen Munir was supposed to retire this year, but last year, through an amendment, he extended the tenure of the Army chief for five years. It is a well-known fact that Pakistan’s army is the cause of many structural ailments in the country, and has to face the heat coming from society, causing a significant loss to its venerated position in the country.  Now, with this attack and retaliation from India, the Pakistani Army has tried to find some breathing space to run away from its structural problems. Still, this gamble can be a double-edged sword in a fast-changing situation. 

Deeply ingrained historical, cultural, and geographical links define the civilizational relationship between India and Nepal. Formally expressed via the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, this bilateral engagement has provided an unmatched degree of permeability between two sovereign governments, enabling the free flow of people and products across an open border spanning 1,770 kilometres. Notwithstanding these apparently tight connections, the relationship has been characterized by occasional conflict, mutual misunderstanding, and diplomatic congestion. Although physical closeness and cultural familiarity should ideally promote smooth collaboration, in practice, India-Nepal ties are nevertheless delicate and vulnerable to both internal political changes and regional forces. This article aims to investigate alternative answers based on existing frameworks and empirical observations as well as to grasp the structural and dependent elements causing these obstructions.

The territorial dispute over Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh is among the most delicate and persistent causes of disagreements. When India published an updated political map including the disputed areas in 2019, this problem became much more severe. Nepal responded with its map and a constitutional change, thereby supporting its assertions. In Nepal, this move stoked nationalistic fervor and turned into a gathering place for claiming historical identity and sovereignty. It shows how closely conflicts over territory—especially in post-colonial states—are related to issues of nationhood and historical recognition rather than just legal or administrative ones.

This escalation also emphasizes the more significant trend in nationalist politics affecting bilateral ties. Domestically, political players in both India and Nepal have been turning more and more to foreign policy issues to inspire popular support. In Nepal, criticism of India often finds prosperous footing in nationalist narratives that show India as an obstructive force. Although these stories are not necessarily based on reality, their resonance comes from past grievances and the more extensive background of imbalance. In India, however, there is a tendency in strategic circles to see Nepal’s actions as either reactive or shaped by outside players. When free from diplomatic communication, such opinions may harden policy stances and limit the area for compromise.

Another significant bottleneck in the relationship is Nepal’s evolving engagement with China. China has significantly expanded its presence in Nepal during the last ten years by means of diplomatic outreach, economic support, and infrastructural projects. Seeing a chance to diversify its economic alliances and lessen reliance on India, Nepal has accepted China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nevertheless, it did not bore much fruit to Nepal. In New Delhi, where worries about Chinese intrusion in the Himalayan area have developed, this realignment has not gone unseen. From Kathmandu's vantage point, interacting with China is a hedging and strategic autonomy-boosting tactic. It aims to strike a balance between two big powers, thereby preventing too much reliance on one.

This captures the dynamics of small-state conduct in international relations, especially the idea of ‘soft balancing’, in which smaller governments try to increase their autonomy by including many partners without open conflict. Nepal’s China outreach also shows an effort to change its growth story, presenting itself not only as a dependent neighbour but also as a growing transit centre between India and China. This change for India calls for a review of its strategic posture. India would be better off improving its attractiveness with dependable infrastructure delivery, open project management, and culturally sensitive diplomacy with Kathmandu.

India has shown both technical know-how and readiness to co-develop responses in water resource cooperation. The great hydropower potential of Nepal offers the area transforming prospects. India has funded significant hydropower projects such as Arun III and Upper Karnali, therefore offering not just financial help but also grid connection and market access. Some cooperative ventures have delays that result not from a lack of purpose but rather from the complexities of transboundary water management. In renegotiating agreements, India has shown willingness and flexibility to guarantee that Nepali issues are resolved and profits are fairly distributed. 

The bilateral dynamic is powerfully shaped by ethnic politics as well, especially in connection to the Madhesi community in Nepal’s Tarai area. Historically excluded from Nepal’s political mainstream, the Madhesis have significant cultural and family links to those living in northern regions of India. Their demands for linguistic rights, federal reorganisation, and proportional representation have set off periodic outbreaks of internal strife. The complexity results from these internal issues permeating bilateral relations. While India views itself as supporting democratic values and minority rights, Nepal has seen India’s comments of support for Madhesi’s inclusion as an intervention in domestic affairs. This sensitive problem emphasises how foreign policy and home politics interact. After the civil war, state-building initiatives in Nepal have required a reconsideration of citizenship, identity, and representation. Cross-border ethnic connections can result in hopes of moral or diplomatic assistance in India. Handling these calls for great care. India needs to stress quiet diplomacy and people-to-person interaction in this case.

With these stacked difficulties, which paths may be followed for a more steady and cooperative relationship? First, bilateral communication has to be institutionalised right now. Although ad hoc conferences and high-level visits are valuable, they cannot replace organised systems of participation. Joint Commissions’ regular meetings, strategic conversations between foreign secretaries, and the rebirth of bilateral working groups on trade, water, and energy can help to provide continuity and lower misperceptions. Scholarly research on international regimes emphasises how crucial ongoing engagement is to building confidence and lowering diplomatic transaction costs.

Second, economic interconnection has to be extended and strengthened beyond conventional industries. In recent years, India has made admirable progress in building cross-border rail connections, starting a petroleum pipeline from Motihari to Amlekhgunj, and setting integrated checkpoints. Other areas like digital infrastructure, educational exchanges, and tourism should have these ideas expanded and duplicated. Economic cooperation should be considered as a vehicle for the empowerment of Nepal’s development aspirations as much as a tool for influence. Here, theories of complicated interdependence are informative, stressing the variety of channels and the role non-state players play in maintaining peaceful interactions.

Cooperation on water resources calls for a paradigmatic change. Pursues of joint development should centre on environmental sustainability, equality, and openness. Project agreements and bilateral treaties have to be negotiated inclusively with local populations and interested parties. Establishing dispute-resolution systems and cooperative environmental assessment agencies would also help to build confidence. Other areas, including the Mekong basin, where transboundary cooperation is controlled by multi-stakeholder systems balancing growth with sustainability, might provide lessons as well.

Ultimately, structural inequalities, changing geopolitical alignments, and deeply ingrained political sensitivity restrict India-Nepal relations, even if they have traditionally been close and profoundly nuanced. Though they are not insurmountable, the obstacles in the way of collaboration call for a change in institutional involvement, policy instruments, and attitude. Mutual respect, strategic empathy, and an awareness of Nepal’s sovereign goals will form the foundation of a forward-looking, sustainable cooperation. Through cooperative development, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term trust-building, India and Nepal can overcome regular difficulties and create a robust and future-oriented alliance.